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Abstract 
This thesis provides an original contribution to ongoing debates within scholarly Political 
Economy and Area Studies literatures on the (neoliberal) transformation of the Hungarian 
political economy. Within this literature, the ‘transition’ to a (free) market economy and 
democracy is commonly dated to the annus mirabilis of 1989. The development of the 
Hungarian political economy since then has widely been considered as a ‘success story’ of 
(neoliberal) transformation and presented as model to be emulated by other countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world. 
 
This thesis challenges this consensus. Drawing on central concepts in Marxist political 
economy, in particular state capitalism theory, and primary sources in Hungary, we argue 
that neoliberalism was not simply an ‘imported project’, which arrived ‘from the West’ on 
eve of the regime change in 1989. Rather, it emerged ‘organically’ in Hungarian society in 
the 1980s, as a response by domestic political and economic elites to the deepening 
economic and political crisis of the Kádár regime. The essential aim of the ‘neoliberal turn’ 
was thus to reconfigure the Hungarian political economy in line with exigencies of the 
capitalist world economy, while at the same time ensuring that the ‘transition’ went as 
smoothly as possible. As such, while at one level obviously a repudiation of past policy, 
policymakers in Budapest pursued the same objectives as central planners under ‘actually 
existing socialism’. 
 
For much of the 1990s and the early 2000s, this Faustian bargain proved relatively 
successful, as the Hungarian political economy became a model of (neoliberal) 
transformation in the region. However, since the mid-2000s, the inherent contradictions 
and limitations of Hungary’s neoliberal regime of accumulation have become increasingly 
evident. This has been confirmed by events since the onset of the global economic crisis, 
as Hungary has rapidly moved from being an erstwhile ‘poster boy’ of (neoliberal) 
transformation to a ‘basket case’.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Neoliberalism and Hungary’s ‘Double Transformation’: A Contentious 
Relationship 
It is more than two decades since the former Soviet-style economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe1 (CEE) experienced their so-called ‘double transformation’2 from central planning 
and authoritarian one-party regimes to the market economy and parliamentary democracy. 
Since then, the ongoing restructuring of the region has been the subject of successive 
waves of historical analyses and debates in the International Relations, Political Economy, 
and Area Studies literatures, as new events and processes have occurred: the 
‘transformational recession’3 that swept the region following the demise of the Soviet bloc 
and puzzled economists and policymakers in the East and West alike, the further economic 
and political re-integration of the region with the capitalist world economy in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, as marked by the accession of former Warsaw Pact members to the 
                                                
1 Finding an apt definition for the geographical region east of the Elbe and west of the Ural mountains has 
been the cause of much academic and popular debate over the centuries. ’Invented’ as ‘Eastern Europe’ by 
travellers, philosophers, and politicians in the 18th century, the region has come to be known as a distinct 
geopolitical, socio-economic, and cultural entity, inferior to the economically, politically, and culturally more 
advanced countries of ‘Western Europe’. This view was reinforced during the Cold War, when politicians, 
scholars, and journalists in the ‘West’ used the term to describe the countries that found themselves ‘East’ of 
the Iron Curtain, which divided Europe into two parts. However, as the intellectual and cultural historian 
Larry Wolff has pointed out his seminal oeuvre: Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the 
Mind of the Enlightenment, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994, the notion that ‘Eastern Europe’ 
represents a homogenous entity, distinguishable from ‘Western Europe’ is a ‘demi-Orientalist’ construction 
par excellence, deeply embedded in a wider process of the ‘mapping’ and colonial expansion of dominant 
powers in ‘Western Europe’ across the world (see also Ben Fowkes. The Post-Communist Era. Change and 
Continuity in Eastern Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999. 
). Having said this, unless stated otherwise in the text, this thesis utilises the term ‘Central and Eastern 
Europe’ to describe the countries of the region.  
2 The term is taken here from Otto Holman, ‘Integrating Eastern Europe: EU expansion and the double  
transformation in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary’, International Journal of Political Economy, 
1998, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 12-43.. 
3 The term was originally coined by the liberal Hungarian economist János Kornai in ‘Transzformációs 
visszaesés. Egy általános jelenség vizsgálata a magyar fejlődés példáján’, Közgazdasági Szemle, 1993, Vol. 
40, No. 7-8, pp. 569-599. 
 12 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO4) and the European Union (EU5), and the 
inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational corporations, and, most 
recently, the negative, albeit variegated impact of the global economic crisis on the CEE 
economies. And rightly so: the symbolic and historical significance of these events is 
difficult to overstate.  
 
In much of the so-called ‘transformatology’ literature, Hungary has been depicted as a 
’poster boy’ of (neoliberal) transformation and promoted as a model to be emulated by 
other countries in the region and elsewhere in the world, by virtue of its rapid, but 
politically peaceful ‘transition’ to the market and parliamentary democracy. This is said to 
have resulted in the creation of a dynamic market economy, geared towards international 
trade and capital inflows, together with the institutionalisation of a stable democratic 
regime with relatively generous social welfare policies. This process has arguably been 
driven by external factors and forces, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank, the EU, hegemonic Western states, and multinational corporations, with the 
consent of domestic economic and political elites. However, since the onset of the global 
economic crisis in 2007-2008 events have radically departed from the script. Although the 
impact of the crisis has been uneven, both between different regions of the capitalist world 
economy and within individual states, it is today widely recognised that the Hungarian 
political economy was among the hardest hit by the crisis.6 As a result, Hungary’s previous 
bon renomée amongst international policymakers and business circles has quickly 
evaporated in recent years. Indeed, experts, journalists, and policymakers have frequently 
singled out the country as one of the bêtes noires of the ongoing crisis, together with the 
                                                
4 In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland became the first ‘post-communist’ states to join NATO. 
Five year’s later they were joined by by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. NATO’s eastward expansion continued in 2009, when Albania and Croatia became the youngest 
members of the organisation. 
5 In 2004, eight ex-Soviet bloc states (including Hungary) joined the EU. They were followed by Bulgaria 
and Romania in 2007. The latest step in the EU’s eastward enlargement was taken on 1 July 2013, when 
Croatia became the 28th member of the organisation. 
6 Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits, Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2012, pp. 223-258; Joachim Becker and Johannes Jäger, ‘Development Trajectories in the 
Crisis in Europe’, Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 2010, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 
5–27; Gareth Dale, Gareth and Jane Hardy, ‘Conclusion: The “Crash” in Central Eastern Europe’, in First the 
Transition, Then the Crisis: Eastern Europe in the 2000s, edited by Gareth Dale, London: Pluto Press, 2011, 
pp. 251-263; World Bank, ‘Overview of Europe and Central Asia (ECA) Region’, September 2009, and id. 
Turmoil at Twenty: Recession, Recovery, and Reform in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union, prepared by Pradeep Mitra, Marcelo Selowsky, and Juan Zalduendo, Washington, DC: World Bank, 
2010. The impact of the global economic crisis on the Hungarian political economy is discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 6. 
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so-called ‘PIGS’ economies of Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain.7 Hungary’s ‘return to 
fame’ (albeit this time in a pejorative sense) stems from the fact that the signs generally 
associated with the current crisis – financial meltdown, falling levels of economic output, 
the introduction of brutal austerity measures in order to cut public debt, growing 
unemployment and social inequalities, and a widespread populist backlash against 
(neoliberal) capitalism, parliamentary democracy, and the ‘West’ (together with its 
political representatives at home and abroad) – are all present in an exacerbated form in the 
country.  
 
The depressing development of the Hungarian political economy in the wake of the global 
economic crisis has also brought about emotive renunciations of ‘market fundamentalism’8 
from across the intellectual and political spectrum in Hungary, thereby showing the 
continued importance of domestic social forces in shaping the development of the 
Hungarian political economy. However, recent economic and political developments in 
Hungary are not only causing a headache for Hungarian commentators and policymakers, 
but are also being watched with increasing puzzlement and alarm by academics, 
journalists, and policymakers abroad. Thus, in a speech in March 2009 US President 
Obama warned Americans about the risk that the ‘problems that exist in emerging markets 
like Hungary or the Ukraine’ might have ‘enormous ripple effects that wash back onto our 
shores’9. The question of the relationship between ‘neoliberalism’ and transformation 
economies such as Hungary is, however, not only debated amongst mainstream academics 
and politicians in the corridors of power in Washington, Brussels, and Berlin. For example, 
drawing on parallels from earlier historical examples, the Hungarian-born critical 
sociologist Iván Szelényi has argued that the current economic crisis is likely to signal a 
shift from a neoliberal model of capitalism based on economic growth through mass 
consumption towards a model characterized by more state regulation and ‘less 
consumption of goods with better quality’.10 More recently, Umut Korkut, a Turkish-born 
                                                
7 The acronym has frequently been invoked in recent years by investors, economists, and journalists to refer 
to the economies of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, suffering from high sovereign debt levels. 
8 Richard Kozul-Wright and Paul Rayment, The Resistable Rise of Market Fundamentalism: Rethinking 
Development Policy in an Unbalanced World, London: Zed Books, 2007; George Soros, The Crisis of 
Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered, London: Little Brown, 1998; Joseph Stiglitz. Globalization 
and its Discontents, London: Allen Lane, 2002. 
9 Barack Obama. ‘Remarks by President Obama and the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown After Their 
Meeting’, 3 March 2009, Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, The White House.    
10 Iván Szelényi, ‘A globális pénzügyi válság és Közép Európa nyomorúsága’, Népszabadság, 21 March 
2009.. 
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expert on Hungarian politics and democratic transition in CEE, has provided a more 
pessimistic account, warning that ‘in Hungary, liberalization got a backlash from 
conservative right-wing and extreme-right forces. … [who] not only repudiate neoliberal 
economic transformation but also scorn the tenets of political liberalization as immoral and 
degenerate.’11  
 
 
Main Argument of the Thesis 
Hence, the neoliberal transformation of Hungary and other political economies in CEE is 
an important topic, which has been the source of successive waves of analysis and debate 
in popular and academic discourse. However, as I explain further in Chapter 2, the focus of 
much of this literature remains remarkably narrow. Much of this literature has been written 
by policymakers and there has been little attempt in theorising dimensions of the 
transformation that are not directly relevant to policymaking. Moreover, although there has 
been increasing recognition of the impact of international and/or transnational social 
forces and pressures on the trajectory of CEE economies, there has been little attempt to 
historicise the transformation. Instead, most transformatologists simply take for granted 
that the ‘transition’ began in 1989. As a result, much of the literature is ultimately 
incapable of providing a theoretically informed analysis of the deeper historico-material 
and politico-ideological origins, contradictory dynamics, key agents, and variegated 
outcomes of neoliberalism in Hungary and elsewhere in the region due to its emphasis on 
either side of the capitalist vs. non-capitalist divide in what was arguably a period of their 
concrete coexistence.12 
 
In contrast, it is argued here that the origins of Hungary’s transformation precede the 
formal ‘transition’ to the market and parliamentary democracy in 1989 and can more 
satisfactorily be explained in relation to the wider neoliberal restructuring of the capitalist 
world economy from the mid-1970s and onwards. As such, neoliberalism was not simply 
                                                
11 Umut Korkut, Liberalization Challenges in Hungary. Elitism, Progressivism, and Populism, New York, 
NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 2. 
12 For notable exceptions, see Gareth Dale, ‘Introduction: The Transition in Central and Eastern Europe’, in 
First the Transition Then the Crash: Eastern Europe in the 2000s, edited by id., London: Pluto Press, 2011, 
pp. 1-20; Jane Hardy, Poland’s New Capitalism, London: Pluto Press, 2009; Stuart Shields, The Internat-
ional Political Economy of Transition: Neoliberal Hegemony and Eastern Central Europe’s Transformation, 
London: Routledge, 2012; Gáspár M. Tamás, ‘Counter-revolution against a counter-revolution’, Eurozine, 
2007. Available on: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-18-tamas-en.html (last accessed on: 28 
December 2013).  
 15 
imported ‘from outside’ after the ‘regime change’ (rendszerváltás) in 1989, but emerged 
‘organically’ in Hungarian society in the 1980s, as a response by domestic political and 
economic elites to the deepening economic and political crisis of the Kádár regime, in the 
wake of increasing pressures of geopolitical and economic competition with the ‘West’ 
and growing disbelief in the Soviet model amongst members of the ruling nomenklatura13. 
The essential aim of the ‘neoliberal turn’ was thus to improve conditions for capital 
accumulation, while ensuring that Hungary’s transition went as smoothly as possible. As 
such, while at one level obviously a repudiation of past policy, policymakers in Budapest 
pursued the same objectives as central planners under ‘actually existing socialism’14. 
 
Crucial to this argument is a wider understanding of Hungary’s position within the world 
economy and the international state system in the period between 1945 and 1989. To 
provide this context, this thesis draws on the insights of state capitalism theory, according 
to which Hungary and other Soviet-style societies, despite official claims to the opposite, 
showed marked similarities with their ‘capitalist’ competitors in the ‘West’, including: the 
separation of the means of production from the producers, persistence of wage labour and 
its subsumption to capital, exploitation, hierarchic division of labour, money, rent, and the 
compulsive drive to accumulate capital – an imperative derived from the systemic 
pressures of economic and geopolitical competition with the ‘West’. This ‘regime of 
accumulation’15 was neither ‘irrational’, nor was it ‘unique’ to ‘Soviet-style economies’. 
                                                
13 The nomenklatura referred to those who held senior positions in the Communist party, the state and 
economic apparatuses. See Gareth Dale, Between State Capitalism And Globalisation, The Collapse of The 
East German Economy, Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2004, p. 19, fn 27.  
14 At this point it is necessary to clarify what we mean by ‘socialism’. Drawing on Marx and Engels, 
‘socialism’ is, in this thesis, defined as a socio-economic system in which the working class effectively owns 
the means of production (the phyisical, non-human inputs used in production, such as machinery, tools, and 
factories) and where capitalist relations of production have been abolished. Hence, under socialism, 
production serves to satisfy human needs, not the necessity to accumulate captial and obtain a profit (as 
under capitalism), and is coordinated through conscious, democratic planning. Finally, in a socialist society, 
economic outputs are distributed equally to the members of society, according to the principle of ‘from each 
according to his or her ability, to each according to his or her need’. Over the years, numerous political 
movements across the world have attempted to establish such a system. However, as Marx and Engels 
emphasised already in The Communist Manifesto, socialism could not be established by diktat ‘from above’, 
but instead ‘the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself’. Against this 
background, this thesis does not believe that the Soviet-style regimes that existed in Hungary and elsewhere 
in Eastern Europe from the end of World War II to 1989 were ‘socialist’ societies, but rather represented a 
particular form of ‘state capitalist’ states. On Marx and Engels’ conception of ‘socialism’, see Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1848]/1992, and Karl Marx, 
Critique of the Gotha Programme, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Selected Works, Moscow/London: 
Progress Publishers and Lawrence & Wishart, [1875]/1968, pp. 297-317. On the theory of state capitalism, 
see pp. 71-77 of this thesis. 
15 Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: the US Experience, London: New Left Books, 
[1974]/1979; Robert Boyer, The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction, New York, NY: Columbia 
 16 
Rather, the tendency towards state intervention in the economy was something that was 
discernible to varying degrees throughout the capitalist world economy, in particular in 
more ‘backward’ economies, in the period of ‘state capitalism/financial capitalism’ (1873-
1929/45) and ‘state capitalism “proper”’ (1945-1973). In Hungary, the role of the state 
became increasingly important during the interwar years, and this trend was intensified in 
the aftermath of the World War II, as policymakers in Budapest turned to the state in order 
to reconstruct the war-ravaged Hungarian economy.  
 
Although ferociously oppressive and exploitative, the Soviet-model proved relatively 
successful as a framework for capital accumulation in Eastern Europe, as state-led 
development ‘from above’ contributed to rapid industrialisation, urbanisation, and a 
general rise of living standards. By the early 1960s, however, the inherent limitations of 
this model were becoming increasingly visible, as the vast reserves of labour that had 
enabled rapid economic growth during the phase of ‘primitive accumulation’ were coming 
to an end. From East Berlin to Moscow there were now increasing calls for economic 
‘reform’. In Hungary, the Kádár regime unveiled a comprehensive programme for 
economic reform, officially known as the New Economic Mechanism (Új Gazdasági 
Mechanizmus, NEM), in 1968. Drawing on the insights of a group of renowned Hungarian 
reform economists, who were well-versed in neoclassical economics, and advocates of 
‘market reformism’ inside the ruling Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP), the NEM 
brought radical changes to the Hungarian economy by introducing greater freedom for 
state-owned enterprises, strengthening the role of world market prices in the economy, 
providing a more flexible labour market, and encouraging gradual (re-)integration with the 
capitalist world economy through foreign trade. Through these measures, the Kádár regime 
hoped to overcome the problems facing the Hungarian economy without losing its 
hegemonic power over Hungarian society. Initially, the reforms proved relatively 
successful, as the Hungarian economy experienced robust economic growth between 1968-
1975. However, following mounting pressures from ‘conservative’ fractions within the 
party-state and wider sections of Hungarian society, as well as from Moscow, the reforms 
gradually came to a halt from 1972 and onwards. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
University Press, 1990; Bob Jessop, ‘Regulation theory: the state of the art’, New Political Economy, 2002, 
Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 463-472; Alain Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Global Fordism, London: 
Verso, 1987. 
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However, following the onset of the global economic crisis in 1973 market reformist ideas 
regained impetus among policymakers in East and West alike. Faced with increasing 
competitive pressures, the leaders of the Soviet bloc sought greater (re-)integration with 
the capitalist world economy through a policy of importing technologically advanced 
goods from the West, in return for industrial and agricultural products going in the other 
direction. The rapid rise in imports would be paid for by loans from Western governments, 
private banks, and international financial institutions. The Kádár regime supported this 
strategy, as foreign borrowing seemed feasible, while export-led growth provided an 
alternative to the introduction of unpopular (and potentially destabilising) austerity 
measures. However, greater integration with the world economy left the state capitalist 
economies exposed to their own internal contradictions and the vicissitudes of the world 
market. As a result, the debt burden of the state capitalist economies rose significantly 
from the mid-1970s and onwards. Hungary became a forerunner within the Soviet bloc 
(albeit in a negative sense): by 1987 the country’s external debt exceeded US$ 18 billion – 
the highest in the bloc and one of the highest in the world in per capita terms.  
 
By the early 1980s, policymakers in Hungary and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc were thus 
caught in a ‘double-bind’.16 Mounting external pressures (geopolitical and economic 
competition with the West) together with increasing disbelief in the Soviet-model within 
the ruling MSZMP, in the wake of continuing relative economic decline in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, opened up a space, in which, ‘proto-neoliberal’ ideas and social forces 
could emerge ‘organically’ in Hungarian society. By the mid-1980s, a group of young, 
radical reform economists associated with the influential Institute of Financial Research 
(Pénzügykutatási Intézet), the official research institute of the Ministry of Finance, 
emerged as one of the key forces for neoliberalisation in Hungary. Also known as the 
‘Dimitrov Square Boys’, in reference to the Karl Marx University of Economics in 
Budapest (where most its members received their education), the group included such 
well-known economists as Lajos Bokros, György Matolcsy, and György Surányi, who 
would all go on to play important roles in the neoliberal transformation of Hungary. 
Similar to other groups of neoliberal reformers in CEE and elsewhere, the members of this 
group were well-versed in neoclassical economics, ‘worked in tight, entrenched, secluded 
bureaucratic teams, isolated from society and [were] united by their personal ties and 
                                                
16 Dale, ‘Introduction: The Transition in Central and Eastern Europe’, p. 4. 
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common social backgrounds.’17 At the same time, they harnessed good relations with 
advocates of market reform within the MSZMP and the mushrooming Hungarian 
opposition, as well as international financial circles, which provided them with a sense of 
credibility and trust in reform debates at the time. In 1987, these economists published an 
ambitious economic reform programme, known as ‘Fordulat és Reform’, which has been 
widely acknowledged as the Absichterklärung of neoliberalism in Hungary.18 The 
document was rapidly naturalised as ‘common sense’ in academic and public discourse in 
Hungary and became a ‘road map’ for the transition. As we conclude in Chapter 4, the 
essential aim of ‘Fordulat és Reform’ was to save the ailing Hungarian economy from the 
‘organic crisis’ of state capitalism, while retaining the class power on which it rested. 
 
As we demonstrate in Chapter 5, a distinct neoliberal regime of accumulation was 
gradually consolidated in Hungary in the period between 1990-2006. While external forces 
and pressures – including international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, regional bureaucratic organisations, such as the EU, and Western-based 
multinational corporations – were admittedly important in this process, this thesis argues 
that domestic social forces were essential in ensuring that different economic actors 
remained committed towards the pursuit of a neoliberal regime of accumulation. This was 
most evident with the introduction of the drastic austerity measures, also known as the 
‘Bokros Package’, by the socialist-liberal government led by Gyula Horn in 1995, which 
demonstrated the determination of Hungarian policymakers to ‘go through fire and water’ 
in order to push through neoliberal reform. 
 
Although widely unpopular, undemocratic, and socially regressive, the ‘Bokros Package’ 
was relatively successful in opening up the Hungarian economy to the exigencies of global 
capital. Hence, between 1997-2006, the Hungarian economy enjoyed a brief golden age of 
high economic growth, large foreign capital inflows, and low unemployment. Hungary’s 
neoliberal regime of accumulation thus seemed to function remarkably well – a view that 
was reflected by the country’s accession to NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004, and 
                                                
17 Shields, The International Political Economy of Transition, p. 127. See also Béla Greskovits, The Political 
Economy of Protest and Patience: East European and Latin American Transformations Compared, 
Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998. 
18 László Andor, Eltévedt éllovas. Siker és kudarc a rendszerváltó gazdaságpolitikában, Budapest: Napvilág 
Kiadó, 2010 pp. 160-161; Iván T. Berend, The Hungarian Economic Reforms, 1957-1990, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990; Zoltán Ripp, Rendszerváltás Magyarországon, 1987-1990, Budapest: 
Napvilág Kiadó, 2006, pp. 27-30; Nigel Swain, Hungary: The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism, London: 
Verso, 1992.  
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reinforced further by the plethora of optimistic assessments provided by experts, investors, 
and policymakers in both Hungary and abroad. However, in contrast to dominant accounts, 
we underline the inherent contradictions and limitations of what we describe as 
‘neoliberalism with Hungarian characteristics’. Thus, while widespread deregulation and 
privatisation contributed to the inflow of much-needed foreign direct investment, which 
enabled the Hungarian economy to grow by an impressive annual rate of more than 4 
percent between 1997-2006, there was little evidence of this growth ‘trickling down’ to the 
popular masses. Instead, neoliberal restructuring led to chronic underemployment, 
increasing income inequalities both nationally and between different regions, and the 
entrenchment of poverty in Hungarian society. Making matters worse, by the early 2000s, 
the sources of economic growth were diminishing, as inflows of foreign direct investment 
were decelerating in relative terms due to increasing inter-state competition both among 
the CEE economies and globally. This was accompanied by increasingly bitter electoral 
rivalry between social-liberal and national-conservative political forces. The eruption of 
massive anti-government protests in the autumn of 2006 was a stark reminder to 
mainstream economists and policymakers that not everything was going according to the 
script in Hungary.  
 
The onset of the global economic crisis in 2007-2008 has further demonstrated the inherent 
limitations of Hungary’s neoliberal regime of accumulation. An erstwhile model of 
neoliberal transformation in CEE, Hungary has been badly hit by the crisis. The economic 
crisis has come at a high social cost for ordinary Hungarians and led to widespread public 
disillusionment and discontent against free markets, liberal democracy, and the ‘West’ (as 
well as the political parties that have historically favoured neoliberal restructuring). With 
the socialist-liberal government of Ferenc Gyurcsány discredited by a toxic combination of 
lies, internal corruption, and the relentless pursuit of unpopular austerity measures, and the 
labour movement on its knees, resistance against neoliberalism has been channelled by 
neo-conservative and fascist political forces. The rightward shift of Hungarian politics was 
formally confirmed in the general elections of 2010, when the socialist-liberal government 
coalition, which had ruled since 2002, was ousted in from power, in favour of the neo-
conservative FIDESZ-KDNP coalition. At the same time, the fascist Jobbik Party, also 
witnessed an electoral breakthrough, becoming the third largest party in parliament. During 
its first 18 months in power, the new right-wing government in Budapest, led by the 
young, mediagenic Viktor Orbán, introduced a barrage of personal changes, laws and 
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decrees, which have alarmed financial markets, politicians, and the liberal press in both 
Hungary and abroad. While these changes have been branded as ‘populist’, the argument 
put forward by this thesis is that they did not represent a fundamental rupture with earlier 
neoliberal practices, but rather an inflection. In this sense, recent changes in Hungary are 
not exemptions to developments elsewhere, but are arguably symptoms of a wider shift 
towards a more ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’.19 
 
 
What is Neoliberalism?  
In order to answer the questions raised by this thesis, however, we need to be clear about 
what we mean by the term ‘neoliberalism’. Despite the rapidly growing popularity of the 
term in recent academic debates,20 this is not as easy as it first might seem, for as critical 
scholars have pointed out, the term has often been invoked with imprecision, in partly 
overlapping and partly contradictory ways, in popular and academic debates.21 The 
problem is compounded by the fact that ‘neoliberalism’ is a highly contested and 
politically loaded term, which, as Jamie Peck et al. point out, has been used more often by 
its critics, ‘as an oppositional slogan, a zeitgeist signifier, and an analytical construct’,22 
than as self-ascription by its supporters (pace Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman). 
Indeed, even its enemies have seldom agreed what it was, for example, in state forms or in 
economic structures that made them ‘neoliberal’.  
                                                
19 The term is here taken from Ian Bruff, ‘The Rise of Authoritarian Neoliberalism’, Rethinking Marxism: A  
Journal of Economics, Culture, and Society, 2014, Vol. 26, No.1, pp. 113-129. For a similar assessment with 
regard to Hungary and other CEE states, see Dale and Hardy, ‘Conclusion: The “Crash” in Central Eastern 
Europe’, pp. 258-261; Erzsébet Szalai, ‘A rendszerváltástól a rendszerválságig’, Rednews, 17 June 2010. 
Available on: http://www.rednews.hu/exkluziv/elmelet/szalai-erzsebet-a-rendszervaltastol-a-
rendszervalsagig.html (last accessed on: 28 December 2013); Slavoj Zizek, ‘The Deadlock’, public lecture at 
Brunel University, 29 February 2012. 
20 Although the ideational history of ‘neoliberalism’ has been traced as far back to as the 1920s, the term only 
entered into widespread popular and scholarly discourse in the 1990s. As Jamie Peck et al. have noted, ‘The 
New York Times used the neologism intermittently from 1939, and fairly regularly after the Reagan ascend-
ancy’, but almost half (44 percent) of the citations occurred in the last decade. In the political dictionary of 
the radical left, the term first entered circulation after the first Zapatista ‘encounter’ with neoliberalism in 
1996, and subsequently became popularised with the birth of the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement in Seattle in 
1999. In academic discourse, explicit reference to the term is a surprisingly recent phenomenon: of the 2,605 
English-language articles in the social sciences that cite ‘neoliberalism’ as a key word, nearly 92 percent 
were published after 1999. Out of these, only 139 articles referred to the terms ‘post-Soviet’ and ‘transform-
ation’ as key words, while only 4 articles named ‘Hungary’ in the title (all of which were published after 
2006). See Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore, and Neil Brenner, ‘Postneoliberalism and its Malcontents’, Antipode, 
2009, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 96-97. Data on academic articles are from the ISI’s Web of Knowledge (last 
accessed on: 28 November 2012). 
21 James Ferguson, ‘The Uses of Neoliberalism’, Antipode, 2010, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 166-184; Stephanie L. 
Mudge, ‘What is neo-liberalism?’, Socio-Economic Review, 2008, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 703-731.  
22 Peck et al., op. cit., p. 96. 
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In this thesis the term ‘neoliberalism’ is used in three mutually interrelated ways. First, in 
senso strictu, the term is used to define an economic doctrine, distinct from the classical 
liberalism of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and others, whose ideational origins can be 
traced back to the 1920s and found on both sides of the Atlantic.23 Building on the central 
tenets of neoclassical economics, as distilled by the likes of Franz Böhm and Walter 
Eucken from the Freiburg school of economics, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek 
from the Austrian school, and key members of the ‘first’ Chicago school around Frank H. 
Knight and Henry C. Simons (both of whom influenced the intellectual trajectory of 
Milton Friedman, the founder of the doctrine of ‘monetarism’ and perceived, both by 
supporters and critics alike, as one of the ‘founding fathers’ of neoliberalism), the doctrine 
is characterised by a strong ideological commitment to a free market economy and support 
for state intervention in the economy in order to promote the development of market 
institutions.24 The doctrine contends that human well-being is best promoted by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and dexterity within an institutional framework 
characterised by strong private property rights, the elimination of barriers to trade, 
currency deregulation, and the deployment of ‘enterprise models’, in order to encourage 
arms of the state to be run like businesses.25  
 
                                                
23 Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society, London: Verso, 
2013; Neil Davidson, ‘Introduction: What was Neoliberalism?’, in Neoliberal Scotland: Class and Society in 
a Stateless Nation, edited by Neil Davidson, Patricia McCafferty, and David Miller, Cambridge: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2010, pp. 1-90; David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007, pp. 5-38; Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010; Dieter Plehwe, Bernhard Walpen, and Gisela Neunhöffer (eds.), Neoliberal 
Hegemony: A Global Critique, London: Routledge, 2006; Rachel S. Turner, Neo-Liberal Ideology: History, 
Concepts and Policies, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008. 
24 Dardot and Laval, op. cit., pp. 21-143; Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pp. 64-86. For the key 
works of leading neoliberal theorists see Milton Friedman, Two Lucky People: Memoirs, Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998 and Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
2002; Friedrich A. von Hayek, [1944]/1986, The Road to Serfdom, London: Ark Paperbacks. 1986. 
25 Dardot and Laval, op. cit.; Gareth Dale,  ‘Double Movements and Pendular Forces: Polanyian Perspectives 
on the Neoliberal Age’, Current Sociology, 2012, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 1-27; Gerard Duménil and Dominque 
Lévy, Capital Resurgent: Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2004; Ferguson, ‘The Uses of Neoliberalism’; Andrew Gamble, ‘Neo-Liberalism’, Capital & Class, 2001, 
No. 75, pp. 127-134; Harvey, op. cit.; Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont 
Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009; 
Mudge, ‘What is neo-liberalism?’; Jamie Peck, ‘Remaking laissez-faire’, Progress in Human Geography, 
2008, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 3-43 and Constructions of Neoliberal Reason; Plehwe et al., Neoliberal Hegemony; 
Turner, Neo-Liberal Ideology. For an early account of the origins of neoliberalism as an explicit political 
philosophy, see Carl J. Friedrich, ‘The Political Thought of Neo-Liberalism’, The American Political Science 
Review, 1955, Vol. 49, No. 2, June, pp. 509-525. 
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Second, I refer to neoliberalism as a political project, which aims to re-establish the 
conditions for capital accumulation on a global scale and restore the power of economic 
elites in the wake of the structural crisis of the capitalist world economy in the mid-1970s. 
Once this strategy obtained traction among elites, following the demise of different forms 
of ‘national capitalism’ (‘Keynesianism’ in the West, ‘state capitalism’ in the Soviet bloc, 
and ‘import-substitution’ in the so-called ‘Third World’) from the mid-1970s and onwards, 
neoliberalism started to operate as a social movement ‘from above’ seeking to put into 
practice a regime of policies and practices that claim allegiance to the doctrine described 
above.26 However, as the renowned Marxist geographer David Harvey has persuasively 
argued, there is necessarily a divergence between the doctrine itself and the 
implementation of neoliberalism, since the doctrine, if applied consistently, implies a 
world that could never exist in reality (which leads Harvey to describe the entire project as 
‘utopian’).27 Thus, as the radical Canadian journalist Naomi Klein has correctly pointed 
out, the irony of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’28 is that its advocacy of anti-statist 
economic policy depended upon the coercive power of the (Fordist) national state against 
whose unfreedom he was ostensibly aiming his critique.29 Instead of applying neoliberal 
doctrine consistently, Harvey argues that dominant elites around the world have deployed 
neoliberal concepts to further a ‘class project’. In this sense, the outcome of 
neoliberalisation has been an extraordinary enrichment of the holders of capital in parallel 
with increasing inequality, insecurity, the loss of public services, and a general 
deterioration in the quality of life of workers and the poor.30  
 
Thirdly, I perceive neoliberalism as the new modus operandi of the capitalist mode of 
production, marked by a structural (re-)orientation of the state towards export-oriented, 
financialised capital, open-ended commitments to market-like governance systems, 
privatisation and corporate expansion, and deep aversion to social collectives and the 
                                                
26 Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Dale, ‘Double Movements and Pendular Forces’.; Davidson, 
‘Introduction: What was Neoliberalism?’; Duménil and Lévy, Capital Resurgent; Chris Harman, ‘Theorising 
Neoliberalism’, International Socialism, 2007, No. 117; Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism. 
27 Harvey, op. cit., pp. 203-204. 
28 The term was originally coined by Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, ‘Cities and the geographies of 
“actually existing neoliberalism”’, Antipode, 2002, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 349-379. 
29 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capitalism, London: Allen Lane, 2007. 
30 Duménil and Lévy, op. cit.; Harvey, op. cit. The outcomes of neoliberalisation in Hungary are discussed in 
further detail in Chapter 5 and 6. 
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redistribution of wealth on the part of ruling classes.31 In this sense, the ‘neoliberal era’ of 
capitalism can be periodised into three distinct ‘phases’32:  
1) ‘proto-neoliberalism’ associated with the ideological assault on different forms of 
‘national economic’ models dating back to the early 1970s and led by the likes of 
Friedman, Hayek, and powerful neoliberal think-tanks, such as the Mont Pelerin Society 
or the Adam Smith Institute;  
2) ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ associated with the conservative ascendancy of Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s and the establishment of neoliberalism as a 
new, dominant ‘common sense’ among policymakers, promoting the gradual 
reconfiguration of the (capitalist) state, through processes of deregulation, privatisation, 
and welfare retrenchment; and  
3) ‘roll-out neoliberalism’, from the 1990s and onwards, focussing on the ‘construction 
and consolidation of neoliberalized state-forms, modes of governance, and regulatory 
relations’33 on global scale (through new trade and financial regulations by international 
financial institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the IMF, or the 
marketisation of the environment under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol), as the logical and 
desirable economic corollary of an emerging ‘new world order’34 under the hegemony 
of the US. The onset of the global economic crisis in 2007-2008 has spurred a debate 
among policymakers, scholars, and political activists, about whether we have entered a 
new, ‘post-neoliberal’ phase of capitalism or not.35  
                                                
31 Dale, ‘Double Movements and Pendular Forces’.; Philip Mirowski, ‘Postface’, in The Road from Mont 
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32 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, ‘Neoliberalizing Space’, in Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring 
in North America and Western Europe, edited by Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 
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33 Ibid., p. 37. 
34 George H.W. Bush, 1990, ‘Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and 
the Federal Budget Deficit’, Washington, DC, 11 September 1990. 
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Edwards, and Frank Stilwell, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012, pp. 231-250; Naomi Klein, 
‘Wall Street Crisis Should be for Neoliberalism what Fall of Berlin Wall was for Communism’, public 
lecture at University of Chicago, IL, 6 October 2008. Available on: http://www.stwr.org/globalization/wall-
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on: 27 December 2013); Vlad Mykhnenko and Kean Birch, ‘Conclusion: The End of an Economic Order?, in 
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and Youth Camp in Băile Tușnad (Tusnádfürdő), Romania, 24 July 2010. Available on: 
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Attempts to deepen the neoliberal project globally have often been dependent on the 
coercive power of the state, but have been fiercely contested by local populations. 
Resistance to neoliberalisation has been intense and taken a plurality of forms, both 
progressive and reactionary. Examples of the former include the popular revolt waged by 
the revolutionary Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional, EZLN), based in Chiapas, southern Mexico, against the Mexican state, the 
global social movement against (neoliberal) ‘globalisation’ and US-led imperialism that 
swept the world in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and, more recently, the concrete 
attempts to wield state power, in order to implement progressive economic and social 
reforms, thereby laying the institutional foundations of a ‘socialism of the 21st century’, in 
countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.36 Elsewhere, opposition to neoliberalism 
has primarily taken ‘nationalist’ and ‘populist’ forms, and been channelled by neo-
conservative and far-right social forces, who have promoted a combination of chauvinistic 
sentiments (virulent homophobia, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism), with 
an opposition to ‘foreign’, ‘financial capital’, as opposed to ‘autochthonous’, ‘productive 
capital’, and the adoration of a strong, expansionist nation-state.37 
 
As I argue in this thesis, the ‘double transformation’ in Hungary, and CEE more generally, 
can only be understood as part of a wider shift towards neoliberalism, both globally and 
within states in the context since the 1970s.  
 
 
Scope and Methodology 
This thesis focuses on the political economy of Hungary in the period between the 1980s 
and 2012, as a case study of the neoliberal transformation in CEE. The rationale behind our 
focus on Hungary stems, first and foremost, from the fact that the country has widely been 
considered as ‘vanguard state’ of neoliberal restructuring in the region. As such, I argue 
                                                                                                                                              
http://www.orbanviktor.hu (last accessed on: 9 October 2013); Peck et al., ‘Postneoliberalism and its 
Malcontents’; Joseph Stiglitz, ‘The End of Neo-Liberalism?’, Project Syndicate, 2008. Available on: 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-end-of-neo-liberalism (last accessed on: 6 August 2013); 
Szelényi, ‘A globális pénzügyi válság és Közép Európa nyomorúsága’..  
36 Klein, The Shock Doctrine, pp. 447-458. 
37 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pp. 81-86; Klein, op. cit., pp. 448-450; Shields, The 
International Political Economy of Transition, pp. 114-120; Kurt Weyland, ‘Neoliberal Populism in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe’, Comparative Politics, 1999, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 379-401.  
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that developments in Hungary are indicative of changes in other ‘transition economies’, 
and indeed elsewhere in the world, especially following the added pressures of EU’s 
eastern enlargement and the ongoing global economic crisis. Secondly, it is motivated by 
the fact that I speak Hungarian fluently (indeed, it is my mother tongue), which allows me 
draw on a wide range of sources available only to scholars who converse in this mysterious 
and rather arcane language. Third, and finally, my focus on Hungary is also driven by a 
strong normative concern. As we noted above, the Hungarian political economy has been 
hit hard by the ongoing global economic crisis, leading to successive waves of layoffs and 
house foreclosures, falling living standards, and widespread public anger and 
disillusionment with the free market and parliamentary democracy (channelled by 
national-conservative and far-right political parties). Against this gloomy background then, 
the need to adhere to Karl Marx’s famous adage and engage in a ‘ruthless criticism of all 
that exists’38 (here: neoliberalism in general, and its Hungarian ‘variety’ in particular), 
while also seeking for signs of progressive alternatives to the neoliberal status quo in 
society, seems highly pertinent to me.   
 
Having said this, the scope of the thesis is somewhat larger than what is usually 
encountered in the transformatology literature. The analysis thus extends backwards in 
time, beyond the putative annus mirabilis of 1989, all the way back to 1945, in order to 
explore the historico-material and politico-ideological foundations of the Hungarian 
political economy, and forward to 2012, to analyse the contradictory and variegated 
outcomes of it’s neoliberal transformation. Such a wide scope obviously has both strengths 
and weaknesses. On the one hand, it obviously sacrifices some depth for breadth of 
analysis. However, on the other hand, it has the advantage of depicting broad overarching 
trends of economic, political, and social processes that have captured the imagination of 
not only mainstream politicians and scholars of the transformation, but also critical 
scholars and progressive social forces for more than two decades. The aim is therefore to 
offer an overall portrait of some of the key dynamics of Hungary’s neoliberal 
transformation, something, which I argue, has not yet been satisfactorily accomplished in 
the English-speaking academic literature.  
 
                                                
38 Karl Marx, ‘Marx to Ruge’ in Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, 1843. Available on: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/letters/43_09.htm (last accessed on: 31 November 2013). 
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In order to answer the questions posed by this study, the thesis employs a combination of 
social science research methods, or what is sometimes referred to as a ‘multi-strategy 
research method’ or ‘triangulation’.39 The thesis draws on a range of empirical material, 
including critical text analysis of secondary literature of the transformatology literature as 
well as the wider literature on the ‘global neoliberal revolution’, official policy documents, 
public statements of politicians, media accounts, economic data, and opinion polls, as well 
as semi-structured interviews. In our first empirical chapter, which focuses on the 
Hungarian political economy between 1945 and 1989, we have drawn upon both primary 
and secondary sources. The analyses of a number of Hungarian-born economic and social 
historians, such as Iván Berend and György Ránki, François Fejtő, and Ignác Romsics, 
have been particularly influential for our understanding of economic, political, and social 
relations in Hungary during this period.40 In addition, the works of Derek H. Aldcroft and 
Steven Morewood, Mark Pittaway, Anna Seleny, and Geoffrey Swain and Nigel Swain, 
have also been very helpful.41  
 
Our analysis of the ‘organic’ development of ‘proto-neoliberalism’ in Hungary before 
1989 does not only rely on secondary material, but also involves critical text analysis of a 
number reform programmes of the Hungarian transition, in particular the notorious 
‘Fordulat és Reform’ described above.42 In addition to this, a number of semi-structured 
interviews have been carried out with Hungarian sources, which have, in one way or 
another, as proponents/opponents of neoliberal ideas and practices, played a key role in the 
consolidation of neoliberalism in Hungary.43 Carried out in Hungarian, in order to avoid 
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41 Derek H. Aldcroft and Steven Morewood, Economic Change in Eastern Europe since 1918, Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1995; Mark Pittaway, Eastern Europe, 1939-2000, London: Hodder Arnold, 2004; Anna 
Seleny, The Political Economy of State-Society Relations in Hungary and Poland: from Communism to the 
European Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Swain, Hungary: The Rise and Fall of 
Feasible Socialism; Geoffrey Swain and Nigel Swain, Eastern Europe since 1945, London: Macmillan, 
1993. 
42 Other important Hungarian reform programmes covered in this thesis include: Híd-csoport, ‘Híd a közeli 
jövőbe (100 nap gazdasági programja)’, Közgazdasági Szemle, 1990, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 442-458; Otto 
Hieronymi, Economic Policies for the New Hungary: Proposals for a Coherent Approach, Columbus, OH: 
Battelle Press, 1990; Kék Szalag Bizottság, A Kék Szalag Bizottság gazdasági programjavaslata: 
Magyarország a szabadság és a gazdasági átalakulás utján, Budapest: Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 
1990; János Kornai, The Road to a Free Economy. Shifting from a Socialist System: The Example of 
Hungary, London: W. W. Norton, [1989]/1990.  
43 Ethical approval for carrying out the interviews was received from Brunel University, School of Social 
Sciences, in June 2010. 
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any linguistic misunderstandings, the purpose of these interviews have been, following the 
seminal work of Grant McCracken, to develop a ‘deeper knowledge’ of the dynamics 
underpinning the construction of neoliberal hegemony in Hungary, by travelling into the 
‘mental world of the individual, to glimpse the categories and logic by which he or she 
sees the world.’44 In so doing, these interviews add colour to the narrative and reveal some 
of the ideological motivations and political strategies of the participants, but more 
importantly, reading between the lines, they illustrate many of the contradictions inherent 
in the ascendancy of neoliberalism in Hungary. Up until now, such perspectives have 
received relatively little attention in the transformatology literature.45  
 
As for our understanding of Hungary’s (re-)integration into the capitalist world economy 
post-1989, and its relationship to the wider shift towards neoliberalism, the works of a 
number of critical Hungarian scholars, in particular Erzsébet Szalai and Gáspár M. Tamás, 
have been particularly insightful.46 In addition, the works of Gareth Dale, Peter Gowan, 
and Chris Harman have also been helpful.47 Regarding the socio-economic outcomes of 
neoliberal restructuring in Hungary and other transformation economies, we have relied on 
data from both Hungarian and international sources, including the Hungarian Central 
Statistics Office (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, KSH), Eurostat, the IMF, UNCTAD, 
UNDP, and the World Bank. In addition to this, the EBRD’s annual Transition Reports, as 
well as the country-specific reports published by the Structural Adjustment Participatory 
Review International Network (SAPRIN) and the Institute for Social Research 
(Társadalomkutatási Intézet, TÁRKI). As for the socio-economic data used in the thesis, 
we have chosen to use data based on current US$ rather than Purchasing Power Parity 
                                                
44 Grant McCracken, The Long Interview, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1988, p. 9. For other examples of 
interview techniques for social scientists, see Hillary Arksey and Peter Knight, Interviewing for Social 
Scientists: an Introductory Resource with Examples, London: Sage, 1999; Bryman, Social Research 
Methods; and Peter Esaiasson, Metodpraktikan: konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad, 
Stockholm: Norsteds Juridik 2002. 
45 Notable exceptions include Mario I. Blejer and Fabrizio Coricelli, The Making of Economic Reform in 
Eastern Europe: Conversations with Leading Reformers in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994; Eszter Rádai, Pénzügyminiszterek reggelire, Budapest: Helikon Kiadó, 2001. 
46 Erzsébet Szalai, Gazdasági elit és társadalom a magyarországi újkapitalizmusban, Budapest: Aula Kiadó. 
2001, id. New Capitalism – And What Can Replace It, Budapest: Pallas Kiadó, 2008, id. ‘A rendszerváltástól 
a rendszerválságig’; Tamás, ‘Counter-revolution against a counter-revolution’. 
47 Dale, Between State Capitalism And Globalisation and First the Transition then the Crash; Chris Harman, 
Class Struggles in Eastern Europe, 1945-1983, London: Bookmarks, [1974]/1988, id. ‘The Storm Breaks’, 
International Socialism, 1990, No. 46, pp. 3-93, id. Zombie Capitalism: Global crisis and the relevance of 
Marx, London: Bookmarks, 2009; Peter Gowan, ‘Neo-Liberal Theory and Practice for Eastern Europe’, New 
Left Review, 1995, Vol. 1, No.  213, pp. 3-60, and id. The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for 
World Dominance, London: Verso, 1999. 
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(PPP), as the former provides a better illustration of economic power relations between 
states in the world economy. 
 
As for developments in Hungary since the onset of the global economic crisis in 2007-
2008, the analysis presented here draws primarily upon public statements of politicians and 
policymakers, newspaper articles, reports, and analyses published in major Hungarian and 
international newspapers and periodicals, including Heti Világgazdaság, Magyar Nemzet, 
Népszabadság, The Economist, Financial Times, New York Times, and Der Spiegel, as well 
as public opinion polls, in order to provide an objective, but not politically ‘neutral’ 
account of what has been a politically and emotionally charged period in Hungarian 
history.48 
 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis is simple and straightforward: it is divided into a theoretical and 
a historico-analytical part. Having adumbrated the main argument of the thesis in the 
Introduction, Chapter 2 critically engages with a number of theoretical approaches on the 
transformation in Hungary and elsewhere in CEE (e.g. neoliberalism, institutionalism, 
world-systems theory, and neo-Gramscianism). By exploring the lacunae in these 
approaches, we will demonstrate the need for an alternative approach to Hungary’s double 
transformation, which sees to connect the domestic and the international as constituting a 
single, causally integrated ontological whole.  This will be done by drawing on some of the 
central insights of Marxist political economy, in particular the theory of state capitalism as 
originally formulated by Raya Dunayevskaya, C.L.R. James, and Tony Cliff, and later 
developed by Chris Harman and Mike Haynes, amongst others.   
 
Against the background of this theoretical framework, Chapter 3 develops a historically 
grounded analysis of state capitalism in Hungary, from its ascendancy in the second half of 
the 1940s, through its deepening crisis from the late-1970s and onwards, to its ultimate 
demise in 1989. Analysing in detail the contradictions of successive waves of market 
reform in nominally ‘socialist’ Hungary, it discusses how growing external pressures 
(geopolitical and economic competition with the West) together with increasing disbelief 
                                                
48 On the difference between ‘neutrality’ and ‘objectivity’ in the social sciences, see Neil Davidson, 
‘Introduction: What was Neoliberalism?’, pp. xvi-xix. 
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in the Soviet model within the ruling party-state, in the wake of continuing relative 
economic decline in the late 1970s and early 1980s, opened up a space, in which, what we 
have termed, for want of a better word, ‘proto-neoliberal’ ideas could be formulated.  
 
Chapter 4 then looks in closer detail at the ascendancy of ‘proto-neoliberalism’ in Hungary 
during the 1980s. Building on insights from critical text analysis of key transition 
programmes and carefully chosen semi-structured interviews, we will show how 
proponents of ‘radical’ market reform, strategically located in the influential Institute of 
Financial Research, managed to construct their reform paradigm as superior to any 
alternative reform programme, such as ‘market socialism’ or a social democratic ‘Third 
Way’. Such a focus on the relationship between structural pressures, ideas, and agency is 
arguably crucial given Antonio Gramsci’s recognition that,  
laissez-faire too is a form of State “regulation”, introduced and maintained by legislative and 
coercive means. It is a deliberate policy, conscious of its own ends, and not the spontaneous, 
automatic expression of economic facts. Consequently, laissez-faire liberalism is a political 
programme, designed to change – in so far as it is victorious – a State’s leading personnel, 
and to change the economic programme of the State itself – in other words the distribution of 
the national income.49  
 
In this regard, the economists at the Institute of Financial Research were the conscious 
bearers of liberal market capitalism in Hungary in the period prior to 1989.  
 
Chapter 5 then analyses in detail the consolidation of neoliberalism in the period between 
1990 and 2006, and its variegated impact on Hungarian society. Situating this process 
within a wider trend of neoliberal restructuring in CEE and the international political 
economy, the chapter outlines the key characteristics, contradictory outcomes, and 
dominant social forces seeking to promote this process in Hungary. In contrast to 
neoliberal accounts, we will argue that this process was dependent on the use of economic 
coercion, as exemplified by the western governments and international financial 
institutions’ insistence on austerity and rapid privatisation as conditions for loans, as well 
as extensive investment in the ideological underpinnings of neoliberalism, in particular by 
USAID, the EU, and German-based multinational corporations and political foundations. 
                                                
49 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1973, p. 160 (my 
emphasis). 
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However, while most critics of neoliberal ‘market fundamentalism’ have emphasised the 
role of external actors in pressuring Hungarian policymakers to pursue policies conducive 
to the logic of (neoliberal) capital accumulation, we will argue that the support of domestic 
social forces was crucial, as evidenced for example in the introduction of the so-called 
‘Bokros Package’ in 1995 – the most extensive austerity package hitherto introduced in 
post-transition Hungary. Analysing the politico-economic trajectory of Hungary, it will be 
shown that the country did in a certain sense become a ‘success story’ of neoliberal 
transformation in the region. However, in contrast to dominant accounts, that Hungary’s 
neoliberal regime of accumulation was fraught with contradictions and limitations. These 
limitations were revealed during the massive anti-government protests that rocked 
Hungary in the autumn of 2006.  
 
Following on from this, Chapter 6 shifts the focus to more contemporary debates, 
analysing the effects of the global economic crisis on the Hungarian political economy in 
the period between 2007-2012. Engaging critically with prevailing accounts of the crisis in 
academic and popular debates in both Hungary and abroad, it will be shown that 
Hungary’s vulnerability to the global economic crisis was neither the fault of ‘greedy 
bankers and corrupt politicians’, nor the result of ‘bad policies’, but instead reflected the 
inherent contradictions of what can be defined, to borrow a popular phrase, as Hungary’s 
particular ‘variety of capitalism’. This chapter also analyses the uneven impact of the 
ongoing crisis on Hungarian politics and society, and argues that the crisis has led to a 
‘populist’ backlash against neoliberalism, including the political parties traditionally 
favouring neoliberal restructuring (MSZP and SZDSZ), which has been mediated by 
national-conservative (FIDESZ) and fascist (Jobbik) forces.    
 
Finally, in the Conclusion I reflect on the historical and theoretical implications that can be 
learned from the case study of Hungary’s transformation offered by this thesis, while 
drawing out the broader implications for the current conjuncture.  
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RETHINKING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
THE ‘DOUBLE TRANSFORMATION’ IN 
HUNGARY AND ELSEWHERE IN CENTRAL 
AND EASTERN EUROPE 
 
 
Introduction 
As we mentioned in the Introduction, the unexpected, uneven, and contradictory 
development of CEE economies since their ‘double transformation’ from central planning 
to (free) market economies and from authoritarian rule to parliamentary democracy in 
1989-1991 has given rise to an ongoing debate in the literature on their relationship to the 
global restructuring of (neoliberal) capitalism as new events and processes occur: the 
‘transformational recession’ that swept the region in the 1990s, the accession of former 
Warsaw Pact members to NATO and the EU, and, more recently, the variegated impact of 
the global economic crisis on the economies of the region. In this context, neoliberalism 
has been a recurring theme and its impact on CEE economies stressed by numerous 
accounts, as the region is widely recognised to have served as a testing ground for 
neoliberal policies of liberalisation, privatisation, and stabilisation.  
 
With this in mind, the aim of this chapter is to offer a critical review of how the ‘double 
transformation’ in CEE has been theorised in the literature. More specifically, we are 
interested in how different approaches have accounted for the origins of the ‘transition’ in 
the region; the key dynamics; the different explanations offered to account for the 
‘anomalies’ of the transformation, such as the ‘transformational recession’ of the 1990s or 
the uneven development of the region since then; and the politics that flow from the 
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different approaches. In accordance with the focus of our thesis, our inquiry will here 
primarily focus on Hungarian developments.  
 
Having said this, this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2 and 3 we look at the 
way in which the two dominant paradigms in the transformatology literature – here 
identified as the neoliberal and the institutionalist approaches respectively – have analysed 
the complex economic, political, and social changes resulting from the demise of ‘actually 
existing socialism’ in Hungary and elsewhere in CEE and the former Soviet Union and the 
reintegration of the region into the global political economy. I address the often-
unacknowledged set of common assumptions and shortcomings of each concerning the 
transformation, and emphasise the underlying neoclassical tendencies of both orthodox 
approaches. Section 4 then turns to more critical approaches to the transformation, as 
represented by world-systems theory and neo-Gramscian political economy. Throughout 
both sections, the analysis demonstrates how each of these approaches, while helpful in 
illuminating particular conditions and factors behind the transformation, remain 
unsatisfactory in their overall explanations. The lacunae identified in these accounts point 
us toward the need for an alternative account of the double transformation. Section 5 takes 
up this challenge by outlining what we consider to be the necessary elements of a critical 
theory of transformation, drawing on the insights of Marxist political economy, in 
particular the theory of state capitalism, as developed originally by the likes of Raya 
Dunayevskaya, C.L.R. James, and Tony Cliff. Finally, the Conclusion will summarise the 
main arguments and make the case that state capitalism theory, together with other 
concepts of Marxist political economy, presents a possible way for overcoming the 
problems that we identified.    
 
 
‘Capitalism Triumphant’: The Neoliberal Account of the 
Transformation 
Following the demise of ‘actually existing socialism’ in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union in 1989-1991, a dominant paradigm for the transition to the market and 
parliamentary democracy was quickly established. Drawing on the diverse theoretical 
influences that we associated in the previous chapter with neoliberalism, as well as the 
practical experiences of implementing structural adjustment programmes in the ‘Third 
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World’ in the 1980s, this approach emphasised the implementation of a set of ‘radical’ 
market reforms in order to shift the ailing centrally planned economies onto a 
fundamentally new path of development. At the heart of the neoliberal approach was the 
idea that ‘successful’ transition was best achieved if entrusted to the beneficial effects of 
the ‘invisible hand’ of the free market.50 The implication of this assumption was that any 
state involvement in the economy – through regulation of competition, provision of 
subsidies, or taxation – would distort the workings of the market. As one of the most 
illustrious representatives of the neoliberal approach to the transition, the young Harvard 
economist Jeffrey Sachs, reassured Eastern European reformers in the early 1990s, ‘[m]any 
of the economic problems [will] solve themselves: markets spring up as soon as central 
planning bureaucrats vacate the field.’51  
 
I refer to this approach as the neoliberal politico-economic approach to the transformation, 
to emphasise that we are not simply dealing with the application of seemingly ‘neutral’ 
economic policies, derived from neoclassical economic theory, on the transformation 
economies. Rather, I contend that the neoliberal approach contains general conceptions of 
institutional change and collective action as well as political and normative judgements 
that are quite independent of their theoretical justifications.52 In this sense then, 
neoliberalism represents, as David Harvey has argued, a political project ‘to re-establish 
the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites.’53 In 
this literature, Hungary has, at least until the mid-2000s, been hailed as a ‘success story’ of 
                                                
50 Important works associated with the neoliberal approach to the transformation include: Leszek 
Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995; 
Olivier Blanchard et al., Reform in Eastern Europe, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991; János Kornai, ‘The 
Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hope, and Reality’, Journal of Economic Literature, 1986, Vol. 24, pp. 
1687-1737, id. The Road to a Free Economy, id. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of 
Communism, Oxford: Clarendon, 1992, and id. ‘The Great Transformation of Central Eastern Europe: 
Success and Disappointment’, Economics of Transition, 2006, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 207-244; David Lipton and 
Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland’, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 1990, No. 1, pp. 75-147; Jeffrey Sachs, ‘What is to be done?’, The Economist, 13 
January 1990, pp. 19-24, id., Poland's Jump to the Market Economy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, and 
id. 1994, ‘Understanding “Shock Therapy”’, Social Market Foundation Occasional Paper, No. 7, London: 
Social Market Foundation, 1994; Anders Åslund, Post-Communist Economic Revolutions: How Big a Bang?, 
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992, id., Building Capitalism: The 
Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, and id. How 
Capitalism was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
51 Sachs, ‘Understanding “Shock Therapy”’, p. xiii. 
52 Frank Bönker, Klaus Müller, and Andreas Pickel ‘Cross-Disciplinary Approaches to Transformation: 
Context and Agenda’, in Postcommunist Transformation and the Social Sciences: Cross-disciplinary 
Approaches, edited by id., London: Macmillan, 2002, p. 5. 
53 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p. 19. 
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(neoliberal) transformation and propagated as a model to be emulated by other countries in 
the region, by virtue of its rapid and peaceful transformation, which resulted in the creation 
of a dynamic market economy, highly open to international trade and capital inflows, 
accompanied by the establishment of a stable democratic regime.54 The ‘success’ of 
Hungary’s transformation is usually ascribed to the strong continuity of economic policy in 
favour of neoliberalisation since 1989, despite the frequent change in ruling political 
parties in Budapest.55  
 
Around the time of the transition, three influential groups advocated the neoliberal 
position. The first consisted of a new generation of neoclassical economists in the west, 
who, as Gregory N. Mankiw notes, were widely considered as the ‘best and brightest’56 in 
the economics profession. This group included, amongst others, Olivier Blanchard, Stanley 
Fischer, David Lipton, Jeffrey Sachs, Larry Summers, and Anders Åslund.57 While the 
members of this group were well-versed in neoclassical economic theory (many of them 
worked at some of the most renowned economics departments on both sides of the 
Atlantic), most of them had limited theoretical knowledge of Soviet-style economies, let 
alone any practical experience of the region worth mentioning (pace Åslund). Rather, most 
of the economists listed above had gained their practical experience from implementing 
structural adjustment programmes in the Third World in the 1980s. Instead, as former 
World Bank economist David Ellerman argues, these economists brought to the region ‘the 
compounded arrogance of youth, academic credentials, and elite associations’, and were 
subsequently ‘unleashed’ into ‘the real world of policy-making as “experts.”’58 The second 
group in favour of radical economic reform were the major international financial 
institutions, in particular the IMF and the World Bank, and the OECD, and regional 
bureaucratic organisations, such as the EU and the EBRD, who provided policy advice to 
                                                
54 As an example, Hungary has continuously ranked among the highest in the EBRD’s Transition Index 
(which measures the level of ‘success’ in achieving economic and political transformation in ‘post-
communist’ countries). 
55 Åslund, Building Capitalism... and How Capitalism was Built…; EBRD, Transition Reportt 2001: Energy 
in Transition, London: EBRD, 2001; Kornai, ‘The Great Transformation of Central Eastern Europe’; OECD, 
OECD Economic Surveys 2002: Hungary, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2002. 
56 Gregory N. Mankiw, ‘Review of: Reinventing the Bazaar, by John McMillan’, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 2003, Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 257. See also David Ellerman, Helping People Help Themselves: From 
the World Bank to an Alternative Philosophy of Development Assistance, Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 2005. 
57 Blanchard et al., Reform in Eastern Europe; Lipton and Sachs, ‘Creating a Market Economy in Eastern 
Europe’; Sachs, ‘What is to be done?’, Poland's Jump…, ’Understanding “Shock Therapy”’; Åslund, Post-
Communist Economic Revolutions..., Building Capitalism…, and How Capitalism was Built... 
58 Ellerman, op. cit. 
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the transformation economies on the development of financial institutions, privatisation, 
enterprise restructuring, and reform of welfare systems, along neoliberal lines. Their ideas 
enjoyed political and ideological backing from powerful Western states, in particular the 
conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1991) and the administrations of 
Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and George Bush Sr. (1989-1993) in the United Kingdom and 
United States respectively, who, as we noted in the Introduction, were key advocates of 
neoliberalism in the 1980s and early 1990s.59 The third group consisted of some of the 
most renowned reform economists in Eastern Europe, most notably János Kornai in 
Hungary, Václav Klaus in Czechoslovakia, and Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland. Similar to 
their neoliberal confrères in the West, many of these reformers would go on to become 
important protagonists in the neoliberal transformation of CEE.60 
 
 
Neoliberalism and the Origins of the Transition  
The neoliberal approach to the transformation developed as a response to the deepening 
economic crisis of the Soviet bloc economies from the late 1970s and onwards. From the 
neoliberal perspective, the socio-economic development of the Soviet bloc diverged from 
the established features of ‘capitalism’ in Western Europe and the United States, 
displaying a number of pathologies – ‘totalitarianism’, the dominance of state ownership of 
the means of production, bureaucratic organisation of the economy and centralised 
allocation of resources, highly regulated prices and international trade, and an economic 
system geared towards high economic growth through investment in heavy industry – 
                                                
59 For the position of international and regional financial insitutions regarding the transition, see EBRD, 
Transition Report 1994: Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, London: 
EBRD, 1994; IMF, Annual Report 1992, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1992; OECD, 
OECD Economic Outlook 1991, 2 volumes, Paris: OECD Publishing, 1991; World Bank, World 
Development Report: From Plan to Market, New York, NY: Oxford  University Press, 1996. For an early 
critique of the coercive nature of ‘Western economic diplomacy’ towards the countries of Eastern Europe on 
the eve of the transition, see Peter Gowan. ‘Western Economic Diplomacy and the New Eastern Europe’, 
New Left Review, 1990, No. 182, pp. 63-84. 
60 Balcerowicz initially joined Solidarity as an economic expert and went on to become one of the key 
advocates of neoliberal shock therapy in Poland and elsewhere after the transition. He served as Minister of 
Finance and Deputy Prime Minister (between 1989-1991 and 1997-2000), as well as the President of the 
Polish Central Bank between 2001-2007. Václav Klaus entered politics in 1989, was and later became one of 
the co-founders of the conservative Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS). He was 
Minister of Finance (1989-1992) and the last Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia (1992-1993), and has later 
served as Prime Minister (1993-1997) and President (2003-2013) of the Czech Republic. In comparison to 
the former, Kornai’s involvement in the politics of post-transition Hungary was modest. Apart from 
providing informal advice to finance ministers, he served on the Central Bank Council of the Hungarian 
National Bank (MNB) from 1995 to 2001 (although in this position he played a pivotal role in the 
formulation of monetary policy in Hungary during this period).   
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distinguishing its economic policy behaviour. This resulted in an economic system 
characterised by ‘incoherence’ and ‘internal contradictions’, as manifested in the existence 
of what Kornai famously described as a ‘shortage economy’, characterised by inefficiency 
in production (a bias for heavy industry over consumption goods), increasing gap in 
technological development vis-à-vis the ‘capitalist’ West, and a waste of (natural and 
human) resources.61 Central planners in the Soviet bloc sought to overcome these problems 
through the introduction of economic reforms ‘from above’, together with the easing of 
political repression. Hungary’s long history of gradual economic reforms – most famously 
exemplified by the introduction of the NEM in 1968 – is here viewed as a paradigmatic 
example of ‘market socialism’ or ‘reform socialism’ in the region (other notable examples 
include Poland and Yugoslavia).62 These reforms formed part of attempts by the ruling 
‘communist’ nomenklatura in the region to remain competitive with the ‘capitalist’ states 
in the West, while at the same time conserving their political hegemony over society. 
However, according to neoliberals these reforms were not viable in the long term, since, as 
Kornai put it, ‘[t]he process of reform yields a heteromorphic formation that contains the 
seeds of its own destruction: inner tensions that build up until it bursts.’63  
 
Hence, according to neoliberal economists the causes of the deepening socio-economic and 
political crisis of the Eastern European command economies in the 1980s were 
endogenous in nature. They were rooted in the inherent shortcomings of an economic 
system characterised by ‘incoherence, internal contradictions, and lack of stability’.64 The 
origins of the double transformation are, in this view, conceived as the result of the 
‘socialist’ states’ imperfect modernisation and failure to transform themselves into liberal-
capitalist societies. In other words, it is conceived as ‘the failure of an entire system’ 
(‘socialism’) and a vindication of economic and political liberalism and ‘Western’ 
                                                
61 The classical text on the ‘shortage economy’ is János Kornai, Economics of Shortage, Oxford: North 
Holland, 1980.. See also János Kornai, Over-centralization in Economic Administration: A Critical Analysis 
Based on Experience in Hungarian Light Industry, Oxford: Oxford University Press., [1957]/1959, and id. 
The Socialist System, pp. 228-301.  
62 For a summary of the Hungarian reform process, see Berend, The Hungarian Economic Reforms, 1957-
1990; Wlodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz Laski, From Marx to the Market: Socialism in Search of an 
Economic System, Oxford: Clarendon, 1989, pp. 62-72; Kornai, ‘The Hungarian Reform Process’.  
63 Kornai, The Socialist System, p. 574.  
64 Ibid. In fact, this claim had already been made by some of founding fathers of neoliberalism, such as 
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek, who had ‘scientifically proven’ that the economic principles of 
‘socialism’ were unworkable in practice and necessarily led to ‘totalitarianism’. See Ludwig von Mises, ‘Die 
Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen’, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften, 1920, Vol. 47, pp. 
86-101; Hayek, The Road to Serfdom. 
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values.65 The ultimate demise of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1991 is thus perceived as external 
to capitalism.  
 
 
Neoliberalism and the Political Economy of ‘Shock Therapy’ 
In order to break out from their deepening crisis, proponents of neoliberalism argued that a 
quick and radical overhaul of the ex-command economies was necessary. Formally 
launched in Poland on 1 January 1990, when the Solidarity-led government introduced the 
so-called ‘Sachs-Balcerowicz Plan’66, the neoliberal prescription for CEE consisted of 
three main elements: 1) the introduction of a radical stabilisation programme to bring 
down inflation, reduce state spending and wages; 2) the liberalisation of prices and trade 
to adjust prices to equilibrium levels (through the forces of demand and supply), break up 
monopoly prices, and encourage economic actors to spontaneously adjust their behaviour 
to market rationality; and 3) the introduction of structural reforms, including the 
privatisation of previously state-owned enterprises, transformation of the banking-, 
financial-, and legal system, in line with Western standards, the slashing of industrial 
policy, and the introduction of targeted welfare provision to those most negatively affected 
by radical market reform.67 Also known as the ‘big bang’ or ‘shock therapy’68 programme 
                                                
65 Ian Jeffries, Socialist economies and the transition to the market: a guide, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 1. 
This thesis was most famously summed up by Francis Fukuyama in ‘The End of History?’, The National 
Interest, 1989, and id. The End of History and the Last Man, London: Penguin Books, 1992. 
66 In much of the transformatology literature, this programme is simply known as ‘the Balcerowicz Plan’, in 
honour of its author, Leszek Balcerowicz, who at the time served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Finance of the Mazowiecki government. However, as Shields has convincingly argued, the programme 
should be known as the ‘Sachs-Balcerowicz Plan to indicate the degree of consistency between the two [main 
proponents of neoliberalism in Poland at the time]’. Here cited in Stuart Shields, ‘The “Charge of the Right 
Brigade”: Transnational Social Forces and the Neoliberal Configuration of Poland’s Transition’, New 
Political Economy, 2003, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 232. 
67 Åslund, Building Capitalism..., pp. 77-82; Lipton and Sachs, ‘Creating a Market Economy in Eastern 
Europe’; Sachs, ‘What is to be done?’. 
68 As Naomi Klein shows in The Shock Doctrine, the term can be traced to Milton Friedman, who used the 
term ‘shock treatment’ to describe the pro-market reforms introduced by the Chilean dicator, General 
Augusto Pinochet, in 1975. The economic policies, which were based on the neoliberal economic ideas 
espoused by Friedman and other prominent members of the Chicago School of economics, emphasised the 
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in the literature, in reference to the drastic, surgical intervention that was to be applied on 
the former command economies, similar programmes were applied across CEE in the 
1990s, albeit with differing emphasis on the speed and sequencing with which market 
reforms were to be implemented.69  
 
The economic rationale behind neoliberal shock therapy derived from the abstract models 
of neoclassical economic theory, as well as the practical experiences of implementing 
structural adjustment programmes in the Third World in the 1980s, which were later 
summarised by John Williamson under the term ‘Washington Consensus’70. Stabilisation 
and structural reform would, it was assumed, combine to usher in a process described by 
the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter as ‘creative destruction’, by which the 
previously unproductive sectors of the centrally planned economies would disappear, 
giving way for new innovative capitalists that would provide the basis for a period of 
sustained long-term economic growth.71 Given the new market environment, trade 
liberalisation would permit the inflow of foreign capital, which in turn would spark an 
export-driven surge with relatively low wages and proximity to Western markets providing 
a competitive advantage. This ‘market-based approach to development’72, it was assumed, 
would allow for a fast re-integration with the world economy, which, in turn, would lead to 
economic growth, as well as greater individual ‘freedom’ and higher living standards to the 
peoples of CEE.73 At the same time, the role of the state in the economy was to be slimmed 
down and radically reconfigured. The ‘regulatory state’ associated with Keynesianism was 
to be replaced by what Phil Cerny has described as the ‘competition state’, which would 
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Emerging Europe, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2007, p. 101. 
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reconfigure the domestic economy to the exigencies of global markets, ensure a legal order 
for the protection of private property rights, and provide targeted social support.74 A 
number of countries and prominent advisers also made calls the provision of debt relief 
and financial assistance, along the lines of the Marshall Plan,75 provided by the US to 
Western European governments between 1948-1951, in order to help post-World War II 
reconstruction and prevent the spread of ‘communism’ westwards.76 However, in the 
1990s this idea fell on deaf ears, as some neoliberals opposed government intervention by 
principle, while international financial institutions and leading Western states insisted that 
countries had to prove themselves before receiving financial assistance.  
 
The hopes and prescriptions of the neoliberal approach were, however, not only confined 
to the economy. The transition was also heralded as a civilising process, which would 
enable the peoples of Eastern Europe to ‘return to Europe’. This notion was aptly 
summarised in Hungary at the time by Miklós Vásárhelyi, a writer and former press 
secretary to the ‘reform communist’ Prime Minister Imre Nagy, who had been imprisoned 
for five years following the violent suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. In an 
interview with the New York Times in 1989, he proclaimed optimistically that,  
First of all there will really be a Europe again. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
will finally get an opportunity to unite with the West. We will begin to live under the same 
conditions. It will take time, but socially, politically, and economically we will achieve what 
the Western countries have already achieved. The doors are open now.77  
 
Meanwhile, privatisation of state-owned enterprises would ensure the organic development 
of a strong domestic bourgeoisie supportive of liberal democratic values. According to 
most neoliberals, this process should be initiated as soon as possible, but could not be 
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achieved in one stroke. Instead, as Kornai argued, the local bourgeoisie would ‘emerge as 
the result of the market’s natural selection process’.78  
 
Proponents of neoliberal shock therapy admitted that their economic reforms would be 
painful for large sections of society, but argued, echoing Thatcher’s famous dictum, that 
‘there was no alternative’ to their prescriptions.79 Stabilisation and liberalisation would 
sharply reduce average real wages in the economy, while unemployment rates would rise 
over the medium term, as firms shed labour in order to remain competitive. However, as 
Sachs insisted, ‘Western observers should not over-dramatise lay-offs and bankruptcies. … 
Eastern Europe, now has too little unemployment, not too much.’80 Instead, the social costs 
of transition-associated adjustment had to be paid, and the quicker the better. The logic 
behind this argument was based on political calculations. Recalling the experiences of 
implementing structural adjustment programmes in Latin America in the 1980s, foreign 
advisers were all too aware that the high social costs of neoliberal restructuring were likely 
to lead to opposition from disaffected groups in society.81 ‘Populist politicians’, warned 
Sachs, ‘will try to hook up with coalitions of workers, managers and bureaucrats in hard-
hit sectors to slow or reverse the adjustment’.82 Therefore, proponents of the neoliberal 
approach called for a strong state, which, as Kornai described it, could ‘set the economy 
right with a firm hand’, while at the same time keeping ‘populist’ pressures in check.83 As 
critics of neoliberalism have pointed out, this was in stark opposition to the ‘minimal state’ 
praised by neoliberal theory. 
 
The most sophisticated theoretical justification of state intervention in favour of the market 
was provided by Balcerowicz, who argued that ‘[t]he key to understanding the interaction 
between the political and economic dimensions of post-communist transitions is to realize 
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that any great political breakthrough in a country’s history is followed by a period of 
“extraordinary politics” that soon gives way to “normal politics”’.84 Hence, a political 
breakthrough like that sweeping through Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989-
1991 was expected to produce a ‘special state of mass psychology’ in which individuals 
were more willing to act and think in terms of the common good, eschewing the narrow 
interest based perspective of ‘normal politics’. Extraordinary politics, according to 
Balcerowicz, translates into an exceptionally high readiness to sacrifice for the ‘common 
good’; and therefore to accept neoliberal economic reform. As he went on to assert, ‘The 
brevity of the exceptional period means that a radical economic programme, launched as 
quickly as possible after the breakthrough, has a much greater chance of being accepted 
than either a delayed radical programme or a non-radical alternative’.85 Reformers should 
therefore seize the ‘window of opportunity’ provided by extraordinary politics to achieve 
as much of their reform agenda as possible, before the normal politics of self-interest 
returned. What thus appeared as a problem for many became for neoliberals a solution: 
rapid and decisive implementation of shock therapy, backed by the state, in order to avoid 
a ‘populist backlash’ against radical market reforms. However, in countries like Hungary, 
which was characterised by a strong degree of intra-ruling class struggle at the time of the 
transition, this had to be achieved through the formation of a ‘broad coalition’, which 
included the political representatives of a nascent capitalist class, the state bureaucracy, 
and the trade unions.86 
 
Why then, despite the social costs borne by the populations of CEE and the former Soviet 
Union, was the neoliberal blueprint for the transition embraced with open arms by 
reformers in the region? Pickel has argued that, ‘The neo-liberal position offers a clean and 
uncompromising break with the past, an initially painful but before long richly rewarding 
reform process … superior Western institutions quickly replace the defunct one-party 
central planning system … [creating] the conditions for both the political freedoms and the 
economic prosperity enjoyed by most citizens of Western countries and integrate the East 
economically, politically, and culturally into the world market and into various global and 
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regional organisations.’87 Crucially, by also embedding the transition within an 
uncompromising ‘anti-communist’ and ‘pro-Western’ normative and intellectual 
framework, the neoliberal approach supplied a clear set of definitions and uncontroversial 
set of goals, while at the same time offering the expertise for implementation.88 However, 
as many critics have noted, the transfer of neoliberal policies to the ‘transition economies’ 
was not as ‘unbiased’ as claimed by its proponents, but served the interests of the 
economic and political elites in the region.89  
 
 
The ‘Anomalies’ of the Neoliberal Approach of the Transformation 
While the neoliberal paradigm has continued to exert strong influence in mainstream 
economic and policymaking circles, it is plagued by numerous conceptual and empirical 
problems. These flaws have been meticulously dissected on a general level in the works of 
institutionalist and Marxian political economists, including, amongst others, Ha-Joon 
Chang, Joseph Stiglitz, Gérard Duménil and Dominque Lévy, David Harvey, Chris 
Harman, and Alfredo Saad-Filho.90 Below, we highlight three lines of criticisms, which are 
believed to be the most relevant for our thesis.  
 
The first problem with the neoliberal approach is its static comparative approach to the 
double transformation in CEE and the former Soviet Union. Simply put, in order to have 
an exception in historical development one must have a norm with which to compare it. 
The norm usually referred to is that of the advanced ‘capitalist’ states in Western Europe 
and North America, which provide a model for ‘normal’ socio-economic and political 
development. The comparative model assumed by neoliberals understands ‘socialism’ and 
‘capitalism’ as two separate systems, rather than as parts of a ‘totality’ mediated by the 
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world market. Such a model fails to recognise the striking similarities that existed between 
the regimes that prevailed on the two sides of the Iron Curtain. This effectively leads to an 
ahistorical understanding of the transformation, based on a misleading conception of how 
capitalist markets operate, while ignoring the historical role of the (capitalist) state in 
promoting economic development within its territory, and its continued role in furthering 
capital accumulation.91 The necessary outcome of this is that the Soviet-style regimes 
represented a historical aberration, which could only cured by replacing the outdated 
structures of ‘socialism’ with the market.   
 
The above points relate to a second problem with the neoliberal approach regarding its 
unconvincing account of how neoliberalism supposedly conquered the ‘hearts and minds’ 
of reformers in the East. To put it simply, the transition from central planning to a free 
market economy, along neoliberal lines, is usually perceived as self-explanatory. This view 
is aptly summarised by Aligica and Evans as follows, ‘Because the system inspired by the 
Marxist political economy is did not “deliver the goods”, Marxist economics ideas were 
rejected: an example of “marketplace of ideas” at work and a straightforward explanation 
of the process of ideas diffusion and change in Eastern Europe.’92 According to this view, 
neoliberal ideas and policies were, by and large, voluntarily embraced by political and 
economic elites in Eastern Europe after 1989. For example, Kornai argues that ‘a certain 
level of external political pressure was also discernible’, but goes on to claim that, ‘Not a 
single foreign country, not even the great powers, “pushed” the small countries of Central 
Eastern Europe around.’93 However, critical studies of the transformation have 
demonstrated that neoliberalism have pointed to the coercive methods employed by 
hegemonic Western powers and international financial institutions in order to create 
neoliberal regimes that were open to the exigencies of global capital.94 Moreover, as Bohle 
and Neunhöffer point out with regard to Poland, neoliberal economic reforms were not 
necessarily symbiotic with the political traditions in the region, meaning that ‘shock 
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therapeutic programme[s] had to be implemented against much of its own social base and 
intellectual tradition.’95  
 
These above points directly relate to a third, and final problem with the neoliberal 
approach regarding its difficulties to account for the ‘anomalies’ of the transformation in 
CEE. Although attempts at assessing the balance sheet of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ 
remain the subject of much ‘controversy’96 in the academia, the empirical track record of 
neoliberalism in the region, in terms of overcoming the problems of low economic growth 
and poverty, appears to be far from convincing.97 Evaluating the balance sheet of 
neoliberal reform in CEE and the former Soviet Union two decades after the transition, 
Mitchell A. Orenstein recently noted that, ‘[r]apid reform produced many success stories, 
including entrepreneurs who made fortunes trading cars or consumer goods, or 
transformed state owned enterprises to make millions. However, the shock program also 
produced massive dislocations among less resilient sectors and social groups.’98 Contra the 
promises of neoliberal economists and policymakers, and notwithstanding what effectively 
constituted ‘the most dramatic episode of economic liberalisation in economic history’,99 
the 1990s turned out to be a ‘lost decade’ for most of CEE and the former Soviet Union, as 
the transformation economies experienced a ‘regional Great Depression’100 unprecedented 
in peace times. According to the EBRD, in 2002, 12 years after the transition, most 
countries had not returned to their 1989 levels of output.101 In Hungary, one of the 
supposed ‘success stories’ of the region, with a high degree of market activity and 
disproportionately large share of the region’s foreign direct investment inflows, transition-
associated adjustment between 1988-1995 destroyed more economic assets than did World 
War II and resulted in the loss of almost 1.5 million jobs (almost one-third of the 
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workforce).102 Elsewhere in the region, the situation has been even bleaker. Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine, and much of the former Yugoslavia experienced catastrophic declines 
in economic output.103 Russia, historically the most important case, was by the end of the 
1990s a ‘black hole’. Between 1990 and 1999 economic output contracted by a whopping 
54 percent in GDP terms and industrial production fell by more than 60 percent – greater 
than what Soviet Russia suffered in World War II and more than that experienced by the 
United States during the Great Depression. Farm livestock decreased by half, while its 
grain harvest more than halved in the five years from 1993, dropping beneath its pre-World 
War I level. Money disappeared from much of economic life so that, by early 1998, half of 
industrial sales were completed through barter.104  
 
For the overwhelming majority of the population in the region the consequences of 
neoliberalisation have been catastrophic. As a result of transition-associated adjustments, 
unemployment and precarious working conditions have become chronic features of CEE 
societies, as the ‘job security’ associated with ‘actually existing socialism’ disappeared.105  
In the 1990s, real wages for CEE workers plummeted, on a scale that exceeded those of the 
Great Depression.106 In 1999, ten years after the transition, real wages were still lagging 
behind their 1989 levels in all countries except the Czech Republic; in Hungary real wages 
were 19 percent less, while in many other countries (including Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, and Ukraine) it was around half that level. The fall was particularly steep in 
Russia, where real wages, in 1999, stood at a meagre 38.2 percent of their 1989 levels.107  
As a result, inequality and poverty rates have skyrocketed, in some cases reaching Latin 
American levels. In some countries, like Russia, mortality rates, particularly among men, 
have soared, particularly in those regions where income differences were the widest.108 
Women have also suffered from the collapse of families, although many adapted better to 
the new market conditions. Ethnic minorities, such as the Roma, have also been hit hard by 
the neoliberalisation of the former centrally planned economies. In many countries, such as 
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Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine, emigration became the only solution as people 
sought refuge in the west from catastrophic economic conditions at home and human 
trafficking exploded.109  
 
Economic growth finally returned to the region in the 2000s, although the benefits were by 
no means shared universally. However, rather than proving the validity of neoliberal 
theory, the growth spurt of the 2000s weakened the correlation between democratisation 
and capitalism, which is usually taken for granted by most neoliberals.110 Moreover, the 
neoliberal regimes that evolved in CEE turned out to be particularly badly hit by the global 
economic crisis that began in 2007. ‘Indeed,’ as Orenstein notes, their greater openness to 
international trade and their foreign-owned banking systems may have made them more 
vulnerable to the collapse of the Western financial system.’111 As we describe in further 
detail in Chapter 6, Hungary has also been badly affected by the crisis and in October 2008 
it became the first country in the region to seek a bailout programme from international 
lenders.  
 
Neoliberals have largely failed to provide a convincing explanation of these developments. 
Instead, neoliberal accounts have, at best, remained ad hoc or, at worst, descended into 
thinly veiled apologies for neoliberal shock therapy. According to most advocates of 
radical market reform, the failures and disappointments of transition-associated adjustment 
in the 1990s were ‘unexpected’.112 As Kornai observed in the early 1990s with a sense of 
astonishment, no ‘forecast of … serious recession [can] be found in the early theoretical 
writings to outline the program for the transition.’113 Others have ex post facto sought to 
downplay the colossal slump in economic output after 1989, insisting that ‘a substantial 
part of the big recorded decline, probably about half, was not real’,114 while at the same 
arguing that the economic decline that did take place was exogenous to the market and the 
result of negative legacies associated with ‘socialism’, such as ‘corruption’, ‘premature 
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welfare state’, and ‘rent-seeking behaviour’.115 Comments like these reveal inability of the 
neoliberal economics to account for the contradictions of the double transformation, while, 
at the same time, highlighting the implicitly political nature of neoliberalism. The point of 
the transformation was not simply to liberate CEE from the shackles of ‘communism’, or 
to liberate latent entrepreneurial talent, as emphasised by neoliberals, but to open up the 
economies of the region to the exigencies of global capital, while furthering the class 
power of domestic elites. The outcome of this has been a growing disillusionment with 
simplistic plans for the installation of a market economy. As a result, more nuanced 
accounts, seeking to salvage capitalism, while emphasising a more ‘gradual’ approach to 
transformation, gained influence in academic and policymaking circles. It is to these that 
we turn our attention next. 
 
 
‘Institutional Fixes’ 
Although the neoliberal approach to the transformation was deeply influential in post-
Soviet CEE, it has been far from uncontested. As the early capitalist triumphalism was 
sobered by the grim realities of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ in the region, social 
scientists from other fields, including anthropologists, comparative political economists, 
historians, and sociologists, began to challenge the dominance of neoliberal economics. 
The common thread in these works is an acknowledgment that the implementation of what 
some have characterised as ‘designer capitalism’116 in the region was far more problematic 
than its neoliberal architects had anticipated. Orenstein is worth quoting at length here. He 
contends that neoliberals, 
regarded institutional reform as distinctively secondary, to be left, perhaps for a second stage 
of transition. Some important items were left off the list almost entirely, particularly reform 
of the social sector, such as health, education and welfare. Only unemployment insurance 
was a priority area. … Furthermore, neoliberals offered very few substantive ideas or 
theories of how to restructure supporting institutions of the capitalist economy, such as 
banks, courts and universities. Neoliberal blueprints emphasized spontaneous adjustment to 
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market signals and offered little guidance on restructuring institutions, short of destroying 
them altogether or “privatizing” them.117 
 
The failures and disappointments of the initial efforts of neoliberal restructuring 
throughout the region and the variegated patterns of development and ongoing problems in 
even the most successful cases, enabled critics of neoliberalism to gain increasing 
legitimacy in academic and policymaking debates. This has been reflected in the 
development of more nuanced accounts, which have emphasised that markets are not a 
‘natural’ phenomenon, but are socially embedded and politically constructed (and thus 
potentially contested) institutions, while also stressing the key role of historical, social, 
and cultural legacies, as well as economic and political actors, in particular the state, in 
fostering sustainable capitalist development. These works draw on the theoretical insights 
of heterodox economics, comparative and evolutionary sociology, as well as the growing 
body of literature associated with the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) framework. Key 
theoretical influences include, amongst others, Friedrich List, Max Weber, Alexander 
Gerschenkron, John M. Keynes, Karl Polanyi, and more recently Oliver Williamson, 
Douglass C. North, Joseph Stiglitz, and Peter Hall and David Soskice.118 I call this the 
institutionalist approach, since the various authors included under the heading of this 
approach all emphasise the importance of building strong institutions to counteract the 
more negative forces of (neoliberal) ‘globalisation’.119  
                                                
117 Mitchell A. Orenstein, Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe, 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001, pp. 13-14. 
118 The key texts of these scholars include: Friedrich G. List, The National System of Political Economy, 
Philadelphia, PA: JB Lippincott & Co, 1856; Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
Oxford: Blackwell, [1904-5]/2002; John M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money, London: Macmillan, [1936]/1960; Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, [1944]/2001; Oliver E. Williamson, The 
Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1985; Douglass C. North,Institutions, 
Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Stiglitz. 
Globalization and its Discontents, and id., Making Globalization Work, London: Penguin Books, 2006; Peter 
A. Hall and Derek Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative 
Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
119 Key works within the institutionalist approach to the transformation include, amongst others, Amsden et 
al., The Market Meets its Match; László Andor, Hungary on the Road to the European Union: A Transition 
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In the section that follows, I distinguish between three different schools of thought within 
the insitutionalist approach: 1) evolutionary sociology; 2) institutional economics; and 3) 
more recently, attempts to combine the two, as represented in the collective work of 
Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits. As we shall see below, in this literature, Hungary is 
(together with the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) usually contrasted with 
other countries in the region, in particular the Baltic States and Russia, as a positive 
example of transformation by virtue of its allegedly more gradual, politically stable, and 
socially embedded transition to capitalism. 
 
 
Evolutionary Sociology: Path Dependency and the Role of Historical 
Legacies in the Transformation 
The first school of thought within the institutionalist approach draws on the theoretical 
insights of evolutionary sociology.120 This school originally developed as a critique of the 
early transformatology literature, which was, as we noted above, dominated by neoliberal 
accounts. According to its proponents the insistence on rapid, radical, and comprehensive 
institutional change, emphasised by neoliberal economists, was ‘erroneous’ and based on a 
series of ‘flawed’ and ‘teleological’ theoretical assumptions, which are only true under 
artificial circumstances. Thus, according to David C. Stark, the neoliberal literature on the 
transition ‘replicates the errors of modernization theory’, by postulating a positive 
direction of change while abolishing conflict and chaotic change to residual categories. As 
he goes on to argue, seemingly descriptive notions, such as ‘transition to capitalism’ or 
‘transition to a market economy’, are in fact, ‘teleological concepts driven by hypothesized 
end states.’121 Hence, rather than the neoliberal emphasis on a straightforward, unilinear 
                                                                                                                                              
American Journal of Sociology, 1996, Vol. 101, No. 4, pp. 993-1027; David Stark and László Bruszt, 
Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Capitalism’, American Journal of Sociology, 2001, Vol. 106, No. 4, pp. 1129-1137; ; Stiglitz, Globalization 
and its Discontents. 
120 Excellent works from the evolutionary school of thought include Gil Eyal, Iván Szelényi, and Eleanor 
Townsley 1997, ‘The Theory of Post-Communist Managerialism’, New Left Review, 1998, Vol. 1, No. 222, 
pp. 60-92; King, ‘Postcommunist Divergence...’; Edmund Mokrzycki and Christopher B.A. Bryant (eds.), 
The New Great Transformation?: Change and Continuity in East-Central Europe, London: Routledge, 1994; 
Peter Murrell, ‘Evolutionary and Radical Approaches to Economic Reform’, Economcis of Planning, 1992, 
Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 79-95; Stark, ‘From System Identity to Organizational Diversity’ and ‘Recombinant 
Property in East European Capitalism’; and Stark and Bruszt, op. cit.. 
121 Stark, ‘From System Identity to Organizational Diversity’, p. 22. 
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transition from central planning to a market economy and from authoritarianism to 
democracy, evolutionary sociologists are instead concerned with:  
[t]ransformations, in which new elements emerge through adaptations, rearrangements, 
permutations, and reconfigurations of existing organisational forms. Instead of institutional 
vacuum we examine institutional legacies rethinking the metaphor of collapse to ask whether 
differences in how the pieces fell apart have consequences for rebuilding new institutions. 
Instead of examining country cases according to the degree which they conform to or depart 
from a preestablished model, we see differences in kind and ask how different paths of 
extrication from state socialism shape different possibilities of transformation.122  
 
By conceiving of transformation in this way it becomes possible to combine both present 
incentives and the role of historical legacies. The idea that capitalism can be ‘applied’, 
according to a universal neoliberal blueprint, is mistaken and ironically ends up 
‘duplicat[ing] the rationalist fallacy evidenced during the introduction of socialism with, 
for example, the Leninist notion that property relations could be changed overnight by 
administrative decree.’123 One of the major contributions of evolutionary sociologists then, 
is to ‘bring history back in’ to the transformation debate.124 
 
How then do the structures and behaviours of agents inherited from ‘state socialism’125 
shape the process of transformation? Stark and Bruszt have proposed a ‘path dependency 
model of transformation’, which emphasises continuity of pre-transformation social 
processes forward into the transformation. They argue that the different ‘paths of 
extrication from state socialism’ – distinguishing between ‘capitulation’ of ‘communist’ 
regimes in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the wake of 
pressures from civil society; a ‘compromise’ between the ‘communist’ regime and the 
Solidarity leadership in Poland; or ‘unfettered electoral competition’ between ‘reform 
communists’ and the political opposition in Hungary (and, to a more limited extent, in 
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Social and Economic Transformation in East Central Europe: Institutions, Property Relations, and Social 
Interests, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999; Murrell, ‘Evolutionary and Radical Approaches to Economic 
Reform’; Mokrzycki and Bryant, The New Great Transformation; Stark, ‘From System Identity to 
Organizational Diversity’ and ’Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism’.  
123 Stark and Bruszt, op. cit., p. 81. 
124 Dorothee Bohle, ‘Internationalisation”: An issue neglected in the path-dependency approach to post-
communist transformation’, in Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe, edited by Michel 
Dobry, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 2000, p. 237; Hardy, Poland’s New Capitalism, p. 35; Shields, 
The International Political Economy of Transition, p. 27. 
125 For a definition of the term, see Stark and Bruszt, op. cit., p. 3. 
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Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania) – influenced the political institutions and forms of 
interest intermediation between state and society that emerged after 1989.126 The 
transformation in CEE and the former Soviet Union is thus viewed as a path dependent 
process: historically developed structures and institutions simultaneously constrain and 
provide resources for post-Soviet restructuring. Path dependency means that the number of 
development paths that a country can embark upon is limited, and that different societies 
follow different development paths. Thus, instead of moving towards one ‘optimal’ model 
of capitalism, as alleged by neoliberal economists, evolutionary sociologists suggest 
multiple national and regional trajectories and constraints. Stark and Bruszt, for example, 
have demonstrated how ‘informal’ relations and structures (the second economy, informal 
networks between managers of state owned enterprises and political and economic actors, 
etc.) shaped the transformation process. Whereas the formal institutions of ‘state socialism’ 
collapsed rapidly, these informal practices, routines, and parallel structures provide the 
context and resources for post-socialist change.127 As we shall see below, the notion of 
‘path dependency’ has become influential in the transformatology literature, as well as 
amongst policymakers attempting to apply standard policy options, transfer successful 
policies, or establish institutional structures in the region drawn from more advanced 
capitalist economies in the West. 
 
 
Institutionalist Economics  
The second school of thought within the institutionalist approach evolved from an attempt 
to explain why neoliberal shock therapy failed so miserably in promoting economic growth 
and prosperity in CEE and the former Soviet Union after 1989-1991. This school was 
formed on the basis of a number of pre-existing theories of late capitalist development 
(including neo-Listian political economy, institutional economics, and Keynesianism), but, 
as we shall show here below, its interventions in refuting neoliberalism in the region, as 
well as elsewhere in the world, have given it a coherence as a school of thought.  
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On the general level, institutionalist economists are highly critical of neoliberalism, which 
they perceive as a form of ‘market fundamentalism’ or ‘market Maoism’128. Drawing on 
the laissez-faire economic policies advocated by the Manchester school of economics in 
the 19th century, proponents of neoliberalism argue that free markets, ‘unfettered’ from 
government intervention and market regulation, provide the best solution to economic and 
social problems. Institutionalist economists generally perceive neoliberalism as an 
ideologically driven attack on the welfare state in its different forms (from the ‘Keynesian 
compromise’ that prevailed in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States, 
through the ‘developmentalist state’ in the Global South, to ‘state socialism’ in the Soviet 
bloc). This ideological project, which began in response to the debt crisis of the mid-1970s, 
was led by a vanguard of conservative economists, such as Milton Friedman, Friedrich von 
Hayek, who were frequently connected to influential neoliberal think tanks in the West, 
like the Mont Pelerin Society or the Adam Smith Institute. Following the conservative 
ascendancy of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
this free market ideology became prominent in international policymaking circles, and 
eventually came to constitute the foundation of the ‘Washington Consensus’ – forged in 
the late 1980s between the Bretton Woods institutions of the IMF and the World Bank, and 
leading Western governments. However, according to institutionalist economists, 
neoliberal economic policies were based on ‘flawed assumptions’ about the functioning of 
capitalism, and failed to take into consideration the importance of sequencing and pacing 
of market reforms, as well as the crucial role played by institutions, in particular the state, 
in embedding capitalist social relations in societies where institutions are weak and 
information not widely available – conditions that prevail in most developing countries, as 
well as the transition economies in the early 1990s.129  
 
When it comes to the ‘transition’130 in CEE and the former Soviet Union, institutionalist 
economists have criticised neoliberals for promoting ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies’, insisting 
on macroeconomic stability and rapid structural adjustment. According to institutionalist 
                                                
128 The term was coined by Andor and Summers (in Market Failure…), in order to describe the proponents 
of neoliberalism in CEE in the 1990s, whose blind fate in the blessings of the market were akin to the 
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CEE and the former Soviet Union since 1989 under the term of ‘transition’.  
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economists, these policies failed to take into account the importance of sequencing and 
pacing of market reforms, as well as the crucial role played by institutions, in particular the 
state, in embedding capitalist social relations in societies where institutions are weak and 
information not widely available – conditions that have historically prevailed in 
‘developing countries’, including the ‘transition economies’ in the early 1990s. 
 
The classical exposition of this position is Alice Amsden et al. (1994), where it is argued 
that neoliberal economic policies did not result in the establishment of market institutions 
necessary for long-term capital accumulation, but instead led to the creation of ‘pseudo-
capitalism’, an economic system characterised by simple market exchange, political 
instability, and rising social inequalities.131 However, Amsden et al. argued that the 
multiple failures of neoliberal restructuring were not intrinsic to capitalism itself, but rather 
the result of ‘copying the wrong capitalist model’.132 Hence, all was not lost for the CEE 
transition economies. Drawing on the insights of neo-Listian political economy and 
previous examples of successful ‘catch-up’ development by economically ‘backward’ 
countries (e.g. the semi-industrialised economies in southeast Asia and Latin America, and, 
more recently, the ‘post-socialist’ economies of China and Vietnam), the authors 
emphasised that the development of some sort of ‘Western-style corporatist social order’ 
was still possible in CEE.133 In order for this to succeed, however, there was a need to 
break with neoliberal orthodoxy, and allow the state to play a proactive role in the 
formulation of trade, industry, technology, and agricultural policy.134 As Amsden et al. 
concluded,  
Despite all its problems, the post-socialist transition can still succeed. The essential 
precondition is that orthodox economics yield to common sense. In Eastern Europe … 
common sense dictates four courses of action: encouraging macroeconomic expansion; 
creating conditions under which viable state-owned enterprises can self-select themselves in 
to growth; giving these state-owned enterprises (as they turn into privately owned 
enterprises) adequate institutional support to generate saving, aid investment, and further 
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technical advance; and empowering a government bureaucracy that can harmonize political 
democracy with the degree of economic governance that modern capitalism requires.135  
 
A similar account has been provided by the renowned post-Keynesian economist Joseph 
E. Stiglitz. A former Chairman of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Relations and 
ex-Chief Economist at the World Bank, Stiglitz played an important role in the extension 
of neoliberal reforms across the world in the 1990s. However, following his abrupt 
dismissal from the World Bank in January 2000, he turned into one of the most vocal 
critics of ‘market fundamentalism’ and the international organisations that have sustained 
it across the world, whom he blamed for ‘mismanaging’ the process of economic 
globalisation and making many ‘Third World’ and ‘ex-communist’ states worse off than 
they were before.136 According to Stiglitz, the many failures of neoliberal shock therapy 
were not, as its advocates have claimed, due to ‘too little shock, and too much therapy’ or 
in the way the reforms were implemented, but went deeper: ‘to a misunderstanding of the 
foundations of a market economy, as well as a failure to grasp the fundamentals of reform 
processes.’ As he went on to argue,  
at least part of the problem was an excessive reliance on textbook models of economics. 
Textbook economics may be fine for teaching students, but not for governments trying to 
establish from anew a market economy …  A part of the problem also rose from confusing 
means with ends: taking, for instance, privatization or the opening of capital accounts as a 
mark of success rather than means to the more fundamental ends. Even the creation of a 
market economy should be viewed as a means to broader ends. It is not just the creation of 
market economy that matters, but the improvement of living standards and the establishment 
of the foundations of sustainable, equitable, and democratic development.137  
 
Based on a comparison of different reform strategies pursued by transition economies in 
the 1990s, Stiglitz argues that those countries that heeded the advice of the Washington 
Consensus and pursued ‘radical’ economic reforms, including the Czech Republic and 
Russia, fared worse than those that pursued ‘gradualist’ policies, such China, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovenia, in terms of building functioning market institutions, long-term 
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economic growth, privatisation, social inclusion, and political stability.138 The gradualism 
of the Chinese transformation, although carried out by an authoritarian regime, received 
particular praise by Stiglitz, and was promoted as a model to follow for other countries.139 
During the 1990s, the Chinese economy grew at an average rate of more than 10 percent, 
while the Russian economy shrank by an annual rate of 5.6 percent. As a result, by the end 
of the decade, Chinese real incomes measured in PPP terms were comparable to those of 
Russia. However, whereas China’s transition had resulted ‘the largest reduction in poverty 
in history in such a short time span (from 358 million in 1990 to 208 million in 1997, using 
China’s admittedly lower poverty standard of US$ 1 a day), Russia’s transition has 
entailed one of the largest increases in poverty in history in such a short span of time 
(outside of war and famine).’140 Consequently, the example of China, and, to some extent, 
Hungary and Poland, showed that, contra the proponents of neoliberal shock therapy, there 
were alternative transformation strategies available to policymakers in ‘transition 
economies’, and, when these policies were coherently pursued, they often led to more 
sustainable economic growth.  
 
In Hungary, such views have been most coherently and persistently argued by László 
Andor, a progressive economist and former economic advisor to the Hungarian Socialist 
Party (MSZP), who has written extensively on the transition to a free market economy and 
parliamentary democracy in Hungary.141 In many respects Andor’s conceptualisation of the 
transition in post-Soviet CEE is analogous to that offered by Amsden et al. and Stiglitz. 
Hence, similar to Amsden and Stiglitz, Andor locates the transition within the context of 
the deepening economic crisis of ‘state socialism’ in Hungary and elsewhere in the region 
from the 1970s and onwards, and the wider ideological shift from Keynesianism to 
neoliberalism in economic policymaking. However, in contrast to the above authors, 
Andor provides a more detailed and sophisticated account of the ascendancy of 
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neoliberalism in Hungary, which places a stronger emphasis on the role of domestic 
economic and political actors and processes.  
 
Drawing on Kornai’s influential conceptualisation of the ‘socialist’ system, which we 
briefly outlined in the previous section, Andor traces the roots of Hungary’s impending 
‘neoliberal restoration’ to the deepening crisis of ‘state socialism’ from the 1970s and 
onwards.142 By then, the material reserves of the command economy were increasingly 
becoming exhausted. Despite numerous attempts by the Kádár regime to introduce market 
reforms ‘from above’, the Hungarian economy failed to improve its competitiveness in the 
world market, resulting in economic stagnation and increasing indebtedness. As the 
economic crisis deepened in the 1980s, it led to an erosion of the social basis of the Kádár 
regime, accompanied by ‘increasing internal and external pressures calling for more urgent 
and radical reforms’.143 According to Andor,  
By the summer of 1989, the transition elite – including the members of the Németh 
government [the last ‘communist’ government in Hungary, in office between November 
1988-May 1990], as well as vocal groups of the opposition – had arrived at their programme 
of a “market economy without adjectives” [jelző nélküli piacgazdaság]. In essence, this 
meant the rejection of any limitations upon the ownership of private property and the 
elevation of neoliberal economic philosophy to the programme of government.144  
 
But how did this ideological volte face came about in the first place? According to 
Andor, three processes were essential.145 The first was the growing influence of external 
actors, in particular the IMF or the World Bank, in economic policymaking from the early 
1980s and onwards. In order to avert the threat of financial bankruptcy, the Kádár regime 
had joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1982. However, while membership in 
international financial institutions provided much-needed loans to the ailing Hungarian 
economy and brought the political recognition for the Kádár regime in the West, it proved 
to be a double-edged sword. As Hungary’s debt crisis deepened in the 1980s, it became an 
increasingly powerful leverage in the hands of international financial institutions, enabling 
them to request Hungarian policymakers to implement radical economic reforms in 
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exchange for further loans. Following the historical demise of ‘state socialism’ between 
1989-1991, the countries of the region became a key laboratory for neoliberal reform. The 
IMF, World Bank, and regional bureaucratic organisations, such as the EU, now became 
active agents in market transition. According to Phillips et al., ‘Nowhere in this region, 
however, was the “power” of these agencies to frame the terms of economic management 
greater than in Hungary’.146  
 
External pressures were, however, by themselves, not enough for neoliberal ideas to take 
hold inside Hungary. Thus, the second factor behind the ascendancy of neoliberalism in 
Hungary was the gradual ideological conversion of domestic intellectuals, somewhat akin 
to a Kuhnian ‘paradigm shift’ in the social sciences.147 As Phillips et al. argue, ‘[w]hile 
foreign advocates of neoliberal reform had long-standing interests in Hungary and Eastern 
Europe more generally, it is clear that the dissemination of ideas did not simply flow from 
West to East. At the very least, the process involved a dialogue with reformers in the 
domestic sphere who were already sympathetic to policy propositions derived from 
neoliberal economics’.148 Putting this argument to work, Andor shows that despite the 
ideological and political restrictions imposed by the Kádár regime following the crushing 
of the 1956 revolution, Hungarian intellectuals continued to have access to ‘Western’ ideas 
in economic theory, as well as in other areas. For example, at the prestigious Karl Marx 
University of Economics in Budapest (now the Corvinus University of Budapest), which 
then, as now, was considered to be the principal institution for the education of Hungary’s 
economic and political elite, ‘non-Marxist’ economics had been taught since the late 
1950s, keeping students up-to-date on developments in neoclassical, Keynesian, and 
monetarist thought. A translated version of Keynes’ magnum opus, The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest, and Money (1936), had already been published in 1965, while the 
works of more radical neoclassical theorists, such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek 
were available to Hungarian economists by the early 1980s. Moreover, since 1964 
Hungarian economists were able to travel to the United States for research purposes 
through Ford Foundation fellowships.149 From the mid-1980s, the Soros Foundation, an 
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influential private foundation set up by the Hungarian-American business magnate and 
philanthropist George Soros, began to offer intellectual and financial assistance for 
Hungarian dissidents favouring radical reforms and systemic change.150 Hence, as Phillips 
et al. have pointed out, ‘[by] the dawn of the transformation process, neoliberal ideas were 
already well embedded in Hungary’s “intellectual ether”.’151 To Hungarian reformers then, 
the terminal crisis of state socialism in the late 1980s seemed confirmed the validity of 
neoliberal doxa.  
 
Third, and finally, Andor argues that Hungary’s neoliberal transition also coincided with 
‘the concrete material interests of domestic economic actors’. This included powerful 
sections of the state bureaucracy, associated with the Ministry of Finance and the 
Hungarian National Bank (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, MNB), as well as sections of the 
economic and political elite, in particular the (neo)liberal SZDSZ and liberal sections 
inside the MSZP, who, according to Andor, all favoured a ‘finance-driven’ model of 
capital accumulation based on neoliberal shock therapy.152 Unfortunately, however, he 
does not go into detail as to how this process took place.  
 
As for the outcomes of Hungary’s double transformation, Andor argues that they have 
been highly contradictory. Thus while Hungary’s ‘new capitalism’ is characterised by a 
high degree of ‘openness’, the benefits of this have not ‘trickled down’ to ordinary 
Hungarians. Instead, the Hungarian economy continues to be plagued by its ‘dualistic 
structure’ (characterised by the coexistence of a technically advanced, highly productive 
manufacturing sector, largely controlled by multinational corporations, and an 
underdeveloped agricultural sector with low productivity and wages), and all the 
drawbacks that follow from it, in terms of high unemployment, regional inequality.153  The 
onset of the ‘global financial crisis’ revealed the inherent weaknesses of this model. 
Drawing on the insights of Keynes, Andor has proposed the need to promote alternative 
economic policies, emphasising increased state economic intervention to promote 
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employment growth, redistribution of income, and the achievement of long-term, 
‘sustainable development’.154  
 
 
Between ‘Old’ Institutionalism and ‘New’ Institutionalism: Bohle and 
Greskovits’ Interpretation of the Transformation  
The third school of thought within the institutionalist approach comes from those that have 
sought to combine the insights of ‘old’ institutionalism, as epitomised by the work of Karl 
Polanyi, and ‘new’ institutionalism, as represented by the increasingly influential VOC 
approach.155 This school is here associated with the work of Dorothee Bohle and Béla 
Greskovits, two comparative political economists based at the Central European University 
(CEU) in Budapest, who have written extensively on the emerging capitalist regimes in 
CEE.156 Based on critical reading of the VOC literature, while also drawing on Karl 
Polanyi’s conceptualisation of capitalism157, as well as Peter Katzenstein’s work on ‘small 
states’158 and Gösta Esping-Andersen’s notion of different ‘worlds of welfare 
capitalism’159, Bohle and Greskovits propose a typology of capitalist regimes in CEE based 
on Weberian ideal-typical distinctions between: 1) the ‘pure neoliberal’ regimes found in 
the Baltic states; 2) the ‘embedded neoliberal’160 regimes in the four so-called ‘Visegrád 
states’ (V4) of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia; and 3) the ‘neo-
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corporatist’ regime existent in Slovenia.161 On the basis of careful analysis of empirical 
data, Bohle and Greskovits argue that their socio-economic regimes differ from other 
varieties of post-socialist capitalism, and, to a lesser degree, between themselves, in three 
important aspects.  
 
Firstly, similar to evolutionary sociologists, Bohle and Greskovits emphasise the enduring 
role of past legacies, including the distinct problems of state formation and nationalism, 
late capitalist development, ‘paternalist welfare states’, and a contradictory relationship 
with the ‘West’ in shaping the development of emerging capitalist regimes in the region. In 
this regard, Hungary was in many ways in a fortunate position compared to other countries 
in the region. Contrary to the Baltic States, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the 
former Yugoslav republics, reformers in Hungary managed to avoid the burdens of nation-
state building in the 1990s (which in the case of Yugoslavia descended into war). Similar 
to Poland, the ‘double transformation’ to capitalism and parliamentary democracy in 
Hungary was achieved peacefully, through a ‘negotiated revolution’ between ‘reform 
communists’ and the opposition. In addition, Hungarian policymakers could, similar to 
Poland and Slovenia, draw on a long history of experimentation with ‘reform socialism’, 
which became an advantage following the transition to capitalism and democracy. This 
was supported by domestic elites, which consisted of an ‘unholy alliance’ between 
pragmatic and cooperative pro-democratic opposition groups, internationally linked and 
oriented financial and policymaking technocrats, and the reformist wing of the party-state. 
On the downside, however, both Hungary and Poland were limited in their economic 
policymaking choices due to the large external debts and macroeconomic imbalances 
accumulated in the 1980s. As a result, with the exception of Slovenia, all governments in 
the region embraced some form of economic neoliberalism.162 
 
Second, Bohle and Greskovits distinguish between the different accumulation strategies 
pursued by the emergent capitalist regimes in the region.  In terms of their transformational 
strategy, the V4 states occupy an intermediate position between the ‘market radicalist’ 
approach pursued by the Baltic States, based on a vigorous adherence to macroeconomic 
                                                
161 In their earlier work, the authors also included a fourth group, the ‘world market driven neoliberalisms’ 
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162 Bohle and Greskovits . Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery, pp. 55-82. 
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stability and radically liberalised markets, and the ‘neocorporatist’ model pursued by 
Slovenia, based on consensual industrial relations and an interventionist state. Motivated 
by the complex interplay of structural (inter-state rivalry, the existence of complex 
industries with well developed linkages to transnational corporations in advanced capitalist 
economies, etc.) and institutional factors (a potent mix of low, in some cases even flat, 
corporate taxes and generous investment incentives), the V4 economies were able to attract 
large inflows of foreign investment in the 1990s and 2000s. This, the authors contend, 
contributed to industrial upgrading and restructuring (most clearly evidenced in the car 
manufacturing and electronics industries), and helped to spur ‘both virtuous and vicious 
circles of foreign-led accumulation.’163 Among the V4 economies, Hungary has been a 
pioneer in pursuing a foreign-led accumulation strategy. Bohle and Greskovits trace the 
origins of this strategy to the huge external debt accumulated by the Kádár regime in the 
1980s. Because of its obligations to service Hungary’s large external debt, successive 
governments in Budapest were highly dependent on hard currency cash receipts, which, 
however, ‘were only available from exports and privatisation.’164  
 
Thirdly, and finally, Bohle and Greskovits point out that the capitalist regimes emerging in 
CEE also differ in terms of the degree of political stability and social cohesion. 
Governments in the ‘pure neoliberal’ regimes of the Baltic States have supported a 
‘minimal state’ and the marginalisation of ethnic (Russian) minorities in society. At the 
other end of the spectrum is Slovenia, which is characterised by neo-corporatist institutions 
and a relatively generous welfare state. Hungary and other Visegrád states fall in between 
these two extremes. Their democratic regimes have been politically stable, while their 
governments have, until the late 2000s at least, offered relatively generous, targeted social 
protection to workers and vulnerable groups in society, including education, health care, 
pensions, labour market policies, family and child care, and social housing.165 According 
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to Bohle and Greskovits, this is in large part thanks to the fact that enlightened political 
elites were:  
aware of the social hardships caused by the collapse [of state socialism] and the market 
reforms, but they could not fall back upon identity politics and disenfranchise large parts of 
the affected population to muffle protests as the Baltic states did. At the same time, they 
shied away from offering institutionalised voice to unions and the losers of reforms, the way 
Slovenia did. Rather, they decided to offer ad hoc compensation in the form of relatively 
generous targeted social protection packages in order to overcome opposition to reforms.166  
 
This model of ‘compensation without institutionalised interest representation’, which can 
be found in all V4 countries, is also similar to the ‘dual democratic regimes’ found in many 
Latin American societies.167  
 
 
Problematic Aspects of the Institutionalist Approach to the Transformation 
The transformation of CEE and the former Soviet Union has not been characterised by 
uniformity and the convergence towards an optimal model of capitalism, as initially 
predicted by neoliberal economists. Rather, as the institutionalist approach demonstrates, 
the neoliberal approach to the transformation was based on mistaken theoretical 
assumptions, which were ill-equipped for the promotion of ‘sustainable’ capitalist 
development in conditions of ‘post-socialism’. Moreover, the approaches discussed above 
have shed light on the role of past legacies and institutions, in particular the state, in 
shaping the transformation in the region. By so doing, insitutionalist scholars have 
provided a powerful criticism of the neoliberal approach to the transformation and the 
assumption that, no matter when in history or where in social geography, the presence of 
market institutions automatically translates into economic growth and prosperity. Since the 
late 1990s, this more cautious approach to the transformation has also been acknowledged 
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by some of those who had previously been amongst the most ardent supporters of 
neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ in the region.168   
 
Having said this, the institutionalist approach suffers from two important shortcomings. 
The first relates to the seldom-acknowledged employment (pace Andor) of a similar, static 
comparative framework, as utilised by many neoliberal economists. Hence, similar to 
neoliberal economists, scholars associated with the institutionalist approach tend to 
perceive the societies that existed in Eastern Europe between 1945-1989 as fundamentally 
different from those in the West (although the taxonomies used to describe these societies 
differ from those used by neoliberals; e.g. ‘socialism’ in the neoliberal literature, as 
compared to ‘state socialism’ in the institutionalist literature). As a result, they end up 
repeating the same conceptual problems associated with the neoliberal approach described 
above.  
 
The second main point of criticism refers to the policy prescriptions offered by the 
institutionalists in order to overcome the problems of neoliberal capitalism. As we have 
noted above, institutionalists advocate ‘gradual’ market reforms and a ‘return of the state’ 
in economic planning and development. This is underpinned by a theory of the state, which 
sees it as an independent mediator between competing actors in the economy. However, as 
Marxist political economists have continuously stressed, under capitalism the primary role 
of the state is to guarantee the reproduction of capital within its borders, rather than to act 
as an ‘honest broker’ between capital and labour.169 As Shields points out in recent 
critique, this poses a difficult question for institutionalists: could the spectacular growth 
rates achieved by the Asian ‘Tiger economies’ in the period between 1970-1990, or, more 
recently, that of China, could have been achieved under democratic regimes?170 Moreover, 
not all states in the international state system have the same power to pursue independent 
economic policies in the competition for capital accumulation. Hence, while 
institutionalists frequently compare the CEE economies to China, describing the latter as 
                                                
168 See for example, Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism and id. Open Society: Reforming Global 
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169 Fred Block, Revising State Theory, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1987; Chris Harman, ‘The 
State and Capitalism Today’, International Socialism, 1991, Vol. 2, No. 51, pp. 3-57. For a summary of 
Marxist perspectives on the state, see Bill Dunn, Global Political Economy: A Marxist Critique, London: 
Pluto Press, 2009, pp. 306-317. 
170 Shields, The International Political Economy of Transition, p. 31. 
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an example of ‘successful’ transition from central planning to a market economy, this fails 
to recognise the fact that the former are in a weak, intermediary position compared to more 
powerful states in the global political economy (such as the United States, Germany, or 
indeed China). Finally, as we shall demonstrate in further detail in Chapter 5, the 
neoliberal restructuring of Hungary and other CEE economies has been highly dependent 
on foreign direct investment from multinational corporations based in more advanced 
capitalist states, but the CEE economies have been the dependent partner in this 
relationship. Industrial upgrading based on foreign direct investment is thus not a 
straightforward component of ‘successful’ transformation, but arguably an essential part of 
the increasing power of Western-based multinational capital in the region.  
 
 
‘Against the Current’: Marxist-inspired Approaches of 
the Transformation 
The demise of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1991 has frequently been described as the definite 
end of the ‘socialist’ experiment in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and, indeed the terminal 
point of Marxism, as a method for scientific inquiry into society. However, a number of 
Marxist-inspired approaches have sought to offer a more critical approach to the 
transformation in CEE. Here below, we critically review two influential Marxist-inspired 
approaches to the transformation – world-systems theory and neo-Gramscianism – before 
presenting the central tenets of an alternative approach, drawing on the insights of state 
capitalism theory.  
  
 
World-systems Theory 
The first Marxist-inspired approach to the CEE transformations is constituted by world-
systems theory, as originally developed by Immanuel Wallerstein,171 and later elaborated 
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by Giovanni Arrighi172 and Christopher Chase-Dunn,173 amongst others. Drawing on 
insights from the French Annales School of historiography, associated with Marc Bloch 
and Fernand Braudel, non-orthodox Marxism, and dependencia theory,174 world-systems 
theory does indeed challenge some of the central assumptions of orthodox approaches to 
the transformation.175 To begin with, world-systems theory insists that the modern world-
system needs to be conceptualised as a ‘totality’, which develops dialectically and 
historically, over what Braudel defined as ‘the longue durée’176. The origins of the modern 
world-system date back to the ‘long sixteenth century’, when strong states in Northern and 
Southwestern Europe were able to colonise, and later dominate, through more informal 
means, societies elsewhere in the world.177 The modern world-system is conceived as a 
‘capitalist world-economy’, which is hierarchically organised and driven by ‘the endless 
accumulation of capital’, and comprised by a plurality of institutions, including markets for 
the buying and selling commodities, firms, a multiplicity of states acting within a 
hierarchical interstate system, households, classes, and ‘status-groups’.178 These different 
structures are connected together through a hierarchically organised international division 
of labour, in which advanced capitalist states in the ‘core’ perform high-value added 
manufacturing, while poor states in the ‘periphery’ supply primary materials. Between 
these two extremes we find the countries of the ‘semi-periphery’, which perform basic, 
labour-intensive manufacturing, while, at the same time, playing a key, political role in the 
world-system, as potential agents for progressive change and systemic transformation, or, 
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conversely, as a force of stabilisation, preventing the system from becoming too 
polarised.179  
 
Although not explicitly identified, the former interpretations draws on classical Marxist 
analyses of imperialism, as undertaken by Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and others, for 
whom early twentieth century Russia was in a unique position on the ‘fringes’ of capitalist 
development – not fully industrialised, yet still considered amongst the European elite.180 
For Lenin and the Bolsheviks then, the imperialist capitalist world system could be 
overthrown by a socialist revolution in its ‘weakest link’; e.g. Tsarist Russia.181 This 
optimist view is, however, not shared by most world-system theorists. For example, 
Wallerstein claims that the semi-periphery essentially represents a safety valve for 
capitalist development in the world-system, providing capitalists with the ability ‘to shift 
capital from a declining sector to a rising sector’, in order to ‘profit from the wage-
productivity squeeze of the leading sector’.182 More recently, Chase-Dunn has pointed out 
that ‘some states are able to move upward in the core/periphery hierarchy.’ However, as he 
goes on to conclude, ‘these cases of upward mobility [are] exceptions against the 
background of the more frequent “development of underdevelopment.”’183   
 
So where does this leave Hungary and other transformation states in CEE and the former 
Soviet Union? According to world-systems theorists, the countries of the region constitute 
a semi-peripheral part of the capitalist world-economy par excellence – together with other 
classical examples, such as Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela in Central and Latin 
America, or China, Korea, and Vietnam in Southeast Asia.184 The economic, political, and 
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cultural ‘backwardness’ of the region predates its absorption into the broader, Western-
dominated world economy.185 Over the centuries, this backwardness was entrenched 
through the processes of ‘re-feudalisation’, the reinforcement of a ‘second serfdom’, and 
unfavourable shifts in world trade routes.186 For world-systems theorists, the ‘state 
socialist’ regimes that came to power in Eastern Europe after World War II, when analysed 
in the context of world history, were part of a wider ‘anti-systemic movement’, which 
aimed to promote ‘late development’ in the semi-periphery, in opposition to bourgeois 
conceptions of it and the interests of hegemonic states of the capitalist-world economy.187 
But these achievements were not purely ideological. In a detailed survey, Arrighi showed 
that, between 1948-1988, the ‘state socialist’ economies outperformed many of their 
‘capitalist’ competitors in the semi-periphery, including the economies of southern and 
central Africa, as well as Turkey and Egypt, in GNP per capita terms, while being on par 
with Latin America excluding Brazil.188 Yet, despite these ‘achievements’, the ‘state 
socialist’ development model ultimately failed because of economic, geopolitical, and 
ideological pressures from the capitalist-world economy.189  
 
In Hungary, the conceptual framework of world-systems theory has been influential 
amongst critics of neoliberal transformation. The most prominent representative of world-
systems theory has been Péter Szigeti.190 Drawing on the works of Wallerstein and Arrighi, 
he traces the origins of the transformation in CEE to the demise of ‘state socialism’191 in 
1989, when the countries of the region were formally restored to their semi-peripheral 
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position in the capitalist world-economy. Since then, Szigeti argues, a ‘new capitalism’ has 
taken root in Hungary (and elsewhere in the region), characterised by ‘extreme openness’ 
to ‘foreign’ capital, and high dependence on exports to advanced capitalist states in the 
core of the world-economy (in the case of Hungary, its largest trading partner is 
Germany).192 While the transformation has contributed to some technological upgrading 
and the improvement of work culture, Szigeti argues that it has also comes with 
disadvantages, in the form of deteriorating terms of trade, exploitation, and the 
commercialisation of mass culture. This contradiction, which, according to Szigeti, reflects 
‘the dilemma of openness-closeness’ that is a distinct feature of the semi-periphery, is 
aggravated by ‘the arrival of new competitors in global capitalism, who often possess a 
greater economic strength than our [Hungary’s] entire national economy.’193 Analysing the 
balance sheet of the regime change in Hungary, Szigeti argues that the socio-economic and 
political outcomes of the transformation have been far from impressive: ‘The performance 
of this new configuration … is roughly equivalent of the output of the state socialist system, 
but its distribution of resources and incomes is much more polarised.’194 The 
transformation of class relations after 1989 has led to the enrichment of a couple of 
hundred thousand of domestic ‘oligarchs’, ‘who have managed to catch up with the core, 
while the number of people living below the poverty line has grown with at least 3.5 times, 
to one-third of the population. … [Meanwhile] a large, non-integrated underclass has 
developed, primarily comprised of the Roma, who struggle to survive on continuously 
reduced welfare provisions.’195 Although Hungary’s ‘new capitalism’ is blatantly 
inegalitarian, Szigeti argues that it serves the interest of multinational corporations based in 
the core, who are able to extract ‘superprofits’ from their operations in Hungary.196 In 
contrast to orthodox accounts, Szigeti argues that the new capitalist regimes that have 
emerged in CEE are politically unstable. Parliamentary democracy in Hungary, he argues, 
is ‘pregnant with tensions’, since ‘the potential for social conflict outgrows the political 
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system’s … problem-solving abilities.’ This, in turn, leads to ‘problems of legitimacy’, 
and, provides a fertile ground for the Hungarian far-right to mobilise support for a ‘second 
revolution’, as a response to the failures of the regime change. Hence, as the Hungarian 
example demonstrates, ‘the semi-periphery is not a road to paradise’.197  
 
 
Neo-Gramscianism 
The second Marxist-inspired approach is neo-Gramscianism, which draws on the work of 
the Italian revolutionary and political theorist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937).198 In 
scholarly International Relations and International Political Economy this approach is 
associated with the seminal work of Robert Cox,199 while contributions from different 
members of the ‘Amsterdam school of International Relations’,200 Stephen Gill,201 Mark 
Rupert,202 Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton203, have developed the approach 
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further. Similar to world-systems theory, these contributions have challenged central 
assumptions of mainstream International Relations and International Political Economy, 
while at the same time rejecting ‘orthodox Marxism’.204 What distinguishes this approach 
from other Marxist approaches, such as world-systems theory, is an interest in 
transnational relations, which are viewed as central to an understanding of the 
international political economy. A particular affinity is the authors’ substitution of the 
‘state’ with the ‘state-society complex’, which, in the words of Overbeek, represents a ‘key 
point of departure for the re-theorisation of transnational class formation’.205 From this it 
follows that, ‘politics is primarily about social forces rather than “actors” in their own 
right.’206 As a result, ‘hegemony’ on the international level is seen as being exercised by 
transnational classes/social forces, not states, as argued by world-systems theory. As 
Overbeek puts it, ‘Hegemony in the global system is … a form of class rule, and not a 
primarily as a relationship between states.’207 
 
By now there is also a growing literature on the post-Soviet states of CEE from the 
perspective of the neo-Gramscian school, which has arguably ‘offer[ed] a significant 
methodological and substantive reorientation for transitological studies’.208 Having said 
this, initial attempts to ‘apply’ a neo-Gramscian perspective on the transformation in CEE 
focused primarily on examining the efforts of transnational agents, such as the EU or the 
European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) to extend their hegemonic projects 
eastwards.209 While such studies have provided useful insights on the coercive pressures 
associated with EU membership or foreign direct investment in shaping the transformation, 
they remain problematic in not adequately historicising the social relations of production 
in CEE or addressing the role of domestic class relations and struggles between capital and 
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labour, as well as different ‘fractions of capital’210 emerging within the region after the 
demise ‘actually existing socialism’.211 However, since the neo-Gramscian approach has 
not been applied to study the transformation in Hungary, we shall not analyse it in further 
detail here. 
 
 
Towards an Alternative? The Theory of State Capitalism 
Having said this, I argue that there is one Marxist account that might be helpful to 
overcome the above-listed shortcomings. That is the theory of ‘state capitalism’, which has 
been employed in Marxist debates in a variety of different ways over the years.212 The way 
we use the term in this thesis draws upon the works of a number of revolutionary Marxists, 
such as C.L.R. James, Rada Dunayevskaya, and Tony Cliff, who became leading figures in 
the various Trotskyist movements that developed in opposition to the Fourth International 
after World War II.213 More recently, their ideas have been developed by for example 
Chris Harman and Mike Haynes.214 
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As with most advances in Marxist thinking, the genesis of state capitalism theory was a 
politically strategic innovation: a means to develop a revolutionary socialist praxis in the 
specific context of the ideological rigidity that characterised world politics after World 
War II. Similar to other revolutionary Marxists at the time, the crucial question facing 
James, Dunayevskaya, and Cliff was whether the Soviet Union and its satellite states in 
Eastern Europe represented a genuine ‘socialist’ alternative to the ‘capitalist’ states in the 
West. In the specific case of the Eastern European People’s Republics after 1947, this 
meant, for example, asking whether ‘socialism’ could be imposed by diktat from Moscow, 
or whether it necessitated the working classes of those countries taking control over the 
means of production and the state?  
 
The dominant position in this debate was taken up by the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU), led by Joseph Stalin, and diligently supported by its sister parties in 
Eastern Europe, for whom the Soviet-style societies were indeed ‘socialist’. At the time, 
the overwhelming majority of all Marxists in the West also shared this perspective. (As we 
have noted above, this remains the dominant view within the transformatology literature as 
well.) As Alex Callinicos has noted, this view was based on what Marx had described as a 
‘metaphysical or juridical illusion’, which gives superiority to legal forms of ownership 
rather than effective ownership of the means of production.215 Following this logic, the 
Soviet-style societies were necessarily ‘socialist’ (albeit with important ‘distortions’), since 
the state controlled the means of production and the workers, through the vanguard party, 
controlled the state. Thus, the task of the proletariat in the West was to ally themselves 
with the workers’ states in the Soviet bloc in their struggle against imperialism and 
international capitalism.  
 
In contrast to this, James, Dunayevskaya, Cliff, and their followers argued that the Soviet 
Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe were ‘state capitalist’ societies. Broadly 
speaking, their argument can be summarised as follows. To begin with, they emphasised 
the central role of accumulation in the development of Soviet-style societies. According to 
Marx, the distinctive feature of capitalist production, which distinguishes it from previous 
class societies, is the compulsive character assumed by accumulation. As he explains in 
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volume 1 of Capital, the endless accumulation of capital is the consequence of the 
competitive nature of capitalism:  
The development of capitalist production makes it constantly necessary to keep increasing 
the amount of capital laid out in a given industrial undertaking, and competition makes the 
immanent laws of capitalist production to be felt by each individual capitalist as external, 
coercive laws. It compels him to keep constantly expanding his capital, in order to preserver 
it, but extend it he cannot except by means of progressive accumulation. …  
 Therefore save, save – i.e. reconvert the greatest possible portion of surplus value or 
surplus product into capital! Accumulation for accumulation’s sake, production for 
production’s sake!216 
 
Second, in contrast to the ‘methodological nationalism’ adhered to by orthodox 
Marxists, state capitalism theory argues that the development of Soviet-style societies 
needs to be understood in relation to the wider capitalist world system around them. 
However, capitalism had undoubtedly undergone profound changes since the time of 
Marx. On the one hand, the expansion of the world market meant that capitalism has 
become a truly global system operating under the law of value. On the other hand, 
however, the development of capitalism in the early 20th century went hand in hand with 
increasing state intervention in the economy. As leading Marxist thinkers (e.g. Nikolai 
Bukharin, Vladimir Lenin, and others) noted at the time, competition between enterprises 
in the domestic economy was increasingly regulated by state intervention, which meant 
that the rivalry of competing capitals increasingly shifted to a ‘higher level’, to competition 
on the world market. As World War I and World War II brutally demonstrated, this rivalry 
could take the shape of military conflict between capitalist states.217  
 
For the proponents of state capitalism theory, compulsive accumulation of capital and 
systematic competition were also conspicuous features of Soviet-style economies. 
According to Cliff, its origins dated back to the late 1920s, when they arose as an attempt 
by new Soviet leadership, following Stalin’s brutal rise to power, to salvage the 
increasingly isolated Soviet Union, following the defeats of the socialist revolutions in 
Germany (1918-1923) and Hungary (1919), and counter the rising threat of foreign 
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military intervention.218 Thus, the new regime in Moscow increasingly came to prioritise 
Soviet ‘national interests’ over the promotion of international socialist revolution. This 
approach became legitimised by the doctrine of ‘socialism in one country’, originally put 
forward by Stalin in 1924, developed by Bukharin in 1925, and elevated to state policy by 
Stalin in 1926.219 However, in order to counter the threat of foreign invasion, the Soviet 
Union needed to have access to the latest weapons, which could only be produced by an 
advanced industrial economy. But the resources necessary to industrialise the country 
could only be obtained from the ‘surplus labour’ of workers and peasants. Thus, Stalin 
elevated the Soviet economy onto a new course of ‘forced industrialisation’. As famously 
stipulated by the First Five-Year Plan, introduced in 1929, the central aim of the Soviet 
Union now became to ‘catch up and overtake’ the advanced capitalist states in the West in 
a period of ten years. As we shall see in Chapter 3, similarly ambitious economic 
programmes were introduced in Hungary and other Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe 
following their incorporation into the Soviet ‘sphere of interest’ after the onset of the Cold 
War. 
 
In order to sustain the industrialisation drive, land was ‘collectivised’, in the form of 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and placed under the control of the state. It has been estimated 
that tens of millions of peasants died in the process, while those that resisted forced 
collectivisation were denounced as kulaks, enemies of the proletariat, and sent to work in 
labour camps in Siberia. However, this brutal policy provided the regime with the grain 
necessary to feed the towns, and to sell on international markets, where it could earn the 
foreign exchange necessary to buy advanced Western machinery and equipment. At the 
same time, an enormous range of heavy industries was built from nothing. As a result of 
forced collectivisation, peasants were driven from their land and sucked into the new 
factories, where their labour power contributed to the industrialisation drive.  
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The above developments bear a striking similarity to the processes that Marx had famously 
associated with the ‘primitive accumulation’ of capital in Western Europe in volume 1 of 
Capital, and which relied on the massive use of the coercive powers of the state – to drive 
peasants from the land and expropriate their property, discipline labour into working 
longer hours and thus produce ‘surplus value’, conquer, enslave, and rob the indigenous 
peoples in the so-called ‘colonies’ of their wealth, while ensuring that unemployed 
‘vagabonds’ closer to home were not threatening society.220 ‘These methods’, Marx went 
on to note, ‘all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of 
society, to hasten, as in a hothouse, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of 
production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition.’221 However, while the 
brutal process of ‘primitive accumulation’ took the bourgeoisie in Western Europe 
centuries to be achieved, it was achieved in a couple of decades in Stalin’s Russia, and 
resulted in millions of deaths. Yet, the outcome was the same: producers were separated 
from their means of production and forced to sell their labour power in order to survive. 
 
Third, and finally, in contrast to all of the other approaches to the transformation described 
above, state capitalism theory argues that the Soviet-bloc regimes were not ‘socialist’ 
states, in which the working class held political power. Rather, compulsive accumulation 
and competition also had a profound impact on the social relations of production and 
institutions existent in Soviet-style societies. As Marx and Engels had already pointed out 
in The Communist Manifesto:  
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, 
everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. 
All fixed, fast-frozen relations relationships, with their train of ancient and venerable 
prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they 
can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last 
compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his 
kind.222   
 
Similarly, although the Soviet bloc regimes formally described themselves as ‘socialist’ 
states, the combined pressures of economic and geopolitical competition with the West 
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meant that a distinct ruling class continued to exist in these societies. The outcome of this 
was that the ruling bureaucracy within the Soviet regimes (the nomenklatura) was, in the 
famous formulation of Marx, just as much ‘personifications of accumulation’,223 as their 
‘capitalist’ counterparts on the other side of the Iron Curtain. ‘They were,’ as Harman puts 
it, ‘members of a capitalist class, even if a it was a class which collectively rather than 
individually carried through exploitation and accumulation.’224 This, in turn, meant that 
those at the top of state capitalist economies were exposed to similar pressures as their 
counterparts in the West. As Harman points out,  
those who control the state and industry [the bureaucracy] have continually to worry about 
how costs of production inside the country compare with the average costs in the rest of the 
world: that is, they have to hold down wages, keep up continual pressure to force speed up 
on workers and aim at levels of investment that will enable the national economy to match 
the effort of economies elsewhere in the world. In other words, although individual 
enterprises may not be directly involved in competition with other enterprises, the national 
economy as a whole is.225 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, I believe that the theory of state capitalism can be very 
useful for: a) explaining the contradictory nature of the system that was established in 
Hungary and Eastern European societies from 1947 and onwards and its initial successes; 
b) providing an explanation of its gradual decline, from the mid-1960s and onwards, and 
ultimate demise in 1989-1991; and c) enabling us to break with the ‘methodological 
nationalism’ that permeates much of the literature on the transformation to this day and 
analyse the Soviet-style societies as part of an interconnected capitalist world system, 
while simultaneously helping us to identify the potential agents of neoliberalism within 
Soviet-style societies: those sections of the nomenklatura that would benefit from a switch 
from a state-led capitalism to a more free-market capitalism.226 Having said this, there are 
important limitations to state capitalism theory. One important issue, which remains 
undertheorised within state capitalism theory are the concrete methods with which 
neoliberal ideas gained ascendancy among the leaders of the Soviet bloc in the 1980s. 
Another important question, which we believe that state capitalism theory by itself is not 
able to account for, is the contradictory and variegated development of the capitalist 
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regimes in the region after 1989.227 In order to explain these processes, as they relate to 
Hungary, we will therefore in the following chapters draw on a number of other concepts 
in Marxist political economy, including ‘concentration’ and ‘centralisation’, ‘crisis’, and 
‘uneven and combined development’. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have engaged with different theoretical approaches to the ‘double 
transformation’ in CEE and the former Soviet Union. As we have seen, both orthodox 
accounts of the transformation – which we identified with neoliberalism and 
institutionalism – have depicted the societies in ‘East’ and ‘West’ as two separate systems, 
guided by fundamentally different logics. The deepening socio-economic and politico-
ideological crisis of the Soviet-style societies from the 1970s and onwards is thus 
considered as endogenous in nature. They were rooted in the inherent shortcomings of an 
economic system (‘socialism’), which Kornai describes as being characterised by 
‘incoherence, internal contradictions, and lack of stability.’228 The origins of the 
transformation are here conceived as the result of the socialist states’ imperfect 
modernisation and failure to adapt themselves to liberal-capitalist societies. The terminal 
crisis of the Eastern bloc is thus ultimately perceived as external to capitalism. A simple 
axiomatic message follows from this claim: the downfall of the Eastern bloc represented 
‘the failure of an entire system’ (‘socialism’), and he ultimate proof of the market’s 
superiority over central planning.  
 
Although these approaches remain dominant within mainstream academic and 
policymaking circles, we have identified a number of shortcomings. Firstly, they tend to 
analyse the Soviet-style societies in isolation from broader dynamics in the world 
economy. As a result, they tend to ignore or downplay the many similarities that existed 
between ‘East’ and ‘West’ during the Cold War. As a result, they either fail to recognise or 
under-theorise how it was that many of the problems facing the Soviet-style economies in 
the East from the mid-1970s and onwards (crisis of capital accumulation, overproduction, 
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debt, budget imbalances, etc.) appeared in the Western ‘varieties of capitalism’ at roughly 
the same time. Secondly, the above approaches have, by and large, failed to provide a 
convincing account of why Eastern European reformers in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
preferred to turn to neoliberalism, rather than let’s say, some ‘Third Way’ or ‘market 
socialist’ alternative? After all, dirigiste capitalist regimes in continental Europe (France, 
Germany, Sweden) and Southeast Asia (South Korea, Japan) had been able to produce 
robust economic growth, while maintaining corporatist relations between capital and 
labour. Similarly, governments in Eastern Europe could have built on a strong tradition of 
market reformist thinking, which had inspired attempts to introduce market reforms ‘from 
above’ since the mid-1960s. Moreover, neoliberal economic policies do not necessarily fit 
easily with the social bases and intellectual traditions of the political parties that have been 
vying for power since the regime change, meaning that, once in office, any government 
would have to have been willing to implement neoliberal reforms against the interests of 
its own electorate. Thirdly, as a result of the above, they have tended to account for the 
transition as an exogenously driven process, thus downplaying the role of endogenous 
forces and processes. Arguably, many of the problems indicated above, are, by and large, 
also true for more critical approaches to the transformation, such as world-systems theory 
and neo-Gramscianism (pace Shields), although they do emphasise the coercive pressures 
behind the transformation.  
 
We propose that there is one Marxist account of the Soviet-style societies that might be 
helpful to overcome these shortcomings. That is the theory of ‘state capitalism’ – a theory 
originally developed by German Social Democrats (SPD) to explain the character of the 
increasingly militarised German economy in the late 19th and early 20th century, and which 
has later been used by Marxists to describe developments in Soviet Russia, Eastern 
Europe, China, and various ‘Third World’ countries. Drawing on Marx’s understanding of 
the capitalist mode of production, the theory of state capitalism emphasises the similarities 
between ‘socialist’ and ‘capitalist’ economies. Hence, although the Soviet bloc regimes 
referred to themselves as ‘socialist’, these societies were actually characterised by the 
persistence of capitalist features: the separation of the means of production from the 
producers, wage labour and its ‘subsumption’ to capital, exploitation, hierarchic division of 
labour, money economy, rent, brutal repression of working class resistance (e.g. Hungary 
1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and Poland 1980-1981), the feverish drive to accumulate 
capital – an imperative decreed by economic and geopolitical competition with the ‘West’. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, it means that rather than operating according to a different 
logic, the Soviet-style societies were exposed to similar systemic pressures to their 
‘capitalist’ counterparts in the West. In the following two chapters we seek to demonstrate 
how these pressures shaped economic policy and power relations in nominally ‘socialist’ 
Hungary, and, as the crisis of capital accumulation deepened in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, opened up a space in which ‘proto-neoliberal’ ideas could be formulated and 
promoted by domestic social forces. 
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HUNGARY AND THE CAPITALIST WORLD 
ECONOMY, 1945-1989  
 
 
Introduction  
The last three decades have seen the ascendancy of neoliberal ideology and practice across 
the world. Whilst the geographical spread of neoliberalism has been highly variegated, 
nowhere did it sweep aside competing paradigms so quickly and radically as in the former 
state capitalist economies of CEE. As one of the frontrunners of the ‘transition’ to the 
market in the region, Hungary embraced neoliberal policies of accumulation in the early 
1990s. Other countries in the region soon followed suit, and, no matter whether their 
reforms were located on the more radical or more gradual end of the reform spectrum, 
altogether the CEE transformations constituted, what Peter Murrell has referred to as, ‘the 
most dramatic episode of liberalization in economic history.’229 
 
Yet, arguably one of the most puzzling questions of Hungary’s ‘double transformation’ is 
why policymakers in Budapest in the late 1980s and early 1990s decided to abandon any 
experiments with ‘market socialism’ or a ‘Third Way’, favouring neoliberal restructuring 
instead? After all, governments in Budapest could have built on a strong tradition of 
reformist thinking, which was almost unique to the region (apart from the notable 
exceptions of Poland and Yugoslavia). As scholars have pointed out, attempts to create 
‘market socialism’ had inspired the introduction of successive market reforms, especially 
since the launch of the NEM in 1968, and contributed to Hungary’s infamous epithet 
amongst commentators during the Cold War of being ‘the happiest barrack in the East’. 
Moreover, neoliberal economic policies do not necessarily fit easily with the social bases 
and intellectual traditions of the political parties that have been vying for power since the 
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regime change, meaning that, once in office, any government would have to have been 
willing to implement neoliberal reforms against the interests of its own electorate. Finally, 
while political parties have often voiced concern about the negative socio-economic impact 
of neoliberal reforms when in opposition, they have remained firmly committed to them 
once in government.  
 
In order to understand this ideological volte face, the shift from a belief in the efficacy of 
the state to that of the market, I argue for a Marxist account of the ‘double transformation’, 
which draws on the insights of state capitalism theory. My aim in this chapter is to deploy 
this approach by tracing the historico-material and politico-ideological origins of 
neoliberalism in Hungary within a longer-term framework. It attempts to historicise the 
process of state and class (re-)formation in Hungary, and clearly a full historical account is 
beyond its scope.  
 
In the next section, I set the stage by providing a broad overview of the specific context 
under which state capitalism emerged in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe in the 
wake of World War II. In the third section, I analyse the economic reforms introduced by 
the Kádár regime in the late 1960s, which attempted to solve the problems of the 
Hungarian economy through the introduction market reforms and gradual (re-)integration 
with the capitalist world economy through foreign trade. This, in turn, contributes to the 
analysis in the fourth section, which looks at Hungary’s gradual ‘transition’ from the late 
1970s and onwards, as reform-minded ‘communists’ attempted to resolve the deepening 
economic and political crisis of the Hungarian state and reorient it along neoliberal lines.    
 
 
Hungary and the World Economy, From 1945 to the 
Late 1950s 
 
 
The Origins of State Capitalism in Hungary 
Hungary emerged from the destruction of World War II with many of the characteristics of 
a ‘backward’ country on the semi-periphery of the capitalist world economy. Under 
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pressure from Nazi Germany and domestic social forces, including wide layers of the 
Hungarian bourgeoisie, key members of the military command,230 and the increasingly 
powerful fascist Arrow Cross Party (Nyilaskeresztes Párt), Hungary, under the leadership 
of Admiral Miklós Horthy,231 participated on the side of the Axis Powers in the war in the 
hope that an ultimate German victory would enable the country to regain territories lost 
following the 1920 Peace Treaty of Trianon.232 However, the war turned out to be a 
disaster and the country suffered enormous human and material devastation. According to 
conservative estimates by the renowned Hungarian historian Ignác Romsics, around 
900,000 Hungarians (6.2 percent) out of a population of 14.5 million died in the carnages 
of the war, including some 350,000 soldiers, as well as around 500,000 Hungarian Jews 
(approximately two-thirds of the total Jewish population) and between 10,000 and 50,000 
Hungarian Roma. As Romsics points out, only Poland (15 percent) and the Soviet Union 
(8.4 percent) suffered markedly higher losses; Germany’s losses were roughly the same 
(6.4 percent), while French losses were put at 1.4 percent, and British and Italian losses 
amounted to 0.9 percent of the population. In addition, as many as 600,000 Hungarians – 
most of them soldiers, but also between 100,000-120,000 civilians – were displaced or fell 
                                                
230 For example, in a memorandum to Horthy in the sumer of 1941, the Chief of the General Staff General 
Henrik Werth, argued in favour of Hungary’s entrance into the war on the grounds that by following a policy 
of ‘loyalty to the Axis … we shall certainly regain the entire territory of historical Hungary’. Werth, here 
cited in Loránd Dombrády, Hadsereg és politika Magyarországon 1938-1941, Budapest: Kossuth 
Könyvkiadó, 1986, p. 226. 
231 Count Miklós Horthy of Nagybánya (1868-1957) was a conservative politican and Commander in Chief 
of the Austro-Hungarian Navy during World War I. After having led the counter-revolutionary army to 
victory in 1919, he was declared Regent and Head of State of the Kingdom of Hungary. Under his rule, 
Hungary entered World War II on the side of the Axis powers. In 1944, he made a desperate attempt to 
withdraw from the war, but failed; Nazi Germany occupied Hungary and Horthy was forced to resign. On 
Horthy’s Hungary, see Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, pp. 127-216 
232 The Peace Treaty of Trianon was the peace agreement signed between Hungary and the Entente powers 
on 4 June 1920 to settle the terms for the end of World War I. As a result of the treaty, Hungary’s territory 
was reduced to roughly one-third of its pre-World War I size (from 282,000 to 93,000 km2), while its 
population decreased from 18.2 million to 7.9 million (43 percent of its pre-World War I figure). The treaty 
left more than 3.2 million ethnic Hungarians outside the borders of the new Hungarian state, out of whom 1.6 
million were located in Transylvania, which was awarded to Romania, around 1 million in Czechoslovakia, 
and almost 500,000 in Yugoslavia, which had constituted much of Hungary’s ‘natural’ economic hinterland. 
In addition, the treaty placed restrictions on military forces, shipping, and aviation, and forced Hungary to 
pay reparations to the Entente powers. The treaty caused mass furore in Hungary – a resentment that was 
kept alive by the revisionist foreign and cultural policies of the Horthy regime during the inter-war years. For 
a brief overview of the Trianon Treaty, see Romsics, op. cit., pp. 117-125. For the impact of the Trianon 
Treaty on Hungarian politics in the inter-war years, see Steven B. Várdy, ‘The Impact of Trianon upon the 
Hungarian Mind: Irredentism and Hungary’s Path to War’, in Hungary in the Age of Total War, 1938-1948, 
edited by Nándor F. Dreisziger, Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1998, pp. 27-48.  
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into Soviet captivity, as a result of the war.233 As for those that had survived the horrors of 
the war, many faced starvation, freezing, and a lack of housing.234  
 
The war also brought enormous damage to the Hungarian economy, as much fixed capital 
was destroyed altogether or severely damaged. It is estimated by historians that, 40 percent 
of Hungary’s national wealth, including 54 percent of its industrial plants, 40 percent of 
railway tracks, more than two-thirds of all locomotives, and between 44 and 80 percent of 
all livestock, was destroyed or hauled away as a result of the war.235 In addition, retreating 
German troops destroyed all major bridges across the Danube and Tisza rivers, thus 
bringing Hungary’s communication system to a point of ‘near-paralysis’.236 The combined 
damages of the war were reflected in national income. Tentative estimates of national 
income show steep falls between 1938-1946, in real terms, ranging from 50 percent in 
Yugoslavia and Poland, 40 percent in Hungary, and 25 percent in Czechoslovakia. These 
figures should be compared with declines of between 10 and 20 percent for Belgium, 
France, and the Netherlands. The level of industrial production was in many cases even 
lower; in the case of Hungary it barely reached 30 percent of its pre-war level.237 As if this 
was not bad enough, Hungary’s economic plight was made worse by the policies of the 
victorious powers. Reflecting the competitive nature of the capitalist world system, the 
1947 Paris Peace Treaty demanded those countries where the old ruling class had sided 
with Nazi Germany to pay substantial war reparations to the victorious Allied States. 
Hungary was compelled to pay war reparations of US$ 200 million, at 1938 prices, to the 
Soviet Union, US$ 70 million to Yugoslavia, and US$ 30 million to Czechoslovakia, as 
well as to support Soviet garrisons on its territory.238 According to estimates by the MNB 
in 1946, the cost of reparations amounted to between 19 and 22 percent of the annual 
                                                
233 Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, p. 216. 
234 To put the situation in Hungary in international context: compared to the League of Nations’ 
recommendations of a ‘normal intake’ of 3,000 calories per day for a healthy adult person, Hungarian 
statistics in 1945-1946 estimated the average intake per person in the country at around 1,700-1,800 calories 
per day. However, according to Romsics (op. cit., p. 246), not even these bleak figures provide an accurate 
description of the suffering of many Hungarians in urban centres, who ‘had to struggle on the brink of death 
from starvation’. 
235 Iván Pető and Sándor Szakács, A hazai gazdaság négy évtizedének története, 1945-1985, Budapest: 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1985, p. 19; Romsics, op. cit., p. 216; Swain, Hungary: The Rise and Fall 
of Feasible Socialism, p. 35.  
236 Romsics, op. cit., p. 245. 
237 Aldcroft and Morewood, Economic Change in Eastern Europe since 1918, p. 91-94; Romsics, op. cit., p. 
245. 
238 Berend and Ránki, The Hungarian Economy in the Twentieth Century, p. 180. 
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national income.239 In light of the above, the task of rebuilding post-World War II Hungary 
must have appeared as truly daunting for policymakers in Budapest.  
 
The establishment of a pro-Soviet People’s Republic in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe after 1945 was, however, neither as swift, nor as unproblematic, as has generally 
been assumed in the mainstream literature.240 Although the idea of ‘socialism’ resonated 
with the demands of large sections of the population in the region, who were tired by the 
unprecedented scale of economic and social dislocation brought upon them by World War 
II and perceived ‘socialism’ as a means to overcome centuries of injustices by the 
traditional ruling classes, the actual realisation of ‘socialism’ proved to be much more 
complicated and was only possible as a result of intensifying geopolitical and economic 
competition between the ‘capitalist’ West and the ‘communist’ East following the onset of 
the Cold War.241 In the case of Hungary, this was due to a combination of initial Soviet 
desires to maintain amicable relations with Western powers, as well as the general 
weakness of the Hungarian Left.242 For example, compared to Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Yugoslavia, where local Communist parties enjoyed genuine mass support thanks to their 
participation in the anti-fascist resistance movement, the Hungarian Communist Party243 
(Magyar Kommunista Párt, MKP) was, as Swain and Swain suggest, ‘weak, and 
occasionally needed the support of Stalin to retain even a coalition stake in the government 
of post-war Hungary.’244 The weakness of the MKP became apparent following the 
November 1945 general elections, in which the conservative Independent Smallholders’ 
Party (Független Kisgazda Párt, FKGP) won a landslide victory, receiving 57 percent of 
the votes. The MKP only arrived in third place, behind the Social Democratic Party 
(Szociáldemokrata Párt, SZDP), with 16.9 percent of the votes, and were only included in 
                                                
239 Here cited in László G. Borhi, ‘The Merchants of the Kremlin: The Economic Roots of Soviet Expansion 
in Hungary’, Working Paper No. 28, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, 
2000, p. 12. 
240 Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, London: The Bodley Head, 2009; Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death Of Communism in the Twentieth Century, London: Macdonald, 
1990; Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. 
241 Pittaway, Eastern Europe, 1939-2000, pp. 1-33; Swain and Swain, Eastern Europe since 1945, pp. 33-55; 
Tamás, ‘Counter-revolution against a counter-revolution’. 
242 Swain and Swain, op. cit., pp. 49-50. 
243 The MKP was founded on 24 November 1918 by a small group of Hungarian Bolsheviks, led by Béla 
Kun, the leader of the brief Hungarian Soviet Republic. Following the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic 
in 1919, the party was banned and many of its leaders were either executed or exiled. The party was 
refounded in 1945 under the leadership of Mátyás Rákosi.  
244 Swain and Swain, op. cit., p. 50. 
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Zoltán Tildy’s popular front government following pressure from the Soviet Union.245 The 
result was a disappointment to the MKP leadership and thwarted its hopes of seizing power 
of the state peacefully, through parliamentary elections. Instead, it was forced onto the 
defensive until 1947, as ‘the possibility always existed of the smallholders and the 
socialists reforming their 1942 alliance to the exclusion of the communists.’246  
 
In the end, it was only by building an alliance with the social democrats, gaining control of 
the trade unions, and by using Soviet support in order to maintain key positions in the 
popular front government that the MKP managed to recover the situation, mobilising its 
supporters and using its control over the security services to gradually wrest state power 
out of the hands of the FKGP in 1946 and 1947.247 The consolidation of the MKP’s power 
over the popular front government was achieved after the semi-rigged elections in August 
1947, in which the Communists emerged as the largest party in parliament, although with 
only 22.2 percent of the vote, compared with 16.4 percent for the Democratic People’s 
Party (Demokrata Néppárt, DNP), 15.4 percent for the FKGP, 14.9 percent for the SZDP, 
13.4 percent for the National Independence Party (Nemzeti Függetlenségi Párt, NFP) and 
8.4 percent for the National Peasant Party (Nemzeti Parasztpárt, NPP).248 In June 1948, the 
final nail in the coffin was placed in Hungary’s barely born democracy following the 
liquidation of the non-socialist opposition and the enforced merger of the MKP and the 
SZDP to form the Hungarian Workers’ Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja, MDP). The new 
People’s Republic of Hungary (Magyar Népköztársaság) established on 18 August 1949, 
was thus effectively a one-party dictatorship with Mátyás Rákosi,249 who proudly 
described himself as ‘Stalin’s best Hungarian disciple’,250 as its autocratic leader. 
According to the 1949 Hungarian Constitution, the new state represented ‘the realisation of 
a close alliance between workers and working peasants, led by the working class’, and its 
goal was the ‘construction of socialism’ in Hungary, to which end ‘most of the means of 
                                                
245 Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, p. 235. 
246 Swain and Swain, Eastern Europe since 1945, p. 51. 
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production [would be] brought under the control of the state or the co-operatives’, and the 
organisation of the economy brought under central planning.251  
 
 
‘Building a Country of Iron, Steel and Machines’ 
As we argued in the previous chapter, one of the most striking features of the capitalist 
world economy in the 20th century, which distinguished it from the capitalism of Marx’s 
time, was the growing influence of the state in the internal production of national 
economies. This trend, which can be traced back to the late 19th century, became 
accentuated as capitalism expanded in the post-World War II decades, and was the key 
contributing factor behind the longest economic boom hitherto known – what has become 
known as ‘the golden age of capitalism’, or les trentes glorieuses, between 1945-1975.252 
Increased state intervention in the economy played a key role in the revival of US 
capitalism after the war. As both Keynesian and Marxist political economists have shown 
in different ways, increased military spending (often referred to as ‘military Keynesianism’ 
or ‘permanent arms economy’) played a key role in promoting economic recovery and the 
maintenance of positive growth rates in the first decades after World War II.253 While the 
role of military expenditure was ‘less important’ in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FDR), the Christian-democratic government of Chancellor Adenauer nonetheless played a 
pivotal role in post-World War II reconstruction. As the Marxist political economist Elmar 
Altvater recounts, ‘far more than in any other capitalist country the bourgeoisie in the 
Federal Republic made use of the state apparatuses and the monetary and fiscal system to 
force capital accumulation by means of favourable depreciation rates, credits for 
reconstruction at favourable rates of interest and finance for investment. All this took place 
in contradiction to the official neoliberal theory…’254 Similarly, the state, in close 
cooperation with the largest private firms, played a key role in the revival of the Japanese 
national capitalism after World War II, as well as the rapid economic growth and 
industrialisation of the small Southeast Asian ‘Tiger economies’ of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
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South Korea, and Taiwan, in the period between the early 1960s and l990s.255  The table 
below summarises these developments. 
 
Table 3.1: State spending of selected countries as percentage of GDP, 1900-1970256 
 
France Germany 
United 
Kingdom 
United States 
1900 15.2 14.2 14.9 7.9 
1930 22.1 29.4 24.7 21.3 
1950 28.4 30.8 30.4 23.0 
1970 38.9 37.6 39.3 32.2 
 
 
In many ways, the structure of the Hungarian economy in the 1940s and 1950s reflected 
the dirigiste trends of the period. The Hungarian state assumed a key role in directing the 
reconstruction of the post-war economy, through awarding of contracts, the purchasing and 
allocation of raw materials, finished and semi-finished products, and the provision of credit 
to private firms. For example, 95 percent of the production at the Manfred Weiss Works, 
one of the biggest iron, steel, and engineering companies, was shipped to state authorities, 
while another engineering firm, Ganz, sold 74 percent of its production to the 
government.257 As a result, Berend and Ránki have concluded that, already by 1946, ‘A 
free market … hardly existed at all.’258 In 1946-1947, a first nationalisation drive was 
launched by the popular front government, which included the nationalisation of the 
country’s coalmines, the four largest firms in heavy industry, and the ten largest banks, 
thereby creating a virtual state monopoly of the credit system. As Berend and Ránki have 
pointed out, these measures marked ‘the continuation of the methods of [a] war-
economy.’259  
 
                                                
255 Harman, Zombie Capitalism., pp. 170-172. For a detailed account of late-capitalist development in the 
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256 Dunn, Global Political Economy, p. 136. 
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The nationalisation of key economic sectors was, however, speeded up from 1948 and 
onwards, as the Rákosi regime began to implement a full-scale ‘Sovietisation’ of the 
Hungarian economy. The First Five-Year Plan was introduced in 1949 with aim of 
‘rais[ing] the economic and cultural level of our country in five years to an extent, which 
previously required decades.’260 The MDP’s firm determination to impose the Soviet 
model was symbolised by the declaration of Ernő Gerő, second in the MDP leadership and 
the central architect of its economic policy, who proclaimed that Hungary was to be 
transformed from an agrarian economy into ‘a country of iron, steel and machines’261. This 
goal, while seemingly ‘irrational’ – for example, the country lacked iron ore completely – 
reflected Hungary’s position as a Soviet satellite state, with economic development 
subordinated to the military demands of the Soviet Union in the context of increasing 
international competition between East and West.262 In line with the basic principles of the 
Soviet model, planning was centralised in the hands of the recently founded National 
Planning Office (Országos Tervhivatal, OT), and became compulsory and 
comprehensive.263 The process of bringing key sectors of the economy, such as banking 
and finance, heavy industry and manufacturing, under state ownership, which, as we noted 
above, had already been initiated before the Stalinist takeover in 1948, was now intensified 
and was essentially completed by December 1949, when all foreign-owned firms, all 
domestic enterprises with more than ten workers, and all printing and electrical factories 
were nationalised – a measure which covered 1,400 manufacturing enterprises, 400 
construction companies, 600 printing and 220 transportation firms, and 80 catering 
businesses.264 Foreign trade also became a state monopoly and, following the creation of 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1949265, underwent a radical 
eastward shift in subsequent years, with the Soviet Union replacing Germany as Hungary’s 
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largest trading partner.266 However, collectivisation of agriculture, which had been a long-
term goal of the MKP and was initiated in 1945, proceeded at a slower pace. As a result, at 
the end of 1949, only 1,300 agricultural co-operatives had been established in the 
Hungarian countryside, with an insignificant membership of 36,400.267 In terms of the 
theoretical framework that we developed in the previous chapter, this was thus a period in 
which a centralised, state capitalist economy was coming into being in Hungary.268 Against 
the background of heightened geopolitical rivalry between East and West, economic 
performance came to be seen by policymakers on both sides, as a crucial weapon. For the 
MDP and its sister parties elsewhere in Eastern Europe, this was a time that demanded ‘an 
intensification of the class struggle’. ‘The most radical challenge today’, as Rákosi, Gerő, 
and their comrades insisted, ‘is to raise labour productivity’.269  
 
However, enforcing the productivity agenda amongst workers turned out to be much more 
complicated than what the Stalinist leadership believed. A new wage system, known as the 
‘piece-rate system’ (darabbér), which sought to ‘bind workers to the goals of the plan’ and 
force them to increase their productivity through the introduction of payment-by-results, was 
introduced in 1948 and became the dominant wage form in Hungarian industry in the 
1950s.270 The regime’s drive to increase productivity and output also involved the extension 
of the working day, as well as the introduction of Taylorist management techniques and 
productivity-raising campaigns. Schemes of ‘socialist labour competition’ were introduced in 
which workers and newly formed ‘work brigades’ (munkásbrigádok) were pitted against each 
other to raise the quantity and quality of production. Another cornerstone of the 
‘Sovietisation’ of Hungarian labour regime was the introduction of the Stakhanovite 
movement on 21 December 1949 (for the occasion of Stalin’s 70th birthday), and in the 
following years the spectacular norm-breaking records of the Budapest-based Stakhanovite 
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József Kiszlinger received frenzied attention in the state media.271 The most diligent workers 
were hailed as the ‘vanguard’ of a ‘new working class’ and earned handsome bonuses (and 
derision from their workmates). The very best were showered with publicity and prizes, 
such as theatre tickets, holiday camp vouchers, or, in outstanding cases, a chance to meet 
with the ‘Great Leader’, comrade Rákosi in personam.272 Through measures like these, the 
Rákosi regime hoped to increase productivity, break down old hierarchies in the workplace 
based on divisions between skilled and unskilled-, old and young workers, gender, and urban 
and rural workers, and transform working class culture and behaviour, paving the way to the 
creation of a ‘new communist working class’, as epitomised by the Stakhanovite 
movement.273 However, workers often contested the competitive culture that was 
demanded or sought to subvert the intentions of the Rákosi regime on the shop floor level 
through various forms of ‘informal bargaining’.274  
 
Engaged in the concurrent project of ‘building socialism’ while at the same time increasing 
economic productivity, the Rákosi regime quickly left aside its earlier aim of soliciting 
popular consent in favour of brutal coercion. By the end of 1948, all independent political 
and industrial organisations had either been crushed or captured by the MDP. Through the 
employment of ‘salami tactics’,275 the Rákosi regime played a distinguishing role in the 
‘wave of political justice’ that marked the onset of the Cold War, and which included 
Senator John McCarthy’s pervasive witch-hunt against ‘communist conspirators’ in the 
USA,276 the outlawing of the Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, 
KPD) in West Germany, and a wave of show trials and purges in the Soviet Union and its 
Eastern European satellites. The State Security Agency (Államvédelmi Hatóság, ÁVH), set 
up in 1948, became responsible for the elimination of ‘reactionary elements’, both real and 
imagined, in Hungarian society. In one single year, the number of people it employed rose 
more than threefold: from 9,000 in 1949 to 28,000 a year later.277 By then, the regime was 
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becoming apparently paranoid of even the slightest criticism or discontent. The scope of 
the repression, which had previously concentrated on hunting down war criminals and 
supporters of the Horthy regime, now rapidly expanded to include prominent social 
democrats, as well as devoted Stalinists who were accused of ‘Yugoslav deviationism’ or 
being Trotskyists in disguise (or a combination of the two). One of the first victims was 
László Rajk, a longstanding member of the MKP and the former Minister of Interior 
(1946-1948), who was arrested on 15 June 1949 for allegedly spying for the ‘imperialists’, 
collaborating with Horthy’s secret police, and holding friendly relations with the demonic 
Yugoslav Communist Party. His execution on 15 October 1949 sparked a wave of arrests 
and trials that convulsed Hungarian society in the following years.278 A couple of months 
later the longstanding leader of the SZDP and former president of Hungary Árpád 
Szakasits, was arrested and sentenced to life under similar circumstances. However, Rajk 
and Szakasits were only two of the most renowned victims of the Stalinist purges in 
Hungary. According to a 1991 report commissioned by the Prime Minister’s Office, an 
estimated 511,270 arrests were made in 1950-1953 alone, resulting in 387,177 prison 
sentences, out of which 33-50 percent were infractions that may be classified as 
‘political’.279 Out of those that were sentenced, some went to prison, while others were sent 
to internment camps, where they were forced to work as manual or agricultural workers.280  
 
The radical transformation wrought by the Rákosi regime extended to the entire Hungarian 
society. The construction of new factories, such as the Lenin metallurgy plant in Diósgyőr, 
or entire towns, such as the case of Sztálinváros (today Dunaújváros), were meant to 
demonstrate the virtues of Hungary’s nascent ‘socialist’ society, while at the same time 
displaying its unwavering allegiance to Moscow.281 New banks were established, 
supposedly untainted by ‘capitalist’ practices.282 New university departments were also 
created, as ‘bourgeois’ science was rejected and ‘class enemies’ in the academia replaced 
with loyal party apparatchiks, who had been educated in Marxist-Leninist doxa. For 
example, in economics, which, according to Csaba, until then ‘tended to follow world 
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trends, mediated by Austrian tendencies’,283 this meant the purging of any ‘bourgeois 
deviance’ and its replacement with Marxist economics, which had hitherto not been taught 
at university level. Between 1947 and 1950, the party-state closed down the Faculty of 
Economics of the Hungarian University of Technology and Economics, the main 
university faculty of economics in Hungary (today known as Corvinus University of 
Budapest); the Hungarian Institute for Economics Research, the only independent 
economics research institute; and the Hungarian Economics Association; while the main 
professional economics journal (Economic Review) was replaced by the Hungarian-Soviet 
Economics Review. The economics faculty was finally reopened by the Rákosi regime in 
1953, but under a new name, the Karl Marx University of Economic Sciences, which 
reflected its Marxist-Leninist principles. Economists who did not adhere to the official 
Stalinist dogmas were forced to leave, seeking shelter in the Institute of Economics of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Közgazdaságtudományi 
Intézete), which had been established in 1948 by reform-minded economists.284 Thus 
despite being officially purged from the academia, ideas of ‘market reformism’ were able 
to survive in Rákosi’s Hungary. 
 
Notwithstanding the root-and-branch change to Hungarian society, most measures indicate 
that the Hungarian economy grew rapidly in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Between 1948 
and 1950, national income increased by approximately 20 percent, while capital 
accumulation increased by 54 percent.285 The growth of heavy industry was even more 
spectacular: between 1949-1953 industrial production rose by 210 percent, as compared to 
120 percent in Bulgaria (1949-1955), 98 percent in Czechoslovakia (1949-1955), 158 
percent in Poland (1949-1955), and 144 percent in Romania (1951-1955).286 By 1953 the 
annual growth rate of Hungary’s industry was 20 percent, in contrast to an average of 2 
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percent per year during the interwar years. As a result, industrial output was almost three 
times higher than it had been in 1938, while its share of national income increased from 39 
percent in 1939 to 54 percent by 1954.287 However, when reflecting on these figures it 
needs to be borne in mind that this growth was from a very low basis. Moreover, as Berend 
and Ránki point out, much of this investment was not aimed towards the needs of Hungary, 
but was rather ‘planned for the needs of the Soviet Union – for which Hungary was to 
serve as an industrial workshop.’288 Also, the investment allocated to agriculture was 
repressed, As a result, agricultural production continued to lag behind, with total output in 
the agricultural sector in 1950 only amounting to 90 percent of 1938 levels.289  
 
By the time the First Five-Year Plan was coming to an end in 1953, the structure of the 
Hungarian economy increasingly came to resemble that of the Soviet Union. In 
preparations for what seemed as an impending military conflict with the West, which 
seemed ever more likely after the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the Rákosi regime initiated 
a policy of rapid rearmament, the economic effects of which should not be underestimated. 
Firstly, it was very expensive. Between 1950 and 1952 one-quarter of the entire state 
budget was poured into the military.290 Secondly, it shifted Hungary’s economic structure 
even further from light- towards heavy industry, in particular the production of raw 
materials (mining, electricity, construction materials, and chemicals) and heavy 
engineering.291 The decision to prioritise the expansion of heavy industry was not a 
coincidence, as Ernő Gerő, the chief architect of economic policy later recalled, ‘We had 
the information, that we had to count on a forthcoming war in three to four years’.292 
Thirdly, and finally, the military rearmament, by enrolling more than 250,000 men into the 
new People’s Army (néphadsereg), further aggravated the labour shortages that had been 
growing as a result of rapid industrialisation.293  
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In several ways then, the Soviet-style growth strategy of enforced industrialisation and 
militarisation was damaging and distorting the Hungarian economy. Firstly, the tempo of 
the regime’s overambitious industrialisation drive was out of proportion to the country’s 
economic resources. Second, the rapid expansion of heavy industry that had taken place in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s was heavily dependent on the existence of a labour surplus 
and under-utilised production capacity. However, this surplus was now rapidly becoming 
exhausted. Thirdly, overemphasis on heavy industry was contributing to a noticeable lack 
of consumer goods. The narrow range of consumer goods is illustrated by the example 
cited by Romsics, who notes that before World War II, 80 types of shoes were produced in 
Hungary; by the early 1950s, this figure was down to just 16.294 Between 1949-1953 real 
wages for workers fell sharply: by the end of 1952 they were down by almost 16 percent 
compared to their 1949 value. The fall in real wages contributed to a fall in living 
standards, which by 1953 were down by an estimated 20 percent compared to 1948 
levels.295 This decline conflicted sharply with the Rákosi regime’s promise of increasing 
the standard of living by 50 percent by the end of the First Five-Year Plan, and was 
causing mounting unrest among workers and peasants in Hungary.296  
 
 
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 
The death of Stalin in March 1953 brought a milder ideological climate and speeded up 
calls for political and economic reforms throughout the Soviet bloc. Whilst the ‘rationality’ 
of the Soviet system remained unchallenged, there was a growing recognition amongst the 
bureaucracies of the region that the needs of the population had be taken into greater 
consideration if social unrest, similar to those witnessed in the summer of 1953 in the GDR 
and Czechoslovakia, was to be avoided in the future. In Hungary, the news of the strike 
and uprising in East Berlin had a strong impact on Rákosi, who according to Rainer, ‘was 
moved to conclude that, short of a complete change of course, they could find themselves 
in a similarly deep crisis.297 However, as events soon revealed, this change of course was 
not to be carried out by Rákosi. 
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In June 1953, the heavy-handed Rákosi was summoned to Moscow, and, after a public 
humiliation, replaced by the ‘reform-minded’ communist and former Minister of 
Agriculture Imre Nagy,298 as head of the government.299 (Although, Rákosi retained de 
facto control over the party, remaining its general secretary.) The first news that the 
Hungarian public received of the impending changes was from Nagy’s policy speech made 
on 4 July 1953, which was broadcasted live by Hungarian radio. In his speech, Nagy 
openly criticised the economic policies of his predecessor: 
We have to acknowledge to the country that the targets of the augmented five-year plan are in many 
respects beyond our capability. … The government will revise both the production and investment 
aspects of the economic plan and make appropriate proposals for necessary reductions. The direction 
of the people’s economy must be revised also. Nothing justifies the excessive industrialisation and the 
attempt at autarchy, especially when we lack the requisite resources.300 
 
With regard to agriculture, Nagy went beyond the official party line and presented a 
strategic shift: ‘[a]s is well known, our agricultural production depends primarily on 
individual farms. … The government wishes to safeguard peasant production and 
property.’ He also proclaimed that private enterprise was to be allowed and craft licences 
granted.301 According to Romsics the impact of the speech, ‘especially amongst peasants, 
was electrifying. In some villages the inhabitants dressed up in their Sunday best, cracked 
open barrels of wine and improvised celebratory dances to elated shouts of “The Rákosi 
government has fallen”.’302 
 
Taking advantage of Moscow’s apparent political backing, Nagy moved quickly to 
implement his government’s programme, which was appositely named the ‘New Course’. 
By the end of 1953, numerous measures were introduced to ease the level of political 
repression in society: the powers of the hated secret police (ÁVH) were curbed; limited 
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political amnesty was provided to former ‘class enemies’ (including old party comrades, 
such as János Kádár, the future leader of Hungary, who had fallen out favour with the 
Rákosi regime in 1951); forced labour camps were closed; and greater tolerance was 
allowed on religious matters. According to a report commissioned jointly by the Ministry 
of Interior and the state prosecutor, ‘approximately 748,000 persons [were] affected’ by 
the political reforms. As Rainer points out, while these reforms remained ‘limited’, the 
political liberalisation initiated by the Nagy government went far beyond what was 
conceivable in other Soviet bloc countries at the time.303 
 
Within the economy, the New Course set itself the task of rectifying the most glaring 
mistakes of the Rákosi regime, eliminating the symptoms rather than the inherent faults of 
state capitalism.304 Rejecting the old guard’s ‘obsession with balanced budgets and 
overproduction of industrial goods’305, Nagy and his economic advisors introduced a set of 
measures that sought to decelerate the tempo of accumulation (by lowering the plan 
quotas), while shifting capital investment from heavy industry to agriculture, food 
processing and consumer goods, and housing construction. Measures were taken to boost 
living standards through the provision of wage increases, averaging approximately HUF 
100 per capita (circa 10-11 percent of the average monthly income), together with 
simultaneous price reductions. The economic reforms sought to reduce the burden on the 
general population, in particular the farmers and the petit bourgeoisie (artisans, 
shopkeepers, small traders, etc.), which now reappeared to some extent.306 As one of my 
interviewees recalls, ‘in 1955, when the Rákosi regime was dissolving, my parents, who 
were artisans (glass makers) in Pécs, could re-apply for an industrial license. So they 
became self-employed [maszek] again.’307 Between 1953-1955, similar, ‘quasi-Keynesian’ 
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economic reforms were introduced throughout Eastern Europe, including in 
Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Poland.308   
 
The New Course portrayed Hungary as a potential model of a future version of ‘socialism 
with a human face’. However, the dream was not to be long-lived. As the political power 
struggle in Moscow took new turns and Hungary’s economic situation worsened in 1954-
1955 – in part due to adverse weather conditions beyond the control of the Nagy 
government –, opposition to the New Course intensified within the party-state.309 In 
February 1954, Nagy had argued for delaying the opening of the massive steel plants in 
Sztálinváros. However, the Politburo overruled this proposal and the prestigious project, 
envisioned in Rákosi’s First Five Year Plan in 1949, was inaugurated according to 
schedule in 1954. As Rainer has pointed out, this ‘was generally viewed as a symbolic 
defeat for the New Course. All the groups that saw their interests endangered by a transfer 
of investment measures felt themselves strengthened thereby.’310 Nagy and his allies 
attempted to save what could be saved from their reform programme, but were forced to 
surrender in early 1955, after the Soviet leadership withdrew its support for the reforms 
and demanded that its ‘mistakes’ be corrected. On Rákosi’s initiative, Nagy was accused of 
‘rightist deviations’ and ‘revisionism’. On 14 April, he lost his place in the Politburo and 
four days later he was relieved from his office as Prime Minister, being replaced by András 
Hegedüs, a young politician who was generally considered a puppet for Rákosi and 
Gerő.311  
 
Once back in power, Rákosi, Gerő, and their supporters sought to resume the old Stalinist 
course where it had broken off in the summer of 1953, calling for an ‘increase in productivity 
and efficiency, the precise fulfilment and overfulfillment of the plan.’312 At the same time, 
political repression was resumed: the hated ÁVH was reactivated, while supporters of Imre 
Nagy were fired from their jobs, and others, including Nagy himself, were dismissed from the 
party,313 However, the decision to clamp down on the reforms introduced by the Nagy 
government antagonised wide layers of Hungarian society, including sections of the working 
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class, intellectuals, and students. The upheaval began following the 20th Congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party, held on 24-25 February 1956, where Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin 
and the methods of terror associated with his regime. The speech had an electrifying effect in 
Hungary, as it weakened the confidence of many party members in the regime, and increased 
demands for change. In an attempt to placate public discontent, Rákosi was removed as party 
leader and replaced by Gerő in July 1956. But this move only increased the assertiveness of 
the opposition, and, by September 1956, there was ‘a real feeling of panic’ amongst party 
ranks in Budapest. On 23 October 1956, a massive student-led demonstration revealed the 
illegitimacy of the regime and the demand for radical changes. The crowds, which filled the 
entire Kossuth Square in front of the House of Parliament, presented a list of 16 key demands 
to the government, calling for the evacuation of Soviet troops, the re-instalment of Imre Nagy, 
and an end to the hated piece-rate system.314 The regime denounced the demonstrators as 
‘counter-revolutionaries’ and responded by firing into the unarmed crowds. In the following 
two weeks a revolution swept the country, which saw the old government removed from 
power and revolutionary ‘workers’ councils’ (munkástanácsok) set up in the workplaces, and 
was only suppressed following violent repression by Soviet troops.315 It starkly illuminated 
the contradictions of Soviet-style ‘socialism’ in general, as well as its particular 
configuration in Hungary.  
 
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was not an attempted ‘counter-revolution’, instigated by 
alleged anti-socialist ‘agitators’, ‘the Horthy-fascist and Hungarian capitalist-gentry’, and 
‘agents of international imperialism’ in order to overthrow ‘socialism’, as the supporters of 
Soviet intervention in Hungary and abroad, including the Communist parties in both the Soviet 
bloc and the West, maintained.316 On the contrary, as the meticulous work of a number of 
dedicated scholars and activists committed to ‘history from below’ has shown, Hungarian 
workers, in particular young workers, played a crucial role in driving the Revolution 
forward by radicalising anti-regime protests, setting up revolutionary ‘worker’s 
councils’ in workplaces, and spreading the revolution out from Budapest to working 
class suburbs, provincial towns, and eventually to rural villages. Although the 
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revolution ultimately failed, it had rocked established institutions, not only in Hungary and 
the wider Soviet bloc, but also in the West, broken assumptions, and overturned 
stereotypes that were considered ‘common sense’ amongst scholars and policymakers in 
the Cold War-era.317 In so doing, the failed revolution would go on to radically reconfigure 
the political and socio-economic arrangements that were to follow in Hungary in the 
ensuing period. 
 
 
The Kádár Regime and the Antinomies of Reform  
In the 1960s, the Hungarian leadership would re-embark on a process of economic and 
political reform, which would come to see profound changes in Hungarian society. 
Officially launched on 1 January 1968, the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), as the 
reforms were termed, has widely come to be known as ‘the most ambitious economic 
reform programme ever undertaken in a Warsaw Pact country.’318 As we show in the 
following subsections, these changes need to be understood within the context of the 
external and domestic pressures facing the Kádár regime in this period: the competitive 
pressures of the capitalist world economy, the policy shifts of the Soviet Union towards its 
satellite states in Eastern Europe, and last, but not least importantly, what Marx described 
as the ‘ebb and flow of revolutionary passions, hopes, and disappointments’319 of the class 
struggle in Hungary.  
 
The Economic and Political Origins of the New Economic Mechanism 
The origins of the NEM date back to the early 1960s, when the revamped party-state, 
under the leadership of the pragmatic János Kádár, revisited ideas on economic and 
political reforms. Having crushed the Revolution in 1956 through the help of Soviet troops, 
and subjugated all opposition forces, Kádár needed to re-establish the ruling party’s 
hegemony over Hungarian society. It should be emphasised, however, that restoring ‘law 
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and order’ after 1956 was by no means an easy task.320 Although the invading Soviet army 
had crushed most of the armed resistance by 11 November 1956, the majority of Hungarian 
society maintained a hostile stance towards the new authorities for a considerable time 
thereafter, while internationally, the new regime could count on few allies apart from the 
Soviet Union. In the factories, the immediate reaction to the Soviet intervention was one of 
furious shock. The Central Workers’ Council of Greater Budapest (Nagybudapesti 
Központi Munkástanács), set up on 14 November 1956, organised a general strike on 21-
22 November, which was followed the day after by a one-hour silent protest in the capital, 
where ‘everything came to a halt and the streets were left practically deserted’.321 
Throughout Hungary, many factories stood still in November and December, while the 
public transportation system in the Budapest was only working occasionally, due to strikes. 
 
In order to clamp down on the resistance Kádár and his supporters adopted what Pittaway 
has described as a ‘two-track strategy’, which involved the careful manoeuvring between 
policies of negotiation and repression.322 Initially, he sought to acquiesce workers’ 
demands by entering into negotiations with the Central Workers’ Council. At one such 
meeting, Romsics writes, Kádár was even reported to have said: ‘Let us relinquish the 
monopolistic position of the Party. We want a multiparty system and free, honest 
elections.’323 When these measures failed to encourage workers to resume work, the 
regime’s policies shifted to a policy of explicit repression.324 On 9 December the 
headquarters of the Central Workers’ Council were raided (in anticipation of a two-day 
general strike called for 11-12 December), and in the coming days some 200 activists, 
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including the leaders of the council, Sándor Báli and Sándor Rácz, were arrested.325 
Martial law was declared, summary courts – officially known as ‘people’s tribunals’ 
(népbiróságok), to provide a sense of ‘legitimacy’ to the regime’s actions – were set up, and 
the death penalty was introduced for ‘inciting strikes’.326 Although workers continued to 
resist through localised strikes (in some factories these continued throughout December and 
into January), by early 1957 it was becoming apparent that armed resistance against the 
regime was futile. Faced with the prospect of heavy prison sentences, in some cases even 
the death penalty, many younger workers fled the country, while those that remained were 
slowly forced back to the factories. 
 
Once the immediate threat of the revolution had been overcome Kádár could turn his energy 
to consolidate his power over the party and ‘to win over the passive majority of the 
populace.’327 In order to consolidate his power, Kádár carried out a rapid overhaul of the 
party and the main state organs. In December 1956, the newly formed MSZMP328 had only 
37,000 members, but one year later, it had reached 400,000 (almost half of the strength the 
MDP boasted in August 1956). According to Romsics, ‘Most of the applicants were old 
party members, partly hard-line Stalinists, partly “moderates” who supported Kádár, whilst 
very few of those who had professed the Imre Nagy brand of reform Communism chose to 
rejoin’.329 Although the high level of recruitment would fall off later on, the party held 
662,000 members in 1970, more than half of whom joined the party after 1956.330 
According to Romsics, ‘A significant proportion of the new intake of members were low-
grade white-collar workers who joined in hope of career advancement.’331 By 1970, only 38 
percent of the party’s members were ‘manual workers’, and this figure had decreased 
further to 32 percent fifteen years later. Hence, ‘rather than being a manual workers’ party, 
the MSZMP increasingly became a “white-collar” party for office employees and 
professional classes, though even in 1985 the proportion of members claiming to have 
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started their working life in a manual occupation was 62%, which suggests that the party 
functioned as one of the prime channels for intra-generational upward social mobility.’332 
 
The new, ‘centrist turn’ of the MSZMP was confirmed by reinforcing the personal 
authority of Kádár, while Stalinist ‘hardliners’, such as Rákosi and Gerő were expelled 
from the party and replaced with ‘reformers’. As a result of these changes, Korbonski 
argues that Kádár had successfully managed to ‘eliminate the two extremes on the left and 
right, thus fashioning a party that was essentially centrist and, what was more important, 
united in its loyalty to Kádár as the person who was willing and able to pick up the pieces 
in the crucial days of November 1956.’333  
 
Having consolidated the new regime, Kádár now turned his attention to winning over the 
wider Hungarian population. In order to achieve this, Kádár pursued a ‘pragmatic 
approach’, offering a relaxation of political oppression and the provision of material 
benefits to the population, especially the working class, the intellectuals, and the peasantry, 
in return for tacit allegiance to the regime. Factory workers, miners, and teachers were 
provided pay rises averaging 18 percent, dating back to 11 November 1956, while the 
regime also sought to win over sections of the petty-bourgeoisie by offering tax reductions, 
including a 20 percent decrease for ‘small entrepreneurs in the craft industries … and 
private-sector shopkeepers and those in the free professions.’ ‘As a result’, Romsics writes, 
‘the numbers of people working in businesses outside the state sector grew by 20-25% 
within just a few months.’334 For the peasantry, limited market reforms were introduced in 
agriculture, enabling agricultural cooperatives opportunities to engage in private farming 
and providing them with access to credit and marketing facilities. Simultaneously, amnesty 
was provided to former political prisoners, censorship in the arts was gradually relaxed, 
and travelling to the West allowed. The regime’s more ‘conciliatory’ tone was summarised 
by Kádár’s closing speech at the 8th MSZMP Congress on 20-24 November 1962, in which 
he proclaimed: ‘Everyone who is striving for the cause of socialism and peace must be 
united on the basis of the socialist policy of national unity. We must bring together 
Communists and those outside the party, politically active supporters of the régime and 
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those who today are still wavering, the indifferent, those who hold to a materialist world-
view and people of religious disposition alike. The construction of a socialist society is a 
matter for the nation as a whole.’335 In other words, as declared in Kádár’s famous slogan, 
originally published in January 1962 and later repeated so many times over the years: 
‘those who are not against us is with us.’336  
 
Western governments also looked positively upon the changes in Hungary and showed 
themselves ready to rehabilitate the Kádár regime. Following assurances by Kádár to the 
US government to offer a general amnesty to political prisoners Hungary was formally re-
accepted to the ‘international community’ on 8 January 1963, when the United Nations 
(UN) recognised the credentials of Hungarian delegates. The official visit of UN Secretary 
General Thant on 1-3 July of that year was another important victory for the regime, while 
another important signal that the regime’s international isolation had come to an end was 
the move of Belgium, France, and the UK to upgrade their diplomatic missions in Hungary 
to ambassadorial level.337 By 1964, even American leaders, who had previously been 
amongst the sharpest critics of the regime, professed that ‘Hungary has perhaps gone 
farther than any other satellite in de-Stalinising the Communist system and the movement 
in that direction continues.’338 
 
The reforms introduced by the Kádár regime in the late 1950s and early 1960s had restored 
the political and economic conditions of the New Course. However, with the memories of 
the Hungarian Revolution fresh in their minds, the MSZMP leadership knew that if they 
wanted to be successful in consolidating their rule, they needed to restore economic growth 
and ensure higher living standards to the population. However, this was not an easy task at 
a time when the Soviet-style state capitalist economies were facing a general slowdown in 
economic growth and investment, shortages of consumer goods, raw materials, and 
intermediate and capital goods.339 In the case of Hungary, growth of national income had 
decreased to 4.1 percent annually in the period between 1961 and 1965, as compared to 6.0 
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percent between 1956 and 1961, while annual growth of investment had fallen even more 
sharply, from 13.1 percent to 4.7 percent.340 Yet, as the table below indicates, this tendency 
was not limited to Hungary, but was also visible elsewhere in the Soviet bloc.  
 
Table 3.2. Average annual growth rate of national income and investment, CMEA 
states, 1951-1965341 
National income Investment 
Country 
1951-1955 1956-1960 1961-1965 1951-1955 1956-1960 1961-1966 
Bulgaria 12.2 9.6 6.7 12.3 17.7 7.9 
Czechoslovakia 8.1 7.0 1.9 9.6 13.1 2.0 
GDR 13.1 7.1 3.4 17.7 14.6 5.0 
Hungary 5.7 6.0 4.1 11.1 13.1 4.7 
Poland 8.6 6.6 6.2 11.2 8.9 7.0 
Romania 14.2 6.6 9.1 18.3 13.6 11.2 
USSR 11.3 9.2 6.5 12.1 13.1 5.5 
 
 
In the meantime, while growth in the state capitalist economies was decelerating, 
competitive pressures from the West were mounting. Between 1951 and 1964, the annual 
growth of gross national income was 5.4 percent in Western Europe, compared to 4.9 
percent in Eastern Europe.342 Rigid internal production structures, which continued to 
favour industrial production over specialisation in goods and services, made it difficult for 
the state capitalist economies to adapt to changes in external and internal market 
conditions.343 In an attempt to keep with competition, Hungarian policymakers were 
gradually turning to imports from the West, as a means of speeding up production. 
However, this deteriorated the country’s balance of payments, in particular with more 
advanced Western economies: according to the MSZMP’s Political Committee, Hungary’s 
gross external debt more than doubled between 1959-1962, from HUF 1.6 billion to HUF 
3.7 billion (with short-term maturity debts rising from HUF 1.2 billion to HUF 3 
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billion).344 In addition to this, the economic difficulties of the Eastern European satellite 
states were exacerbated by Moscow’s decision to shift crude-oil production from the area 
close to the Caspian Sea to Siberia, thus increasing the cost of energy. The latter decision 
was, as Seleny points out, particularly problematic for Hungarian policymakers, since ‘the 
energy-intensity of production in Hungary was widely acknowledged to be ‘“irrationally” 
high’. Hence, compared to other countries with similar levels of development, Soviet-style 
state capitalist countries used ‘far higher proportions of material and energy inputs’. 345  
 
 
The New Economic Mechanism: Preparations, Decision-making, and 
Policy Implementations 
Faced with the above-described ‘structural and conjunctural exigencies’,346 leaders 
throughout the Soviet bloc realised the necessity for economic reforms. As usual, the 
‘green light for reform’ was provided by Moscow, in the autumn of 1962, when the 
renowned Soviet reform economist Evsei Liberman published his celebrated article on 
‘Plan, Profit, Premium’ in Pravda, the official organ of the Soviet leadership.347 Although 
Liberman’s reform proposals were ‘considerably less radical’ than those put forward by 
Polish and Hungarian comrades in the mid-1950s, it sparked off a wave of reform debate 
amongst economists within the Soviet bloc.348 For Eastern European leaders, it now 
seemed safe to introduce reforms. The East Germans, under the leadership of Walter 
Ulbricht, were first out, announcing the introduction of the ‘New Economic System’ 
(NES) in January 1963. The reforms, which were primarily aimed at improving economic 
efficiency, were extended to the entire economy in January 1964. Other governments in the 
region soon followed, ‘some of them rapidly and baldly, others hesitantly and 
cautiously.’349  
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In Hungary, the MSZMP leadership had resumed debates on economic reform following 
the 8th Party Congress in 1962, where members of the nomenklatura had voiced concerns 
over Hungary’s poor export performance and the inefficient operation of state-owned 
enterprises. In response to these concerns, the need for economic reform was formally 
recognised in July 1964, when the State Economy Committee, drafted a decree (passed in 
December of that year), which called for the elaboration of a comprehensive conception 
for modernising the economic mechanism within two years. Two years later, the MSZMP 
Central Committee spelled out the economic and political rationale behind the reforms in 
dramatic terms:   
its [the reform programme’s] economic necessity is rooted in the fact that the past sources, 
reserves of economic growth are being depleted. Hence, rapid growth in the future is only 
possible through a more intensive exploration of our internal economic reserves and by 
accelerating technological development. The political importance of the reforms lies, above 
all, in the fact that it seeks to ensure a rapid increase in the living standards of the masses, 
and strives to ensure that the living standards of each worker will be more dependent on the 
social usefulness of his or her labour, individual performance, and collective productivity. 
Moreover, the reform also has as its political aim to further individual initiatives and 
responsibility by removing barriers and excessive constraints, and combat bureaucratic 
tendencies. The development of socialism, providing greater freedom for the unfolding of 
creative work in the public interest, is necessary. Finally, the reforms have as a political 
objective to create more favourable conditions for the further development of socialist 
democracy. The handling of economic affairs ought to be based on the competence of 
managers, their broad powers and personal responsibility, while at the same time ensuring 
adequate control [over the production process] for democratically elected bodies and the 
general public.350 
 
As the above quote demonstrates, the reasons behind economic reform in ‘socialist’ 
Hungary were strikingly similar to the logic of ‘competitive accumulation’ that operated in 
the ‘capitalist’ states in the West.   
 
The MSZMP Central Committee entrusted Rezső Nyers, a former social democrat and 
Minister of Finance between 1960-1962, with the task of coordinating the work on the 
economic reforms. Nyers had confirmed his reformist zeal in an article published in 
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Társadalmi Szemle, the party’s main theoretical journal in 1964, noting that: ‘The methods 
of directing the economy and the financial incentives must accord at all times with the 
dominant economic and political goals … It would by no means be correct to identify the 
essence of the socialist planned economy with a particular planning method. The Marxist-
Leninist economic concept of socialism provides scope for a wide variety of methods, 
indeed for the periodic change of methods and mechanism, which is, moreover, part of it.’ 
As he went on to note, the time was now ‘ripe’, for ‘review[ing] the methods and 
incentives of economic management’, with a view of ‘bring[ing] company activity and 
national economic interests closer together.’351 Under Nyers’ leadership an informal ‘brain 
trust’ (agytröszt) had been established in late 1963, with the aim of putting forward 
proposals for economic reform.352 Comprised of twelve members, this group represented, 
as Berend notes, ‘an institutional link of a new kind between economists, theoretical and 
practical, on the one hand and party and governmental direction of the economy on the 
other.’353 Having received the blessing of the party leadership, Nyers deliberately sought to 
include supporters of market reform, both from within and outside the MSZMP, in his 
team. Hence, his working group included such renowned reform economists as Tibor 
Liska, the previously mentioned János Kornai, and Márton Tardos, as well as leading 
proponents of economic reform within the ruling MSZMP, including György Aczél, the 
regime’s chief cultural ideologist, Jenő Fock, the Deputy Prime Minister, and István 
Hetényi, an economist who worked for the OT and who would later serve as Minister of 
Finance in the 1980s.  
 
Under Nyers’ leadership, eleven commissions were set up to examine different aspects of 
the proposed reform programme, including central planning, investment, the price and 
wage system, credit and monetary policy, and cooperation between CMEA countries, with 
each commission providing recommendations for their subject area. More than 200 experts 
were involved in the immediate work of the commissions, while many more were 
indirectly involved. Within this circle of experts, a specific circle of ‘reform 
intellectuals’354 (reformértelmiség) developed, which, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
would go on to reconstitute itself through the academia in the following decades. However, 
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in stark opposition to the first wave of Hungarian reforms, this group generally worked in 
cooperation with the party leadership. Moreover, the composition of the reformers had also 
changed: whereas the first generation of reformers, involved in the works on the New 
Course a decade earlier, had largely consisted of journalists and writers, those involved in 
the preparation of the NEM were primarily economists, with a smaller part coming from 
other fields within the social sciences.355 Nyers and his reform-minded party members 
were largely left in charge with negotiating with the party leadership.356  
 
In developing their reform programme, the Hungarian reformers did not have to start from 
scratch. For one thing, Hungarian reformers could build on the reform proposals that had 
been around the time of Imre Nagy’s New Course. Key texts, such as Péter’s ‘On the 
importance and significance of economic efficiency and profitability in the plan-based 
management of the economy’357, or Kornai’s ‘Overcentralisation in Economic 
Administration’358, had survived the ideological freeze that followed the crushing of the 
revolution. Furthermore, Liska’s seminal article, ‘Critique and Conception’ (Kritika és 
Koncepció), which provided a comprehensive critique of the price system and the 
economic mechanism, whilst proposing – amongst others – a transition to world market 
prices (an idea that continued to tickle the thoughts of Hungarian reform economists up 
until the late 1980s), had been published in Közgazdasági Szemle in 1963.359 In addition, 
Hungarian economic research was also well integrated in the international epistemic 
community, thus enabling reformers to draw upon the insights of reform economists 
elsewhere.360 Neoclassical economics – in which Hungarian reform economists were well 
equipped – provided reform economists with a lingua franca, which enabled them to 
transcend the physical and ideological barriers erected during the Cold War.361 The famous 
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work of the Polish reform economist Wlodzimierz Brus, The General Problems of the 
Functioning of the Socialist Economy (1961),362 which sought to explain how to build a 
‘market mechanism’ into a planned economy, was highly influential on Hungarian 
reformers in the mid-1960s.363 Moreover, Hungary’s relative openness within the Soviet 
bloc enabled Hungarian reform economists to study and work in the West, and gain access 
to key works of Western contemporary economic schools, including the works of Keynes, 
and, later on, Milton Friedman, James Tobin, John Hicks, and Theodore Schultz.364 In 
1964 Hungarian economists began receiving Ford Foundation fellowships to conduct 
research and study, usually lasting ten months, in the US. In particular, Hungarian 
economists chose to visit universities where there were specialists in neoclassical 
economics with knowledge of the Soviet-style economies of Eastern Europe (e.g. Harvard, 
Yale, Columbia, Berkeley, and Stanford).365 As Johanna Bockman has pointed out, the 
combined effect of these developments was that, in applied fields, like finance, 
management and marketing, neoclassical economics set the standards long before the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc.366 
 
When the NEM finally came into effect on 1 January 1968, it brought significant changes 
in four key areas.367 To begin with, it provided greater autonomy to enterprises with regard 
to the allocation of resources for production and investment. Albeit within limits, this 
reduced the role of centralised planning and resource allocation in the economy, 
encouraging enterprises to keep up with market demands. Second, prices were granted a 
more active role in the economy, in order to reflect world market values, although state 
control of agricultural products, consumer goods, and domestic raw materials remained 
strong to counterbalance inflation. As a result, prices of raw materials increased sharply.  
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Third, the wage system was redesigned in order to promote efficiency and productivity 
growth in the workplaces, while legal restrictions on the movement of labour were 
restricted, providing enterprise managers with greater access to workers that fitted the 
‘needs’ of the firm. Fourth, and finally, the NEM explicitly encouraged further re-
integration with the capitalist world economy, through the mechanism of foreign trade. 
Enterprises were given rights to engage in foreign trade without the usual requirement that 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade served as an intermediary and in 1972 a law permitting joint 
ventures between Western multinationals and Hungarian state-owned enterprises was 
passed.368 Through these measures, policymakers in Budapest hoped that the structure of 
the Hungarian economy would approximate more closely to ‘capitalist’ economies in the 
West, thereby leading to improvements in efficiency, productivity growth, and higher 
living standards.  
 
In order to promote the NEM to wider sections of Hungarian society, the Kádár regime 
launched a veritable ideological offensive. In May 1966, the MSZMP's Agitation and 
Propaganda Committee passed a motion, which stated: 
Our chief propaganda task is to acquaint our whole society with the reform of the economic 
mechanism and make it accepted to reinforce an economic attitude at every level, to make 
the substance of the economic processes embodying the essence of the economic reform 
known, along with the part to be played by the reform in fulfilling the assignments of our 
economic development … One chief task is to explain and convince people how the reform 
assists and serves the purposes of the current assignments in the building of socialism … to 
prove … that in all fields the reform will strengthen the socialist economy and socialist 
relations and further increase the democratisation of our society … Accomplishment of the 
propaganda tasks … requires that swift use should be made of the advances of in economic 
theory and that the teaching of the political economy of socialism should be updated in its 
substance and methodology. The Agitation and Propaganda Department should take steps to 
ensure that the results of the theoretical researches done by the Institute for Social Sciences 
and by the Academy of Sciences are swiftly included in economic propaganda.369   
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In the autumn of 1966, a confidential report on the preparatory operations wrote of how 
two to four week-long courses were being prepared for ‘several thousand functionaries 
(county, factory and cooperative party secretaries, council leaders and leaders of mass 
organisations, etc.) In 1967 in different courses and seminars, around 300,000 people will 
study the fundamental issues of the reform.’370 The importance to ‘inform and win over all 
the leading officials working in the state economy … the party organisations and the trade 
unions’ was reaffirmed by Kádár at a meeting of the Central Committee in November 
1967. As he frankly pointed out, ‘The nature of economic planning is such that, apart from 
two-three hundred thousand leading officials, the working millions will not be able to exert 
any direct influence on it [the reform of the economic mechanism].’371  
 
However, whilst the NEM proposed far-reaching economic reforms to the Hungarian 
economy, the party-state made it clear that the political changes were to be limited. To 
persuade his sceptics, Nyers laboriously explained that the party cadres would not be 
replaced with experts and the enterprises would not be ‘self-managed’, Yugoslav-style, but 
run by approved directors. By preserving the system of overall state regulation, ‘no 
concessions will be made to the spontaneity of the market.’372 This point was reaffirmed by 
an editorial in Népszabadság, the official party paper, in late 1966: ‘The party’s position is 
clear: the reform of the mechanism does not amount to any kind of changing of the guard. 
For that there is no need at all! … In general, staff changes will only be necessary where 
the time for such a change has long been ripe in any case.’373 
 
 
The Reform Comes to a Temporary Halt 
In the initial stages, the NEM seemed to fulfil its objective. Compared with the average 
annual rises of 4.1 percent experienced in the period between 1961-1965, Hungarian 
national income increased at an impressive rate of 6.8 percent per year between 1966-1970 
and continued to grow at 6.6 percent annually between 1971-1975.374 As a result of these 
changes, figures by Paul Bairoch showed that Hungary’s per capita GNP in 1973 stood at 
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89 percent of the European average – well ahead of its position in 1913 (69 percent) and its 
peak in the inter-war years (74 percent).375 One of the key beneficiaries of the reform was 
agriculture, which now became somewhat of a ‘success story’ of Hungarian state 
capitalism. In this regard, the example of the Bábolna State Farm is telling: exploiting the 
opportunities that had opened up in the new, relatively liberal economic climate, it 
purchased a license to use American technology for ‘closed-system maize cultivation’. The 
initial trial, which began in 1970, proved to be a success and, by 1975, 20 percent of the 
Hungary’s arable land was being cultivated following such scientific methods. As a result 
of these changes, Hungarian agriculture was rapidly catching up, and in some regards even 
overtaking, world leaders.376  
 
The apparent success of the Hungarian reforms attracted interest from other reform-minded 
economists in Eastern Europe, as well as the West. One Western commentator summed up 
the positive mood at the time as follows: ‘It [the NEM] clearly represents the most radical 
postwar change, in the economic system of any COMECON country, which has been 
maintained over a period of years and gives promise of continuity.’377 US policymakers 
expressed similarly favourable comments, arguing that the NEM represented ‘the most 
interesting, most successful, and most obvious example within the Warsaw Pact countries 
of internal modification of the basic Soviet politico-economic model.’ As the document 
went on to note, ‘The business minded and trade-oriented Hungarians (trade is 35% of 
GNP) have given a high priority to achieving more market oriented production through 
greater enterprise latitude and flexibility.’378 However, despite these accolades, the 
Hungarian market reforms were facing a variety of pressures.  
 
First, there was growing criticism amongst Stalinist hardliners against the perceived 
decline of ‘socialist values’ and the growth of ‘petty bourgeois attitudes’, ‘individualism’, 
and ‘craving for material possessions’, following the introduction of the NEM.379 
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According to Romsics, this ‘anti-reform camp’ included conservative sections of the ruling 
MSZMP, the heads of some of the big state enterprises, and the leaders of the trade union 
bureaucracy.380 For example, a report to the Political Committee in September 1972 
warned that: ‘[g]reat attention must be devoted to revealing the new or strengthening 
negative phenomena in society … and stepping up the battle … to curb them.’381  
 
A second source of opposition came from Hungarian workers, who were frustrated over 
growing income differentials, escalating prices, and increasing overtime work. Following 
the introduction of the NEM, wages became more differentiated, increasing from a 1:3 
ratio to a difference of 1:9 between the top and bottom categories.382 As result, one report 
by the MSZMP Central Committee in 1970 noted that many workers ‘spoke [negatively] 
of the leading role of the intelligentsia, and some that management are a “new class”’.383 
This echoed a theme that would become increasingly popular amongst academics in the 
East and West alike from the late 1960s and onwards, which argued that a ‘new class’ – 
comprised by technocratic managers, the new politocracy, and intellectuals – was replacing 
the bourgeoisie as the dominant class in ‘post-industrial’ societies.384  
 
Thirdly, Hungarian reformers were also facing increasing external pressure, mainly from 
the Soviet Union, but also from other ‘fraternal states’ in the Soviet bloc, such as Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, the GDR, who were complaining about the NEM’s perceived ‘negative 
effects’ on the ‘political and ideological unity of the socialist camp’.385 In particular, 
Moscow’s influence on the fate of the Hungarian reforms should not be underestimated. 
Although Moscow had initially greeted the introduction of the NEM, its position had 
shifted by early 1970s, reflecting the conservative turn in policymaking under Leonid 
Brezhnev. According to the Brezhnev Doctrine, which had been announced to retroactively 
justify Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, no country 
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was allowed to compromise the cohesiveness of the Soviet bloc. And the leadership in 
Moscow was not pleased with the increasing liberalisation that was taking place in 
Budapest. As Károly Németh, a Politburo member and first secretary of the Budapest party 
committee, later recalled, by 1969 the ‘Soviets were banging on the table’ protesting about 
the ideological confusion to which the NEM had given rise in Hungary.386 When Kádár 
paid an official visit to Moscow in February 1972, he was reportedly ‘severely taken to 
task by his hosts, Brezhnev included, being berated for the hold that petty-bourgeois 
notions had gained in Hungary, the return of small-capitalist conditions in agriculture, lack 
of concern for social justice, and general lack of vigilance.’387 The writing was now on the 
wall, and at the meeting of the MSZMP Central Committee in November 1972, the 
decision was taken to slow down market reforms and instead focus on economic 
stability.388 As a result, a number of important market reforms were repealed between 
1972-1978: entrepreneurship and ‘bourgeois tendencies of profit-making’ was 
discouraged, while a re-centralisation drive was launched and ‘socialist work competition’ 
was revived.389  
 
As the Kádár regime officially distanced itself from the NEM, its architects within and 
outside the ruling MSZMP were forced onto the defensive. In the spring of 1974, Nyers 
was dismissed from his position in the MSZMP Secretariat, while one year later, at the 11th 
Party Congress; he lost his seat in the Politburo. Following the resignation of his closest 
political ally, Fock resigned from his post as Prime Minister, but retained his seat in the 
Politburo for another term. They were replaced by ‘hardliners’ loyal to Kádár, including 
Károly Németh as Secretary for Economic Affairs in the Central Committee, György Lázár 
as Prime Minister, and Ferenc Havasi as Deputy Prime Minister.390 As for the ‘great 
generation’ of Hungarian reform economists that had participated in the preparation of the 
NEM, most of them decided to ‘abandon politics’, seeking refuge in the relative safety of 
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academia or in various party-sponsored research institutions, where they could sharpen 
their ideas until the next great reformist opportunity arrived.391  
 
 
Deepening Crisis and the Transition of the 1980s  
As we pointed out in the previous section, the Kádár regime was built upon a fragile 
‘social contract’ (not dissimilar from the ‘Keynesian compromise’ in the West), which 
offered workers and ordinary Hungarians the prospect of full employment, continuously 
growing living standards, and relative political freedom, in return for increasing 
productivity and economic growth. However, as we shall demonstrate in this section, all 
this was increasingly called into question following the onset of the global economic crisis 
in 1973.  
 
Caught between the State and the Market: The State Capitalist Economies 
and the Global Economic Crisis of the 1970s 
The global economic crisis that began in 1973 brought an end to the ‘golden age’ of 
capitalism and presented leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain with a gloomy picture of 
overproduction, lower returns on investments, the threat of mass unemployment and 
renewed working class resistance. Following old habits, capital sought to respond to the 
crisis by spurring a Darwinian process of ‘creative destruction’, allowing unprofitable units 
of capital – the firms within the system – to go bust, while those surviving were supposed 
to provide the basis for a new cycle of economic growth. However, as we noted in section 
2, the capitalist world economy had undergone significant changes during the years of the 
post-World War II boom, with the units of capital within the system becoming larger 
through processes that Marx described as ‘concentration’ (the gradual accumulation of 
capital) and ‘centralisation’ (mergers and takeovers).392 Moreover, tense geopolitical 
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rivalry between East and West further discouraged world leaders from allowing capital to 
be destroyed to a sufficient degree. As Joseph Choonara explains, this meant that ‘the very 
mechanism that clears out the system and restores it for a time to some level of health – 
economic crisis – had become more dangerous for the system.’393 The system was in other 
words becoming ‘too big to fail’.   
 
As a result, other solutions thus had to be invented to solve the crisis. In the West, the 
answer was to turn to neoliberal policies in an attempt to create what David Harvey has 
described as a ‘spatial fix’,394 which sought to overcome the problems of falling profit rates 
by moving capital and labour to new areas where it was cheaper to produce them 
(‘outsourcing’), while at the same time seeking to open up new market for capital 
accumulation (ushering in the processes commonly recognised today under the rubric of 
‘financialisation’). The implementation of these policies was, however, not automatic, but 
relied on active support from the state.  
 
In the East, the global economic crisis of the 1970s brought the Soviet-style state capitalist 
economies face to face with their own internal contradictions and the grim realities of the 
world market. On the one hand, the state capitalist economies remained geared in favour of 
heavy industry over specialisation in goods and services. As Haynes points out, this meant 
that the state capitalist economies ‘developed over-large industrial sectors which gave 
them the base for military and great power competition, but which made little sense from 
the view of the world market as a whole.’395 On the other hand, pressures to comply with 
Soviet interests meant that integration with the world economy through trade of 
commodities and services remained relatively limited and was, as Dale points out, 
‘compounded by non-convertible currencies, and by treatment by the major Western states 
as “least favoured nations”.’396 This combination was to prove fatal at a time of a general 
slowdown of capital accumulation in the world economy. 
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When the crisis hit in 1973, the initial response by leaders of the Soviet bloc was that it 
would be ‘stopped at our borders’.397 This policy soon became untenable, however, as the 
effects of crisis became increasingly felt within the Soviet bloc. As a result, the leaders of 
the one-party regimes decided to bow to the pressures of capital – what Trotsky had 
described as the ‘whip of external necessity’398 – and gradually abandoned central planning 
in favour of the market and greater integration with the capitalist world economy. This was 
to be achieved by importing advanced machinery and technology from the West, which 
was to be financed through loans from Western states, private banks, and international 
financial institutions.399 According to the plan, advanced Western technology would lead 
to productivity gains and expand production of industrial and agricultural goods, thereby 
enabling Western loans to be repaid. The Kádár regime supported this strategy, as it 
believed that foreign loans and Western technology would enable the Hungarian political 
economy to overcome its sclerotic characteristics, while, at the same time, enable the 
regime to refrain from pursuing more restrictive reforms as were being implemented by 
many governments in the West. In fact, Hungary became a regional forerunner, with its 
imports from the West growing faster than those from other Soviet bloc states in the period 
between 1976-1980.400 However, the rise in imports from the West meant that the debt 
burden of the Hungarian economy increased significantly from the early 1970s onwards.401 
 
By the end of the 1970s, however, the benefits of opening up to the capitalist world 
economy through technology transfers and foreign loans were becoming much less 
obvious. The global economic crisis was accompanied by rising interest rates, but 
prevented a similar rise of export prices.402 And the problems of the Soviet bloc economies 
were compounded by the unilateral decision of US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul 
Volcker to increase interest rates sharply in 1979 (also known as the ‘Volcker shock’) and 
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the Reagan administration’s politically motivated decision to restrict credit to the East. As 
a result, credit was drying up on international financial markets, eventually leaving the 
Kádár regime faced with a severe liquidity crunch in the spring of 1982, which was 
eventually only averted through the provision of loans from Western banks and the IMF 
and the World Bank (which Hungary had officially joined in May 1982).403 
 
By the early 1980s, the dark clouds that had been gathering above the Soviet bloc in the 
1970s were developing into full-blown storms, as official figures showed that economic 
growth was rapidly coming to a halt. According to official figures, average annual 
economic growth in the Soviet Union was down from 5.1 percent in the period between 
1971-1975 to 3.7 percent between 1976-1980.404 In the case of Hungary, which was still 
treated by some pro-market Western commentators as the ‘miracle economy’405 of Eastern 
Europe in the early 1980s, the decline of economic growth was more pronounced: down 
from 6.6 percent in 1971-1975 to only 2.9 percent between 1976-1980.406 While the 
situation was not as bad as in Poland, where the economic crisis had descended into a full 
blown political crisis, which was only overcome following General Jaruzelski’s imposition 
of martial law in December 1981407, the Hungarian economy showed no signs of 
improvement in the first half of the 1980s. Between 1981-1985 gross investment fell by 
3.1 percent and national income only grew by a meagre 1.6 percent per year.408 Thus, far 
from ‘catching up and overtaking’ the advanced capitalist economies in the West, the 
economies of the Soviet bloc were beginning to fall behind. Meanwhile, domestic 
discontent was also brewing as real wages were declining (despite an increase in overtime 
work), forcing workers to turn to the mushrooming ‘second economy’ in order to maintain 
their living standards.409 Moreover, external pressures (resulting from the Reagan 
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administration’s unilateral decision to reassert US hegemony by increasing arms spending 
and spiralling foreign debt) added to the problems facing policymakers in Hungary and 
elsewhere in the Soviet bloc.  
 
All this was bad news for the leaders of Soviet bloc regimes, who found themselves 
increasingly incapable of uphold their fragile ‘social contracts’ under these circumstances. 
As Harman explains: 
By 1981, the choice between maintaining the closed economy and opening up to the rest of 
the world was indeed the choice between the frying pan and the fire. The first option meant 
deepening stagnation, growing waste, an inability to satisfy the demands of the mass of the 
population, and the continual danger of working class rebellion. The second option meant 
binding oneself into the rhythm of a world economy increasingly prone to stagnation and 
recession – and giving up the administrative means to stop recession involving contraction of 
the domestic economy. That is why the Polish crisis of 1980-81 was so traumatic for all the 
rulers of Eastern Europe. It proved that there was no easy solution to the problems besetting 
every state.410 
 
As we shall see in the next section, the Kádár regime eventually opted for the second 
option, seeking further (re-)integration with the world economy, through the pursuit of 
macroeconomic stabilisation and structural adjustment.  
 
 
‘The Storm Breaks’ 
By the mid-1980s the symptoms of the crisis were becoming more visible than ever. In the 
Soviet Union, official figures, published in 1986, showed that the Soviet economy had 
been suffering from ‘stagnation’ for some years.411 The situation was hardly any better in 
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Hungary, where official figures showed that economic growth had decelerated by 1 percent 
in 1985. Making matters worse, Hungary’s external debt was increasing at record rates (see 
table below), while both the balance of payments deficit and the budget deficit seemed 
untenable.412  
 
Table 3.3. The growing debt burden of the Soviet bloc (in US$ billions)413 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Bulgaria 1.6 3.6 5.1 6.1 8.0 9.8 
Czechoslovakia 3.6 4.3 5.1 5.6 5.7 6.3 
Hungary 11.5 14.7 18.1 18.2 19.4 20.3 
Poland 28.2 31.9 35.8 34.1 37.5 41.8 
Romania 6.5 6.3 5.3 2.0 -1.3 1.3 
Soviet Union 15.8 16.6 25.1 27.7 39.3 43.4 
Total 67.3 77.5 94.3 93.8 108.9 122.9 
 
 
Drawing inspiration from Gorbachev’s economic reforms (perestroika), the Kádár 
regime launched a new wave of market reforms from 1986 and onwards, which included 
the gradual liberalisation of trade, decentralisation and greater independence for managers 
of state enterprises with regard to investment and the hiring and firing workers, and the 
introduction of further market reforms. In July 1987, the government, now headed by 
Károly Grósz, the ‘favorite son’414 of the MSZMP apparatus and perceived as a ‘devoted 
reformer’415 by Western commentators, unveiled a new set of reforms, which aimed at 
curbing Hungary’s foreign debt through the introduction of a number of austerity 
measures, while at the same time, increasing the productivity of state enterprises and 
workers alike. As a result, state funding to local councils was cut by HUF 1,5 billion, equal 
to 2 percent of the government’s budget. Simultaneously, the price of bread and bakery 
products was increased by an average of 19 percent; gasoline and diesel prices augmented 
by 10 percent; cigarette prices by 20 percent; and household energy prices rose on average 
by 20 percent. As a result, the price of bread, which ‘has a symbolic place among 
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Hungarian food products’, had risen almost threefold since 1970.416 In addition, the Grósz 
government also passed a banking reform, which established a Western-style two-tier 
banking system that separated commercial banking functions from the MNB. One year 
later, the MSZMP Central Committee accepted a wide-sweeping liberalisation plan, which 
reduced state-subsidies by HUF 32-35 billion and ended controls on nearly 70 percent of 
consumer prices and 35-40 percent of convertible currency imports, while a personal 
income tax and value added tax was introduced. Also, the Law on Business Organisations, 
enabling the creation of private joint stock companies and private ownership of shares in 
these companies by private citizens, and the Law on Foreign Investment was passed and 
came into force on 1 January 1989. According to Swain, these laws brought fundamental 
changes to the Hungarian economy, and the wider society:  
The company law, in a fundamental sense, can be seen as having reintroduced capitalist – 
certainly embryonic capitalist – relations into Hungary in two ways. First, it conceded the 
principle that natural and legal persons could own, buy and sell shares in the means of 
production, distribution and exchange. Second, less abstractly, it was the legislation that was 
actually used throughout 1989 and 1990 for both piecemeal, spontaneous and state-initiated 
privatization. If the company law permitted the development of domestic capitalism, the law 
on foreign investments permitted foreign capitalists to repatriate their profits, and do so on 
very generous terms.417 
 
But the attempts to shake up the economy showed no signs of working. Instead, as the 
economic crisis intensified, it turned into a political and social crisis. Public opinion 
surveys carried out in the period between 1981-1988 showed a dramatic decline in the 
public’s perception about the general quality of life and a growing lack of trust in the 
Kádár regime’s ability to solve the country’s economic problems. Particularly noteworthy 
was the dissatisfaction with inflation (with a 60 percent increase in dissatisfaction among 
respondents), the quality of the public health system (53 percent increase in 
dissatisfaction), the lack of housing (47 percent increase in dissatisfaction), and the 
protection of workers’ interests (47 percent increase in dissatisfaction), and the lack of 
equal opportunity (40 percent increase in dissatisfaction).418 Another survey, carried out 
amongst students at the Technical University of Budapest (today the Budapest University 
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of Technology and Economics), told a similar story: while 61 percent of the students in 
1983 believed that the MSZMP would win a majority in a free election and 70 percent had 
an optimistic view of the future for socialism, by 1988 the ratios had dropped to 25 and 37 
percent respectively.419 By 1988, the signs of the MSZP’s internal crisis were becoming 
increasingly evident: membership diminished by seven percent in the first half of that year, 
while amongst those members that remained, there was a growing tendency to follow 
subjective interests, instead of those of the party as a whole, resulting in growing problems 
of corruption within the party.420 Figures like were arguably indicative of what Gramsci 
described as an ‘organic crisis’, which extends beyond the ‘normal’ problems of capital 
accumulation (‘conjunctural crisis’), to become a ‘crisis of hegemony’ of the ruling class, 
or a ‘general crisis of the State.’421 Gramsci emphasised that these contradictions could 
‘sometimes protract themselves for tens of years … since no social formation will ever 
admit that it has been superseded.’422 Society thus finds itself at an impasse, in which ‘the 
old is dying [while] the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid 
symptoms appear.’423  
 
As the organic crisis of the Kádár regime intensified, there were increasing demands, both 
from wider sections of Hungarian society, as well as within the ruling MSZMP, for reform.  
Initially, the expression of old grievances and discontent with the deteriorating economic 
situation was limited to two camps of opposition intellectuals – the first, ‘democratic’ 
camp, which drew on liberal political thought and attracted most of its support from the 
urban middle class (most of whom, in Hungarian public debates at the time, were 
perceived to be of Jewish origin); and the second, ‘national-conservative’ camp, which 
defined itself as the heir of the ‘national-popular’ movement of the 1930s, and, whose 
supporters were predominantly perceived as coming from the rural countryside.424 There 
were also calls for ‘radical reforms’ from a group of influential economists working for the 
Institute of Financial Research, the in-house research institute of the Ministry of Finance, 
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who argued that the only solution to Hungary’s malaise was to open up the economy to the 
exigencies of the world economy.425 Meanwhile, opposition intellectuals began to call for 
political reforms, insisting that ‘Kádár must go!’, and setting out a detailed programme for 
gradual democratisation, which included the introduction of political pluralism, freedom of 
speech and association, and a free press.426 These events sparked a flurry of activity within 
the opposition movement. In September 1987, the country’s first opposition movement 
was created when a group of some 150 national-conservative intellectuals founded the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). An indication of the growing popularity of the 
opposition came when the first mass demonstration against the regime took place on 15 
March 1988 (on the 140 year anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution against the 
Habsburg monarchy), at which demands for democracy, human rights, and national 
sovereignty where fused with grievances at the deteriorating social conditions experienced 
by the majority of the population.427 The demonstration was rapidly followed by the 
establishment of two liberal opposition movements: the Alliance of Young Democrats 
(FIDESZ) in March 1988, and, two months later, the foundation of what became known as 
the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). Following the example of the newly formed 
opposition movements, a number of ‘historical’ political parties were revived between the 
autumn of 1988 and spring 1989, including the FKGP, the SZDP, and the Christian 
Democratic People’s Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP).428  
 
While these events unfolded, there was growing confusion and conflict within the ranks of 
the ruling MSZMP. Reform-minded nomenklatura members unhappy with the course of 
events argued that in order to implement necessary economic reforms, the ageing party-
leader, János Kádár, had to be removed. This led to an open power struggle within the 
MSZMP between ‘conservative’ bureaucrats and the ‘reformers’ over the control of the 
party.429 The conflict within the MSZMP was finally resolved at a special party 
conference, convened on 20-22 May 1988, where Kádár and his closest associates were 
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removed from power and replaced with a quartet of ‘reform communists’, comprised of 
Károly Grósz, Imre Pozsgay, Rezső Nyers, and Miklós Németh. As one commentator 
described the changes at the time, this was ‘the most radical and most peaceful change of 
guard in a communist party leadership that has ever happened under normal conditions’.430 
By the time the special conference was over, 37 new members had joined the 108-member 
Central Committee. Two-thirds had only been members since 1985, and only 13 had been 
in the Central Committee since 1966. As Rudolf Tőkés concludes, the outcome meant that, 
‘For all intents and purposes, the Kádárist party had fallen apart by the end of May 1988. 
The apparat and the hard-core leadership were still there, but the local organizations and 
the counties were in total disarray.’431  
 
While this political drama was unfolding, important changes were taking place within the 
ruling class. In the second half of the 1980s, sections of the ruling class in Eastern Europe 
were beginning to resort to private forms of enterprise, indulging in what has become 
known in the transformation literature as ‘nomenklatura privatisation’ or ‘spontaneous 
privatisation’. In Hungary, this process was described in detail at the time by the 
Hungarian sociologist Elemér Hankiss. As he noted, ‘it is not unusual today [1988] to meet 
a family belonging to the Kádáriste oligarchy where the father is a high ranking party or 
state official, the daughter owns a town centre clothes shop, the eldest son represents a 
Western company in Hungary, the son in law is the chairman of a recently created 
company or a Western bank and a grandmother owns a family hotel on the edge of Lake 
Balaton.’432 While a more detailed account of this process is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, a brief summary of some of the methods used will serve to indicate the general 
process. With remarkably little resistance from ‘communist’ officials or wider sections of 
Hungarian society, state-owned assets were sold off to insiders, including managers and 
nomenklatura members. These sales were conducted on extremely favourable terms so that 
state enterprises were steadily stripped of their most profitable assets. The significance of 
this cannot be under-emphasised: members of the party ruling class realised that operating 
in market conditions meant that their interests lay with private capital.433   
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Faced with increasing calls for ‘reform’, both from within Hungarian society and Western 
leaders, and spurred by Gorbachev’s increasingly liberal policies towards the Soviet 
satellite states, the MSZMP leadership eventually decided to ‘jump before they were 
pushed’.434 In February 1989, the ruling MSZMP renounced its hegemonic role in society, 
and, in June in that same year, trilateral talks, known as the ‘Roundtable Negotiations’ 
(Kerekasztaltárgyalások), were opened between the ruling MSZMP, the opposition parties, 
and other interest groups over the transition from a centrally planned economy controlled 
by an authoritarian party-state into a market economy and parliamentary democracy.435 At 
a special congress in October 1989 the MSZMP changed its name to the Hungarian 
Socialist Party, and, later in the month, the Hungarian Peoples’ Republic was officially 
disbanded and transformed into a parliamentary democracy, to the joy of jubilant crowds 
on Kossuth Square. Hungary’s more than four decades long experiment with state 
capitalism had thus officially come to an end.  
 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have analysed the trajectory of the Hungarian political economy 
between 1945-1989, in the context of the capitalist world economy. The analysis presented 
in this chapter challenges dominant accounts in the literature in three important aspects. 
Firstly, we dismissed the claim, widely accepted as ‘common sense’ both in the 
‘transformatology’ literature and popular debates, which depict Hungary and other Soviet-
style economies as ‘socialist’, operating to a fundamentally different logic from those of 
the ‘capitalist’ West. Instead, we argued that it is more useful to see these societies as 
existing on a continuum of state intervention, with two extremes – Hong Kong and the 
Soviet Union – at opposite ends of the scale. Secondly, our analysis suggested that from 
the mid-1960s and onwards, Hungary was gradually becoming (re-)integrated in the 
capitalist world economy, as well as the international epistemic community in which 
dominant ideas about how to best operate it were formulated. As we noted, this enabled 
Hungarian policymakers to draw upon the ideas and practices of economists and state 
managers elsewhere. (As we demonstrate in the next chapter, this would turn to have 
profound implications this meant that Hungarian policymakers did not have to import 
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neoliberalism ‘from the West’ on the eve of the transition. Rather, social forces for 
neoliberalism were emerging ‘organically’ in the 1980s, in an attempt to solve the 
deepening crisis of Hungarian state capitalism and reorient it along neoliberal lines.)  
Thirdly, as outlined in section 4, we contend that the transition in Hungary occurred in the 
context of the organic crisis of state capitalism in the 1980s, leading to the introduction of 
consensual economic and political reform.  
 
The main reasons behind this diverging account can be traced to the theoretical approach 
that has informed our analysis. Drawing on the theory of state capitalism we showed in the 
first part of this chapter how the particular configuration of the post-World War II world 
economy forced leaders in Eastern Europe to pursue efforts of state-led development, in 
which particular emphasis was placed on rapid capital accumulation through investment in 
heavy industry. Although notoriously oppressive and exploitative, this regime of 
accumulation was neither ‘irrational’ nor ‘unique’ to Stalinism. Rather, the tendency 
towards increasing state intervention in the economy was, as Marxists have pointed out, 
something that was discernible to varying degrees throughout the capitalist world economy 
in the period of state monopoly capitalism/finance capitalism (1873-1929/45) and in the 
subsequent period of state capitalism proper (1945-1973).436 It was particularly 
conspicuous in more ‘backward’ societies (the USSR from the late 1920s, Germany and 
Japan in the 1930s, and various ‘developing’ countries in the Global South from the 1950s 
and onwards), where the absence of a strong domestic bourgeoisie, together with the 
pressures of international economic competition and geopolitical rivalry – what Trotsky 
termed the ‘whip of external necessity’ – forced local ruling classes to turn to the state in 
order to promote capital accumulation. In the case of Hungary, state intervention had 
become an increasingly important feature of the economy during the interwar years, and 
this trend was intensified following the end of World War II. Yet, as we demonstrated in 
the second section, the full-scale ‘Sovietisation’ of Hungary was not a straightforward 
process and was only formally achieved on 18 August 1949, when the People’s Republic 
of Hungary was declared.  
 
Initially, the Soviet model proved to be highly efficient for capital accumulation within 
backward economies during a world-economic epoch of relative autarky.437 Similar to 
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most other states in the Soviet bloc, Hungary experienced a dynamic socio-economic 
transformation in the 1950s and 1960s. State-led development ‘from above’ achieved rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation, accompanied by a rise in living standards. As illustrated 
by G.M. Tamás,  
The change from village to town, from back-breaking physical work in the fields to 
technological work in the factory, from hunger, filth, and misery to modest cafeteria meals, 
hot water and indoor plumbing was breathtaking – and the cultural change dramatic. Also the 
rout from illiteracy and the inability to read a clock face to Brecht and Bartók was 
astonishingly short.438 
 
And although opposition to the coercive nature of the Stalinist system was widespread in 
Hungarian society, the party-state was always able – if need be, with the help of Soviet 
tanks – to crush any resistance, most famously in the 1956 Revolution.  
 
However, as we demonstrated in section 3, by the early 1960s problems were becoming 
apparent in the Soviet-style economies, as the resources for further primitive accumulation 
were becoming exhausted.  For the Kádár regime these news were a grave concern, as it 
threatened to undermine the foundations of the delicate ‘social compromise’ that the 
regime had constructed after crushing the 1956 revolution. Throughout the Soviet bloc 
policymakers responded to these pressures by calling for economic reforms. This was 
officially recognised on 1 January 1968, when the ruling MSZMP introduced a programme 
of ‘comprehensive reform’, known as the New Economic Mechanism (NEM). The NEM 
aimed to reform the Hungarian economy by reducing the role of central planning, 
encouraging market relationships among firms, using prices as allocative functions and 
enterprises responding to prices in order to maximise profits, and using profits to budget 
new investments. Widely accepted as ‘the far most radical reform of the Warsaw Pact 
countries’,439 the NEM brought greater freedom for state-owned enterprises in production 
and investment decisions, granted a more active role for world market prices in the 
economy (although the state maintained control over the prices of most consumer goods, in 
order to prevent inflation), created a more flexible labour market, and opened up the 
Hungarian economy to foreign trade. Initially, the reform seemed to fulfil its objective, as 
the Hungarian economy enjoyed robust annual growth rates between 1966 and 1975. But 
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with mounting pressures from Stalinist ‘hardliners’ within the MSZMP bureaucracy and 
wider sections of Hungarian society, as well as from Moscow, the reforms were gradually 
slowed down after 1972, while the proponents of reform within the party were demoted 
from their positions. 
 
Finally, in section 4, we demonstrated how the slowdown of accumulation and return of 
global economic crisis forced the Kádár regime to seek greater interaction with the 
capitalist world economy, through export-led growth and foreign loans. While this decision 
was ‘rational’ on the part of the regime, it left the Hungarian economy dangerously 
exposed to the vicissitudes of the world market. The problem was exacerbated by the fact 
that Eastern European currencies were non-convertible, which left the Kádár regime with a 
‘Hobson’s choice’: to seek loans in convertible currencies from Western states, private 
banks, and international financial institutions, for the goods imported from West. As a 
result, the indebtedness of the Hungarian economy rose significantly from the mid-1970s 
onwards, and, by the mid-1980s, the country had the highest per capita debt amongst the 
Soviet bloc economies.  
 
Perceiving their own and the Soviet Union’s relative decline, the Hungarian ruling class 
increasingly lost faith in the Soviet model and began to look for alternative methods for 
securing the conditions for capital accumulation. However, this led to internal divisions 
and strengthened calls for economic and political reforms, both within the ruling MSZMP 
and from wider sections of society. By the mid-1980s Hungary had turned in this direction, 
as its reform communist leaders preached about the necessity for austerity at home, while 
offering its enterprises for sale to Western investors (‘even if’, as Prime Minister Grósz 
famously declared in 1988, ‘they became 100 percent foreign owned’440). As it turned out, 
the more visionary members of the nomenklatura opted to jump before they were pushed, 
leading to a process that Haynes aptly described as, ‘moving sideways from the party, state 
or planning structures to the business and commercial ones.’441 This then, answers the 
conundrum of why the Hungarian revolution of 1989 took the ‘passive’ character that it 
eventually did. The downfall of the party-state was not met with any significant resistance 
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by the nomenklatura because they had already changed their suits to the newly evolving 
order. 
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THE ASCENDANCY OF NEOLIBERAL SOCIAL 
FORCES IN HUNGARY IN THE 1980S 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we analysed the general contours of the Hungarian political 
economy from the end of World War II to its ‘long transition’ to a free market economy 
and parliamentary democracy in the 1980s. We argued that the particular configuration of 
the post-World War II world economy, geopolitical competition with the West, and the 
military influence of the Soviet Union, forced leaders in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe to pursue efforts of state-led development, emphasising rapid capital accumulation 
through investment in heavy industry. However, in the wake of the global economic crisis 
of the 1970s the ‘Kádárist compromise’ became increasingly difficult to uphold, prompting 
Hungarian policymakers to seek greater integration with the capitalist world economy. 
Then, as the economic crisis deepened in the 1980s, the Hungarian ruling class 
increasingly lost faith in the Soviet model and began to look for alternative methods for 
securing the conditions for capital accumulation. In this chapter, we seek to flesh out in 
more detail the argument that was raised in the previous chapter concerning the organic 
ascendancy of ‘proto-neoliberalism’ in Hungary before the formal regime change in 1989.  
 
As we pointed out in the introductory chapter, the (neoliberal) transformation of Hungary 
and other Soviet-style economies has received much attention in recent scholarly debates. 
In broad terms, accounts have tended to emphasise two particular narratives. In 
Constructions of Neoliberal Reason (2010), Jamie Peck distinguishes between what he 
describes as ‘centrifugal’ and ‘dialogic’ theories of the global diffusion of neoliberalism.442 
According to the former, the neoliberalisation of the region was driven ‘from the outside’, 
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through the mechanisms and pressures of global financial markets, transnational 
corporations, global and regional bureaucratic organisations (in particular through the EU, 
IMF, and the World Bank) and their Western advisors, free-market think tanks, and 
hegemonic (and imperialist) powers, such as the United Kingdom and the United States.443 
The problem with this account, Peck maintains, is that while it correctly identifies 
neoliberalism as the form that capitalism has taken since the global economic crisis of the 
1970s, it incorrectly understands neoliberalism as form of ‘replicating machine’, which, 
once distilled into a coherent theory by Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek, then 
promoted across the world by the conservative regimes of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan, and later translated into global strategy of capital accumulation by ‘the 
‘Washington Consensus’, swept the world in a unidirectional direction from the late 1970s 
and onwards.444 By contrast, proponents of the ‘dialogic’ thesis, such as Bockman and 
Eyal, Peck argues, have perceptively (and correctly) pointed to the complex (and 
sometimes contradictory) articulation between internal dynamics and external pressures.445 
Having said this, it is difficult to deny the ‘coercive’ pressures applied by external actors in 
the neoliberalisation of the region. As Peck observes, ‘In some senses, Eastern Europe 
during the 1990s, rather like Chile a generation earlier, did indeed become for a while the 
pre-eminent “laboratory” of neoliberal practice.’446 
 
Yet, despite their disagreements, most scholars tend to agree that neoliberalism only 
‘conquered’ the Eastern Europe after the demise of ‘actually existing socialism’ in 1989. 
Bockman and Eyal sum up the conventional wisdom on the subject, when they write: 
‘After communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989, the new post-communist 
governments have embarked, at various speeds, on neo-liberal economic reform designed 
to bring about rapid liberalization, macroeconomic restructuring, and, ultimately, 
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privatization.’447 However, as we argued in Chapter 2, this position is theoretically 
problematic, as it fails to acknowledge: a) the persistence of capitalist social relations in 
the Soviet bloc between 1945-1989, and b) the interconnection of the capitalist world 
economy. In addition, as we demonstrate in this chapter, it is simply empirically wrong. 
The aim of this chapter is therefore to show that, in the case of Hungary, neither of the 
above theses provides an adequate narrative of the ascendancy of neoliberalism. Rather, as 
we shall demonstrate, neoliberal ideas were already existent in Hungary before the regime 
change in 1989-1990. As such, we argue that the ascendancy of neoliberalism in the 
second half of the 1980s was a much more ‘home-grown’ programme, developing in 
‘dialogue’ between radical reform economists and proponents of reform within the ruling 
MSZMP, than what has usually been acknowledged in the literature.  
 
In light of the above discussion, the next section analyses the conditions under which 
neoliberalism emerged in Hungary in the 1980s, identifying what we, following Gramsci, 
can describe as the ‘organic intellectuals’448 of neoliberal ‘common sense’, who helped to 
facilitate the reorientation of the debate on how to reform ‘socialism’ along neoliberal 
lines. The third section then asks how radical reform economists interpreted the deepening 
crisis of the Hungarian political economy and what proposals they offered to overcome it, 
by analysing in detail the contents of ‘Fordulat és Reform’, a document published in 1987 
by a group of radical reform economists in the samizdat journal Medvetánc, which, as we 
pointed out in the Introduction, has generally been described as the founding document of 
neoliberalism in Hungary. Finally, in the fourth section, we look at how the document 
contributed to ongoing reform debates amongst policymakers and wider Hungarian society 
in the late 1980s.    
 
 
The Emergence of Social Forces for Neoliberalism in 
‘Socialist’ Hungary: The Institute of Financial Research 
As we noted in the previous chapter, the Hungarian economy was descending into an ever-
deeper crisis by the time Károly Grósz assumed the post of Prime Minister in September 
1987. Economic growth, which had only averaged 2 percent between 1979 and 1984, was 
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negative in 1985 and only reached 1.5 percent in 1986. At the same time, real wages had 
been stagnating since 1979, while inflation, which had only once (in 1976) reached more 
than 5 percent before 1978, was averaging 7.15 percent between 1979-1986. Although 
these figures were not necessarily much worse than many Western economies at the time – 
for example, despite all the gloss about the wonders of ‘Thatcherism’, the UK economy 
only grew with 1.9 percent per year between 1979-1986, while inflation in France and Italy 
averaged 9.4 and 13.8 percent respectively between 1979-1986 – Hungary’s situation was 
made worse by its notoriously high external debt.449 The country seemed perennially 
trapped in the not-so-privileged group of ‘Severely Indebted Middle Income Countries’ 
(SIMICs450); in fact, in the second half of the 1980s, Hungary had the highest per capita 
debt rate in Eastern Europe and the annual debt servicing amounted to more than 10 
percent of GDP.451 In July 1987 the MSZMP Central Committee was therefore forced to 
self-critically admit that the objectives of the 7th Five-Year Plan, which had only been 
introduced one year earlier, were no longer attainable, and that the introduction of painful 
austerity measures, although potentially leading to serious social conflicts, was 
‘unavoidable’.452 Grósz presented himself as a devoted reformer, but argued that there was 
a need for ‘order, discipline, and full adherence to the principles of performance’, if the 
planned reforms were to be successful.453 He was welcomed by the Hungarian public 
opinion, as well as Western governments and financial circles, who praised ‘his profile of 
economic liberalism and political conservatism – what locals at the time called the 
Pinochet model.’454 However, he received a lukewarm reception from the opposition, who 
argued that the reforms did not go ‘deep enough’.455  
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Grósz was thus facing a two-front struggle: on the one hand, he needed to introduce further 
economic reforms in order to fend off criticism at home and satisfy foreign lenders, while 
on the other hand, he needed to ensure that these reforms did not jeopardise the hegemonic 
role of the ruling MSZMP in society. But where was he to turn for advice on how to 
introduce the reforms necessary for ‘turning around’ the economy? It is at this critical 
juncture that we can see the molecular emergence of social forces for ‘proto-neoliberalism’ 
in Hungarian society. In the remaining part of this section, we seek to offer some further 
detail about the intellectual roots of neoliberalism and the individuals involved.  
 
As we demonstrated in the previous chapter, experiments with ‘market reform’ had a 
longstanding tradition in nominally ‘socialist’ Hungary, dating as far back as the mid-
1950s. Despite the constraints imposed by the Kádár regime following the crushing of the 
1956 revolution, Hungarian economists were well versed in neoclassical economics and, 
from 1964 and onwards, had the possibility to travel to Western universities. By the early 
1980s, some of the classical works of neoliberals, including Friedman and Hayek, were 
also available in translation.456 By then, the majority of the faculty and students of the Karl 
Marx University of Economics in Budapest, which, as Phillips et al. point out, was ‘the 
principal institution for the education of Hungary’s economic and political elite’457, were 
already neoclassical in orientation. In a 2009 interview in the Hungarian monthly 
Egyenlitő, Béla Kádár, a well-known economist and Minister of International Economic 
Affairs in the Antall government (1990-1994), provides a mesmerising account of the 
ascendancy neoliberal ideas amongst policymakers in late-Kádárist Hungary. As he 
recounts, 
  In the 1980s, Hungary was much more open than the neighbouring countries. This enhanced  
the neoliberal line, since those who could travel abroad essentially received essentially a  
neoliberal education. It was always more profitable to be connected to the Anglo-Saxon 
world. The peak of the financial profession was to work for the IMF or the World Bank. You 
were most probable to land such a position if you were a fervent believer of the therapy that 
these institutions were offering. But even at the Karl Marx University of Economics, the 
Anglo-Saxon recipes were the most attractive ones, most scholarships were US-funded, the 
Soros Foundation appeared, the Chicago School had a very strong influence on domestic 
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economic thinking from the late 1970s.458 
 
Kádár’s account is highly revealing, as it confirms our claim that neoliberal ideas were 
already existent (albeit in an embryonic form) in Hungary prior to the regime change in 
1989-1990.   
 
So how was it possible for neoliberal ideas to develop in nominally ‘socialist’ Hungary? 
As we noted in the previous chapter, until the mid-1980s, market reformers had primarily 
focused on ‘perfecting the economic mechanism’, while accepting the hegemonic role of 
the ruling MSZMP in society. But this was to change rapidly during the second half of the 
decade, as a small, but highly influential and dynamic group of young reform economists 
emerged in Hungarian society, who, drawing on neoliberal doxa, came to argue that the 
only cure for the beleaguered Hungarian economy was the implementation of ‘radical’ 
market reforms. However, rather than an ‘imported project’459 developed by technocrats 
and neoliberal economists educated at Western universities, as was the case with the 
Chilean ‘Chicago Boys’460 or the ‘Georgetown Gang’461 of émigré economists that 
descended on Latvia following its independence from the Soviet Union, the architects of 
neoliberalism in Hungary emerged from within the institutions of the party-state itself, 
more precisely in the in-house research institute of the Ministry of Finance, the Institute of 
Financial Research.462  
 
The institute had been set up in 1968 by Jenő Wilcsek.463 Wilcsek was an influential 
economic policymaker who had moved to the Karl Marx University of Economics 
following the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, where he developed an interest 
in mathematical economics ‘because its technical language could conceal a wide range of 
                                                
458 Kádár, here cited in László Szále, ‘A vezetői minőség forradalma’, interview with Béla Kádár, Egyenlítő, 
2009, Vol. 7, No. 7-8.  
459 Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, p. 2. 
460 On the rise of the ‘Chicago Boys’ in Chile, see Klein, The Shock Doctrine, pp. 77-81; Marion Fourcade-
Gourinchas and Sarah L. Babb, ‘The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries’, 
American Journal of Sociology, 2002, Vol. 108, No. 3, pp. 547-549. 
461 On the ‘Georgetown Gang’ in Latvia, see Jan Berzins and Jeffery Sommers, ‘Twenty Years Lost: Latvia’s 
Failed Development in the Post-Soviet World’, in First the Transition, Then the Crash: Eastern Europe in 
the 2000s, edited by Gareth Dale, London: Pluto Press, pp. 120-122; Juris Dreifelds, Latvia in Transition, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
462 Andor, Eltévedt éllovas, pp. 160-161; Greskovits, The Political Economy of Protest and Patience, pp. 38.  
463 If not indicated otherwise, the information on the Institute of Financial Research on the following pages is 
provided from the semi-structured interviews carried out with E.Sz, L.K, and Z.M.P.   
 136 
politics.’464 When Wilcsek left his post in 1975, he was replaced by István Hagelmayer,465 
a renowned reform economist and former head of the Karl Marx University’s Department 
of Financial Economics. Hagelmayer, whose work focussed on monetary theory, was 
revered by his students, and, from the late 1970s and onwards, he managed to convince 
many of them to join the research institute. Beside Hagelmayer’s personal charisma, there 
were a number of other reasons that made the institute a popular destination for many 
economists, who were in the early phase of their careers, including an ‘apolitical’ work 
environment, access to up-to-date (and sometimes confidential) economic data on the 
Hungarian economy, as well as the chance to earn a relatively high salary. As one former 
members recalled the intellectual environment within the research institute in the 1980s in 
an interview:  
The institute was an intellectual citadel; in fact, we were on the top of an intellectual peak, 
with a higher salary than in the academic institutions, with access to much more information 
[on the Hungarian economy], including top-secret materials … And we also developed a 
sense of responsibility that we will save Hungary!466  
 
A similar view was later expressed by Lajos Bokros, another former researcher at the 
institute, who, as we shall see below, would go on to become one of the most (in)famous 
and relentless advocates of neoliberalism in post-transition Hungary. In an interview in 
December 2000, he discusses the importance of the intellectual climate at the institute:  
I believe that, in those days, this was an exceptional workplace. The era and the people are 
very important. When Hetényi was Minister of Finance, Hagelmayer was Director and 
Gábor Havas Head of Department [of the Institute of Financial Research], the institute 
represented an exceptionally free world, packed in wadding and secluded from the outside 
world, but nonetheless a very free world. Back then, there were few workplaces like this in 
Hungary. … It cannot be emphasised enough how privileged we were compared to anyone 
who, as an economist, in the early-stages of their career, wanted to find a job and be able to 
work with what they liked. Once again, I would like to emphasise the importance of the three 
“H’s”: Hetényi, Hagelmayer, Havas. Let us remember them forever. … Apart from the 
‘three H’s’, László Antal also served as model. It follows from the specificities of the 
Hungarian situation that the young reform economists finally met with the democratic 
opposition, since, although having started from different fields and positions, they both 
                                                
464 Bockman, Markets in the Name of Socialism, p. 120. 
465 Hagelmayer’s (1933-1997) work focussed on monetary theory and he was a strong critic of Marxism-
Leninism. He served as the Director at the Institute of Financial Research until 1987. After the regime 
change, he was appointed as the first President of the State Audit Office by Prime Minister József Antall.  
466 Interview with E.Sz 23 March 2011. See also Tőkés, Hungary’s negotiated revolution, p. 203. 
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reached the same conclusions: without a political transition, there is no economic transition. 
This idea was already present in “Fordulat és Reform”, albeit not as harshly, but we said 
it.467 
 
Amongst those that joined the institute in the late 1970s and early 1980s were, as one 
interviewee pointed out, ‘some of the greatest minds of a new generation of reform 
economists’.468 These included:  
 
1. László Antal (1943-2008). An internationally renowned ‘reform economist’, who 
had graduated from the Karl Marx University of Economics in 1967, Antal worked 
for the Ministry of Finance for almost a decade, before joining the Institute of 
Financial Research as a researcher in 1977. He was a leading member of the 
‘reform-wing’ within the ruling MSZMP, and contributed to the economic 
programme of the Grósz government.469 Later, he would serve as Deputy Minister 
of Finance in the last ‘communist’ government, led by Miklós Németh. Following 
the regime change, he joined the (neo)liberal SZDSZ and went on to serve in a 
number of high-ranking policymaking positions in the 1990s and 2000s, including 
as advisor to the President of the MNB (1990-1991) and the Hungarian Foreign 
Trade Bank (1992), the ministers of finance of the first MSZP-SZDSZ government 
(1994-1998), and later as economic policy advisor to the Prime Minister’s Office 
during the socialist-liberal governments of Péter Medgyessy and Ferenc 
Gyurcsány. 
 
2. Lajos Bokros (b. 1954). Similar to many other influential reform economists, 
Bokros was educated at the Karl Marx University of Economics, which, as we 
noted in the previous chapter, was one of the most Western-oriented universities in 
the Soviet bloc. He joined the Institute of Financial Research in 1980 and became 
famous within liberal opposition circles in the 1980s, publishing articles in 
samizdat papers under the pseudonym ‘David Ricardo’. After he leaving the 
institute in 1987, he worked for the MNB in a number of high-ranking positions, 
including as its Managing Director between 1989-1991. Following the regime 
                                                
467 Bokros, here cited in Rádai, Pénzügyminiszterek..., pp. 166-167.  
468 Interview with Z.M.P on 21 December 2011. 
469 Antal, here cited in Gizella Tarnói, ‘Mindenki tudta hogy amit írunk, igaz’, interview with László Antal, 
Mozgó Világ, March 1990, p. 12. 
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change, he served as the President of the Budapest Stock Exchange (1990-1995), 
while in parallel being the Head of the newly created State Property Agency 
(Állami Vagyonügynökség, ÁVÜ) (1990-1991), and the Chief Executive of 
Budapest Bank (1991-1995). He became appointed Minister of Finance in 1995 by 
Prime Minister Gyula Horn and would go on to plan and oversee the introduction 
of the largest austerity programme in the history of post-transition Hungary, 
commonly known as the ‘Bokros Package’, but was forced to resign one year later 
amidst widespread criticism.470 Following his resignation, he moved abroad, 
working as the director of the World Bank’s department for the Europe and Central 
Asia Region (ECR), and later as a consultant for the IMF. As part of his duties, he 
has contributed in the spreading of neoliberal ideas and practices working as an 
advisor to the governments of Croatia, Poland, and, most recently, in Ukraine. In 
the mid-2000s he returned for a brief period to academia, working as Professor in 
Economics at the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest. Reflecting 
wider trends in the evolution of neoliberalism, ranging from Britain’s New Labour 
under Tony Blair to the African National Congress (ANC) in post-Apartheid South 
Africa, Bokros has gradually moved to the right on the political spectrum over the 
years. Originally a member of the ruling MSZMP, which he claimed to have joined 
‘because I have a strong sense of solidarity with those who are underprivileged, 
disabled, and the outcasts [of society]’471, he officially dissociated himself with its 
successor party, the MSZP, in 2007, after the party expressed concerns about the 
privatisation of the health service. By 2009, he was standing as the leading 
candidate of the national-conservative MDF in the European Parliament elections. 
One year later, he stood as the party’s candidate for Prime Minister in the general 
elections, but failed miserably, obtaining only 2.66 percent of the votes. In 2011, he 
set up the Freedom and Reform Institute (Szabadság és Reform Intézet), which is a 
surrogate of the pan-European neoliberal-neoconservative think tank New 
Direction–The Foundation of Free Market Reform, and affiliated to the Alliance of 
European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR). In April 2013, he founded the 
Movement for a Modern Hungary (Modern Magyarország Mozgalom, MOMA), 
                                                
470 For Bokros’ own account of his time as Minister of Finance, see the interview in Rádai, Pénzügy-
miniszterek..., pp. 159-225.  
471 Ibid., p. 163. 
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which aims to ‘represent authentically and spread pro-market, libertarian, national 
and European values in Hungary.’472 
 
3. György Surányi (b. 1954). An old friend of Bokros (the two served together in the 
military and, in the opinion of one of their former tutor’s, were ‘like brothers’473), 
Surányi has had a similarly glittering transnational career. He joined the Institute of 
Financial Research in 1977, following his graduation from the Karl Marx 
University of Budapest. After a brief spell at the World Bank in the mid-1980s he 
returned to Hungary in 1988, working as chief economic policy advisor and then 
Under-secretary of State at the National Planning Office in the Németh 
government. Surányi has served as the MNB twice (first between 1990-1991, and 
then again between 1995-2001). During this period, he played an essential role in 
the neoliberalisation of Hungary: for example, he co-authored the ‘Bokros-
package’ and during his tenure at the MNB the liberalisation of the country’s 
banking and finance sector continued apace. Until recently, worked as the regional 
head of Banca Intesa San Paolo (previously the Central European International 
Bank, CIB), and he has also served on the advisory board of the Hungarian-
American Enterprise Fund (Magyar-Amerikai Vállalkozási Alap, HAEF), the 
EBRD, the Board of Directors of the International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF) 
and the East-West Institute (EWI), an influential global think-tank, set up in 1980 
by John E. Mroz and Ira D. Wallach, in order to promote peace and economic 
stability between East and West, and train ‘strong leaders for democratic states.’474 
Surányi continues to be highly regarded in domestic and international financial 
circles, and was considered as a potential Prime Minister candidate in 2009 by the 
MSZP and SZDSZ following the resignation of Ferenc Gyurcsány.475 
 
4. György Matolcsy (b. 1955). Also a graduate of the Karl Marx University of 
Economics, Matolcsy worked for the Institute of Financial Research in 1980s. In 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, he became a strong advocate of ‘radical’ reforms 
                                                
472 MOMA, ‘A MOMA célkitűzései’, Budapest: Modern Magyarország Mozgalom (MOMA), 2013. 
Available on: http://www.moma.hu/rolunk/celjaink/#rtop (last obtained on: 4 November 2013). 
473 Nicholas Denton, ‘Intimate Network: Economic Policy-makers’, Financial Times, 17 September 1990. 
474 EWI, ‘The Decades of Making the World a Safe and Better Place’, East-West Institute (EWI), 2013. 
Available on: http://www.ewi.info/30 (last accessed on: 6 November 2013).  
475 Politics.hu, ‘SZDSZ backs György Surányi for PM’, 25 March 2009. Available on: 
http://www.politics.hu/20090325/szdsz-backs-gyorgy-suranyi-for-pm/ (last obtained 16 October 2013).  
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along neoliberal lines, including the much-criticised process of ‘spontaneous 
privatisation’,476 and he coordinated the Bridge Group’s (Híd-csoport477) reform 
programme in 1989-1990, which urged the incoming government to impose severe 
austerity measure in order to bring down Hungary’s balance of payments deficit 
and halt the growth of inflation.478 However, from the mid-1990s and onwards, he 
became increasingly critical of capitalism ‘red in tooth and claw’,479 beginning 
instead to advocate the use of more ‘unorthodox’ economic policies, which 
advocate a stronger role for the state in the economy, whilst retaining many of the 
core features of neoliberalism (including a dogmatic adherence to macroeconomic 
stability, the provision of tax cuts to private enterprise and the upper and middle-
classes in order to stimulate economic growth, etc.). Commonly referred to as 
‘Matolcsyism’ in contemporary Hungarian political discourse, these policies have 
found a warm reception in national-conservative circles. Following the regime 
change, he worked as an economic advisor to Prime Minister József Antall, 
responsible for the government’s privatisation programme, but resigned within a 
year of taking office following frequent disagreements with the Minister of 
Finance, Ferenc Rábár, and the Minister of International Economic Relations, Béla 
Kádár.480 From 1991 to 1994 he served as the Hungarian government’s 
representative at the EBRD. From the late 1990s he has become increasingly 
closely associated with the national-conservative FIDESZ. Having designed the 
economic programme of the party in the 1998 general elections, Matolcsy 
eventually joined the party in 2003. He has served as Minister of Economy in both 
the first and second Orbán governments (first between 1999-2002, and then 
between 2010-2013), and was nominated by Prime Minister Orbán as the Governor 
of the MNB in March 2013, after the six-year tenure of András Simor had come to 
an end.  
                                                
476 György Matolcsy, ‘Defending the Cause of Spontaneous Reform of Ownership’, Acta Oeconomica, 1990, 
Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 1-22. 
477 The group was set up in November 1989 and funded by the American-Hungarian billionaire and 
philanthropist George Soros. The group consisted of a group of politically ‘independent’ economists and 
bankers, though many were affiliated with the two major of the democratic transition, SZDSZ and MDF. The 
aim of the group was ‘to work as a bridge between the competing political parties and experts, in order to 
provide a joint crisis management programme to the new governement and parliament.’ See Híd-csoport, 
‘Híd a közeli jövőbe’. 
478 Ripp, Rendszerváltás Magyarországon, 1987-1990, p. 513.  
479 Hardy, Poland’s New Capitalism, p. 35. 
480 On the reasons for these disagreements, see the interview with Rábár in Rádai, Pénzügyminiszterek..., pp. 
23-24.  
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5. Márton Tardos (1922-2006). An internationally acknowledged economist – in 1990 
he was described by the Financial Times as ‘one of Hungary’s best-known and 
cleverest radical economists’481 –, Tardos served as the Executive Director of the 
Institute of Financial Research between 1987-1990. He was a passionate advocate 
of ‘radical’ reforms and participated in the preparation of both the Bridge Group 
and the Blue Ribbon Committee’s (Kék Szalag Bizottság)482 reform programme 
during the transition.483 Tardos also held close relations with the nascent 
democratic opposition from the mid-1980s, and became one of the founding 
members of the (neo)liberal SZDSZ in 1988 (he served as an MP between 1990-
2002). He was a member of the supervisory board of the Budapest Stock Exchange 
between 1990-1993.  
 
This group of radical reform economists also included others who would later go on to 
play important roles in the neoliberalisation of Hungary. Amongst other notable members 
of this group, consider the below listed examples and their connections to neoliberal social 
forces in Hungary and elsewhere. István Csillag, one of the contributors to ‘Fordulat és 
Reform’, he worked as a researcher at the Institute of Financial Research from 1986 to 
2002, when he became the Minister of Economy and Transportation in the Medgyessy 
government. Following his resignation in 2004, he served as the Chairman of the 
Hungarian Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) until 2010. Throughout this period, he has 
remained an unrepentant supporter of neoliberalism in Hungary, publishing his views 
regularly in domestic newspapers and journals. Mihály Kupa, a graduate of the Karl Marx 
University, he worked for the Institute of Financial Research from 1975 to 1984. From 
December 1990 to February 1993 he served as Minister of Finance in the Antall 
government, where he designed the austerity measures introduced in 1991 (known in 
Hungary as ‘the Kupa Plan’).484 In 2001, he created the Centrum Party,485 which attempted 
                                                
481 Denton, ‘Intimate Network’. 
482 The committee was set up in the autumn of 1989 with the task of preparing a reform programme for the 
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experts and was jointly headed by Tardos and Sylvia Ostry, a Canadian economist and former deputy 
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to present itself as a ‘party of the middle’, neither supporting the centre-left MSZP-SZDSZ 
coalition, nor the parties of the centre-right lead by FIDESZ, but it failed to get into 
parliament in the 2002 general elections and he left the party in 2004. Between 2002-2011, 
he served on the Supervisory Board of MOL, the Hungarian oil and gas giant. Then, there 
is Mihály Patai, a graduate of the Karl Marx University of Economics, who worked for the 
institute between 1978-1982, from where he moved to work for the Ministry of Finance. 
Between 1988-1993 he worked as an assistant to the Executive Director of the World Bank 
in Washington, DC. From 1996 to 2006, he worked as Chief Executive Officer of the 
German multinational financial services company Allianz’ Hungarian subsidiary. He was 
the President of the Budapest Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2011, and also served as the 
Hungarian Banking Association (Magyar Bankszövetség), the leading interest group of the 
banking industry in Hungary, between 2011-2012. At the moment, he is the President and 
CEO of Unicredit Bank Hungary, a post that he has held since 2006. Last, but not least 
importantly, there is László Lengyel, who has worked for the institute since 1976 to the 
present, and currently serves as the institute’s Executive Director. Throughout the 1980s, 
he was a vocal member of the reform opposition within the MSZMP and was ultimately 
dismissed from the party in April 1988, together with Mihály Bihari, Zoltán Biró, and 
Zoltán Király, in what was a last desperate attempt to restore party discipline (which 
eventually only strengthened the reformers’ hand).486 He was one of the contributors to the 
Bridge Group’s reform programme.487 However, in contrast to many of his former 
colleagues, Lengyel was never lured to party politics. Instead, he works as an economic 
analyst and political commentator, and has over the years produced a number of robust 
neoliberal works.488  
 
The impact of this group in establishing neoliberalism in Hungary cannot be stressed 
enough. Their role in shaping the reform debate in the second half of the 1980s was crucial 
in engulfing Hungarian society and contributed to the emergence of a broad consensus that 
‘actually existing socialism’ was irreparable, and needed massive, immediate, and 
wholesale reforms and the introduction of a free market economy and democracy. As Ripp 
                                                                                                                                              
Democrats (Zöld Demokraták Szövetsége, ZDSZ), and the Association of a Third Side for Hungary 
(Harmadik Oldal Magyarországért, HOM). 
486 Swain, Hungary: The Rise and Fall of Feasible Socialism, p. 18; Tőkés, Hungary’s negotiated revolution, 
pp. 192, 198-199. 
487 Ripp, Rendszerváltás Magyarországon, 1987-1990, p. 513. 
488 Lengyel publishes frequently in some of the largest Hungarian newspapers and journals, including 
Népszabadság, Heti Világgazdaság, and Figyelő. For his most recent book on Hungary and the global 
economic crisis, see László Lengyel, Pretoriánusok kora, Budapest: Kalligram Kiadó, 2011. 
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contends, this group of radical reform economists had ‘already been successful in changing 
the intellectual climate of Hungary’.489  
 
So, what separated the members of this group from other Hungarian reform economists at 
the time? To begin with, they constituted a close group, whose members were all well 
versed in neoclassical economic theory, adhered to a technocratic and ‘apolitical’ 
Weltanschauung (although, as we saw above, most of them harnessed good relations with 
‘reformers’ in the ruling MSZMP and opposition circles), and, most of them (with the 
notable exception of Tardos), were relatively young at the time of the transition. In 
September 1990, a Financial Times journalist described the intimate connections of 
Hungary’s radical reform economists as follows: 
Hungary’s post-communist economic policy-making establishment has the intimacy of a 
university senior room. This might have been expected: the leading figures come from a 
close network of academics who worked on the margins of Government and have known 
each other for decades. They have more in common with each other than with the parties 
they have attached themselves to.490  
 
Indeed, surveying the similar educational background of Hungary’s radical reform 
economists, one Hungarian commentator described the members of this group as the 
‘Dimitrov Square Boys’ – in reference to the name of the square where the Karl Marx 
University of Economics (today Corvinus University) was located.491 In addition, many of 
them were also fluent in English and/or German, which probably facilitated their 
imbedding into international neoliberal circles, as Gramsci discussed in a note on 
language: ‘Culture, at its various levels, unifies in a series of strata, to the extent that they 
come into contact with each other, a greater or lesser number of individuals who 
understand each other’s mode of expression in differing degrees, etc.’492 Moreover, the 
members of the Institute of Financial Research were also characterised by what Andor has 
described as a ‘missionary vision’, which ‘seemed to prove that after the national poets in 
nineteenth century, the torchbearers of the twentieth century were the economists; “who 
were to guide the [Hungarian] people towards Canaan”.’493 Finally, their critique of the 
                                                
489 Ripp, Rendszerváltás Magyarországon, 1987-1990, p. 30 (my translation). 
490 Denton, ‘Intimate Network’. 
491 Roland Sas (pseudonym), ‘A Dimitrov téri fiúk’, Élet és Irodalom, 1989. 
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Kádár regime did not separate between economics and politics, but openly declared that 
(radical) economic and political reforms needed to go hand in hand.  
 
Interestingly, many of the above characteristics have been identified by scholars as a 
common feature of neoliberal reformers elsewhere, ranging from the infamous ‘Chicago 
Boys’ that oversaw the implementation of neoliberal shock therapy in Chile between 1975-
1990 to Mexico’s neoliberal reformers in the 1980s.494 As Balcerowicz has argued with 
regard to the Balcerowicz team’ in Poland: ‘The shared background, commonality of 
purpose, similar age (around 40), and the common pressures created what quickly became 
known as the “Balcerowicz team”’.495 How then did the members of the Institute of 
Financial Research interpret the crisis that was engulfing the ailing Hungarian economy in 
the 1980s and what solutions did they offer to overcome these problems? It is to this we 
turn our attention next: the radical reform programme of ‘Fordulat és Reform’.  
 
 
Building Neoliberal Consent: ‘Fordulat és Reform’ 
Although Hungarian reform economists had, as we noted above, confessed their 
admiration for neoliberal ideas before, the official emergence of ‘proto-neoliberalism’ as a 
distinct opposition trend in Hungary can be dated to the publication of ‘Fordulat és 
Reform’ in 1987.496 While the intellectual origins of the document can be traced back to 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the actual document was put together by a group of more 
than 50 economists and other social scientists, and appeared in 1987 as a special 
supplement to samizdat journal Medvetánc.497 However, this account leaves out a number 
of piquant facts, which sheds light on the processes of state and class (re)formation in late-
Kádárist Hungary. 
 
To begin with, the document was not just put together ‘out of the blue’, but was prepared 
on the orders of the Social Policy Council of the Patriotic People’s Front (Hazafias 
                                                
494 Sarah Babb, Managing Mexico: Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004, pp. 171-198; Greskovits, The Political Economy of Protest and Patience, pp. 35-52; 
Shields, The International Political Economy of Transition, pp. 61-66. 
495 Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation, pp. 303-304. 
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497 On the intellectual origins of ‘Fordulat és Reform’, see László Lengyel, ‘Adalékok a Fordulat és Reform 
történetéhez’, Medvetánc, 1987, No. 2, pp. 131-163. In the Medvetánc version, Antal, Bokros, Csillag, 
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Népfront). Founded in 1954 with the support of Imre Nagy, the Patriotic People’s Front 
was revamped by Kádár following the 1956 revolution, with the purpose of ‘unit[ing] the 
forces of society for the complete building up of socialism, for the solution of political, 
economic, and cultural tasks.’ During the Kádár era, it became the largest mass 
organisation in Hungary, with a national newspaper and thousands of local committees at 
its disposal throughout the country, involving as many as 130,000 members.498 Since 1982 
the organisation had been headed by the highly ambitious reform communist Imre 
Pozsgay, who made little secret of his desire to one day succeed Kádár as General 
Secretary of the MSZMP.499 Although Pozsgay had been a member of the MSZMP Central 
Committee since 1980, he also held good connections with opposition intellectuals (in fact, 
he was among the participants of the historical gathering of the Hungarian opposition, in 
Monor in 1985, and was also present when the MDF was formed in Lakitelek in 
September 1987). As one of the signatories to the document revealed in an interview, it 
was Pozsgay himself who commissioned the Institute of Financial Research to prepare a 
comprehensive economic reform programme.500 An abridged version of the document was 
first published in Közgazdasági Szemle, the main professional economics journal of 
Hungary, which at the time was directed by Rezső Nyers, who, as we noted in the previous 
chapter, was an old reform communist and the architect of the NEM.  
 
Having traced the origins of ‘Fordulat és Reform’, the first thing that stands out about the 
actual document is that its language bears a marked resemblance to the ‘shock and awe’ 
style, which has become such a distinguishing feature of neoliberal authors ever since 
Milton Friedman. As Naomi Klein points out, Friedman had favourably likened 
neoliberalism to a ‘shock doctrine’, which takes advantage of a disaster, in order to impose 
the idea of the new market order.501 As Friedman famously put it, ‘only a crisis – actual or 
perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken 
depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop 
alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically 
impossible becomes politically inevitable.’502 Once a crisis struck, it was essential to act 
swiftly, to impose rapid and comprehensive change before society slipped back into what 
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500 Interview with L.K on 21 December 2011. 
501 Here cited in Klein, The Shock Doctrine, pp. 6-7 and 140-141.  
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Friedman described as the ‘tyranny of the status quo.’503 According to his estimates, which 
were probably informed by his personal experiences as an advisor to Chile’s dictator, 
General Augusto Pinochet, ‘a new administration has some six to nine months in which to 
achieve major changes; if it does not seize the opportunity to act decisively during that 
period, it will not have another such opportunity.’504 As we noted in Chapter 2, in CEE, 
these ideas were expressed most eloquently by Balcerowicz, who emphasised the need for 
Eastern European reformers to take advantage of the brief ‘window of opportunity’ 
represented by the extraordinary political changes of 1989, in order to implement as much 
market reform as possible, before the return of  ‘normal politics’.505  
 
In a similar vernacular to Friedman and Balcerowicz, the authors of ‘Fordulat és Reform’ 
painted a disastrous picture of the Hungarian economy, which they claimed was in ‘a 
serious situation.’ The ‘signs’ of the crisis included, amongst others:  
 
• The rate of economic growth was diminishing, or in some years even negative;  
• The living standards of the population was stagnating and conditions were 
deteriorating for significant layers of society; 
• Foreign debt was growing and, together with rising interest rates and repayment 
obligations, are contributing to a risk of insolvency;   
• Inflationary pressures are increasing, while citizens are feeling more insecure 
and loosing their trust in state institutions; and  
• The deterioration of Hungary’s foreign trade balance.  
 
According to the document, these negative features were not accidental, but inherent to 
Hungary’s (socialist) economy. As the document put it, ‘It is a sign of deeper, structural 
tensions within the economy, which are primarily manifested through its inability to adapt 
itself to changes within the world economy.’ This in turn led to a ‘waste’ of resources 
(labour power, raw materials, energy, and land) and created ‘tensions’ in the economy. 
Attempts to introduce corrective measures from the party-state were ‘chaotic’ and 
‘makeshift’, and thus ultimately only served to deepen the crisis. According to the 
document, these problems were not only limited to the Hungarian economy, but were also 
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504 Ibid., p. 3. 
505 Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation. 
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visible throughout the CMEA economies, ‘where the inability to adapt [to the world 
economy] is leading to uncertainty, and the stagnation of [trade] relations.’506  
 
According to the authors of ‘Fordulat és Reform’, ‘the necessary prerequisite for 
recovering from the crisis’ facing the Hungarian economy was to encourage the unfolding 
of a market economy (sans préfixe).507 To adapt to the requirements of intensive growth 
and a competitive world market, the authors suggested the introduction of a 
‘comprehensive reform programme’, ‘in line with the spirit of the NEM and the Central 
Committee’s April 1984 decision,’ which had re-introduced economic reforms that sought 
to enable the evolution of a market economy. The key goal of the reform programme was 
to ‘to bring attention to the gravity of the situation, and hold back [the policymakers in the 
regime] from going down a road, from which there is no return.’508 In order to stop the 
situation from worsening, the authors called for the introduction of ‘comprehensive, 
radical, democratising, decentralising, and deregulating market reforms.’509 As part of the 
document’s proposals central planning was to be abandoned and ‘the interference of 
political and administrative organisations in the functioning of the self-regulating market 
was to be blocked by constitutional means, if necessary.’ Furthermore, the document called 
for the introduction of a competition and bankruptcy law, which, it was suggested, would 
serve to encourage the ‘creative destruction’ of big state-owned enterprises holding a 
monopoly position in the economy, and stimulate the creation of new, competitive firms.510 
Moreover, trade was to be liberalised in order to enhance the growth of exports and bring 
down the government deficit. These measures were to go ‘hand in hand’ with severe 
macroeconomic restrictions. According to the programme, fiscal consolidation was 
necessary in order to bring Hungary’s growing foreign debt to a halt, stabilise the state 
budget, increase the efficiency of enterprises, and, at the same time, contribute to the 
restructuring of the Hungarian economy. This was to be achieved through the pursuit of 
restrictive monetarist policy. The recommended monetary restrictions were to have four 
components: 1) the liberalisation of imports and devaluation of the Hungarian forint; 2) a 
reform of the taxation system, introducing a personal income tax and value-added tax; 3) 
increasing the reliance on monetary measures of planning; and, finally 4) ‘a very strict 
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507 Andor, Eltévedt éllovas, p. 160. 
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curbing of domestic incomes’ as a result of the simultaneous increasing prices, while 
subsidies on key consumer items were to be slashed (e.g. housing, energy, meat, milk, 
etc.).511  
 
The programme admitted, with an uncompromising honesty, that, ‘temporarily’, the 
suggested reforms would come with ‘economic losses’.512 For example, it was argued that 
rising unemployment, reduction of real wages, and falling living standards were 
‘undesirable, but inevitable’ outcomes of the reforms.513 However, as the programme went 
on to explain, these ‘sacrifices’ would, ultimately, ‘have to be made’ in order for the 
reforms to be ‘successful’. The ‘logic’ behind this argument is carefully described by the 
authors:  
From the point of view of the enterprise, wages are considered as costs, while from the point 
of view of the individual it is the price of labour power; a means towards the attainment of 
consumer goods. This “dual” function also reflects conflicting interests. … As a result of the 
indicated conflict of interests, wages need to develop from such bargaining processes, which 
facilitate the harmonisation of interests. In a market economy, such bargaining processes do 
not enable the growth of wages at levels threatening the equilibrium of the economy. This is 
partially due to the cost-sensitiveness of enterprises, and partially guaranteed by a developed 
labour market.  
 
The authors admitted that, ‘[i]n the initial period of implementation, … the restrictive 
effects of market processes [will be] insufficient’. However, this problem could be 
overcome by allowing the state to restrict wage growth ‘from above’.514  
 
Liberalisation and austerity, the document goes on to argue, was not enough to achieve a 
long-term solution to the ailing Hungarian economy. To adapt to the increasingly 
competitive pressures of the world economy, the authors argued that the system of 
ownership had to be reformed. The basic principle of the ownership reform was set out as 
follows:  
all members of society (citizens, communities, organisations, and institutions) may become owners of 
all forms of social property, and may, for this, step out onto the market of properties, which includes 
the markets for securities and deposits; all actors on this market are constitutionally equal; the 
                                                
511 Antal et al., ‘Fordulat és Reform’, pp. 5-6, 16, 19, 20-21. 
512 Ibid., p. 17. 
513 Ibid., pp. 21-22 (emphasis in original). 
514 Ibid., pp. 28-29 (my emphasis). 
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different property forms can be transformed into each other and freely chosen by the given group, 
community, or entrepreneur; and the state and its administrative organisations are not allowed to 
control ownership, except in specific circumstances, as set out by law.515  
 
The document went on to propose, albeit, as Szelényi argues, in a somewhat ‘opaque 
language’516, the institutionalisation of a ‘two-tier system of ownership’, with large-scale, 
profit-oriented, state-owned enterprises (holding and joint stock corporations) at the top, 
and a variety of small-scale, private forms of ownership at the bottom. As Szelényi noted 
at the time, this implied that ‘more investment in private firms should be allowed to open 
up to private enterprises to outside investors, including foreign investors, and also to 
transform some of the state enterprises into joint stock companies (and presumably allow 
private individuals or foreign investors to own stocks and not just bonds in such firms).’517 
Although not expressed openly, the document thus opened up the door for the privatisation 
of state-owned enterprises. 
 
The authors of ‘Fordulat és Reform’ did not stop there, but argued that radical economic 
reform had to go hand in hand with moderate political liberalisation. As the document 
makes clear, ‘the reform programme cannot be narrowly limited to the economy … but 
also needs to extend to other areas of society, including political institutions. Economic 
and social reform are connected with each other.’518 This view stemmed from the authors’ 
conviction that the necessary economic reforms required ‘strong political will’ and could 
only be introduced ‘from above’. However, in order for this to take place, there was a need 
for a shift in the balance of power within the ruling MSZMP, which could enable the 
‘changing of the old guard’. (Perhaps not by accident, this view also coincided with the 
position of leading reformers within the ruling MSZMP, such as Pozsgay, Nyers, as well as 
the different strands of the opposition.) In line with this, the document called for the 
introduction of democratic reforms, including ‘[g]reater freedom and autonomy for citizens 
and communities’, political equality and plurality, and encouraged the ‘popular 
involvement and active participation’ of civil society in reform debates by increasing the 
freedom of the press, freedom to form interests groups and the right to association. 
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Meanwhile, the hegemony of the party-state was to be limited and regulated by 
constitutional means. Ultimate responsibility for the economy was to be transferred from 
the ruling MSZMP to the government, which was to be provided with greater powers when 
it came to the revitalisation of enterprises, the creation of new markets, and the 
maintenance of restrictive monetary policies, and become responsible to a democratically 
elected parliament.519  
 
Overall, the reforms outlined in ‘Fordulat és Reform’ constituted what David Harvey 
describes as a ‘class project’.520 However, contrary to Harvey’s argument (which is shared 
by many other radical scholars, such as Gowan521 and Klein522), we argue that it did not 
represent a ‘restoration’ of class power, but rather its ‘retainment’ (albeit with 
modifications), in an attempt to rescue the Hungarian state the deepening crisis that was 
engulfing the economies of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s. While masked by a liberal 
rhetoric that appeared attractive to large sections of Hungarian society at the time (the 
provision of greater ‘freedoms’, ‘human rights’, etc.), this programme went hand in hand 
with increasing social inequalities. Ultimately then, as Ripp has argued, whether 
voluntarily or not, these reforms ‘supported the interests of those “technocrats”, within the 
party and in leading positions, who, after having stripped themselves of any ideological 
constraints, were preparing to take power [in society].’523 
 
 
The Impact of ‘Fordulat és Reform’ on Reform Debates 
in ‘Socialist’ Hungary  
The reform proposals outlined in ‘Fordulat és Reform’ were first presented to a wider 
audience at an academic seminar in Budapest in early December 1986. The seminar, which 
was headed by Rezső Nyers, a relentless advocate of market reforms within the MSZMP, 
was attended by around 50 reform intellectuals, including economists, political scientists, 
and a number of journalists (many of whom would later play a key role in the creation of a 
free press in Hungary). The air was buzzing with a sense of renewal. As one of the 
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participants at that meeting recalls: ‘[t]his was a very important meeting. I think that this 
was where we first realised that it was more than just a “reform” that was at stake. My dear 
God, the whole regime is at stake here!’524 The reform proposals were generally well 
received by the audience and an abridged version was published in the main professional 
economics journal in Hungary, Közgazdasági Szemle, in June 1987. The publication of 
‘Fordulat és Reform’ was, as a former member’s of the editorial board recalls, ‘a big 
breakthrough.’ It became an immediate hit amongst Hungarian reformers. The first edition 
was, despite attempts by the party-state to sabotage its publication, printed in 17,000 
copies(!), which was unparalleled in the history of the journal. Demand was so high that 
the document had to be republished twice (eventually it was printed in more than 30,000 
copies).525  
 
Following its publication, the document began, as Tőkés notes, to acquire ‘a life of its 
own.’526 Copies of the document started to reach the mushrooming opposition movement. 
By the mid-1980s, students at Hungarian universities had access to copy machines – 
thanks to the financial support of Western pro-democracy organisations, such as the Soros 
Foundation, headed by the Hungarian-American business magnate and philanthropist 
George Soros – and quickly began to duplicate the document in various opposition 
meetings. Simultaneously, the authors of ‘Fordulat és Reform’ began touring Hungary, 
explaining the rationale of the programme at various ‘reform clubs’. As one interviewee 
recalls, these ‘reform lectures’ could sometimes lead to meetings that, in contemporary 
Hungary, would be considered ‘strange encounters’:  
In Pécs [an important industrial town in the south of Hungary], the Secretary of KISZ [the 
Communist Youth League], a guy called Gyurcsány [the Prime Minister of Hungary 
between 2004-2009], invited us to hold a two-day training, so me and István Stumpf [a 
political scientist and since 2010 member of the Constitutional Court] brought Laci Urbán 
[an economist and former FIDESZ politician] and Laci Kövér [founding member of FIDESZ 
and the current Speaker of the Hungarian Parliament] with us.527  
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Later in that year, the document was republished in the samizdat journal Medvetánc, 
together with ‘Reform és Demokrácia’, a document written by Mihály Bihari, which set 
out the necessary political reforms for increasing democracy in Hungary.528  
 
By then, news about the document was also reaching beyond the borders of Hungary. In 
early 1987, The Economist, the renowned London-based news magazine; Radio Free 
Europe, the propaganda broadcasting service of the West during the Cold War; as well as 
L‘Unità, the official newspaper of the Italian Communist Party (Partito Communista 
d’Italia, PCI), all carried positive stories on ‘Fordulat és Reform’.529 As a result, the ruling 
MSZMP, which until then had collaborated with the author’s of the document, came to 
consider the document as ‘enemy material’, and decided to interrupt the dialogue.530 In the 
summer of that year, the Institute of Financial Research was closed down on the orders of 
Péter Medgyessy531, a prominent member of the late technocratic elite and then Minister of 
Finance in the Grósz government, on the grounds that ‘the members of the staff held and 
propagated revolutionary views’ and that its work was ‘of no value’.532  
 
However, rather than a sign of strength, the decision to clamp down on ‘Fordulat és 
Reform’ and the Financial Research Institute was an indication of the growing intellectual 
disorientation and political desperation within the ranks of the ruling MSZMP. The reform 
proposals presented in ‘Fordulat és Reform’, and the neoliberal doxa upon which it drew 
its intellectual inspiration, were rapidly becoming ‘common sense’, both in narrow reform 
economic circles, as well as in wider policymaking debates. This became evident in the 
intellectual debates that followed in the wake of the publication of ‘Fordulat és Reform’, 
where the party-state was pushed on the defensive. The Economic Subcommittee of the 
Central Committee of the MSZMP wrote a response to ‘Fordulat és Reform’, which was 
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published in the same issue of Közgazdasági Szemle in which the reform document 
appeared. In it, the authors acknowledged that the reform programme’s analysis of the 
situation was ‘basically correct’, but laid the blame for ‘anti-reform tendencies’ on the 
‘conservative opposition’ within the ruling MSZMP.533 Indeed, as Szelényi points out, the 
Economic Subcommittee took ‘an even stronger pro-market reform stand’ than ‘Fordulat 
és Reform’, which it attacked for overemphasising monetary policies.534 Instead, the 
Economic Subcommittee emphasised the importance of changing property relations. It 
rejected the proposal to transform state-owned enterprises into joint-stock companies, but 
gave, as Szelényi notes, ‘strong, though at crucial points qualified, support for the 
expansion of private business.’535 For example, the document stated:  
If we want private entrepreneurs to invest their incomes in the expansion of their businesses, 
then we have to give institutional guarantees that, within certain limits, they can grow. We 
have to work out arrangements, which would gradually shift the growing private firms – to 
the satisfaction of the private owners – toward a social form of ownership.536  
 
In the summer of 1987, an official statement by the MSZMP Central Committee on 
proposed economic and social reform, confirmed the ideological volte face that was 
underway within the party-state. The document stated: ‘The second economy and the 
private sector are integral parts of the socialist economy [sic!]. All initiatives which 
contribute to the increase of the national income and to the amelioration of the living 
standard of the population should be encouraged.’537 Although both party documents still 
abounded in socialist rhetoric, such as ‘the leading role of the party’ in the reform process, 
and avoided the question of political reform, it was increasingly clear that Hungarian 
society was about to undergo a fundamental transformation.  
 
With hindsight then, it is hardly an overstatement that the publication of ‘Fordulat és 
Reform’ signalled an ideological breakthrough in Hungarian reform discourse. Indeed, 
many of the reform proposals formulated in the document could later be recognised in the 
economic and political reforms introduced by the last ‘communist’ governments of Károly 
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Grósz and Miklós Németh, such as the banking reform introduced in 1987, or the Law on 
Business Organisations and the Law on Foreign Investment which came into force on 1 
January 1989.538 Traces of the document were also visible in the numerous ‘blueprints’ for 
the transition that were drawn up in 1989-1990, from János Kornai’s famous ‘passionate 
pamphlet’539, through the economic programmes of the Hungarian political parties vying 
for power540, to the policy proposals of domestic and international economists and experts, 
such as the above mentioned Blue Ribbon Commission and Bridge Group, or those of the 
Battelle Memorial Institute541, the IMF, World Bank, and OECD. As for the fate of the 
Institute of Financial Research, it was reopened in the autumn of 1987, after an alliance of 
private banks and large companies had joined together to resuscitate it as a private 
enterprise.542 While the institute sought to continue the intellectual tradition represented by 
its reform workshop predecessor, many of the radical reform economists had by then 
moved on to become influential policymaking advisors to the government or the parties of 
the opposition, while others took up well-paid jobs in Hungary’s rapidly developing 
private sector.543  
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by outlining the way the ascendancy of neoliberalism in Hungary and 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe has been theorised in the literature. As we noted, most 
scholars have tended to conceptualise this process as either being driven ‘from the outside’ 
or in ‘dialogue’ between internal and external actors. However, despite their disagreements 
about the modalities through which neoliberalism allegedly ‘conquered’ the region, most 
scholars tend to argue that this process happened after the demise of ‘actually existing 
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socialism’ in 1989. The argument presented in this chapter has challenged this account in 
three important ways.  
 
Firstly, we demonstrated how social forces promoting ‘proto-neoliberal’ ideas emerged in 
Hungarian society before the formal transition in 1989, in an attempt to solve the 
deepening crisis of the ailing state capitalist economy by reconfiguring it along neoliberal 
lines. Drawing on our broader theoretical framework of state capitalism theory, as well as 
neo-Gramscian political economy, we identified a group of radical reform economists, 
based at the influential Institute of Financial Research, as the ‘organic intellectuals’ of 
neoliberalism in Hungary. Also known as the ‘Dimitrov Square Boys’, in reference to the 
Karl Marx University of Economics in Budapest (where most of them received their 
schooling in neoclassical economics), the members of this group played a key role in 
influencing the transition through the articulation and promotion of certain ideas about the 
transition, and many of them would later go on to play an active role in the (neoliberal) 
transformation of Hungary after 1989.  
 
Secondly, we illustrated how the ‘Dimitrov Square Boys’ envisaged the reconfiguration of 
the Hungarian economy in the late 1980s by analysing the contents of the influential 
‘Fordulat és Reform’, described by one commentator as ‘the key economic reform 
document of the decade’544. As we illustrated, it contained many ideas of the transition, 
which later came to be considered as essential features of neoliberal transformation in 
Hungary and elsewhere, including the deregulation of markets in order to facilitate export-
led growth, the pursuit of restrictive fiscal policy, and privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (although the latter was only implied in the document). Our general assessment 
of the programme was that it constituted what David Harvey has described as a ‘class 
project’. However, contra Harvey (and others), we argued that the aim of the programme 
was not to ‘restore’ class power, but rather to ‘retain’ it, in order to save the Hungarian 
state from the organic crisis of state capitalism.   
 
Thirdly, and finally, our analysis showed how the ‘proto-neoliberal’ ideas developed in 
‘Fordulat és Reform’ became increasingly popular following its publication in 1987, so 
that by the time of the formal ‘transition’ in 1989-1990, they had become accepted as 
‘common sense’ both amongst ‘reformers’ within the ruling MSZMP, as well as the parties 
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of the opposition. In this sense, the perhaps greatest contribution of ‘Fordulat és Reform’ 
and the influential ‘Dimitrov Square Boys’ that had put together the document, was to take 
what, even in the relatively liberal political environment of late Kádárist Hungary, had 
hitherto been considered renegade ideological, intellectual, and political positions and 
made them mainstream in reform debates. However, while the political project of 
constructing neoliberal hegemony in the late 1980s seemed to be relatively smooth and 
consensual, attempts to consolidate a distinct neoliberal regime of accumulation after the 
regime change would, as we set out to demonstrate in the next chapter, turn out to be much 
more uneven and contradictory.  
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THE CONSOLIDATION OF ‘NEOLIBERALISM 
WITH HUNGARIAN CHARACTERISTICS’, 
1990-2006 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we analysed the ascendancy of neoliberalism in Hungary in the 
1980s. Contrary to dominant accounts in the literature, we demonstrated that neoliberalism 
was not an ‘imported project’, which arrived to Hungary from the West on the eve of the 
transition in 1989, but rather that it was promoted by domestic social forces in the 1980 as 
a solution to the organic crisis of the Kádár regime. In this chapter, we turn our attention to 
the reconfiguration of the Hungarian political economy after 1989, looking first at how 
neoliberalism was consolidated between 1990 and 2006, and secondly, analysing what 
were the outcomes of neoliberalisation in this period.  
 
In the transformatology literature, Hungary has, as we have noted in passim, frequently 
been portrayed as a ‘success story’ of the transformation and propagated as a model to be 
emulated by other states in the region. The ‘success’ of Hungary’s transformation is 
generally associated to a number of factors, including the fact that Hungary’s ‘double 
transformation’ was achieved in a shorter time and was more politically stable than in 
many neighbouring ‘post-communist’ countries. Moreover, although Hungary’s 
‘transition’ from state-led capitalism to a free market economy resulted in a 
‘transformational recession’ (between 1989-1993 economic output fell by more than 18 
percent), which came with high social costs, the Hungarian economy returned to positive 
growth in 1994 and grew by almost 4 percent annually between 1997-2006 – a figure that 
was higher than many advanced capitalist states in the core of the world economy, such as 
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the United States, Germany, and Japan, and also fared well in comparison with other 
economies in the region.545 According to neoliberal economists and the representatives of 
international and regional bureaucratic institutions, the ‘success’ of Hungary’s 
transformation was largely the result of the strong continuity of economic policy in favour 
of neoliberalisation, despite frequent change in ruling political parties in Budapest.546 As 
we shall see in the analysis below, the main pillars of the Hungarian transformation were 
the rapid and comprehensive privatisation and simultaneous opening of the economy to 
international trade and foreign capital inflows. With more than 80 percent of the economy 
in private hands, one of the most open economies in the world, as measured by the 
UNCTAD Transnationalization Index,547 and one of the lowest unemployment rates in the 
region, Hungary was in the mid-2000s seen to belong to the ‘winners’ of the 
transformation according to the proponents of neoliberalisation.  
 
In contrast, institutionalist scholars, such as Amsden et al., Bohle and Greskovits, Stiglitz, 
have remained highly critical of neoliberal ‘market fundamentalism’ in the region. 
However, at the same time, they also contend that Hungary’s transformation was a relative 
‘success story’, albeit for different reasons than those suggested by their neoliberal 
counterparts.548 Thus, Bohle and Greskovits argue that policymakers in the Visegrád states 
of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, were relatively successful in 
withstanding international and transnational pressures for neoliberal reform, opting instead 
to pursue economic policies that ‘search[ed] for compromises between market 
transformation and social cohesion’.549 The outcome, the authors claim, was a more 
‘embedded neoliberalism’, as compared to the ‘pure neoliberalism’ found in the Baltic 
states, characterised by successful market transformation and the development of more 
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socially inclusive, albeit not always efficient, systems of democratic government.550 
According to Bohle and Greskovits, the economic achievements of the Visegrád states 
were particularly impressive, resulting in emergence of a regional ‘manufacturing miracle’. 
As the authors asserted, ‘Whether measured by its share in output, employment or total 
exports, the complex industrial sector’s [chemicals, equipment, machinery, etc.] 
performance appears as remarkable … Even when compared with some of the giant NICs 
[the newly industrialised countries of southeast Asia], it is striking to recognize the extent 
of the region’s success in attracting TNCs without whose involvement capturing large 
world market shares would not have been possible.’551  
 
In what follows below, we shall put these different arguments to the test. Having said this, 
the next section of this chapter analyses who were central agents of neoliberalisation in 
Hungary after 1989 and what methods did they use in order to sustain this process. The 
third section then turns towards the three key areas of what we, following David Harvey, 
can describe as neoliberalism ‘with Hungarian characteristics’552, analysing the key 
outcomes of: a) privatisation; b) the inflow of foreign investment and multinational 
corporations to the Hungarian political economy; and c) the restructuring of labour after 
1989. Finally, in the fourth section, we outline some of the contradictions and inherent 
limitations of this model.  
 
 
Between Coercion and Consent: the Management of 
Neoliberal Reform in Post-transition Hungary 
 
 
‘A Difficult Beginning’: The ‘Gradualism’ of the Antall Government, 1990-
1994. 
In May 1990, following Hungary’s first democratic elections for more than 40 years, a 
nationalist-conservative coalition, dominated by the MDF, was formed. Headed by József 
Antall, a former librarian and historian who had been little known to the greater Hungarian 
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public (let alone commentators in the West) before the elections, the government was 
faced with the difficult task of resolving the pressing social and economic problems of the 
time. The Antall government inherited a difficult economic situation from its ‘communist’ 
predecessors. The Hungarian economy had been stagnating from 1973 to 1990 – in 
contrast to the preceding period, between 1950-1973, when annual growth had averaged 
3.6 percent, which was above or on par with most advanced economies.553 Making matters 
worse, the newly formed government was also faced with the pressures resulting from 
what a number of Marxists have described as the deepening ‘fiscal crisis of the state’. By 
1990, Hungary’s external debt exceeded US$ 21 billion (more than 50 percent of GDP), 
while its currency reserves was falling to critical levels (US$ 300 million).554 As 
Drahokoupil notes, in the case of Hungary, the situation was worsened by the fact that 
most of country’s debt was in the form of state debt to private banks and low-cost bonds, 
which made debt repayment more difficult than to international financial institutions.555 
 
In order to resolve Hungary’s problems, the government officially advocated a ‘gradualist’ 
strategy, based on Keynesian expansionary policies, emphasising public investment, 
provision of state subsidies to industry, and the devaluation of the forint to promote export-
led economic growth.556 This strategy was based on a fear of the potentially destabilising 
effects that neoliberal shock therapy would have on Hungarian society.557 Within the 
government it was supported by the Minister of International Economic Relations Béla 
Kádár, and the Minister of Industry, Péter Á. Bod, but it was strongly opposed by the 
Minister of Finance, Ferenc Rábár, and technocrats in the MNB, which at the time was led 
by György Surányi, who instead urged the government to push ahead with neoliberal 
shock therapy.558 György Matolcsy, who had moved on from the Institute of Financial 
Research to become Antall’s personal economic advisor, came to advocate a ‘middle road’ 
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between these two positions.559 The government’s economic programme, entitled ‘On the 
Road to National Renewal’ (A Nemzeti Megújhódás Programja), was presented to 
parliament in May 1990 and reiterated Hungary’s commitment to ‘a free, socially oriented 
market economy, based on private property and free enterprise’, but argued this could be 
achieved with minimum sacrifices from the Hungarian population.560 Hence, Antall’s 
strategy of a ‘gradual’ transformation, excluded the introduction of neoliberal shock 
therapy as pursued by the Solidarnosc government in Poland.561 Perhaps not surprisingly, 
the programme received a frosty reception from the neoliberal economists, who dismissed 
it as being ‘too vague’ and ‘lacking any concrete objectives’.562 
 
However, although, the government officially advocated ‘gradual’ reforms, it seems that a 
sense of ‘economic pragmatism’ prevailed during the first months in power, propelled by 
the need to maintain debt payments as scheduled. Following pressure from the domestic 
and international financial community, large transnational corporations, and leading 
western states, the option of defaulting or rescheduling the foreign debt – an idea that was 
promoted by a group of influential businessmen, neoliberal economists, and politicians, 
such as the American-Hungarian business magnate and philanthropist George Soros, 
György Surányi, and other economists associated with the (neo)liberal SZDSZ – was 
dismissed by the government who feared that such a move would have ‘weakened the 
country’s image’ on global financial markets and cut off the provision of further credit 
from institutional and private lenders.563 Instead, it decided to pursue a strategy of rigorous 
debt repayment.564 In the spring of 1991, this strategy was brazenly summed up by the 
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Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance Katalin Botos, as follows: ‘We will pay our 
debt, even if the country goes onto the rocks.’565 As we shall see below, the decision to 
repay the country’s external debt as scheduled would have crucial implications on the 
economic policies of the Antall government.  
 
During the summer of 1990, the Antall government unveiled a number of economic 
reforms, including an ambitious privatisation programme (see section 3 below) and a series 
of public spending cuts and price increases. These reforms were in line with requirements 
from the IMF and were meant to show to foreign investors that Hungary was ‘open for 
business’. However, when it announced plans to increase petrol prices by a massive 85 
percent in late October 1990, private taxi and truck drivers staged spontaneous protests in 
Budapest, blocking all the major bridges and roads in the capital, thus effectively 
paralysing the transport system of the entire country.566 Although the subsequent ‘taxi 
blockade’ (taxisblokkád) only lasted for three days, it turned out to be the greatest popular 
demonstration witnessed in the country since 1956 and was perceived as a ‘national crisis’ 
by representatives of the government as well as the media.567 Although members of the 
government attempted to convince the demonstrators and the trade unions that the price 
increases were ‘inevitable’, they failed and were eventually forced to offer concessions.568  
 
The taxi blockade debacle led to personal changes in the government. In late 1990, Rábár 
resigned from his post as Minister of Finance and was replaced by Mihály Kupa, a ‘non-
partisan’ technocrat, who, as we noted in the previous chapter, had previously worked at 
the influential Institute for Financial Research, and has also served as personal advisor to 
Antall. Under Kupa, economic policy maintained a high degree of continuity with the brief 
Rábár era. Similar to Rábár, Csaba argues that Kupa was ‘an avowed adherent of urgent 
fiscal reform’, who also enjoyed broad support domestic and international financial circles, 
including the IMF.569 In March 1991, Kupa presented his own programme for economic 
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reform, the ‘Kupa Plan’, which promised to broaden the liberalisation of foreign trade 
(including agriculture and food products), speed up the privatisation process, while, at the 
same time, maintaining debt repayments as scheduled and pursuing strict fiscal and 
monetary policies.570 The proposed reforms were supposed to be implemented gradually 
(over a period of three years), but consequentially. The programme was highly optimistic 
about the future of the Hungarian economy. By 1994, it expected the economy to grow by 
an annual rate of 6 percent, led by a 7 percent annual growth of exports, while budget 
expenditures would fall from 64 percent in 1991 to 57 percent in 1994, and inflation 
brought down to single digit levels.571 In order to achieve these goals, the programme 
proposed the introduction of a number of laws, which its author considered as 
‘fundamental’ for the development of capitalism in Hungary.572 For example it proposed 
the introduction of a Bankruptcy Law (realised in 1992), which saw more than 16,000 
enterprises go bankrupt between April 1992 and December 1993.573 Meanwhile, the 
Accounting and Public Financing Laws brought Hungarian accounting standards in line 
with those of the EU. Rábár had already suggested similar policies, but in contrast to the 
former’s rather confrontational approach, Kupa was able to present his programme in way 
that appeared more conciliatory to critics of neoliberal reforms within the Antall 
government.574 Any doubts about the feasibility of the Kupa programme were dispelled by 
the determined attitude of its architect, who argued that ‘we are going to do this’. Hence, 
the Kupa Plan was well received amongst economists and was passed with the full support 
of the opposition parties in parliament.  
 
Yet, despite the ‘unquenchable optimism’ of Kupa and other neoliberal economists, both 
inside Hungary and abroad, economic growth showed no signs of materialising in the first 
half of the 1990s. On the contrary, in the first two years after the transition economic 
output decreased by 18.5 percent in Hungary, while industrial production fell by more than 
25 percent in the period between 1989-1993.575 Meanwhile, unemployment grew by more 
than 500,000 people in two years, and by 1994 the official unemployment rate was 
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reaching 14 percent.576 Wages plummeted and by the end of 1992 stood at 85 percent of 
their 1989 levels. As a result, inequality and poverty rates skyrocketed, causing some 
sociologists to warn of a possible ‘Latin Americanisation’ of Hungarian society.577 The 
deep decline in food consumption in Hungarian households, depicted in the table below, 
provides a telling illustration of the widespread malaise characterising Hungarian society 
in the early years following the regime change. For a country renowned for its meat 
consumption, the nearly 15 percent decline of meat consumption between 1989-1994 
provides striking evidence of the catastrophic impact of neoliberal restructuring on 
Hungarian society. Yet, despite these bleak figures, Hungary was a considered a relative 
‘success story’ of neoliberal restructuring, as the situation elsewhere in CEE and the 
former Soviet Union was even bleaker.578 
 
Table 5.1. Household consumption in Hungary, 1989-1994579 
Meat  
and  
fish 
products 
Milk  
and  
dairy 
products 
Eggs Fats  and oils Cereals Sugar Potatoes Year 
Index 
of  
per 
capita 
consum
ption (kg/year) 
(pieces/
year) (kg/year) 
Nutritive 
materials 
(kJ/day) 
1989 100.0 81.0 189.6 364 39.2 112.2 40.5 55.2 14,637 
1990 94.8 75.8 169.9 389 38.6 110.4 38.2 61.0 14,164 
1991 86.1 74.1 167.4 356 37.0 102.6 35.0 55.3 13,420 
1992 86.1 75.2 159.1 338 37.5 105.6 39.5 56.0 13,741 
1993 87.6 70.5 144.2 365 36.8 97.4 35.8 59.3 13,002 
1994 87.6 69.0 140.0 338 38.1 91.3 34.2 58.2 12,669 
 
 
As the economic problems of the country deepened, the Antall government faced a 
popular backlash. By 1992, opinion polls showed that the government’s unpopularity was 
reaching record levels, while there was a rise in support for opposition parties. Antall was 
also facing mounting opposition from within the national-conservative coalition. Members 
of the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP), which since 1991 was led by the right-
wing ‘populist’ József Torgyán, objected against the government’s policy to deny the 
restitution of land to its pre-1948 owners. While conservative members of the FKGP 
                                                
576 Andor, Hungary on the Road to the European Union, Table 1, p. 175. 
577 László Laki, Rendszerváltás, avagy a “nagy átalakulás”, Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 2009. 
578 Genov, Global Trends in Eastern Europe; Gowan, ‘Neo-Liberal Theory and Practice for Eastern Europe’; 
World Bank, Transition – The First Ten Years. 
579 Source: KSH, ‘Household income and consumption, 1960 – to present’. Available on: 
http://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_long/h_zhc001.html (last accessed: 31 January 2013). 
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remained loyal to the Antall government, Torgyán and his allies went into opposition.580 A 
more serious threat came from within the MDF itself. In a lengthy article published in 
Magyar Fórum, the weekly paper associated with the MDF, one of the party’s deputy 
leaders, István Csurka, blamed the ills of the transformation on a conspiracy by 
‘foreigners’ (led by the IMF, multinational corporations, leading Western governments, 
and domestic ‘traitors’, such as ex-communists, liberals, and Jews).581 His position caused 
a political crisis within the MDF, as it became evident that his ideas were supported by a 
substantial – though not a majority – of party members.582 The crisis was eventually 
resolved after Csurka was expelled from the party in May 1993. He responded by founding 
the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP), which 
openly advocated a far-right stance based on racism, anti-communism, and irredentist aims 
of restoring the borders of ‘historical Hungary’.583 Although Csurka’s views were 
criticised from across the political spectrum, as well as by leading members of Hungary’s 
cultural and intellectual elite,584 the increasingly weak government ‘felt the need to 
compromise with them.’585 
 
Thus, in the year prior to the 1994 elections, the Antall government increasingly attempted 
to mask its difficulties by appealing to ‘nationalist’ and ‘populist’ ideas. Members of the 
government openly spoke of the need to create a ‘national bourgeoisie’ and began to take 
active measures in order to achieve this aim: the government imposed restrictions on 
foreign ownership in key economic sectors, such as banking, energy, and 
telecommunications; and implemented several policies promoting domestic accumulation 
of capital (discussed in further detail in section 3).586 In February 1993, Kupa was replaced 
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as Minister of Finance by Iván Szabó, a member of the MDF and former Minister of 
Trade, Commerce, and Tourism (1991-1993) and supporter of right-wing Keynesian 
economic planning.587 Yet, despite some degree of withdrawal from neoliberalisation in a 
discursive sense (favouring ‘domestic’ instead of ‘foreign-led’ accumulation of capital), 
there was no major retreat from the changes previously engineered. Even after the death of 
Antall in December 1993 (following a long period of illness with cancer), the MDF-led 
government remained broadly committed to neoliberalisation, albeit now increasingly 
shrouded in ‘populist’ discourse.588 This was, for example, evident in the government’s 
approach towards foreign investment, which was welcomed by MDF politicians who 
argued that it was good for the country on the grounds that it brought jobs, contributed to 
technological upgrading, and helped Hungary’s (re-)integration into the world economy.589 
As caretaking Prime Minister Péter Boross argued in 1994, ‘FDI improves Hungary’s 
prestige abroad’.590  
 
 
Consolidating Neoliberalism through Socialist and Liberal Forces: The 
Horn government, 1994-1998 
Ultimately, however, the government’s attempt to salvage political power through 
‘populist’ discourse turned out to be a failure. The parties of the nationalist-conservative 
coalition were trounced in the 1994 elections: the MDF lost 126 of its 164 seats in 
parliament, while the FKGP lost 18 of its 44 seats. The results were also a disappointment 
for the two parties of the liberal opposition, FIDESZ and SZDSZ, who failed to capitalise 
on the collapse of the Right and both lost seats. Instead, the big winner of the elections was 
the reformed Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), which won 33 percent of the votes, 
obtaining 209 out of 386 seats in parliament. Led by Gyula Horn, a longstanding member 
of the MSZMP and former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Németh government, the 
party had won the elections on the back of growing discontent with the effects of 
transition-associated adjustment and nostalgia for the perceived ‘achievements’ of the 
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Kádár regime, such as the provision of public welfare programmes and relative job 
security.591 However, as we shall see below, the victory of the socialists would turn out to 
be pyrrhic.  
 
Although the MSZP was the political heir of the MSZMP, ‘intellectually its leading figures 
were products of the institutional and economic reforms of the 1980s. By the early 1990s, a 
number of them had become strongly neoliberal in orientation.’592 Thus, in order to 
appease concerns in the West over the return of ‘ex-communists’ to power and to ensure 
himself of a two-thirds majority in parliament, Horn decided to form a coalition 
government with the (neo)liberal SZDSZ.593 To further increase his credibility as a 
‘responsible statesman’ committed to market reforms, Horn appointed László Békesi as 
Minister of Finance (he had previously held the same post in the Németh government).594 
According to Andor, Békesi was ‘the archetype of the Socialist politician who was never 
seen releasing a positive comment on socialism in recent times. He would easily have 
found a job on the right wing of the British Conservative Party or the American 
Republican Party.’595 In the 1980s, he had come under the personal influence of Milton 
Friedman,596 and he was committed to implement a ‘radical’ neoliberal programme based 
on macroeconomic stability, wage reductions for public sector workers, liberalisation of 
trade, and the acceleration of privatisation.597 His programme was supported by the IMF 
and the World Bank, domestic business circles, and the SZDSZ, as well as the liberal 
sections of the MSZP.598 However, Horn refused the programme, partly because of 
opposition from the left wing of his own party and the trade unions.599 Consequently, the 
government spent much of the first months in power bickering, while economic 
circumstances continued to deteriorate. 
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Meanwhile, the Hungarian economy was rapidly heading towards the precipice. By early 
1995, the external deficit exceeded 9 percent of GDP, the government’s budget deficit had 
reached 8.4 percent of GDP, and the public debt was more than 85 percent of GDP.600 
Making matters worse, the value of the forint was decreasing and the government faced a 
capital flight, as anxious investors were withdrawing their assets from ‘developing 
economies’ following the onset of the Mexican ‘peso crisis’ in December 1994.601 Békesi 
subsequently resigned as Minister of Finance in January 1995, after having failed to 
convince Horn of the need implement austerity measures. However, global financial 
markets, IFIs, and leading Western governments (in particular the United States, Germany, 
and Austria), as well as their neoliberal confrères in Hungary continued to impose 
economic and political pressure on the Horn government to implement radical austerity 
measures.602 Eventually, the government decided to succumb to budgetary restraint and 
austerity, in order to ensure IMF funding. On 1 March 1995, Horn appointed Lajos Bokros 
as Minister of Finance, while György Surányi was appointed Governor of the MNB. As we 
pointed out in the previous chapter, the two were old friends and former colleagues at the 
Institute of Financial Research, and were leading advocates of neoliberal reform. The 
appointment of Bokros and Surányi was welcomed by international financial circles, 
Western governments, as well as leading coalition politicians, who all saw it as a move that 
would ‘restore a measure of confidence’ in the Hungarian economy.603 
 
Enjoying the backing of both domestic and international financial circles, as well as 
leading politicians in Budapest, as well as abroad, Bokros and Surányi went on to prepare a 
radical austerity programme, which came to be known in popular discourse as the ‘Bokros 
Package’,604 after its main architect. Similar to many neoliberal reform measures 
implemented elsewhere, from the New York City fiscal crisis in 1975, through the 
structural adjustment programmes imposed on many countries of the Global South in the 
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1980s, to the most recent austerity measures imposed on the governments of Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus, by the unelected ‘Troika’ of the European Commission, 
European Central Bank (ECB), and the IMF, the Bokros Package had all the makings of a 
neoliberal coup d’état.605 It was drawn up in absolute secrecy, circumventing democratic 
oversight and public debate, by a small working group of neoliberal economists, many of 
whom had been connected to each other through the influential Institute of Financial 
Research or the Ministry of Finance.606 As the architects of the programme have confirmed 
in a number of highly revealing interviews and articles, this was by no means an ‘accident’ 
or a ‘mistake’. On the contrary, as László Antal, a former colleague of the Institute of 
Financial Research and one of the contributors to the Bokros Package, later admitted with 
uncompromising honesty:  
It is true: the preparation of the programme was like a putsch, without any prior discussions. 
It might sound cynical, but I am convinced that it could not have happened in another way. 
(Around the world, similar programmes are prepared in the same way. At times like this, 
there is no consensus.) If the increase in wages had adjusted to the devaluation [of the forint] 
(and the import surcharge), and the expenditures of the budget to the inflation, then nothing 
would have happened. It would neither have improved the budget or balance of payments 
deficit, nor the competitiveness of our exports, but only lead to greater inflation.607   
 
Less than two weeks after the appointment of Bokros and Surányi, on Sunday 12 March 
1995, the Bokros Package was presented to the wider public – later known in Hungarian 
public discourse as ‘black Sunday’. In an interview, made five years later, Bokros 
explained the ‘logic’ behind the austerity measures as follows: 
the main task [of the programme] was to restore Hungary’s international competitiveness. 
Being a small country, we export most of our production, but we can only be competitive 
with our products on the world market if the Hungarian labour force is not too expensive, 
since we are mostly not offering high quality products, made with high technology, which 
the world market is ready to give any money, but we are in fact competing with the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Chile, Malaysia, and similar, semi-developed countries and their semi-
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developed products. Under such circumstances, the level of domestic wages is very 
important. If wages are too high in Hungary, then we will be less able to export our products, 
more factories will be destroyed, and more people will become unemployed. This is not 
compatible with my left-wing views; it does not fit into my perception of social solidarity 
that some people earn well, while the majority cannot find work. It is much better if many 
people earn less, but the majority works. And this – in a country where there is high 
unemployment – is very important for the trade unions to understand as well. … Hence, in 
the short run, there is no other way to restore our international competitiveness – and this 
complies with the principle of solidarity –, than to reduce real wages, which enables more 
people to find work once the economy starts to recover.608  
 
As the table below indicates, the Bokros Package rested on two ‘pillars’, which were 
organised in terms of short- and long-term goals and designed in order to stimulate export-
led economic growth and reduce Hungary’s external debt. The first pillar was constructed 
by means of accelerating the privatisation programme and the second by the abolition of 
the universal welfare state. The programme explicitly ruled out the use of privatisation 
receipts to reduce the external debt; this was to be done instead by the abolition of family 
allowances, child- and maternity benefits, free higher education, the dismissal of 15 
percent of civil servants, and the introduction of a wage freeze in the public sector. The 
forint was also to be devalued by nine percent and a so-called ‘crawling peg’ introduced 
(under which the national currency was devalued by 1.9 percent for another three months, 
which then decreased to 1.3 percent per month). In total, these measures were estimated to 
cut public spending by around HUF 200 billion (US$ 1.4 billion), and the budget deficit by 
one-third.609  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
608 Bokros, here cited in Rádai, Pénzügyminiszterek..., pp. 193-194 (my emphasis). 
609 Mommen, ‘Magyarország neoliberális forradalma’, p. 165; The Economist, ‘Hungary: Radical at last’, 
pp. 45-46. For Bokros’ own conception of the package, see Bokros in Rádai, op. cit., pp. 188-194. 
 171 
Table 5.2. Key elements of the 1995 austerity measures (‘Bokros Package’)610 
 Short-term Long-term 
Budget • Wage freeze 
• Public sector 
redundancies 
• Import surcharges 
• Reduction of universal 
welfare benefits 
• Reduction of free 
access to higher 
education 
Current account • Import surcharges 
• 9 percent currency 
devaluation 
• ‘Crawling peg’ 
exchange rate 
 
 
The Bokros package constituted the largest austerity package hitherto introduced in 
post-transition Hungary and its introduction sparked fierce popular opposition. Throughout 
1995 Hungary witnessed some of the largest protests by the organised labour movement 
since the transition as railway workers struck for 86 hours in April, while 160,000 people 
participated in a nationwide teachers’ strike in December 1995.611 The national-
conservative opposition denounced the austerity measures, arguing that they ‘unnecessary’ 
and led to the ‘skinning of the Hungarian people’ (népnyúzás). The Bokros Package also 
led to an internal crisis within the MSZP; two socialist ministers resigned immediately in 
protest against the harshness of the package, with two more following suit before the end 
of the year.612 But the socialist-liberal coalition held firm, and, echoing Thatcher’s famous 
maxim ‘There Is No Alternative’, made it clear that there was no room for compromise. 
Apart from a few dissenting voices, most economists agreed that the austerity measures, 
albeit painful and unpopular, were ‘necessary’.613 Eventually the trade unions gave in, 
accepting that the unpopular measures were in the ‘national interest’. Since the Horn 
government held a two-third majority in parliament, the operationalisation of the Bokros 
Package did not meet any obstacles in the legislature. However, in subsequent months the 
                                                
610 Source: Phillips et al., ’Usurping Social Policy’, p. 598, Table 3. 
611 As one commentator reflected looking back on the number of anti-austerity protests that swept Hungary in 
that year, ‘it’s a wonder that all these protests did not coalesce into a broader movement of public anger.’ 
László Kéri, A rendszerváltás krónikája, 1988-2009, Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó/Népszabadság, 2010, p. 54 
(my translation). 
612 In fact, as Andor (here cited in Hungary on the Road to the European Union, pp. 62-63) points out, on day 
that  the Bokros Package was unveiled to the public, the vice-presided of the MSZP.Imre Szekeres, had 
stated that ‘the government did not plan any measures to decrease living standards.’ As Andor goes on to 
note, ‘[h]e [Szekeres], as leader of the parliamentary fraction, apparently had no information about what had 
been prepared.’ 
613 For criticism of the Bokros package from Hungarian economists, see András Köves, ‘Gazdaság és 
gazdaságpolitika Bokros után’, Társadalmi Szemle, 1996, Vol. 51, No. 8-9, pp. 5-20; György Matolcsy, 
‘Kiigazítás recesszióval: kemény költségvetési és puha piaci korlát’, Közgazdasági Szemle, 1997, Vol. 44, 
No. 9, pp. 782-798; Nagy, From Command to Market Economy in Hungary. 
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Constitutional Court – much to the irritation of Bokros – annulled a number of social 
measures related to the package on the ground that they were unconstitutional.  
 
Notwithstanding the concerns about democratic accountability (or, rather, the lack thereof) 
and the effects of the austerity measures on Hungarian society, the Bokros package was 
hailed as a ‘success story’ by the advocates of neoliberal shock therapy both in Hungary 
and abroad. According to the IMF’s Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, the austerity 
measures were ‘courageous and substantive’,614 while the Director of the IMF’s European I 
Department, Massimo Russo, praised Bokros for the ‘achievements’ of his package, which 
he argued had ‘clawed the [Hungarian] economy back from the edge of a financial 
precipice’. He also reassured Bokros that he had the full backing of the IMF and ‘the 
international community’.615 A 1998 IMF report summarised the ‘achievements’ of the 
Bokros Package as follows:  
During 1995-97, the performance of the Hungarian economy improved in almost all 
respects. The most impressive result of the program was the dramatic turnaround in the 
external accounts, which is illustrated by two key statistics: the external current account 
deficit fell from 9 ½ percent of GDP in 1994 to a projected 2 ¾ percent of GDP in 1997; and 
net external debt was lowered from more than 45 percent of GDP to less than 30 percent of 
GDP. This turnaround benefited from favorable external conditions (the growth rate of 
imports of Hungary’s partner countries was 7 percent in 1995-97, against 4 ½ percent during 
the first half of the 1990s), but should be credited primarily to the policies implemented by 
the authorities.616 
 
In recognition of their ‘achievements’, Bokros and Surányi were awarded the title of 
‘Finance Minister of the Year’ and ‘Central Banker of the Year’ respectively, by the 
                                                
614 Michel Camdessus, ‘IMF, Hungary Continue Dialogue; Camdessus Welcomes Measures’, IMF News 
Brief No. 95/14, 6 June 1995, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
615 As Russo (1995, here cited in Nagy, From Command to Market Economy in Hungary, p. 52, my 
emphasis) expressed in a private letter to Bokros (leaked by the latter to the Hunagrian press): ‘we in the 
Fund, together with many others in the international community, subscribe fully to your vision for the 
Hungarian economy over the medium term. You have spoken with some passion about a Hungary with 
falling external indebtedness, stable prices, lower taxes, and rising real living standards for all of the people – 
not just jobs, but good jobs with good prospects for Hungarian workers. We share too your assessment of 
how to get there: a package of fiscal retrenchment, wage restraint, monetary stringency, social security 
reform, and structural adjustment will entail some adjustment pains in the short run, but it is the only secure 
route to the vision you have for Hungary in the medium term.’ On international praise for the Bokros 
package, see Virgina Marsh, ‘Hungary: Austerity has paid off’, Financial Times, 8 May 1998; Anthony 
Robinson and Virgina Marsh, ‘Tough medicine puts new life in Hungary’, Financial Times, 31 October 
1995; The Economist, ‘Hungary: Radical at last’, 1 April 1995, pp. 45-46. 
616 Cottarelli, Hungary: Economic Policies for Sustainable Growth, p. 13. 
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prestigious global financial journal Euromoney in 1996, However, this was probably of 
little comfort to the former, who by then was the most unpopular politician of post-
transition Hungary, and had resigned from his post.617  
 
However, while the Bokros Package managed to keep the Hungarian economy from falling 
over the financial cliff, this came at the cost of rising social polarisation and public 
discontent in Hungary. In line with the aims of the package real wages fell drastically; 
decreasing by 17.2 percent in 1995-1996. Although there was a gradual increase from 1997 
onwards, real wages had still not reached their 1990 levels by 2001.618 Moreover, the 
introduction of the Bokros package also led to a rise in poverty and strengthened income 
polarisations in Hungarian society (both of which had been on the rise since the 1980s).619 
Working class people and the poor, who were the MSZP’s traditional constituents, were 
particularly badly hit by the cuts in wages and public welfare services. As one Hungarian 
commentator later summed up, the Bokros Package effectively constituted an ‘economic 
shock therapy “without anaesthesia”.’620 In addition, a series of corruption scandals 
involving high-ranking government officials connected to the privatisation process 
generated considerable public discontent against the socialist-liberal government.621 
However, despite these ‘achievements’, the Bokros Package would, as we shall see below, 
ultimately fail to correct the inherent structural contradictions of the Hungarian political 
economy and stimulate sustainable economic growth over the long-term.  
 
 
Experimenting with ‘Populist Neoliberalism’: The Orbán government, 
1998-2002 
Although the socialist-liberal government managed to restore the ‘competitiveness’ of the 
Hungarian economy, it paid a heavy price for this at the 1998 general elections. While the 
                                                
617 The Economist, ‘Hungary: Knifeman knifed (Finance Minister Bokros resigns)’, 24 February 1996. 
618 Klára Fóti, Alleviating Poverty: Analysis and Recommendations. Human Development Report for 
Hungary, 2000-2002, Budapest: Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2003, Table 1.2, p. 12.  
619 Ibid., p. 30-58. 
620 Lengyel, here cited in Károly Tardos, Felzárkózás vagy lemaradás?: beszélgetések a magyar gazdaság-
politika elmúlt húsz évéről, Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 2010. 
621  The most infamous corruption scandal was the so-called ‘Tocsik affair’, explained in further detail on pp. 
See also Éva Inzelt, ‘White collar crime during the political and economic transition in Hungary’, US-China 
Law Review,  2011, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 352-379; József Mocsáry, ‘Visszapillantás a privatizációra’, Eszmélet, 
2001, Vol. 13, No. 52, pp. 4-39. 
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MSZP won 33 percent of the popular vote, it lost more than one-third of its seats in 
parliament due to Hungary’s disproportional electoral system. The (neo)liberal SZDSZ 
fared much worse, however, losing more than half of its electorate (down from 19.7 
percent in 1994 to 7.9 in 1998) and nearly two-thirds of its seats in parliament. While the 
socialist-liberal vote deteriorated, support for the Right increased. As a result, the far-right 
entered parliament, for the first time since 1989, with Csurka’s MIÉP party obtaining 5.5 
percent of the popular vote and 14 seats in parliament. However, the big winner of the 
elections was FIDESZ, which became the biggest party in parliament with 148 seats. 
Originally a libertarian party (as late as 1992 FIDESZ had joined the Liberal International, 
ahead of the SZDSZ), the party had started to move to the Right from 1993 and 
onwards.622 Led by the young and charismatic Viktor Orbán, it now formed a national-
conservative coalition together with the FKGP and MDF. The newly formed Orbán 
government was comprised of 16 ministers, out of which 8 were non-partisan technocrats. 
Interestingly, both the post as Minister of Economy and Minister of Finance were awarded 
to well-known liberal economists, Attila Chikán and Zsigmond Járai respectively. As 
André Mommen has pointed out, the general message that the Orbán government sought to 
convey to foreign investors and politicians in the West was that ‘Hungary had changed 
government, but not economic policy.’623 
 
While scholars and political commentators, both on the Left and Right, have tended to 
describe the economic policies pursued by the Orbán government as an aberration from the 
neoliberal consensus, we argue that they might arguably best be understood as an example 
of what Kurt Weyland has described as ‘neoliberal populism’, characterised by a support 
for market competition together with a ‘top-down approach to decision making’ and an 
opposition towards ‘special interest groups’ (civil society, established politicians and 
government bureaucrats, and trade unions).624 On certain areas, this meant a much stronger 
degree of continuity with the neoliberal policies pursued by the socialist-liberal 
government than what might have been inferred from FIDESZ’s election manifesto. The 
government pledged to reduce inflation and unemployment, cut taxes and social insurance 
                                                
622 Andor, Hungary on the Road to the European Union, pp. 68-72; András Bozóki and Eszter Simon, 
‘Hungary since 1989’, in Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989, edited by Sabrina P. Ramet, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 215. For a detailed account of the political transformation 
of FIDESZ, see Edith Oltay, Fidesz and the Reinvention of the Hungarian Centre-Right, Budapest: 
Századvég Kiadó, 2012. 
623 Mommen, ‘Magyarország neoliberális forradalma’, p. 168 (my translation). 
624 Weyland, ‘Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe’, pp. 381-383. 
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contributions, and to bring down the budget deficit, which stood at 4.5 percent of GDP in 
1998, in line with the Maastricht criteria. Finally, Orbán also reaffirmed Hungary’s 
commitment to economic and political reintegration with the West. In March 1999, 
Hungary became a member of NATO, and the government continued negotiations about 
EU membership, although it was becoming increasingly frustrated by the slow speed at 
which discussions with Brussels proceeded.625 However, there were discontinuities as well.  
 
Closer to home, the national-conservative government was keen to transmit a different 
message. Under Orbán’s leadership the idea of building a ‘national bourgeoisie’, which, as 
we discussed earlier, had been championed by the first national-conservative government 
between 1990-1994 (albeit with limited success), was resurrected. Similar to Antall, Orbán 
believed that a strong Hungarian economy could be built on the backbone of a small 
number of Hungarian-owned transnational corporations, supported by small- and medium 
sized family-owned companies, rural farmers, and the Church.626 In a 1994 interview with 
József Debreczeni, he outlined his vision of how this was to be achieved:  
You ought to identify eight to ten large businessmen, who would go on to become Hungary’s 
big capitalists. And then you should have supported them – not directly through the 
government, but simply, through banking relationships. A personal relationship ought to 
have been developed with them, which they then would be able to use on the market in order 
to gain a competitive advantage. That relationship would then connect them to Prime 
Minister of Hungary, or his personal circle. True, certain spheres of the economy would have 
been handed over to the interest sphere of eight to ten big capitalists. However, this could 
safely have been allowed, since it has happened anyway. It is inevitable that, sooner or later, 
the economic map of the country will look like this anyway. …  
This is what ought to have been done. Make it clear to the bankers that these are our 
eight to ten people, then leave it to the logic of the market to handle the rest. Perhaps they 
could have been provided further assistance in the … development funds and projects, but 
even there it should be done modestly, without exceeding the boundaries of “good 
taste”…627 
 
                                                
625 As Orbán put it at the time: ‘It is no tragedy if we do not gain accession in 2003. Currently, we are not 
members of the Union, and, as we can see, there is life outside the EU as well. But this is not what we are 
preparing us for. We seek integration because it would give a new boost to our economic development.’ 
Interview with Orbán in Albert Gazda and Marianna Mucsányi, ‘Együtt kell élni politikai ellenfeleinkkel’, 
interview with Viktor Orbán, Világgazdaság, 17 December 1999 (my translation). 
626 Mommen, ‘Magyarország neoliberális forradalma’, p. 171; Oltay, Fidesz..., p. 130-133. 
627 Orbán 1994, here cited in József Debreczeni, Orbán Viktor, Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2002, pp. 273 (my 
translation).  
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As we shall see in the next chapter, these words turned out to be a premonition of the 
economic policies pursued by the second Orbán government after it was catapulted back 
into power in 2010. 
 
Orbán frequently invoked ‘nationalist’ rhetoric in order to describe his economic policies. 
He criticised the socialist-liberal coalition for being ‘the most corrupt’ since the end of 
‘communism’, and accused it for ‘selling out’ the country to ‘foreigners’. In order to 
satisfy political allies, he promised to keep agricultural lands in ‘Hungarian hands’, a 
particularly important issue for the Independent Smallholders and the far-right. Moreover, 
he spoke passionately about the ‘spiritual and cultural reunification of the Hungarian 
people’, including the roughly 2.4 million ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. For example, Transylvania, he said, was ‘part of 
Hungary’s living space in the Carpathian basin’, adding self-assuredly that once the 
countries of CEE gain accession to the EU, then ‘borders [will] have no importance’. 
Understandably, comments like these caused considerable discomfort amongst the 
socialist-liberal opposition at home, politicians in neighbouring countries, as well as in 
Brussels and Washington. Moreover, the government’s incapability, or at times 
unwillingness, to silence Csurka’s far-right MIÉP party, did not improve the Orbán 
government’s reputation either.628     
 
However, Orbán’s shift to the Right was not merely ideological, but also constituted a 
political response to the material constraints of an increasingly crisis-prone world 
economy. Rather than unleashing a new, unprecedented phase of capitalism characterised 
by high growth, soaring profits, new jobs, and, as the UK Chancellor and future Prime 
Minister George Brown often repeated in the late 1990s and early 2000s, ‘an end to boom 
and bust’,629 the neoliberal era of capitalism has turned out to been characterised by low 
economic growth (with noticeable exceptions, like China), high unemployment, and, 
recurring crises.630 When the Orbán government assumed power in 1998, the Russian 
financial crisis was reaching its zenith. As Russian stock, bond, and currency markets 
collapsed, the Budapest Stock Exchange plummeted, falling from its record level of 9,016 
                                                
628 Mommen, ‘Magyarország neoliberális forradalma’, pp. 168-171; Pittaway, ‘Hungary’, pp. 69-71; The 
Economist, ‘Viktor Orban, an Assertive Hungarian’, 28 February 2002. 
629 Deborah Summers, ‘No return to boom and bust: what Brown said when he was chancellor’, The 
Guardian, 11 September 2008. 
630 On the ‘achievements’ of neoliberalism, see for example Harman, Zombie Capitalism, pp. 229-253; 
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pp. 152-182. 
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points in April 1998 to 3,775 points in September 1998.631 In order to stave off the risks of 
contagion, and ensure Hungary’s fragile economic recovery, the government resorted to 
what Phillips et al. have described as ‘right-Keynesian’632 economic policies. In 2001, the 
government launched a comprehensive social and economic development programme, 
known as the Széchényi Plan. Named symbolically after Count István Széchényi (1791-
1860), the great Hungarian reformer of the 19th century, the programme aimed to boost 
economic growth and domestic consumption through the promotion of large-scale ‘public-
private partnership’ (PPP) programmes focussing on the development of transport and 
infrastructure, tourism, public housing, research and development (R&D), and small and 
medium-sized businesses.633 Between 2001-2002, the programme distributed grants in the 
value of HUF 200 billion, in order to generate investments valued at HUF 600 billion. 
Annually, between 10-15,000 houses were built and 46,000 workplaces created.634 The 
government also carried out a radical reform of the state administration, which resulted in 
the centralisation of power in the hands of the newly created Prime Minister’s Office, 
effectively rendering it ‘a new ministry beyond the control of Parliament.’635 At the same 
time, measures were taken to curb the power of organised labour. For example, the 
Ministry of Labour was abolished and brought under the control of the Prime Minister’s 
Office, while the National Council for Interest Reconciliation (Nemzeti Érdekegyeztető 
Tanács, NÉT)636 was dissolved and the Labour Code amended, imposing restrictions on 
the trade unions in the workplace.637 These moves were not, as supporters of the 
government or neoliberal economists argue, simply the unfortunate outcome of necessary 
‘economic belt-tightening’ or the ‘need to streamline the state’s institutional framework’. 
                                                
631 Mommen, ‘Magyarország neoliberális forradalma’, p. 169. 
632 Phillips et al., ‘Usurping Social Policy’, p. 600. 
633 The programme was developed by György Matolcsy, former member of the Insitute of Financial 
Research, who had replaced Chikán as Minister of Economy in 1999. It was prepared in collaboration with 
politicians, foreign investors, and various business associations and interest groups, such as the Confederat-
ion of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists (Munkaadók és Gyáriparosok Országos Szövetsége, 
MGYOSZ) and the National Association of Large Families (Nagycsaládosok Országos Egyesülete, NOE). 
Bohle and Greskovits. Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery, p. 177; Phillips et al., op. cit., p. 600. For 
a detailed account of the Széchényi Plan, see György Matolcsy, Élő emlékeink: a Széch-enyi Terv világa, 
Budapest: Válasz Könyvkiadó, 2002. 
634 Oltay, Fidesz..., p. 132. 
635 Phillips et al., op. cit., p. 599. 
636 The NÉT was originally established in 1988 (although it only began to operate in 1990), as a tripartite 
body responsible for resolving labour disputes, setting minimum wages in industry, and health and safety 
concerns. Although the council was officially ‘neutral’, it was balanced in favour of employers in practice, 
with the council comprised of nine employers’ representatives against six trade union representatives. 
Jeffries, Socialist economies and the transition to the market, p. 423.  
637 Bohle and Greskovits, Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery, p. 150; András Körösényi, A magyar 
politikai rendszer, Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2002, p. 20. 
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Rather, they need to be understood as integral parts of a dual strategy: first, to continue the 
process of capital accumulation, creating both capital and wage-labourers. And second, to 
ensure capitalist hegemony by ‘eliminat[ing] the possibility of a coordinated challenge to 
the government over labour relations and labour issues more generally.’638  
 
As the examples above indicate, the economic policies pursued by the Orbán government 
did not represent an aberration from an imaginary neoliberal ‘norm’, but should rather be 
understood as an inflection of neoliberalism.639 Similar combinations of ‘populist’ rhetoric 
with the pursuit of neoliberal economic policies were discernible elsewhere in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, ranging from the populist governments of Carlos Menem and Silvio 
Berlusconi in Argentina and Italy to the neoconservative Bush administration in the United 
States.640 In fact, as Harvey cogently argues, ‘populist’ discourse is integral to 
neoliberalism:  
the neoliberal state needs nationalism of a certain sort to survive. Forced to operate as a 
competitive agent in the world market and seeking to establish the best possible business 
climate, it mobilizes nationalism in its efforts to succeed. Competition produces ephemeral 
winners and losers in the global struggle for position, and this in itself can be a source of 
national pride or of national soul-searching.641 
 
Hence, notwithstanding his ‘populist’ rhetoric, Orbán remained an acceptable guarantor 
of neoliberal reform in Hungary according to the representatives of capital. This was the 
implicit message of an article in The Economist written on the eve of the 2002 elections:  
Mr Orban may be an awkward neighbour and a rough opponent. He may prove a tricky 
European. But he is an able leader of a new breed of Central Europeans for whom joining the 
EU is mainly a matter of self-interest … Brussels bigwigs are rightly warier of telling such 
people what to do. They may even suck their teeth and shut their eyes if horrid Mr Csurka 
helps keep Orban in power.642  
 
 
                                                
638 Phillips et al., ‘Usurping Social Policy’p. 600.  
639 On the ‘neoconservative turn’ in politics, see Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pp. 81-86.  
640 Weyland, ‘Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe’, pp. 379-401. 
641 Harvey, op. cit., p. 85. 
642 The Economist, ‘Viktor Orban’.  
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Attempting a Balancing Act: Gyurcsány, the ‘Josephinist’643 
Following a fiercely contested electoral campaign the national-conservative coalition was 
narrowly defeated in the 2002 elections by the MSZP, who formed a coalition government 
with the neoliberal SZDSZ. The new cabinet was headed by the non-partisan technocrat 
Péter Medgyessy, who had previously served as Minister of Finance twice (in 1987 and, 
again, between 1996-1998), and also worked for a number of Western banks based in 
Hungary. The new government promised quick accession to the EU and further neoliberal 
reforms, including the liberalisation of telecommunications market, privatisation of the 
health care sector, and bringing down inflation and the budget deficit to below 3 percent.644 
Yet, at the same time, it also provided a 50 percent wage increase for some 600,000 
teachers and public sector workers, as well as increased benefits for university students, 
pensioners, and the poor, as part of its electoral manifesto promising a ‘change of the 
welfare regime’ (jóléti rendszerváltást). These measures amounted to nearly HUF 190 
billion and resulted in a deterioration of the government’s budget deficit, from 4.1 percent 
of GDP in 2001 to 9.4 percent in 2002.645 The measures were strongly criticised by the 
parliamentary opposition, neoliberal economists, and the EU and IMF, who argued that 
they were ‘populist’ and ‘irresponsible’, and would lead to a deterioration in the 
‘competitiveness’ of the Hungarian economy.646 Medgyessy also faced personal criticism 
from national-conservative forces inside and outside parliament, after an article published 
by Magyar Nemzet, a conservative newspaper affiliated with FIDESZ, revealed that he had 
worked as a counterespionage officer in the III/II section of the Ministry for Internal 
Affairs during the Kádár era.647 The Prime Minister admitted to this, but claimed that his 
duties were confined to securing Hungary’s IMF membership (which was opposed by the 
Soviet Union).648 However, in Hungary’s increasingly polarised political climate, the 
revelations were highly controversial and further strengthened political tensions. 
 
                                                
643 The term is here used to describe the analogies between the reforms pursued by Prime Minister Gyurcsány 
and Joseph II’s (1741-1790) attempt to reform the Habsburg Empire ‘from above’, in order to promote the 
economic development.    
644 It should be pointed out that these reforms were in line with the demands of the EU, IMF, World Bank, 
etc. 
645 Mommen, ‘Magyarország neoliberális forradalma’, p. 172. 
646 Tibor Gazsó, András Giró-Szász, and István Stumpf (eds.), A jóléti rendszerváltás csődje: a Gyurcsány- 
kormány első éve, Budapest: Századvég Kiadó, 2003; IMF, ‘Hungary: Selected Issues’, IMF Country Report 
No. 03/125, May 2003, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
647 Matild Torkos, ‘Titkos ügynök a kormány élén’, Magyar Nemzet, 18 June 2002. 
648 Kate Connolly, ‘Hungarian PM admits he worked as a spy catcher’, The Guardian, 20 June 2002. 
 180 
Following prolonged disputes with its junior coalition partner, Medgyessy was forced to 
resign in August 2004, after SZDSZ revoked its trust in the Prime Minister. He was 
succeeded by the young, ambitious pro-reformer Ferenc Gyurcsány. As G.M. Tamás has 
argued, Gyurcsány’s career summarised ‘the unique blend of the outsider, the emerging, 
defiant reactionary, self-taking arrogance, and the desire to assimilate to those who are 
superior.’649 Having grown up in poor conditions in Pápa, a small town in Northwestern 
Hungary, Gyurcsány had climbed the social ladder during the heydays of the Kádár era, to 
become a leading member of the Communist Youth League (Kommunista Ifjúsági 
Szövetség, KISZ) in the late 1980s. After the democratic transition, he moved into the 
private sector, setting up his own enterprise specialising in construction and financial 
wealth management. By 2002, he had risen to become Hungary’s 50th wealthiest person. In 
the same year, he returned to politics, becoming a strategic advisor to Medgyessy, and, 
after the victory of the socialists, was rewarded with the post of Minister for Sports, Youth, 
and Children.650 Following the resignation of Medgyessy, the socialist-liberal coalition 
united behind Gyurcsány, in the hope that he would manage to break with the problems 
associated with the Medgyessy government and salvage the situation before it was too 
late.651 Gyurcsány employed his newly obtained powers to pursue a policy further 
economic and political liberalisation, including an acceleration of privatisation and 
European integration. Drawing inspiration from Anthony Giddens and Tony Blair, he also 
promised to turn the MSZP from an ‘outdated’, ‘reform communist’ party into a ‘modern’, 
Western-style social-democratic party, which promoted social justice and equal 
opportunities, while at the same time supporting competitive markets and foreign 
investment.652 These measures were welcomed by domestic business circles, neoliberal 
economists, and international and regional bureaucratic organisations, who saw them as 
                                                
649 Gáspár M. Tamás, ‘Képek Gyurcsány falán’, Élet és Irodalom, Vol. 51, No. 34, 24 August 2007. See also 
Korkut, Liberalization Challenges in Hungary, pp. 42-43. 
650 New York Times, ‘Hungary: Tycoon Picked as New Premier’, 26 August 2004; Origo.hu, ‘A 100 leg-
gazdagabb magyar’, 2002. Available on: http://www.origo.hu/uzletinegyed/hirek/2002111541tol.html (last 
accessed on: 20 May 2009); The Economist, ‘Revolving doors: A new prime minister steps up’, 26 August 
2004. 
651 In June 2004, the socialist-liberal coalition was trounced in the European parliamentary elections: 
FIDESZ obtained 47.4 percent of the vote, while the parties of the socialist-liberal coalition received 34.3 
(MSZP) and 7.7 (SZDSZ) percent respectively. Moreover, opinion polls in the summer of 2004 seemed to 
confirm this trend. By August 2004, the MSZP was more than 10 points behind the leading party of the 
opposition, FIDESZ. See Tibor Gazsó and István Stumpf (eds.), A jóléti rendszerváltás csődje: a Gyurcsány- 
kormány első éve, Budapest: Századvég Kiadó, 2005, Table 1, p. 15.   
652 Korkut, Liberalization Challenges in Hungary, p. 43. On Gyurcsány’s relation to Blair and Giddens, see 
interview with Gyurcsány in Eszter Rádai, ‘Elsiették a támadást’, interview with Ferenc Gyurcsány, Mozgó 
Világ, December 2003 and Adam Lebor, ‘New Labour is Still Cool – In Hungary’, New Statesman, 15 May 
2006.   
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‘necessary’, initial step towards the implementation of ‘structural reforms’. Although the 
main opposition party, FIDESZ, tried desperately to destabilise the government, 
denouncing the Hungarian Left as ‘unfaithful to the nation’653 and questioning the methods 
of Gyurcsány’s enrichment, while, at the same time, outbidding the MSZP in offering 
generous welfare provisions, it was not able to stop the ruling socialist-liberal coalition 
from securing a ‘historic’ victory, becoming the first ‘post-communist’ government in 
CEE to win re-election.654 However, as we shall see in section 4, Gyurcsány’s victory 
would soon turn out to be bittersweet.  
 
 
The Neoliberal Restructuring of the Hungarian Political 
Economy 
 
 
The Panacea of Privatisation 
Following the demise of ‘actually existing socialism’ in Eastern Europe in 1989, the most 
pressing task from the point of view of neoliberal economists, international and regional 
bureaucratic organisations, representatives of transnational corporations, and  governments 
on both sides of the former Berlin Wall became privatisation, which was promoted with 
messianic fervour as a universal panacea for rapid transformation. The rationale for 
privatisation was summed up by a 1996 World Development Report as follows:  
At the heart of the transition lies a change in incentives, none more important than those for managers 
of enterprises. Managers in centrally planned economies faced distorted incentives that sooner or later 
led to poor enterprise performance. Transition requires changes that introduce financial discipline and 
increase entry of new firms, exit of unviable firms, and competition. These spurs needed restructuring, 
even in state enterprises. Ownership change, preferably to private ownership, in a large share of the 
economy is also important. Once markets have been liberalized, governments cannot indefinitely 
control large parts of a dynamic, changing economy. Decentralizing ownership is the best way to 
increase competition and improve performance.655 
 
                                                
653 Viktor Orbán, ‘Magyarország jövője jövőre’, speech at the 15th Summer University and Youth Camp in 
Băile Tușnad (Tusnádfürdő), Romania, 23 July 2005. 
654 Bohle and Greskovits. Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery, pp. 178-179; Sándor Révész, ‘A Fidesz 
átmenetele – 2006’, Népszabadság, 4 June 2012; The Economist, ‘Hungary’s election: the re-election prec-
edent’, 27 April 2006. 
655 World Bank, From Plan to Market, p. 44. 
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As political economists have noted, privatisation was promoted by local and international 
ruling classes for a variety of reasons.656 From a politico-juridical point of view, 
privatisation became a method for what Stephen Gill has defined as ‘constitutionalising 
capital’,657 by transferring property rights from the state to private investors and putting in 
place measures which ensured that free enterprise became the primary vehicle for capital 
accumulation. In this regard, privatisation was presented as the backbone of a successful 
market economy, which would ensure the creation of a strong domestic bourgeoisie 
supportive of liberal democratic values in the countries of post-Soviet CEE.658 
Privatisation also made ‘sense’ for economic reasons. Supporters of privatisation promoted 
it as a quick fix to ‘the fiscal crisis of the (capitalist) state’, which, as we noted in chapter 
3, had become an increasingly pressuring concern for governments across the world since 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Selling off state-owned enterprises to foreign investors thus 
promised to generate much-needed cash for ailing state treasuries, while, at the same time, 
spurring the arrival of foreign direct investments and technological know-how to the 
‘transition economies’. Moreover, privatisation was also touted by neoliberal economists 
as a way of ensuring better management of remaining state owned enterprises, as it was 
argued that by exposing them to increasing competitive pressures would increase 
efficiency and productivity, improve product quality, and reduce costs, both directly to 
consumers through cheaper products and services, as well as indirectly by reducing the tax 
burden.659 However, as Marxist political economists point out, privatisation was also 
advantageous to international ruling classes, as it provided them access to the ‘crown 
jewels’ of the ex-state capitalist economies by putting them on sale for the predations of 
their multinational firms soon as possible.660  
 
As we describe in this section, the privatisation process in Hungary can be divided into 
roughly four periods: a first phase, from 1990 to 1992, in which the Antall government’s 
determination to repay Hungary’s foreign debt led to a privatisation strategy prioritising 
                                                
656 Hardy, Poland’s New Capitalism; Gowan, ‘Neo-Liberal Theory and Practice for Eastern Europe’; Shields, 
The International Political Economy of Transition. 
657 Gill, ‘Constitutionalising Capital’, pp. 47-69. 
658 See for example Kornai, The Road to a Free Economy. 
659 For neoliberal views on privatisation, see Åslund, Building Capitalism..., pp. 255-303; Robert Frydman 
and Andrzej Rapaczynski, Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering Away?, Budapest: Central 
University Press, 1994. For Marxist critiques, see Gowan, op. cit.; Hardy, op. cit.; Harvey, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism. 
660 Hardy, op. cit., p. 59. 
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the sale of state owned enterprises to foreign investors. Second, a brief intermezzo between 
1993-1994, in which the government attempted to constitute a national bourgeoisie 
following growing resistance against ‘foreign’ capital. A third phase from 1995 and 
onwards, during which Gyula Horn’s socialist-liberal government surrendered to domestic 
and international pressures and accelerated the privatisation process, leading to the 
wholesale privatisation of entire sectors of the economy, such as banking, energy, and 
telecommunications. As a result, by 1999, the private sector accounted for 80 percent of 
GDP (highest in the region together with the Czech Republic), with foreign capital 
dominating key sectors of the economy, domestic capitalists controlling a sizeable number 
of businesses in labour-intensive sectors of the economy, and the state left in control of a 
few hundred firms in strategic sectors such as defence, steel, transport, and agriculture.661 
A fourth wave of privatisation was initiated in 2003, focussing on sectors that EU 
competition policy had opened up for the exploitation of large transnational corporations. 
This final wave of privatisation has primarily focussed on banks, steel, 
telecommunications, and transport (including the airport of Budapest).662 The figures 
below provide a summary of the four phases of privatisation in Hungary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
661 World Bank, Transition – The First Ten Years, p. 6. See also Drahokoupil, Globalization and the State in 
Central and Eastern Europe; Hanley et al., ‘The State, International Agencies...’. 
662 Since 2002, the most noticeable privatisations have included the sale of Postabank to the Austrian banking 
giant Erste Bank, in 2003, for a total of US$ 450 million, and in 2005, the sales of Antenna Hungária to 
Swisscom, for around US$ 240 million, and Budapest Airport to the British Airport Authority Plc. for more 
than US$ 2.1 billion (making the latter, the biggest privatisation deal in Hungary’s history).  
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Figure 5.1. Privatisation in Hungary, 1989-2011663 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
663 Source: Privatization Barometer, ‘Hungary’, 2012. Available on: 
http://www.privatizationbarometer.net/atlas.php?id=18&mn=IN (last accessed on: 29 January 2013).  
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Figure 5.2. Sectoral distribution of privatisation revenues in Hungary, 1989-2011664 
 
 
 
 
The Antall Government, 1990-1992 
As we noted in the previous section, the national-conservative government led by József 
Antall was determined to honour the debt obligations of the old regime, no matter the cost. 
This decision had critical implications for the government’s privatisation strategy.665 In the 
context of a deepening ‘transformational recession’ and the collapse of the CMEA, hard-
currency offers were hard to come by. In December 1990 the Antall government 
announced that it intended to channel 85 percent of privatisation revenues towards the 
repayment of the foreign debt.666 In 1991 alone, some US$ 200 million in privatisation 
revenues was used for this purpose.667 Thus, the main criterion for the government’s 
privatisation strategy became the highest cash offer. However, as Hanley et al. note, ‘This 
                                                
664 Source: Privatization Barometer, op. cit.  
665 Drahokoupil, Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 103; Hanley et al., ‘The State, 
International Agencies...’, p. 151. 
666 MTI Econews, ‘Government Discusses Property Policy Guidelines for 1991’, 3 December 1990. 
667 Rachel van Elkan, ‘Privatization’, in Hungary: Economic Policies for Sustainable Growth, edited by 
Carlo Cottarelli, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1998, pp. 63-67. 
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policy had a number of implications, not all of which met with popular approval.’668 On 
the one hand, it ruled out the restitution of property to previous owners or their 
descendants, a central aim of the FKGP, the second-largest party in the national-
conservative coalition. On the other hand, it effectively disqualified Hungarian firms and 
individuals from the privatisation process, as they had very little cash at their disposal 
compared to their foreign counterparts. Therefore the implicit result was that a significant 
number of state-owned enterprises were to be sold to foreign corporations.669  
 
Despite opposition from within the ranks of the coalition government against the idea of 
selling off state enterprises to the highest bidder, the Antall government made no secret of 
the fact that its privatisation strategy involved a concerted effort to attract foreign capital. 
On the contrary, in 1991 the government openly declared that it intended to sell 25-30 
percent of state-owned enterprises to foreign investors within five years.670 Amongst the 
first 20 enterprises to be privatised were some of Hungary’s ‘most attractive companies’, 
including Hungarohotels, the country’s largest hotel chain, Ibusz, the national travel 
agency, and Chinoin, the renowned pharmaceutical company.671 The government also 
employed other measures in order to attract foreign investors to participate in the 
privatisation process, including the provision of generous tax reductions to foreign 
investors.672 
 
The foreign-oriented privatisation strategy enjoyed broad support amongst Hungarian 
economists and policymakers, as well as a significant section of the domestic managerial 
elite.673 Not surprisingly, it was also welcomed by international financial institutions, 
Western governments, and multinational corporations. The IMF demonstrated its approval 
                                                
668 Hanley et al., ‘The State, International Agencies...’, p. 146 
669 Drahokoupil, Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 103-104; Hanley et al., op. 
cit., p. 146. 
670 MTI Econews, ‘Proposal on Privatization Strategies in Hungary’, 3 June 1991. 
671 Nicholas Denton and Christopher Bobinski, ‘Hungary Releases its Privatization Shortlist’, Financial 
Times, 15 September 1990, p. 3. 
672 Hanley et al., op. cit., pp. 146-147; World Bank, Hungary: Structural reforms for sustainable growth. 
673 The strong level of consensus amongst Hungarian policymakers in the early 1990s is summed up well by 
Joseph Stiglitz, when he reflecting on the ‘irony’ of the privatization (non-)debate: ‘There is a joke about the 
debate on the speed of privatization in Hungary, with those who advocate rapid privatization arguing that 
privatization must be achieved in five years, while those who advocate slow privatization urging that matters 
be taken calmly – privatization should take place over five years’. Here cited in id. Whither Socialism?, 
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Hungarian Economics, 1978-1996’. Working Paper No. 97/6, Frankfurt: Frankfurter Institut für Trans-
formationstudien, 1997; Drahokoupil, op. cit., p. 103; Greskovits, ‘Hungary’s post-communist development’, 
p. 131. 
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by providing Hungary with a US$ 1.6 billion stand-by-agreement, to be released in 
tranches subject to the Antall government’s ability to fulfil IMF-imposed criteria.674 In 
1992, the World Bank provided the Hungarian government with a loan of US$ 200 
million, in order to support ‘enterprise restructuring’.675 USAID also threw its financial 
and political power behind the privatisation process in the belief that it would demonstrate 
the advantages of US-led capitalism. In 1989, it established the Hungarian-American 
Enterprise Fund (HAEF) and endowed it with a budget of US$ 60 million (later raised to 
US$ 72.5 million), in order to promote free enterprise and private sector development in 
Hungary, while strengthening economic, political, and cultural ties between the US and 
Hungary.676 In the following years, similar funds were set up throughout CEE and the 
former Soviet Union, with a total budget of US$ 1.3 billion.677 To elicit support for 
privatisation amongst US and Hungarian elites, offices were set up in Washington and 
Budapest, while prominent businessmen, economists, and politicians, from both sides of 
the Atlantic, were drafted onto the HAEF’s Board of Directors. Amongst its members we 
find John C. Whitehead, an American banker and US Deputy Secretary of State during the 
Reagan administration (1985-1989), Zsigmond Járai, Minister of Finance in Orbán 
government (1998-2000) and later Governor of the MNB (2001-2006), and György 
Surányi, who, as we noted above, was one of the key ‘organic intellectuals’ of 
neoliberalism in Hungary. By the end of 1993, the HAEF had invested US$ 43.3 million in 
31 Hungarian companies, with most of the money going to the consumer goods and 
services sector, which, at the time, was ‘one of the fastest growing [sectors] in the 
Hungarian economy.’678 Companies like the Central European Franchising Group Rt., the 
exclusive Hungarian franchisor for famous US fast food brands like Pizza Hut, Kentucky 
Fried Chicken, and Dunkin’ Donuts, and FOTEX, Hungary’s leading private retail 
company at the time, were amongst the highest beneficiaries.679 In this way, the HAEF 
                                                
674 Hanley et al., ‘The State, International Agencies...’, p. 152. 
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 188 
ensured that Hungarian consumers and intermediaries had access to buy US goods and 
services. From the point of view of the US, the HAEF had two advantages: it accelerated 
the economic transformation of Hungary and returned a healthy profit of US$ 13 million 
by the time the programme was downscaled in 1999.680  
 
As a result, by 1992, important sectors of the Hungarian economy, including the brewing, 
food processing, and tobacco manufacturing industry, were already in the hands of 
Western multinational corporations. In 1991 alone, nine out of the ten largest privatisations 
went to Western-based multinational corporations.681 Yet, not all techniques used to 
transfer capital to the private sector were transparent and there were plenty examples of 
predatory business practices by multinational firms and their advisors in Hungary. One 
such example was the privatisation of Tungsram, the renowned Hungarian manufacturer of 
light bulbs and vacuum machines.682 In late 1989, General Electric acquired a majority 
stake in the company for US$ 150 million. At the time, the move was considered ‘a coup’ 
by the Financial Times, and for good reasons: it provided General Electric with an access 
to the Western European market (which it had lacked until then) and control of one of 
Hungary’ most valuable large manufacturing companies, together with a relatively cheap 
labour force – wages in Hungary were one-tenth of those in the US at the time – and an 
advanced research and development department.683 However, what was hailed a ‘success 
story’ of privatisation by General Electric’s top management became a painful adjustment 
for Tungsram’s workers. After General Electric bought the company the production 
process was ‘rationalised’ and reorganised, while workers were made redundant: 
Tungsram’s labour force shrank from 18,000 in 1990 to 9,300 in 1993. Similarly, an 
Austrian steel producer bought a major Hungarian steel plant only to close it down and 
capture its ex-Soviet market for the Austrian parent company.684  Over the years, similar 
examples of (hostile) takeovers by Western-based multinational firms, followed by 
‘downsizing’ and ‘rationalisation’, have abounded throughout the CEE and the former 
Soviet Union. 
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By 1992, the Antall government’s externally-oriented privatisation strategy was provoking 
increasing discontent within the ruling government coalition, as well as among ordinary 
Hungarians. Although privatisation contributed to the inflow of US$ 6 million in FDI 
between 1990-1993685, making Hungary the largest recipient of FDI in per capita terms in 
the region, this was not accompanied by economic growth and an improvement of living 
standards.686 On the contrary, the ‘transformational recession’ was deepening and ordinary 
Hungarians were witnessing a decline in living standards. As noted above, representatives 
of the FKGP objected to the fact that the government’s policy of channelling privatisation 
revenues to the repayment of Hungary’s foreign debt ruled out restitution of private 
property to original owners.687 There was also growing dissatisfaction within the ruling 
MDF, most notoriously expressed by Csurka, who lashed out against the ‘sell-out’ of state 
property to ‘foreigners’.688 Although Csurka was criticised for his far-right position by 
politicians from across the political spectrum, as well as the cultural and intellectual elite, 
he seemed to express a sentiment shared by many Hungarians at the time. According to 
one opinion poll, carried out in 1993, just after a large number of state owned enterprises 
had been sold to large transnational corporations, only 24 percent of Hungarians supported 
foreign-ownership of state-owned enterprises ‘under the condition that it would improve 
the state of the economy.’ Elsewhere in the region, opinion polls indicated higher support 
for foreign ownership, ranging from 64 percent in Lithuania, through 50 percent in the 
Czech Republic, to 48 percent in Poland.689   
 
 
Attempting to Build ‘National Capitalism’, 1993-1994 
Faced with dwindling popularity in the opinion polls and growing public opposition to 
foreign ownership of the economy, the national-conservative coalition changed course in 
1993-1994.690 The government imposed restrictions on foreign ownership in key economic 
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sectors, such as banking, energy, land, and telecommunications.691 At the same time, it 
implemented several policies promoting the domestic accumulation of capital. These 
measures included the effective re-centralisation of large enterprises in sectors such as 
chemicals, engineering, energy, metallurgy, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications, 
with the intention of maintaining long-term state control, promoting domestic ownership of 
productive capital through subsidized loans (through the introduction of a so called ‘E-
credit programme’), and encouraging the sale of state owned enterprises to Hungarian 
citizens through a specific voucher programme.692  
 
The new strategy led to a significant decrease in foreign investment, while most of the 
privatisation transactions benefited domestic actors.693 As a result, an embryonic domestic 
bourgeoisie was developing, although many of these were former members of the ‘late-
Kádárist technocracy’, who had merely reproduced their class power following the regime 
change.694 However, neoliberal economists in Hungary and members of the opposition in 
parliament criticised the government’s privatisation strategy for being ‘nationalist’ and 
argued that it discouraged foreign investors and jeopardised Hungary’s prospective EU 
membership. Similar concerns were voiced by the IMF, EBRD, and the EU.695 When these 
measures failed to convince the government to change track, all the above agencies cut off 
their financial assistance to Hungary. In the spring of 1994, the IMF cancelled the 
payments of a US$ 340 million stand-by-agreement, and later in the year the EBRD 
followed suit.696 As a result, Hungary’s credit rating declined, making it harder and more 
expensive for the country to obtain capital on international financial markets. Given its 
dependence on foreign capital to manage its current account deficit, Hungary could not 
afford to resist the pressures of international financial organisations. In the 1994 election 
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campaign, the MSZP promised to change the privatisation policies of the nationalist-
conservative government and bring an end to Hungary’s isolation within the ‘international 
community’. Ironically, its subsequent victory would mark an end to Hungary’s brief 
experiment with building a ‘national capitalism’ and a return to neoliberal orthodoxy.697 
 
 
Opening the Doors to Multinational Capital: Privatisation from 1995 to Present 
Following a period of inactivity, the Horn government re-established the privatisation 
strategy favouring cash sales to foreign corporations. However, this change in privatisation 
strategy cannot only be attributed to a change in government. Rather, as we described in 
the previous section, they were the outcome of growing external and internal pressures for 
neoliberal reform, in the wake of Hungary’s deepening financial crisis in 1994. In 1995, an 
agreement was reached with the IMF, which obliged the socialist-liberal government to 
speed up privatisation and to accept strict limits on the budget and current account deficits 
in exchange for a new US$ 264.2 million stand-by-agreement with the agency.698 The 
agreement also led the EBRD to release funds and invest in Hungary.699 Finally, the Horn 
government signed an agreement with the EU in 1995, in which it committed itself to 
introduce a set of sweeping market reforms, in particular with regard to the privatisation of 
banks, telecommunications, and utility companies, which had been objected by the 
previous government.700 Following the conclusion of negotiations with the EU, the Horn 
government passed a Privatisation Law, which eliminated any restrictions on foreign 
ownership of banks and other financial institutions, such as insurance companies and 
mutual funds.701 These changes heralded the beginning of what Gowan later described as a 
‘Mexican-style privatisation bonanza’, which turned out to be ‘unique to the region’.702 
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The Horn government’s embrace of externally-led privatisation led to a dramatic increase 
in cash sales, in particular to foreign investors: in just one year revenues from cash sales 
rose by more than 10 times in real terms, from approximately US$ 350 million in 1994 to 
US$ 3.6 billion in 1995, with sales to foreign investors accounting for more than 90 
percent of the total.703 International and regional bureaucratic institutions played a key role 
in promoting the privatisation process. For example, in 1995, the EBRD acquired minority 
ownership stakes in five of Hungary’s six main commercial banks. According to Hanley et 
al., this action served a dual purpose: ‘first, to inject capital for use in restructuring the 
banks’ operations, and, second, to send a signal to potential investors that the reform of the 
banking sector was proceeding as planned’.704  The strategy worked to perfection: by 1997, 
all except one of Hungary’s commercial banks had been privatised, with large European 
financial institutions gaining control of majority ownership rights.705 As a result, Hungary 
became a regional ‘leader’ in terms of privatisation. In 1995 alone, Hanley et al. write, 
‘foreign multinationals invested US$ 2 billion in Hungarian energy companies, acquiring 
majority ownership positions rights over all of Hungary’s electricity producers and 
distributors and all of Hungary’s gas distributors as well as minority ownership rights in 
MOL, Hungary’s state-owned gas producer.’706 Later that year, in another widely 
publicised privatisation deal, a consortium of two transnational corporations, Deutsche 
Telekom and Ameritech International, acquired a majority interest in MATÁV, the former 
state-owned telecommunications company, which alone accounted for more than 3 percent 
of Hungary’s GDP at the time.707 (At the time, MATÁV’s privatisation was the largest 
privatisation in the CEE region and the largest foreign investment in Hungary.) However, 
most of the revenues that arrived did not ‘trickle down’ into the Hungarian economy, but 
was used towards repaying the country’s foreign debt.708 Moreover, any protests against 
the wholesale privatisation of entire industries were either ignored or actively thwarted by 
the Horn government, for example by the introduction of specific articles, which 
prohibited the right to organise unions in the recently sold enterprises.709 
 
                                                
703 Hanley et al., ‘The State, International Agencies...’, p. 157. 
704 Ibid., pp. 158-159. 
705 EBRD, Transition Report 1998: Financial Sector in Transition, London: EBRD, 1998, pp. 22-38; van 
Elkan, ‘Financial Markets in Hungary’. 
706 Hanley et al., op. cit., p. 159. 
707 Financial Times, ‘Setting a Fast Pace for Hungary and Europe: Profile, MATAV’, 8 October 1999, p. 31. 
708 Drahokoupil, Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe. 
709 Imre Pozsgay and Tibor Polgár, A rendszerváltás (k)ára: nyílt párbeszéd a sorsfordító évtizedről, 
Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó, 2003, p. 120.  
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In summary then, contrary to the claims of neoliberal economists, the privatisation process 
in Hungary did not lead to increasing competition in the Hungarian economy, but rather 
the concentration and centralisation of key sectors of the Hungarian economy – albeit now 
under the domination of large, Western-based multinational corporations, instead of 
domestic, ‘socialist’ enterprises, as during the pre-1989 period –, as well as the enrichment 
of a small group of Hungarians. According to one estimate cited by Hanley et al., ‘by the 
late 1990s, foreign capital controlled two-thirds of the economic assets in the 
manufacturing sector, 90 percent in telecommunications, 60 percent in energy production 
and distribution, and 70 percent in finance.’710 In fact, as a recent report on the investment 
climate in Hungary admitted: ‘Ownership in Hungary is considerably more concentrated 
than in the U.S. It is common for one or two stockholders to have a controlling stake in 
even large corporations. Crossholdings are common and the independence of directors 
sometimes difficult to establish.’711 Having said this, it is important to point out that the 
privatisation of the Hungarian economy was part of a wider process of more direct, albeit 
uneven inter-capitalist competition on the world scale, as European capital (and their 
respective governments) tried to find new sources of capital accumulation, in order to 
remain competitive with the US, Japan, and a rapidly emerging China.712  
 
While neoliberal economists have stressed the ‘success stories’ of privatisation in Hungary 
and elsewhere in the CEE, it is important to remember that there were also many examples 
of corruption and shady business practices, as both consultants and local government 
officials had abundant openings for deal-making based on ‘insider information’. There was 
huge public anger directed at the corruption of ‘insiders’, such as high-ranking officials 
associated with the State Privatisation and Holding Company (Állami Privatizációs és 
Vagyonkezelő Rt., ÁPV). The most (in)famous case dates to 1996, when Márta Tocsik, a 
lawyer entrusted by the ÁPV to mediate with local municipalities about the privatisation of 
their lands and properties, was discovered to receive a more than healthy ‘success fee’ of 
HUF 804 million as part of the profit arising from the completed transactions. The 
revelations quickly developed into a full blown political scandal when it was discovered 
that individuals associated with the socialist-liberal government also profited from the 
transactions. The ‘Tocsik affair’ led to widespread public anger against the 
                                                
710 MTI Econews 1997, here cited in Hanley et al., ‘The State, International Agencies...’, p. 159. 
711 Dimireva, ‘Hungary Investment Climate 2009’.  
712 Harman, Zombie Capitalism, pp. 238-241.  
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mismanagement of state-owned property and suspiciously funded political parties, and 
resulted in the sacking of the entire ÁPV board, as well as the resignation of the Minister 
for Privatisation, Tamás Suchman, a close ally of Prime Minister Horn.713 A criminal 
procedure was raised against in 1996 against Tocsik and a number of high-ranking officials 
at the ÁPV, as well as an MSZP politician and a businessman linked to the SZDSZ. 
Following lengthy deliberations, the Supreme Court, in April 2003, fined Tocsik HUF 
400,000 for ‘counterfeiting private documents’, but acquitted her and the others standing 
trial due to a ‘lack of evidence’. However, in May 2008, Tocsik lost a civil procedure case 
and was demanded by the Supreme Court to pay back HUF 801 million.714    
 
 
The Pivotal Role of Foreign Investment 
The second distinctive feature of the neoliberal regime of accumulation that developed in 
Hungary after 1989 is the outstanding weight of foreign capital in the economy. According 
to neoliberal economists, in Hungary and abroad, foreign investment would be ‘the engine 
of growth’ in ‘transition economies’.715 This claim was predicated on the argument that by 
opening up to international trade and foreign capital, the ex-state capitalist economies of 
the region would gain an injection of financial capital, as well as an automatic transfer of 
western technology, managerial know-how, and organisation methods that was ‘necessary 
to overcome the dismal economic legacy of the past 40 years.’716 Moreover, neoliberal 
accounts emphasised the positive role of foreign investment in bringing about a 
competitive stimulus that, similar to a form of economic Darwinism, would force all firms 
to restructure both their management and production activities.717 Over the years, this 
position has been reiterated by neoliberal economists, international and regional 
bureaucratic institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank, OECD, EU, and EBRD, as well as 
the representatives of hegemonic Western states. For example, in a speech at the 
                                                
713 Inzelt, ‘White collar crime...’, pp. 369-370; Kéri, A rendszerváltás krónikája, 1988-2009, p. 65; Mocsáry, 
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714 For examples of corruption in other CEE countries, see Janine R. Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The 
Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. 
715 Csaba, The New Political Economy of Emerging Europe; Gábor Hunya, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and 
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Making Central European Industries Competitive, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1999; Lipton and 
Sachs, op. cit..  
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Collegium Budapest in 1995, the US ambassador to Hungary neatly summed up the 
consensus view on foreign investment after the transition:  
I have often been asked why there isn’t a new Marshall Plan to help Central and Eastern 
Europe. Well, there is – it is here – and it is called private foreign investment … Foreign 
investment creates jobs, enhances productivity, generates economic growth, and raises the 
standard of living. It brings new technology, new management techniques, new markets, new 
products, and better ways of doing business.718   
 
In the early 1990s, claims such as this became accepted as ‘common sense’ amongst 
Hungarian policymakers. The primary reason why policymakers decided to follow this 
strategy was, as we noted above, the country’s high indebtedness and the political decision 
to pursue unconditional debt service.719 Secondly, it was also hoped that opening up the 
Hungarian economy to international trade and foreign capital would allow for a fast 
incorporation with the global economy (and the economic success and higher living 
standards that came with this process), while at the same time accelerate the country’s 
geopolitical reintegration with the West.720 As G.M. Tamás recalls, some politicians in 
Budapest even held more fanciful dreams, and believed that the arrival of foreign capital 
would help transform the country into the ‘financial hub’ of CEE, beating neighbouring 
Prague, Warsaw, and Vienna in this race.721 Third, and finally, as Drahokoupil argues, 
openness to foreign investors was also well received by ‘a significant sector of the 
Hungarian managerial elite’, who believed that ‘FDI was needed for Hungarian industry to 
develop … [and] that their career prospects would be better served under a foreign 
owner.’722 
 
In order to attract foreign capital to invest in the country, the Hungarian state developed a 
wide-ranging investment attraction and support scheme. As we noted in Chapter 3, initial 
steps in this direction had already been taken before the formal transition to a free market 
economy and democracy in 1989. Legislation permitting the creation of joint ventures had 
                                                
718 Blinken 1995, here cited in Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 193. 
719 Drahokoupil, Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 102-103; Christopher 
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Hungary’, Competition & Change, 2007, Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 182; Fink, ‘FDI-led Growth and Rising Polarisa-
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721 Gáspár M. Tamás, ‘Interview – Hungary: “Where We Went Wrong”’, International Socialism, 2009, No. 
123, p. 36. See also Andor, op. cit., pp. 82-83. 
722 Drahokoupil, op. cit., p. 103. See also Greskovits, ‘Hungary’s post-communist development’, p. 131. 
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been introduced as early as 1972 and a scheme for industrial free trade zones (IFTZs) was 
set up by the Kádár regime in 1982, while the 1988 Law on Foreign Investment provided 
foreign investors with equal treatment and the right to repatriate profits. Following the 
regime change, these measures were refined and deepened by successive governments in 
Budapest, to encompass the provision of generous fiscal incentives (for example, foreign 
investors were offered tax holidays, reductions, or total exemption from income tax over a 
period of ten years if they invested a pre-determined amount of capital), state subsidies for 
investment in research and development (R&D), and various and infrastructural measures, 
such as the construction and maintenance of export processing zones (EPZs), IFTZs and 
industrial parks.723 In order to lobby existing investors and communicate with prospective 
investors about benefits of investing in Hungary, the Hungarian Investment and Trade 
Development Agency (ITDH)724 was established in 1993. When these measures where not 
sufficient to lure foreign investors to the country, governments in Budapest also made 
individual deals with foreign investors, guaranteeing them monopoly positions and above-
average profit rates.725 This was, for example, the case with the privatisation of the public 
utilities sector, where the Horn government guaranteed prospective buyers the provision of 
an annual profit rate of 8 percent.726 From 1996 and onwards, the incentives scheme 
underwent significant change (in part due to the criticism raised against the ‘Bokros 
Package’), and measures were taken to increase the benefits of foreign investment for the 
local economy. The new incentives scheme became less generous and more targeted 
towards attracting investment towards export-oriented manufacturing. At same time, 
governments in Budapest also attempted to create stronger linkages between transnational 
corporations and Hungarian suppliers.727 Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s and early 
                                                
723 Drahokoupil, Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 49; Dörrenbächer, 
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2000s, Hungary was considered a regional ‘leader’ in terms of the generosity of its 
incentives scheme offered to foreign investors.728 
 
Multinational capital was attracted to Hungary and other CEE economies for a variety of 
reasons. In the early 1990s, foreign investors were largely attracted by the prospect of 
acquiring the ‘crown jewels’ of these economies. However, once the privatisation bonanza 
receded other incentives took over. On the one hand, the combination of ‘relatively low 
labour costs’729, together with ‘an attractive business climate’ (including protection of 
private property and the right to expatriate profits, low or flat tax rates, and the provision 
of state subsidies for investment in research and development, etc.), geographical 
proximity to the core capitalist states of the EU (and, after 2004, EU membership), and 
higher than average profit rates in a number of sectors of the economy, made the CEE 
economies a lucrative region for capital flows from advanced economies.730 As The 
Economist mused in 2005,  
investors … love the new [EU] members for their low wages, high productivity and simple 
taxes. Build a factory here, and you get EU market access at far less than average EU costs. 
According to the Boston Consulting Group, if you want to sell refrigerators or cars in 
western Europe, it can be cheaper to make them in Poland than in China.731  
 
On the other hand, the flow of capital to CEE enabled capitalists in the core economies 
to spur a ‘race to the bottom’ by pressuring workers’ in their countries to accept lower 
wages and inferior working conditions. According to a recent study by the Research on 
Money and Finance (RMF) network, the great beneficiary of these policies was German 
capital, who managed to hold down wages and working conditions (in the 1990s German 
wages rose cumulatively by 10 percent less than the European average) and thereby 
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increase exports and profits.732 As the report goes on to note, the big balance of trade 
surplus that Germany accumulated was subsequently ‘recycled through foreign direct 
investment and German bank lending to peripheral countries and beyond.’733 As a matter 
of fact, by 2001, Germany was the largest investor in Hungary, with German capital 
accounting for 26 percent of all FDI into Hungary, and German banks were one of the 
main owners of the Hungarian banking system.734  
 
Despite these measures and contrary to the optimistic forecasts of neoliberal economists, 
inflows of foreign capital to Hungary and other ‘transition economies’ were, by all 
accounts, relatively meagre in the first half of the 1990s. However, from the mid-1990s 
FDI inflows began to soar and from 1996 onwards total FDI stock as percentage of GDP in 
CEE surpassed the world average. As the table below indicates, Hungary became one of 
the most favoured destinations of foreign capital in the region. The lion share (78.8 
percent) of the foreign capital flowing into region between 1990 and 2004 went to the four 
so-called ‘Visegrád states’ (V4) of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
Within this group, Hungary received the second largest share (following Poland) of total 
FDI inflows to post-Soviet CEE in the period between 1990 and 1998. Almost one-third 
(31 percent) of all FDI inflows into the region went to Hungary. In terms of country of 
origin of inward FDI flows, as well as Hungary’s major trading partners, it can be seen that 
the country’s neoliberal regime of accumulation is predominantly European in orientation. 
In 2003, about 80 percent of the FDI stock in Hungary came from transnational 
corporations with headquarters in the EU, about 80 percent of Hungary’s exports and 70 
percent of its imports originated from the EU.735 Germany is the largest investor in 
Hungary, as well as its largest trading partner. By 2001, German capital accounted for 26 
percent of overall FDI into Hungary, followed by the Netherlands (23 percent), Austria (12 
percent), and the United States (8 percent).736 The growing influence of German capital on 
the Hungarian economy can be seen as reflection of wider economic and geopolitical shifts 
in Europe and indeed globally.737 
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733 Ibid., p. 4. 
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Table 5.3. FDI inflows and stocks in post-Soviet CEE economies, 1990-2004738 
 
FDI 
inflows, 
1990 
(US$ 
millions, 
current 
prices) 
FDI 
inflows, 
1990-
2004 
(US$ 
millions, 
current 
prices) 
Percentage 
share of 
FDI 
inflows to 
EU-10 
total, 1990-
1998 
Share of 
FDI 
flows to 
EU-10 
total, 
1999-
2004 
FDI 
stocks, 
2004 
(US$ 
millions) 
FDI 
stocks/capita, 
2004 (US$) 
FDI 
stocks/GDP, 
2004 
(in percent) 
Bulgaria 4 10,530 2.0 6.3 7,569 1,298 39.98 
Czech 
Republica 
- 43,044 14.2 22.7 56,415 5,613 50.24 
Estoniab - 5,064 2.2 2.4 9,530 7,449 83.60 
Hungary 554 42,401 31.0 13.6 60,328 6,089 60.40 
Latviac - 3,816 2.3 1.5 4,493 1,953 32.97 
Lithuaniad - 4,567 2.1 2.1 6,389 1,862 28.20 
Poland 88 68,180 32.6 30.7 61,427 2,273 36.24 
Romania 0 17,495 6.0 9.1 18,009 938 27.03 
Slovakiae - 17,606 5.8 9.3 14,501 5,209 51.87 
Sloveniaf - 4,580 1.6 2.3 4,962 3,799 22.43 
Total 646 217,283 100 100 243,623   
 
 
The inflow of multinational capital brought drastic changes to the Hungarian economy. 
On the one hand, it contributed to a rapid reorientation of Hungary’s foreign trade, away 
from the former Soviet bloc economies towards the EU. Between 1989 and 1991 the share 
of Hungarian exports going to Soviet bloc markets decreased from 41 to 19 percent of 
GDP, while the share of exports going to the advanced capitalist economies of the OECD 
increased to 70 percent of GDP.739 These levels have become entrenched since then: by 
2004 more than 80 percent of Hungary’s trade was with ‘non-transition economies’.740 On 
                                                
738 Sources: László Csaba, ‘Between Transition and EU Accession: Hungary at the Millennium’, Europe-
Asia Studies, 2000, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 805-827; Martin Myant and Jan Drahokoupil, Transition Economies: 
Political Economy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2011, p. 279; 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005, New York, NY: UNCTAD, 2005, p. 308.  
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b Figures for Estonia are for the period, 1992-2004. 
c Figures for Latvia are for the period, 1992-2004. 
d Figures for Lithuania are for the period, 1992-2004. 
e Figures for Slovakia are for the period, 1993-2004. 
f Figures for Slovenia are for the period, 1992-2004. 
739 Jeffries, Socialist economies and the transition to the market, p. 428. For a more detailed analyses, see 
Paul Brenton and Daniel Gros, ‘Trade Reorientation and Recovery in Transition Economies’, Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy, 1997, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 65-76; János Gács, ‘Output decline and the demise of the 
CMEA and the USSR: the case of Hungary’, Empirica, 1994, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 83-104. 
740 EBRD, Transition Report 2004: Infrastructure, London: EBRD.  
 200 
the other hand, it contributed to the introduction of new manufacturing activities and 
techniques that had hitherto been nonexistent or underdeveloped in Hungary, while the 
proportion of low-technology industries declined significantly.741 One such example is the 
car manufacturing industry. During state capitalism, the importance of the car industry had 
been negligible in Hungary (although the country was an important supplier of trucks and 
buses to the CMEA-market with domestic brands, such as Ikarus and Rába). However, 
following the regime change Hungary established itself as a ‘regional leader’ of the car 
industry, ‘as global car makers sought to take advantage of cheaper labour and sell to 
consumers eager for a modern motoring experience.’742 In the 1990s, three global car 
manufacturers – Audi, Opel, and Suzuki – established car assembly plants in Hungary.743 
The biggest investor is Audi, which has built the largest engine manufacturing plant of 
Europe (third largest in the world) in Győr, Northwestern Hungary, investing more than € 
3.3 billion until 2007.744 The presence of major car manufacturers has contributed to the 
arrival of a number of component producers, who supply multinational corporations based 
in Hungary and other parts of the firms’ networks throughout the world. For example, in 
2006 the Korean Hankook Tire established its first European plant in Dunaújváros, located 
in central Hungary, which will produce 10 million tires annually and employ 1,500 
Hungarian workers. As a result of these changes, the car industry became one of the pillars 
of the Hungarian economy. In 2007, Hungary produced 290,235 passenger cars and 3,566 
commercial vehicles (an increase of more than 50 percent from the year before). By then, 
the industry provided jobs for around 110,000 workers, including a number of highly 
skilled workers.745 The revenues from the sector amounted to € 15.4 billion, nearly 15.5 
                                                
741 Andrea Szalavetz, Structural change – structural competitiveness, Working Paper 155, Budapest: Institute 
of World Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2005, p. 6; János Gács, ‘Structural change and 
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2013); Eddy Kester, ‘Manufacturing: Hungary’s auto sector quietly goes on growing’, Financial Times, 6 
October 2011.  
743 In 2008 Mercedez-Benz became the fourth global car manufacturer to open an assembly plant in Hungary, 
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the new Mercedes-Benz Class A and B cars. The investment, which cost € 800 million, provides work for 
some 2,500 workers producing an expected 100,000 cars annually, was opened on 29 March 2012.  
744 HITA, ‘The Automotive Industry in Hungary: Engine of Growth’, Hungarian Investment and Trade 
Agency (HITA), 2007. Available on: http://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/5914885/engine-of-growth 
(last accessed on: 31 July 2013). 
745 ACEA, op. cit.; EY, ‘The Central and Eastern European Automotive Market’, 2013. Available on: 
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percent of GDP, 19.4 percent of all industrial production, and about 20 percent of 
Hungary’s exports.746  
 
In some cases, domestic capitalists also benefited from the arrival of foreign capital. For 
example, VIDEOTON, one of the flagships of Hungarian electronics production under 
‘actually existing socialism’, managed to establish itself as the 30 most important 
electronic manufacturing services (EMS) providers in the world,747 supplying transitional 
corporations such as Bosch and Valeowith manufacturing products, engineering services 
and workers from its nine different locations in Hungary, as well as one location each in 
Bulgaria (Stara Zagora) and Ukraine (Mukachevo).748 The firm’s co-CEO Ottó Sinkó 
characterised VIDEOTON’s strategy as follows: ‘Downsize radically, stop developing new 
products, and focus on labour-intensive manufacturing to serve a hungry crop of 
multinational investors’.749 As Bohle and Greskovits have noted, ‘Such services facilitate 
what TNCs [transnational corporations] and their foreign suppliers consider crucial to 
operate efficiently in Hungary: flexibility. Such arrangements can produce at minor fixed 
costs and flexibly react to market changes.’750 While workers bear the burden of flexibility 
through precarious forms of employment, this business model has been highly rewarding 
for the company and its top management. In 2007, VIDEOTON recorded an operating 
profit of around HUF 7 billion,751 while its President and CEO Gábor Széles, was one of 
the richest men in Hungary.752  
 
For supporters of neoliberalisation, in Hungary and abroad, figures and stories like these 
confirm the positive impact of foreign investment and transnational corporations on the 
                                                
746 Based on data from ACEA, ‘Country Profile: Hungary’. 
747 MMI, ‘The MMI Top 50 for 2012’, Manufacturing Market Insider (MMI), 2012. Available on: 
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751 Videoton, op. cit.. 
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Echo TV television channel. See Figyelő, ‘A Széles birodalom’, 9 October 2005. Available on: 
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Hungarian political economy.753 This view is also shared by some institutionalists, such as 
Bohle and Greskovits, who have recently argued that foreign capital has contributed to a 
form of Wirtschaftswunder in Hungary and other V4 states.754 However, a closer look at 
the overall structure of the Hungarian economy reveals a number of problems with 
Hungary’s ‘FDI-led growth model’.  
 
To begin with, while the above figures might reflect well on Hungary in terms of its ability 
to capture a relatively large share of foreign investment inflows to CEE, it is important to 
put the example of Hungary and other CEE economies in a pan-European and global 
perspective. The table below provides a sober antidote to those overly optimistic accounts 
arguing that CEE economies to ‘catching up’ in terms of FDI. As we can see, by 2006, the 
three largest economies of the EU – Germany, France, and the UK – accounted for nearly 
half (44 percent) of total FDI stocks in the EU, whereas the three strongest CEE economies 
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) accounted for less than 5 percent between 
them. This pattern is also reflected in the comparatively small share of total FDI flows to 
the EU that these countries received. Thus, in terms of capturing a share of global FDI 
flows, Hungary remained very much on the periphery of Europe.  
 
Table 5.4. FDI stocks and inflows in CEE accession countries in a comparative 
perspective755 
FDI stocks as percentage of EU total 
FDI inflows as 
percentage of 
EU total 
 
1990 2000 2006 2006 
Germany 15 12.5 9 8 
France 12 12 14 15 
United 
Kingdom 27 20 21 26 
Czech Republic 0.2 0.9 1.4 1.1 
Hungary 0.07 1.0 1.5 1.1 
Poland 0.02 1.6 2.0 2.6 
 
 
                                                
753 György Csáki and Gábor Karsai (eds.), The Evolution of the Hungarian Economy, 1848-2000, Vol. III, 
Hungary: From Transition to Integration, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 226-261; 
Kornai, ‘The Great Transformation of Central Eastern Europe’. 
754 Bohle and Greskovits, Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery. 
755 Sources: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005, pp. 303; 308, Table B1 and B2; Hardy, Poland’s New 
Capitalism, p. 83, Table 5.3. 
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A second problem with the Hungarian model is that it is heavily dependent on foreign 
capital and export-led growth. The signs of this are omnipresent. In the first decade after 
the transition, the number of transnational corporations located in Hungary grew more than 
fourfold, from 6,000 in 1990 to 26,645 in 2000.756 By then, transnational firms employed 
more than 28 percent of the total workforce.757 Transnational corporations controlled major 
export industries (especially in the food and car manufacturing industries), utilities, and 
financial services.758 As the table below indicates, the influence of foreign capital was 
particularly strong in the banking sector. 
 
Table 5.5. Penetration ratios of majority-owned foreign bank affiliates, 2001759 
CEE* 
Percentage of 
banking industry 
controlled by 
foreign banks 
Developed 
economies* 
Percentage of 
banking industry 
controlled by 
foreign banks 
Estonia 98.9 New Zealand 99.1 
Czech Republic 90.0 United Kingdom 46.0 
Hungary 88.8 United States 20.2 
Slovakia 85.5 Norway 19.2 
Lithuania 78.2 Portugal 17.7 
Poland 68.7 Australia 17.0 
 
 
Moreover, while foreign capital is monopolistic in many parts of the Hungarian 
economy, this problem is further aggravated by what Szalai has described as the 
‘monocultural character’ of foreign capital, in the sense that the activities of transnational 
corporations are primarily based towards the needs of Western European markets (in 
particular Germany, which as we noted above, was Hungary’s largest trading partner).760 
According to estimates by Károly Loránt, the profit extracted by transnational corporations 
from the Hungarian economy amounted to 6-7 percent of GDP.761 This has led some 
                                                
756 Fink, ‘FDI-led Growth and Rising Polarisations in Hungary’, p. 53. 
757 Ibid. 
758 Csáki and Karsai, The Evolution of the Hungarian Economy, p. 234; Drahokoupil, Globalization and the 
State in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 55. 
759 Source: Drahokoupil, op. cit., p. 55. 
* Top six in ranking. 
* Top six in ranking. 
760 Szalai, ‘A rendszerváltástól a rendszerválságig’. 
761 Károly Loránt, ‘A Magyarország eladósódásával kapcsolatos legfontosabb tudnivalok’ (unpublished 
manuscript), 2008.  
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scholars of the transformation to describe the Hungarian economy as a ‘dual economy’, 
characterised by a weak domestic sector and a strong and dynamic transnational sector.762  
 
Third, and finally, in addition to the dependence on foreign capital in practically all 
economic sectors of Hungary, the Hungarian model has also strengthened regional 
inequalities. Polarisations between the industrialised Western and ‘backward’ Eastern parts 
of Hungary, as well as between the urban Budapest and the larger regional centres on the 
one hand and the rural villages and small and medium sized towns on the other, have 
existed historically in Hungary, dating as far back as the establishment of Christianity in 
Hungary in the 11th century.763 However, these polarisations have deepened following the 
regime change, as a result of neoliberal restructuring and the accompanying decline of 
agriculture and ‘socialist’ industry. The Western and Central regions of Hungary have 
closer (and better) connections with Western Europe, a modern infrastructure, and a more 
educated labour force, as well as, in general, a higher level of development. Conversely, 
the underdeveloped regions of Eastern and Southern Hungary are still suffering from 
‘socialist legacies’, characterised by ‘a dominance of heavy industry and agriculture.’764 
This has led to a strong concentration of foreign investment. According to official 
statistics, the western and central regions received 85 percent of all the FDI inflows to 
Hungary between 1990 and 1998, although they only accounted for 32 percent of the 
country’s territory and 49 percent of its population.765 Since then, these trends have large 
remained unchanged. As a result, more than three quarters of all FDI inflows to Hungary 
were still located in Central and Western Hungary by 2004.766 And even though the 
underdeveloped regions of Eastern and Southern Hungary have been able to increase their 
share of FDI since the late 1990s, empirical studies have shown that most of the foreign 
                                                
762 Andor, Eltévedt éllovas; Zoltán Pogátsa, ‘Hungary: From Star Transition Student to Backsliding Member 
State’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 2009, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 597-613; Szalai, ‘Morális 
krizis vagy rendszerválság?’ and ‘A rendszerváltástól a rendszerválságig’. 
763 Dörrenbächer, ‘Challenges...’ , p. 184; Fink, ‘FDI-led Growth and Rising Polarisations in Hungary’, p. 65. 
764 Fink, op. cit., p. 66. See also Dörrenbächer, op. cit., p. 184; Károly Fazekas, The Impact of Foreign Direct 
Investment Inflows on Regional Labour Markets in Hungary, Working Paper 2000/8, Budapest: Labour 
Research Department, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Social Sciences, 2000, pp. 1-35. 
765 Fazekas, op. cit.; Fink, op. cit., pp. 65-66; OECD, OECD Reviews of Foreign Direct Investment; Petr 
Pavlinek, ‘Regional development implications for foreign direct investment in Central Europe’, European 
Urban and Regional Studies, 2004, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 51. 
766 Dörrenbächer, op. cit., p. 184. 
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capital that has arrived has been in low-paid and less-skilled work.767 Empirical studies 
have observed similar trends elsewhere in CEE.768  
 
 
Labour: A Heavy Adjustment 
If capital (both ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’) has been the main ‘winner’ of Hungary’s double 
transformation, workers and the poor have been the ‘losers’ of this process. The table 
below shows the profound impact of neoliberal restructuring on the Hungarian labour 
market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
767 Judit Hamar, ‘Regional Effects of FDI-inflows in Hungary’, Acta Oeconomica, 1999, Vol.  50, No. 1-2, 
pp. 169-190; János P. Kiss, ‘Industrial Mass Production and Regional Differentiation in Hungary’, European 
Urban and Regional Studies,  2001, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 321-328; Péter Serenyi, ‘Rising in the East’, Business 
Central Europe, March 2001.  
768 For the Czech Republic, see Petr Pavlinek, ‘Foreign direct investment in the Czech Republic’, The 
Professional Geographer, 1998, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 71-85 and ‘Regional development‘, op. cit. For Poland, 
see Boleslav Domanski, ‘Poland: labour and the relocation of manufacturing from the EU’, in CEE countries 
in EU companies’ strategies of industrial restructuring and relocation, edited by Grigor Gradev, Brussels: 
European Trade Union Institute, 2001, pp. 21-49. 
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Table 5.6. Employment in Hungary, by activity, 1990-2004769 
 
Total employment by activity (in thousands)  
1990 1995 2000 2004 
Percentage 
change in 
employment, 
1990-2004* 
Agriculture, 
hunting, forestry, 
and fishing 
906.7 295.1 251.7 204.9 - 77.4 
Mining and 
quarrying N/A 34.0 19.2 14.2 - 58.2 
Manufacturing 1,495.7a 850.2 931.3 893.9 - 40.3 
Construction 336.4 217.3 267.8 308.7 - 8.2 
Trade and repair 578.2b 459.9 540.9 545.7 - 5.6 
Hotels and 
restaurants N/A 116.6 133.3 148.8 + 27.6 
Transport, 
storage, and 
communication 
427.0 319.6 311.8 296.1 - 30.1 
Finance N/A 82.2 83.7 80.1 - 2.5 
Real estate, 
renting, and 
business 
N/A 130.6 204.6 272.5 + 108.6 
Public 
administration 
and defence 
N/A 318.1 299.0 298.8 - 6.1 
Education N/A 335.4 317.8 333.0 - 0.7 
Health and social 
work N/A 231.4 241.7 269.4 + 16.4 
Total men and 
women 4,980.1 3,678.8 3,849.1 3,900.4 - 21.6 
 
 
As illustrated by the figures, the 1990s and the early 2000s was a period of dramatic 
change for Hungarian workers. Between 1990 and 1995, more than 1.3 million jobs were 
shed as a result of the collapse of industry and agriculture. Within the same period, the 
official unemployment rate increased from 0.5 percent to 12 percent of the labour force.770 
All transformation economies, with the exception of the Czech Republic, experienced a 
similar growth of double-digit unemployment. At the end of 1994, around 2.8 million 
people were unemployed in Poland (an unemployment rate of 16 percent), while in 
Slovakia 370,000 people were registered as unemployed (14.6 percent), and in Bulgaria the 
same figure was around 500,000 people (13 percent of the working population).771 Similar 
                                                
769 Source: author’s calculations based on data from KSH. 
* Where data for 1990 is unavailable, the figure indicates changes in the period between 1995 and 2004. 
a Figure includes people working in mining and quarrying. 
b Figure includes people working in hotels and restaurants.  
770 Andor, Hungary on the Road to the European Union, Table 1, p. 175. 
771 Ibid., p. 88. 
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to other countries in the region undergoing neoliberalisation, Hungary had thus formally 
created what Marx called ‘an industrial reserve army of labour’,772 the effect of which, as 
Harvey argues, was ‘to undermine the power of labour and permit capitalists to make easy 
profits thereafter.’773 
 
In Hungary, the three sectors that suffered the biggest decline in employment were 
agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. Between 1990 and 2004, the number of people 
earning a living from the land fell from 18.2 percent to 5.2 percent of the working 
population, while more than 620,000 jobs were lost in mining and manufacturing, as a 
result of neoliberal restructuring. While the decline in manufacturing (40.3 percent) in this 
period is noticeable, still almost one-in-five of the working population worked in 
manufacturing in 2004, which is a relatively high figure compared to most advanced 
capitalist economies. For example, in the US manufacturing accounted for 46 percent of 
total US profits in 1999, but only 14 percent of the labour force.774 Having said this, the 
dominant trend in the Hungarian labour market is the expansion of jobs in the services 
sector. As Table 5.1 shows, the number of people working in hotels and restaurants 
increased by 32,200 between 1995 and 2004 (an increase of 27.6 percent). The biggest 
growth is the more than 108 percent increase in real estate, renting, and business, which 
grew from 130,600 jobs to 272,500 jobs – increasing its overall share of the labour force 
from 3.5 percent to 7 percent. In total, the number of people employed in the services 
sector accounted for 55.8 percent of the total working population in 2004. While this figure 
is largely in line with other CEE economies, it is significantly lower than averages in most 
advanced capitalist states.775  
 
Eventually, the Hungarian economy returned to growth in the second half of the 1990s, 
and the unemployment rate eventually stabilised around 6-7 percent in the early 2000s. 
However, this seemingly positive figure does not reveal a number of distinct features of the 
Hungarian labour market. To begin with, as Fink points out, ‘economic growth in Hungary 
has by no means been employment-intensive.’776 As a result, underemployment remained 
chronically high; in 2006 Hungary’s employment rate stood at 57.3 percent, well below the 
                                                
772 Marx, Capital. Volume 1, pp. 781-794. 
773 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p. 59. 
774 Endnotes and Aaron Benanav, ‘Misery and Debt: On the Logic and History of Surplus Populations and 
Surplus Capital’, Endnotes, No. 2, Glasgow: Benn & Bain, 2010, p. 37, fn. 28. 
775 Source: Eurostat Statistical Database; Dunn, Global Political Economy, p. 229, Table 11.1. 
776 Fink, ‘FDI-led Growth and Rising Polarisations in Hungary’, p. 51. 
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EU-15 average of 66.1 percent.777 Second, it also masks important generational and 
regional disparities. Similar to many other countries, unemployment among young people, 
including graduates, has been increasing in the 1990s and 2000s. In 2006, youth 
unemployment stood at 19.1 percent (up from 11.9 percent in 2000), and was more than 
twice as much as the national average rate of unemployment (7.5 percent). However, this 
figure was still relatively favourable in comparison with many other European countries – 
in the same year, the youth unemployment rate was 22 percent in France, 25 percent in 
Greece, 29.8 percent in Poland. In fact, amongst the advanced capitalist economies, it was 
only significantly lower in Germany (13.8 percent), Japan (8 percent), and the United 
States (10.5 percent).778 There are also stark regional polarisations in unemployment, with 
the official unemployment rate rarely exceeding 5-6 percent in Budapest and Northwestern 
Hungary, while it was not uncommon that unemployment in the Northeast and Southern 
parts of the country stood at 25 percent (and in some cases even higher). According to a 
report by Eurequal, working class towns in Northern Hungary, where much of the 
country’s heavy industry and mining had been concentrated prior to 1989, were 
particularly badly hit by the ‘transformational recession’ in the 1990s.779 In Borsod-Abaúj-
Zemplén county, located in Northern Hungary and once considered ‘the Ruhr area of 
Hungary’, official unemployment stood at 20.4 percent in 2000 (the highest in the 
country).780 Third, and finally, unemployment also has an ethnic and gender dimension in 
Hungary. Neoliberal restructuring had catastrophic consequences for Hungary’s Roma 
population, which is the country’s largest ethnic minority accounting for 3.2 percent of the 
population in 2011.781 The employment rate of the Roma dropped by more than half 
between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, from 75 to 30 percent.782 In 1997, Martin 
Kovats, a British researcher on Roma politics, painted the following dramatic picture of the 
situation: 
The last ten years have been a disaster for the majority of Hungary’s Roma population. Most 
of those who had work have become unemployed, and young people coming through are 
                                                
777 Source: Eurostat Statistical Database, Employment (main characteristics and rates). Available on: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do;jsessionid=9ea7d07d30d7886cbc02ead44
ba589e9ce67dfbfa30d.e34MbxeSaxaSc40LbNiMbxeNbx8Oe0.  
778 Source: Eurostat Statistical Database, Unemployment rate by sex and age groups. Available on: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do.  
779 Eurequal, The State of Inequality in the Central and Eastern Europe: Desk Research on Hungary, Oxford: 
Eurequal, 2006, pp. 21-22. 
780 Source: KSH Statistical Database. 
781 KSH, Hungary Population Census 2011. Available on: 
http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tablak_demografia (last accessed on: 11 December 2013).  
782 Fóti, Alleviating Poverty..., p. 21. 
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denied opportunities. Half-hearted government policies to improve the social and economic 
position of the Roma have failed to halt the rapid rise in Roma poverty. Neither have they 
addressed poverty-related problems such as falling standards of education, anxiety, poor 
health, crime, prostitution, etc. The scale of problems are mounting and they have to be 
addressed if Hungary is to make any long-term social, political or economic progress.783 
 
The situation has hardly improved since. Many Roma people continue to face 
discrimination in society and live in impoverished conditions resembling those described 
by Charles Dickens in Oliver Twist.784   
 
The neoliberal restructuring of the Hungarian economy also came at a high social cost. 
Throughout CEE and the former Soviet Union, transition-associated adjustments 
contributed to a ‘transformational recession’, whose effects even the World Bank admitted 
was ‘comparable to that of developed countries during the Great Recession, and for most 
of them it was much worse’.785 In Hungary, economic output measured in GDP per capita 
terms only returned to its 1989 level in 1999, but this was still considered a (relative) 
‘success’ by the proponents of neoliberal reform, bearing in mind that many other 
‘transition economies’ only reached their 1989 level by 2002.786 Even by 2005, countries 
like Russia and Ukraine had still not recovered their 1989 levels of GDP per capita, while 
some other countries, like Moldova, were still 50 percent below their 1989 levels of GDP 
per capita.787 But by then ordinary citizens had paid a heavy burden for the slump. 
Between 1990 and 1992 wages plummeted – by 33.6 percent in Poland, 21.5 percent in 
Czechoslovakia, and 14 percent in Hungary.788 As Genov points out, in no country affected 
by the Great Depression of the 1930s did real wages decline as sharply as they did in CEE 
during the 1990s.789 Ten years after the transition, in 1999, real wages were still lagging 
behind their 1989 levels in all countries except the Czech Republic; in Hungary real wages 
                                                
783 Kovats 1997, here cited in Andor and Summers, Market Failure..., p. 123. 
784 For example, according to a 2004 study by TÁRKI, the prevalence of poverty was almost seven times 
higher for households with a Roma head of family compared to others. See TÁRKI, Hungary: Social Report 
2004, Budapest: TÁRKI, 2004, p. 103. On the discrimination of Roma in urban spaces, see János Ladányi, 
‘Patterns of residential segregation and the Gypsy minority in Budapest’, International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 1993, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 30-41 and ‘Residential Segregation among Social and Ethnic 
Groups in Budapest during the Post-Communist Transition’, in Of States and Cities: The Partitioning of 
Urban Space, edited by Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kampen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 
170-182. 
785 World Bank, Transition – The First Ten Years, p. 3. 
786 EBRD, Transition Report 2002. 
787 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
788 Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 203. 
789 Genov, Global Trends in Eastern Europe, p. 138. 
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were 19 percent less, while in many other countries (including Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, and Ukraine) it was around half that level.790 The fall was particularly steep in 
Russia, where real wages, in 1999, stood at a meagre 38.2 percent of their 1989 levels.791  
 
Making matters worse for those adversely affected by transition-associated adjustments, 
welfare provisions have been strenuously cut by successive governments in Budapest, 
irrespective of where they stand on the political spectrum. Between 1991 and 1996, social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP had been scaled back from 39 to 29 percent, while, as 
a proportion of household income, it was reduced from a high of 18.7 percent in 1992 to 
12.9 percent in 1999.792 Drastic cuts in welfare provisions have been accompanied by what 
Andor describes as a ‘new thinking’ on social policy amongst Hungarian policymakers.793 
One of the forerunners of this discourse was László Békesi, the former finance minister of 
the first socialist-liberal government, who has tirelessly sought to legitimise neoliberal 
austerity measures on the basis that ‘Hungarians have been living beyond their means.’794  
 
Similar to other regions of the world, neoliberal restructuring has resulted in an increasing 
polarisation of income in CEE and the former Soviet Union.795 Social inequality was of 
course never eradicated under ‘actually existing socialism’, despite all the rhetoric to the 
contrary,796 but there has been an intensification of inequality throughout the region since 
the double transformation. As the table below indicates, the rise in income inequalities in 
Hungary was milder than in other transformation economies, such as Poland or Russia (in 
the former there was a 20 percent increase in income inequality between 1988 and 2006, 
whereas the same figure in the latter two countries was 30 and 66 percent respectively). In 
comparison to other EU or OECD states, Hungary is thus placed in the middle range in 
                                                
790 UNICEF 2001, here cited in Genov, Global Trends in Eastern Europe, p. 138. 
791 Ibid. 
792 Phillips et al., ‘Usurping Social Policy’, pp. 590-591; World Bank, Hungary: On the Road to the 
European Union, pp. 137-138. 
793 Andor, Hungary on the Road to the European Union, p. 94. 
794 Ibid. A similar line of reasoning could be detected behind the famous phrase coined by János Kornai, who 
associated Hungary with a ‘premature welfare state’. See Kornai, ‘Transzformációs visszaesés’. 
795 On income inequalities under the neoliberal era, see Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pp. 15-19, 
88, 92, 100.  
796 On inequality in Hungary during ‘actually existing socialism’, see Iván Völgyes, ‘Modernization, Stratifi-
cation and Elite Development in Hungary’, Social Forces, 1978, Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 500-521; Szonja 
Szelényi, Social Inequality and Party Membership: Patterns of Recruitment into the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party’, American Sociological Review, 1987, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 559-573. 
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terms of income inequality; on a similar level with France and Spain, but well below 
countries with more conspicuous income inequalities, like Mexico and the United States.797  
 
Table 5.7. Inequality in CEE and selected countries of the former Soviet Union as per 
GINI Index798 
 1988-1989 1992-1994 1995-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003 2004-2006 
Bulgaria 23 28 31 26 32 N/A 
Czech 
Republic 19 27 25 N/A N/A 25 
Estonia 23 40 30 37 35 36 
Hungary 25 28 30 27 27 30 
Latvia 22 27 31 34 37 36 
Lithuania 22 35 32 31 34 36 
Poland 27 30 33 33 33 35 
Romania 23 27 N/A 30 31 32 
Russia 24 48 46 44 40 N/A 
Slovakia 20 19 26 N/A N/A 28 
Slovenia N/A 29 N/A 28 N/A 31 
Ukraine 23 26 37 29 28 28 
 
 
In terms of income dispersion, the ratio between the highest and lowest 10 percent of per 
capita household income increased from 4-5 times the late 1980s, to 8.4 times in 2003, 
despite the negative impact of the ‘transformational recession’, high inflation, and the 
sharp rise in unemployment in the early 1990s.799 In concrete terms, this translates into 
staggering differences in wealth: while the richest 1 million of the population control 25-26 
percent of national wealth, the poorest 1 million owned a mere 3 percent.800  
 
The growing polarisation of income on a national level has been accompanied by 
deepening regional inequalities. Empirical studies demonstrate that Hungary exhibits the 
highest level of ‘sub-national territorial inequality’ amongst the EU-27 states, followed by 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania.801 While the industrialised regions of around Budapest 
and Northwestern Hungary have ‘surged ahead’ thanks to the arrival of foreign investment, 
                                                
797 Márton Medgyesi, ‘A jövedelmek eloszlása az EU országaiban’, in Társadalmi Riport 2008, edited by 
Tamás Kolosi and György I. Tóth, Budapest: TÁRKI, 2008, pp. 148-167; OECD, Divided We Stand: Why 
Inequality Keeps Rising, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011. 
798 Source: Myant and Drahokoupil, Transition Economies, Table A.17; World Bank, World Development  
Indicators; KSH. Note: The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some 
cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within a national economy deveiates from 
a perfectly equal distribution. 
799 TÁRKI, Hungary: Social Report 2004, p. 51. 
800 Ignác Romsics, ‘Mé ́rlegen a magyar XX. század’, Élet és Irodalom, Vol. 54, No. 9, 5 March 2010. 
801 Adrian Smith and Judit Timár, ‘Uneven transformations: space, economy and society 20 years after the 
collapse of state socialism’, European Urban and Regional Studies, 2010, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 115-125.  
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much of the former state capitalist ‘rust belt’ of Northeastern Hungary has either failed to 
‘take off’ altogether or struggled badly. In a striking parallel to the areas of Britain that 
experienced the greatest job losses in manufacturing and the mining industry under 
Thatcherism, these are today the areas of Hungary that exhibit the highest levels of 
unemployment, poverty, and related social problems. Perhaps even more emphatic has 
been the increasing inequality within rural and urban areas of Hungary. In Budapest, writes 
one sociologist, average life expectancy in District 2, which includes the famous and 
historically prestigious Rózsadomb area, is ‘on the level of Belgium, while in District 10 
[in Pest] it approximates that of Syria.’802 These differences are also expressed in plain 
numbers: there is a six-year difference in average life expectancy between the two parts of 
the city, while in terms of number of welfare recipients, the difference is threefold.803 
‘Budapest is splitting into two parts’, argues the Hungarian sociologist János Ladányi, 
when analysing the increasing socio-economic segregation of post-1989 Budapest. ‘Parts 
of the city inhabited by higher-status social groups look more and more like similar areas 
in western Europe. By sharp contrast, other parts, inhabited by the losers of postcommunist 
transition, tend to resemble parts of cities of the Third World.’804 
 
 
The Economic and Political Limitations of Neoliberalism 
‘With Hungarian Characteristics’ 
In the above sections we have outlined the central characteristics of the specific neoliberal 
regime of accumulation that became consolidated in Hungary after 1989. On the basis of 
this, some considerations can be made. Contra the arguments of neoliberal economists, as 
well as Bohle and Greskovits, a critical assessment of the economic, political, and social 
outcomes of neoliberal restructuring suggests that it was built on weak foundations.  
 
As we noted in the previous section, one of the most striking characteristic of Hungary’s 
neoliberal regime of accumulation, was its heavy reliance on foreign capital. This was, as 
we have argued, the result of a strong commitment by the Hungarian state towards export-
led growth driven by transnational corporations based in Hungary (albeit the modalities in 
                                                
802 István Tosics, ‘Lakáspolitika – szociális várospolitika’, Budapesti Negyed, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 143. 
803 Ibid. 
804 Ladányi, ‘Residential segregation...’, p. 170. 
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which this has been expressed has undergone significant modifications over the years). As 
an indication of Hungary’s dependence on foreign investment, inward FDI stock as a 
percentage of GDP accounted for 70.2 percent in 2006, the second highest amongst the 
‘transition economies’ after Estonia (75.6 percent) and significantly higher than that of 
other advanced capitalist states, such as Germany (20.4 percent) and the United States 
(24.6 percent).805 However, by the turn of the century, the material foundations of the 
Hungarian model were drying up. On the one hand, revenues from the privatisation of 
previously state owned enterprises were decreasing in importance, as the majority of the 
Hungarian manufacturing and services industry had already been sold to foreign investors. 
On the other hand, the attraction of new foreign investment was also becoming 
increasingly difficult, as a result of increasing inter-state state competition, both within the 
region and globally following the rapid rise of China as the ‘workshop of the world’, as 
well the relatively high labour costs in Hungary.806 As a result, there was a noticeable 
decrease in FDI inflows to Hungary. Between 1999 and 2004 Hungary’s share of total FDI 
inflows to the CEE dropped by more than 50 percent in the period between 1999 and 2004, 
from 31 to 13.6 percent. As a result, economic growth was showing signs of running out of 
steam: the Hungarian economy was the only one in the region where the average annual 
growth rate decreased following EU accession.807  Thus, by 2005, The Economist, which 
previously had praised Hungary as a ‘frontrunner’ of market reform, was describing the 
country as ‘the laggard of Central Europe’.808  
 
Faced with this situation, there was increasing political pressure on Hungarian 
policymakers, both from abroad and at home, to push ahead with deeper ‘structural 
reforms’, in order to improve the country’s ‘competitiveness’ in the global economy. But 
implementing these reforms proved to be difficult at a time when Hungarian politics was 
becoming increasingly polarised and characterised by ‘cutthroat party competition’ 
between the socialist-liberal government and the national-conservative opposition.809 The 
political situation worsened in 2006 when, fresh from having won a historic re-election on 
a slogan of ‘reform without austerity’, Prime Minister Gyurcsány admitted that there was a 
                                                
805 Source: UNCTAD Statistical Database. Available on: http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Statistics.aspx. 
806 Bohle and Greskovits. Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery, pp. 141-146, 166-170; Drahokoupil, 
Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 46-58; Fink, ‘FDI-led Growth and Rising 
Polarisations in Hungary’, pp. 52-53.  
807 Bohle and Greskovits. op. cit, p. 240.  
808 The Economist, ‘Transformed’. 
809 On the Hungarian politics in this period, see Bohle and Greskovits. op. cit, pp. 178-179, 240-241. 
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need for economic belt-tightening. He announced a complete turnaround in government 
policy, marked by the introduction of a draconian austerity package, which included the 
imposition of new taxes and fiscal expenditure cuts, in line with the Maastricht criteria, 
and comprehensive structural reforms in public administration, education, health care, and 
the pension system.810 As a result, the MSZP-SZDSZ government’s popularity quickly 
plummeted.811 But the rot did not stop there.  
 
On 18 September 2006 massive anti-government protests erupted in Budapest, on a scale 
unprecedented in the brief history of the new Hungarian democracy, while violence broke 
out between far right groups and the police, when the former broke into the offices of the 
state television office and set fire to it.812 The demonstrations followed the after the 
revelation of a secret speech by Prime Minister Gyurcsány. In the speech, he admitted, 
using particularly foul language, that the socialist-liberal government had ‘lied morning, 
noon, and night’, in order to win the general elections earlier in the year.813 ‘Protests 
continued for months, deteriorating rapidly, dominated by the symbolism of the Arrow-
Cross, the Hungarian Nazis famous for their anti-Jewish terror in the encircled Budapest in 
1944.’814 According to the dominant view expressed by the mainstream media and experts, 
the turmoil reflected the ‘moral crisis’ of the MSZP and the SZDSZ and/or limitations of 
the ‘populist’ economic policies pursued successive governments in Budapest, irrespective 
of their political colour. The former view was spearheaded by FIDESZ, the main 
opposition party, whose leaders vehemently criticised the ‘mendacious’ socialist-liberal 
government for its austerity drive and, after having swept to a landslide victory in the local 
election held in early October, called for the resignation of the Prime Minister.815 The latter 
view, was primarily proposed by neoliberal economists, but can also been seen in the 
                                                
810 GoH, Az Új Egyensúly programja, 2006-2008, Budapest: Government of Hungary, 2006. 
811 One opinion poll in 2006 showed that, in a matter of months, support the MSZP-SZDSZ government 
dropped by 10 percent. At the same time, the number of those that believed that things were going ‘in the 
right direction’ also fell sharply, from 42 percent to 19 percent. Source: Medián, ‘Apadó Fidesz-előny’, 13 
December 2006. Available on: http://www.median.hu/object.104f145f-98ae-4962-856a-bef6acb40b2e.ivy 
(last accessed on: 12 September 2014).  
812 Tamás, ‘Counter-revolution against a counter-revolution’. 
813 BBC, ‘Excerpts: Hungarian Lies Speech’, 19 September 2006. Available on: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5359546.stm. 
814 Tamás, op. cit. 
815 The move was supported by politicians and intellectuals from across the political spectrum, from the 
conservative President of the Republic László Sólyom, through the liberal philosopher and former leader of 
the SZDSZ János Kis, to the Marxist philosopher G.M. Tamás.  
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writings of institutionalist scholars, such as Andor and Bohle and Greskovits.816 In contrast 
to this, we argue that there were deeper, structural reasons and connections behind the 
demonstrations. This, of course, does not mean the denial of the existence of a ‘moral 
crisis’. However, the latter is arguably only considered a by-product of the deepening 
contradictions of the neoliberal regime of accumulation that had developed after 1989. Yet, 
despite mounting signs of a looming ‘systemic crisis’817 of Hungarian capitalism, the 
ruling MSZP-SZDSZ coalition remained committed to the prime minister and his austerity 
drive. As it had done some ten years earlier, during the introduction of the infamous 
‘Bokros Package’, ‘the Socialist Party downsized its engagement with civil society 
severing its remaining ties to the trade unions, turned a blind eye to an unprecedented drop 
in voters’ support, and ignored popular protest. It tied its fate increasingly to a narrow 
circle of domestic and transnational actors eager to continue harsh economic reforms.’818 
 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was twofold: firstly, to analyse the central agents and means 
through which neoliberalism was consolidated in Hungary in the period between 1990-
2006, and secondly, analyse the outcomes of this process. While we agreed with the 
commonly held view in the literature that Hungary did in a certain sense become a 
‘vanguard state’ of neoliberalism in the region during this period (characterised by a highly 
open political economy geared towards foreign direct investment), our analysis differed on 
two important points. Firstly, while acknowledging the important role of external forces 
and pressures in this process, we emphasised the key role of domestic social forces (in 
particular an ‘unholy alliance’ comprised of sections of the domestic capitalist class, 
political elites, and neoliberal technocrats with connected to policymakers in the West, 
international financial institutions, and multinational corporations), in lubricating the 
different actors of the Hungarian economy to maintain neoliberal regime of accumulation. 
While we noted that the neoliberal restructuring of the Hungarian political economy was 
                                                
816 László Békesi, ‘A magyar gazdaság helyzetéről, kilátásairól, a gazdaságpolitika  dilemmáiról és feladat-
airól’, Élet és Irodalom, Vol. 54, No. 9, 5 March 2010; Lajos Bokros, ‘A reformok kritikus tömege, I-II’, Élet 
és Irodalom, Vol. 53, No. 4, 23 January 2009; Lengyel, Pretoriánusok kora. See also Andor, Eltévedt 
éllovas; Bohle and Greskovits. Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery. 
817 Erzsébet Szalai, ‘Morális krízis vagy rendszerválság?’, Élet és Irodalom, Vol. 50, No. 43, 27 October 
2006; Gáspár M. Tamás, ‘Vallásháború vagy osztályharc’, Élet és Irodalom, Vol. 50, No. 40, 6 October 
2006. 
818 Bohle and Greskovits, op. cit., p. 241. 
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promoted by all post-1989 governments in Hungary (albeit with differences in emphasis, 
for example on the question of whether to prioritise ‘foreign-led’ or ‘domestically-driven’ 
capital accumulation), we emphasised the vital role of successive social-liberal 
governments in this process (most notably illustrated through the introduction of 
Hungary’s largest austerity programme, also known as the ‘Bokros Package’, launched in 
1995 by the Horn government). This account does not only question the dominant view of 
the neoliberal transformation in Hungary and elsewhere in CEE as an externally-driven 
project, but also questions the idea that neoliberalism was/is a ‘conservative reaction’ 
against the welfare state in all its different forms, which remains dominant on much of the 
Left to this day.  
 
Secondly, in contrast to dominant accounts in the literature, we argued that the neoliberal 
restructuring of the Hungarian political economy after 1989 was not a straightforward 
‘success story’, but was rather plagued by contradictions and limitations. At the most 
general level, this means that the country has been reintegrated as a semi-peripheral player 
in the world economy, but this masks stark inequalities. While the arrival of foreign 
investment has enabled areas in the historically more developed Northwestern and Central 
Hungary to join the ‘global city’, characterised by skilled labour and high productivity, 
large parts of Northeastern and Southern Hungary have been confined to the ‘global 
village’, with high unemployment and poverty, and low standards of living.819 Hungary’s 
‘new bourgeoisie’ in their kitsch, ‘neo-Habsburg’ palaces in Buda hills live as if on a 
completely different planet compared to their fellow citizens on the other of the Danube, in 
the rundown working class neighbourhoods of Pest.820 Moreover, existent inequalities have 
been worsened by strenuous cuts in welfare provisions by successive governments in 
Budapest, irrespective of where they stand on the political spectrum. Rather than a fairytale 
then, the reality of Hungary’s neoliberal transformation turned out to be much more akin to 
a nightmare.  
 
By late 2006, Hungary’s neoliberal regime of accumulation was facing increasing 
economic and political limitations. Although the Hungarian economy had grown by an 
impressive average rate of more than 4 percent annually between 1997 and 2006, the 
                                                
819 Dale, ‘Introduction: The Transition in Central and Eastern Europe’, p. 14. 
820 Judit Bodnár, ‘Becoming Bourgeois: (Postsocialist) Utopias of Isolation and Civilization’, in Evil 
Paradises: Dreamworlds of Neoliberalism, edited by Mike Davis and Daniel B. Monk, New York, NY: The 
New Press, 2007, pp. 140-151. 
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material foundations of this growth were dwindling, as the inflows of foreign capital were 
drying up. Faced with growing economic pressures, the newly re-elected socialist-liberal 
government of Prime Minister Gyurcsány decided to break with its electoral promises and 
push ahead with unpopular neoliberal reforms, in the hope that these measures would 
revive the Hungarian economy and enable his government to regain the thrust of the 
electorate. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, this would turn out to be a 
difficult balancing act at a time when the world economy was heading straight towards one 
of the worst crises of in the history of capitalism. 
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FROM ‘POSTER BOY’ OF NEOLIBERAL 
TRANSFORMATION TO ‘BASKET CASE’: 
HUNGARY AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
CRISIS, 2007-2014 
 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we analysed the consolidation of neoliberalism in Hungary 
between 1990-2006. We argued that the neoliberal restructuring of the Hungarian political 
economy was pursued by all post-transition governments in Budapest (albeit to different 
degrees), in the hope that this would improve the ‘competitiveness’ of the ailing Hungarian 
economy, resulting in economic growth and higher living standards to ordinary 
Hungarians. However, the outcome of this process was the creation of a regime of 
accumulation that was built on weak foundations, as manifested by the massive anti-
government protests that shook Hungary in the autumn of 2006. In this chapter we turn our 
attention to more contemporary debates, analysing the impact of the ongoing global 
economic crisis on the Hungarian political economy.  
 
As we have noted in passim, Hungary has for long been a ‘poster boy’ of neoliberal 
transformation in the CEE. However, as the negative effects of the financial crisis started 
to be felt in 2008, its bon renommé in international policymaking and business circles 
quickly evaporated. The international business press has singled out Hungary as one of the 
bêtes noires of the current crisis. This ‘return to fame’ largely stems from the fact that the 
signs generally associated with the global crisis – financial meltdown, falling levels of 
production, growing unemployment and falling living standards, widespread 
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disillusionment and public anger (channelled through rabid, reactionary politics) – are all 
present in an exacerbated form in present-day Hungary.  
 
In light of the above, the next section of this chapter presents a chronology of the problems 
that the Hungarian economy has faced since 2007 until mid-2010. In the third section, we 
present a critical overview of the four narratives that have dominated mainstream discourse 
about the crisis in Hungary. Finally, in the fourth section, we outline the central features of 
an alternative interpretation, which builds on central concepts in Marxian political 
economy, in particular Marx’s concept of the ‘law of value’ and Trotsky’s theory of 
‘uneven and combined development’. It depicts the crisis as the outcome of external (a 
global crisis in neoliberalism – although not necessarily of neoliberalism) and internal 
(contradictions inherent in Hungary’s neoliberal regime of accumulation) pressures 
confronting the national economy and the state. As we go on to argue, it is against this 
background that we need to understand the policies pursued since 2010 by the national-
conservative FIDESZ-led government led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. 
 
 
An Economic Tsunami Sweeps Down the Danube: The 
Three Phases of Hungary’s Crisis (Up Until 2010) 
The ‘global crisis’ has evolved in three interdependent and mutually reinforcing ways. 
What started out in 2007 as a ‘crisis in the heartland’821 of global capitalism with the 
bursting of the ‘sub-prime’ mortgage bubble in the United States, had within a year 
evolved into a global ‘credit crunch’, which the IMF at the time estimated to cause the 
global economy losses of at least US$ 1 trillion.822 The credit crisis subsequently spread 
rapidly to the ‘real’ economy. According to the World Bank, global economic output 
declined by 2.1 percent in 2009.823 By then, total write-downs on global exposures were 
estimated to reach US $ 4 trillion or more.824 Since then, policymakers, international 
business papers and mainstream economists have desperately tried to identify signs of 
                                                
821 Peter Gowan, ‘Crisis in the Heartland. Consequences of the New Wall Street System’, New Left Review,  
2009, No. 55, pp. 5-25.  
822 IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2008, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2008.  
823 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
824 IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2009, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2009. 
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‘green shoots’ of recovery, but with little success.825 In what follows, we provide an 
overview of the impact of the global economic crisis on Hungary and other CEE 
economies. 
 
 
First Wave: Storms Gathering Around CEE 
The ten ‘post-communist’ countries (EU-10) that joined the EU in 2004 and 2006 were hit 
by the global crisis in a succession of waves.826 The first, which followed after the onset of 
the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US, was generally not perceived as a threat to these 
economies. As we noted in the previous chapter, inflows of foreign capital to the region 
had gradually risen since 1989, and showed no signs of abating in the first-half of the 
2000s. Between 2000-2007 a total of more than US$ 305 billion of foreign direct 
investment poured into the EU-10 economies.827 As one of the leading ‘reformers’ in the 
region, Hungary had been one of the prime recipients of foreign investment in the region, 
with cumulative FDI between 1989 and 2007 reaching nearly US$ 64 billion.828 However, 
before we take this figure as an indication of the inevitable ‘flattening’ of the world 
brought about by benevolent effects of neoliberal globalisation (to borrow a famous phrase 
from New York Times columnist and pro-globalisation advocate Thomas L. Friedman829), 
these figures need to be put into perspective. In so doing, they illustrate what the Marxist 
political economist Bill Dunn has described as the ‘enduring pertinence of geography’ for 
capital accumulation.830 Whilst increasing in relation to previous years, the total amount of 
FDI inflows to the EU-10 economies between 2000 and 2008 still only represented 3.6 
percent of total FDI flows in the world.831 
 
                                                
825 Barry Eichengreen and Kenneth H. O’Rourke, ‘A tale of two depressions: What do the new data tell us?’, 
VoxEU, 2010. Available on: http://www.voxeu.org/article/tale-two-depressions-what-do-new-data-tell-us-
february-2010-update (last accessed on: 31 December 2013). 
826 IMF, ‘The Credit Boom in the EU New Member States: Bad Luck or Bad Policies?’. IMF WP/10/130, 
prepared by Bas B. Bakker and Anne-Marie Gulde, May 2010, Washington, DC: International Monetary 
Fund; Paul Marer, ‘The Global Economic Crises: Impacts on Eastern Europe’, Acta Oeconomica,  2010, Vol. 
60, No. 1, pp. 3-33.  
827 Figures are from UNCTAD Database and based on US $ current prices and current exchange rates. 
828 Ibid.  
829 Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century, New York, NY: 
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005. 
830 Dunn, Global Political Economy, p. 170. 
831 Own calculations based on figures from UNCTAD Statistical Database. 
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Having said this, the economies of CEE were, in a sense, becoming a ‘destination of 
choice’832 for capital. Indeed, between 2003 and 2007 the unweighted average of capital 
inflows (107 percent of GDP) to the EU-9 (the EU-10 minus Slovenia) was almost three 
times as high as in the emerging Southeast Asian economies of Indonesia, Philippines and 
Thailand prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 (38 percent of GDP in 1992).833 
The positive flow of foreign capital continued even when share prices of investment banks 
and hedge funds began to fall in the US and Western Europe in late 2006. Hence, net 
private capital flows to the EU-9 increased from 8.1 percent of GDP in 2006 to 11.6 
percent of GDP in 2007 – well above the average for all emerging market economies (3.8 
percent).834 The credit bonanza in the region seemed interminable.  
 
No wonder then the official view in policymaking circles and among international 
investors at the time was that the ‘sneeze’ caught by the US economy following the sub-
prime mortgage crisis was not going to cause any severe flu in the EU-10 economies. 
Despite signs of problems looming ahead for the world economy, the dominant view about 
the prospects of the transformation economies in CEE remained relatively upbeat.835 The 
IMF projected in October 2007 that average GDP growth in CEE was to fall moderately, 
from 6.7 percent in 2002-2007 to 5.0 percent in 2008-2012. Hungary’s decline was 
expected to be modest: down from 3.6 percent in 2002-2007 to 3.4 percent in 2008-
2012.836 This relatively optimistic view was reiterated one month later by the Secretary 
General of the OECD Ángel Gurría, who, in an interview with the Hungarian daily 
Népszabadság, asserted: ‘The Hungarian economy is currently preparing its next growth 
cycle. … There is no need be dramatic about the current situation. There is no crisis [in 
Hungary].’837 In a sense, he turned out to be right, although perhaps not in the sense that he 
intended. The worst, as we shall see below, was still to come.  
 
 
                                                
832 IMF, ‘The Credit Boom...’, p. 4. 
833 Ibid., p. 5. 
834 IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2010, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2010; IMF, 
op. cit., p. 6.   
835 One of the few dissenting voices within mainstream debates was that of Nouriel Roubini. A former 
advisor to President Clinton and economics professor at New York University, Roubini, argued already in 
late June 2006  that ‘Hungary is an accident waiting to happen.’ See Nouriel Roubini, ‘Hungary faces enorm-
ous economic hurdles’, USA Today, 22 June 2006. 
836 IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2007, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2007. 
837 Gurría 2007, here cited in Miklós Blahó, ‘A magyar gazdaság átmeneti állapotban van’, Népszabadság, 16 
November 2007. 
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Second Wave: ‘A Vulnerable Antelope on the Savannah of Global Finance’  
The second wave of the crisis was less benign to the CEE economies. Following the 
collapse of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008, widely 
considered as ‘one of the pillars of the US’s financial system’,838 liquidity dried up in 
global financial markets, as investors retracted to ‘safer’ havens in the core capitalist states. 
Faced with this situation, the openness of the region’s economies turned out to be a recipe 
for disaster. The combination of relatively small economies (with the exception of Poland), 
together with extreme openness to foreign capital and high dependency on exports, left the 
region highly exposed to the effects of the credit crunch.  
 
The Hungarian economy fitted these descriptions perfectly. As we described in detail in 
the previous chapter, Hungary’s level of economic openness is extremely high, bearing in 
mind its small size in relation to the global economy. The share of trade to total GDP 
amounted to 161.4 percent in 2008 (highest among the EU-10 economies) and 70 percent 
of this trade went to advanced economies.839 As a further indication of Hungary’s 
embeddedness into the global economy, the country ranked as the sixth ‘most open’ 
developed economy in the world, after Belgium, Luxemburg, Estonia, Bulgaria, and 
Slovakia, according to the 2005 UNCTAD Transnationalization Index, well ahead of most 
advanced capitalist states, including Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.840   
 
Hungary’s vulnerability to ‘financial tsunami’ that was now hitting the world economy 
was worsened by what international investors perceived as the dire state of its public 
finances.841 At a first look, this fear appears somewhat exaggerated. While it is true that 
Hungary’s consolidated government debt in 2008 (73 percent) was significantly higher 
than the average for the EU-10 economies (26.5 percent), it was not substantially above the 
average of the old EU-15 member states (59.6 percent).842 Indeed, numerous countries 
within the EU – including Greece (112.9 percent), Germany (66.8 percent), France (68.2 
                                                
838 Harman, Zombie Capitalism, p. 277. 
839 EBRD, Transition Report 2009: Transition in Crisis?, London: EBRD, 2009.  
840 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008, p. 12, Figure I.7. See also Zoltán Pogátsa, Éltanúló válságban. 
Állam és piac a rendszerváltás utáni Magyarországon, Budapest: Figyelő, 2007. 
841 Andor, ‘Hungary in the Financial Crisis...’, pp. 286-287; Zsolt Darvas, ‘The rise and fall of Hungary’, The 
Guardian, 29 October 2008. 
842 Source: Eurostat Statistical Database, Government deficit/surplus, debt and associated data. Available on: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do.  
 223 
percent), Italy (106.1 percent) and Portugal (71.7 percent) – had similar or considerably 
higher levels of government debt.843 However, the great difference between these countries 
and Hungary was that the former were larger in size and also benefited from longer 
maturity periods on their sovereign debt. The weighted average of maturity on Hungary’s 
sovereign debt was only 3.3 years – lower than all the countries listed above.844 In 
addition, investors were also growing worried about the high indebtedness of Hungarian 
households and the private sector. The level of private sector indebtedness stood at 67.6 
percent of GDP in 2008 (fourth highest among the EU-10 economies), while household 
debt stood at 27.4 percent of GDP (third in the region after Estonia and Latvia). The fact 
that the majority of these debts had been taken out in Swiss francs or Euros, against which 
the Hungarian forint depreciated sharply in October 2008,845 brought investors’ worries 
about the state of the Hungarian economy further towards boiling point.846  
 
These concerns finally boiled over in October 2008 when foreign investors sold more than 
US$ 2 billion of Hungarian government securities (nearly 5 percent of Hungary’s foreign-
owned securities at the time) within a couple of days.847 At the same time, long maturity 
interest rates jumped from the already high 8.5 percent to 11.5 percent and the government 
bond market dried up.848 As a result, government officials and policymakers in Budapest 
were forced to admit that Hungary was under increasing threat of an ‘attack’ on its 
financial system. The Governor of the MNB András Simor, vividly depicted the graveness 
of the situation in an interview with US television channel CNBC, when he compared 
Hungary’s situation to lions’ pursuit of antelopes on the Savannah. Similar to the lions 
(who select slower, weaker and more vulnerable antelopes as their prey), Simor argued that 
speculators had targeted Hungary as the next country, after Iceland, to suffer in the global 
financial crisis.849  
                                                
843 Eurostat Statistical Database, Government deficit/surplus, debt and associated data. See also Martin 
Myant and Jan Drahokoupil, ‘Transition Economies after the Crisis of 2008: Actors and Policies’, Europe-
Asia Studies, 2013, Vol. 65, No. 3, Table 6, p. 378. 
844 The Economist, ‘Debt sustainability: Not so risk free’, 11 February 2010. 
845 In October 2008, the value of the forint fell from 240 to 280 against the Euro, a fall of 17 percent. Marer, 
‘The Global Economic Crises’, p. 21. 
846 The Hungarian government estimated that 10-15 percent of these loans were ‘endangered’ (eg. liable to 
default). As a result, of the depreciation of the forint many borrowers had to sell their homes, while others 
faced hefty hikes in mortgage payments. See Chris Bryant, ‘Hungarians in Debt to Swiss Franc’, Financial 
Times, 16 July 2010. 
847 Marer, op. cit., p. 21. 
848 Darvas, ‘The rise and fall of Hungary’; Marer, op. cit., p. 21. 
849 András Simor, ‘Hungary Says It’s Not Iceland’, CNBC.com, 2008. Available on: 
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=899424610 (last accessed on: 17 December 2013).  
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Faced with this quagmire, the socialist-minority government led by Prime Minister 
Gyurcsány850 decided to appeal for financial assistance from international lenders.851 A 
bailout package of US$ 25.1 billion was provided to Hungary (with the IMF providing 
two-thirds of the sum, the EU covering the majority of the remaining sum and the World 
Bank ‘chipping in’ with a little more than US $ 1 billion in assistance). In order to regain 
the ‘confidence of the markets’, the government was convinced by Simor and others in the 
MNB to implement further austerity measures, including fierce welfare spending cuts and 
tax increases, which aimed to bring down the budget deficit from 3.7 percent in 2008 to 2.6 
percent in 2009 – beyond than the requirements of the Maastricht criteria and those 
initially stipulated by the IMF.852 These measures followed on from the drastic austerity 
package introduced by the socialist-liberal government in 2006, which had brought down 
the budget deficit from 10 percent to around 3 percent of GDP in just two years – ‘a heroic 
achievement from the government and the people.’853 
 
 
Third Wave: ‘The Crisis Hits Head On’ 
By the end of 2008, the global financial crisis was transforming into what became known 
as a ‘Great Recession’, on a scale not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Similar to the Great Depression of the 1930s, the freezing up of liquidity on global 
financial markets accelerated and deepened the slowdown in the world economy causing a 
destructive downward spiral of declining levels of production and trade, increasing 
bankruptcies, and rapidly falling levels of employment. According to the oft-cited analysis 
of the respected economists Barry Eichengreen and Kenneth O’Rourke, the overall 
performance of the world economy during the initial months of the Great Recession was 
even worse than the Great Depression: between April 2008 and February 2009 world 
industrial output fell by 13 percent (compared to 8 percent in the first months of the Great 
Depression); stock markets declined by 50 percent (compared to 15 percent for the Great 
                                                
850 SZDSZ, the junior partner in the government coalition, left the coaliation on 30 April 2008, in protest 
against Gyurcsány’s dismissal of Ágnes Horváth, the Minister of Health and a member of the SZDSZ. 
However, the SZDSZ continued to support the policies of the Gyurcsány government.  
851 Gideon Rachman, ‘Hungarian Lessons for a World Crisis’, Financial Times, 11 May 2009.  
852 Lengyel, Pretoriánusok kora, p. 31. 
853 Andor, ‘Hungary in the Financial Crisis...’, p. 290. 
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Depression); and world trade fell by one-fifth (the same figure for the Great Depression 
was 5 percent).854   
 
The third wave of the crisis hit the EU-10 economies head on. According to a 2009 World 
Bank report, the CEE economies were among ‘the hardest hit by the ongoing global 
economic crisis’.855 A quick look at the table below sheds some light on the grim realities 
of the crisis in the region. 
 
Table 6.1. Selected economic indicators, end of 2009 (in percent)856 
 GDP growth, 
at market 
prices 
Export of 
goods and 
services 
Industrial production 
(except construction), gross 
value added at basic prices 
Unemployment 
(registered) 
Bulgaria - 5.5 - 11.2 - 8.0 6.8 
Czech 
Republic 
- 4.5 - 10.9 - 13.4 6.7 
Estonia - 14.1 - 21.3 - 19.2 13.8 
Hungary - 6.8 - 10.2 - 14.4 10.0 
Latvia - 17.7 - 13.1 - 14.9 17.5 
Lithuania - 14.8 - 12.6 - 14.3 13.6 
Poland 1.6 - 6.8 1.2 8.1 
Romania - 6.6 - 6.4 - 1.4 6.9 
Slovakia - 4.9 - 16.3 - 16.1 12.1 
Slovenia - 7.9 - 16.1 - 15.2 5.9 
EU-10 
average - 8.1 - 12.5 - 11.6 10.1 
Selected comparators 
Germany - 5.1 - 13.0 - 16.6 7.8 
Greece - 3.1 - 19.4 2.0 9.5 
Ireland - 6.4 - 3.8 N/A 12.0 
Italy - 5.5 - 17.5 - 15.1 7.8 
Portugal - 2.9 - 10.9 - 9.0 10.6e 
Spain - 3.8 - 10.0 - 11.4 18.0 
Eurozone  
(12 
countries) 
- 4.4 - 12.3 - 12.9 9.6 
United 
Kingdom - 5.2 - 8.7 - 9.5 7.6 
United 
States 
- 2.8 - 9.1 N/A 9.3 
China 9.2 - 10.3 N/A N/A 
Japan - 5.5 - 24.2 N/A 5.1 
 
 
                                                
854 Eichengreen and O’Rourke, ‘A tale of two depressions’. 
855 World Bank, ‘Overview’. 
856 Source: Eurostat Statistical Database; World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
e Estimated figures. 
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As the table reveals, the effects of the crisis have been variegated on different parts of the 
world economy.857 With the exception of China (annual GDP growth of 9.2 percent) and 
Poland (1.6 percent), all economies listed in the table above experienced negative 
economic growth in 2009, ranging from 2.8 percent in the United States to 17.7 percent in 
Latvia. Although not as badly hit as the Baltic States, which ‘have gone from being dubbed 
the “Baltic Tigers” to suffering the effects of the crisis in the most acute form in the 
EU’,858 Hungary was nonetheless hit hard by the global recession, with output contracting 
by 6.8 percent in 2009. However, it is important to remember that the performance of the 
Hungarian economy was deteriorating already before 2009, with the economy only 
growing by an average rate of 0.5 percent in 2007-2008,859 as a result of the austerity 
measures implemented by the Gyurcsány government. The impact of the crisis was 
aggravated by the contraction in production experienced by Hungary’s primary export 
markets (in particular Germany).860 As a result, exports plummeted by 10.2 percent. With 
exports coming to a halt, industrial production fell by 14.4 percent in 2009 – the highest 
fall registered since 1991, when Hungary lost much of its Eastern markets as a result of the 
collapse of the CMEA.861 The manufacturing sector was particularly badly hit by the 
reduction of global demand, with output falling by 18.4 percent on an annual basis. 
Amongst the subsectors within manufacturing, car production experienced the most severe 
slump, decreasing by nearly 30 percent on an annual basis.862  
 
By 2009, Hungary’s economic malaise was rapidly spilling over into the sphere of politics 
(this is described in further detail in section 4). In late March 2009, Prime Minister 
Gyurcsány resigned from his post, stating that he had become an obstacle to further 
economic and social reforms.863 After an initial period of confusion, he was replaced by 
the young, but uncharismatic Gordon Bajnai, a former Minister of National Development 
                                                
857 For more detailed accounts of the impact of the crisis on other CEE economies, see Bohle and Greskovits. 
Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery, pp. 223-258; Becker and Jäger, ‘Development Trajectories in the 
Crisis in Europe’, pp. 5-27; Dale, ‘Introduction: The Transition in Central and Eastern Europe’; Hardy, 
‘Crisis and Recession...’.  
858 Jane Hardy, ‘Crisis and Recession in Central and Eastern Europe’, International Socialism, 2010, No. 
128, pp. 111-129. 
859 Eurostat Statistical Database. See also WIIW, Current Analyses and Forecasts 6, ‘Will Exports Prevail 
over Austerity?’, prepared by Vasily Astrov, Mario Holzner, Gabor Hunya, Kazimierz Laski, Leon 
Podkaminer et al., July 2010, Vienna: Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW). 
860 Becker and Jäger, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
861 See Table 6.1. on previous page. 
862 Ábrahám, Ambrus 2010, ‘Két évtizedes mélyponton a magyar ipar’, Népszabadság, 16 February 2010. 
863 Nicholas Kulish, ‘Hungary’s Premier Offers to Resign’, New York Times, 21 March 2009; John Nadler, 
‘Is Hungary the Financial Crisis’ Next Iceland?’, Time Magazine, 24 March 2009.  
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and Economy and ex-business partner to Gyurcsány, who took charge of a semi-
technocratic government. As Bohle has pointed out, many of the members of the new 
government held ‘close connections to transnational corporations.’864 Although the new 
government virtually lacked any popular support and despite increasing signs of social and 
political instability – including fascist paramilitaries from the Magyar Gárda (Hungarian 
Guard) marching up and down the streets of the country terrorising the Roma population, 
gays and lesbians, and so called ‘communists’ –, it adamantly went ahead with the 
implementation of harsh austerity measures.  
 
The combination of a global recession together with the austerity measures introduced by 
the Gyurcsány and Bajnai governments proved to be a poisonous mix for workers poor 
people in Hungary. By the end of February 2010, the official unemployment rate stood at 
11.4 percent, the highest figure for 16 years.865 Whilst this figure gives little reason to 
celebrate, it does not take into consideration the more than 1.3 million jobs that were shed 
in the first five years of Hungary’s transformation, which, as we noted in the previous 
chapter, made Hungary a country suffering from chronically high underemployment.866 As 
for those ‘lucky’ enough to have a job in Hungary, the situation was hardly rosier. Similar 
to elsewhere, capitalists responded to the downturn by attempting to raise the exploitation 
of Hungarian workers through the enlargement of the working day or increasing the 
intensity of work. Consequently, the Hungary is turning into one of the worst places to 
work in the EU. Weekly working hours for full-time employees in Q4 2009 stood at 40.7 
hours (well above both EU-27 and EU-15 averages of 39.3 and 38.9 hours respectively).867 
Meanwhile, real wages decreased in 2007 by 4.6 percent and, after a virtually inexistent 
rise of 0.9 percent in 2008, fell again in 2009 by 4.5 percent (the third steepest fall amongst 
the CEE economies after Latvia and Lithuania).868 Yet, there were not only ‘losers’ of 
Hungary’s economic malaise, but ‘winners’ as well. Those at the top of Hungarian society 
                                                
864 Dorothee Bohle, ‘Countries in Distress: Transformation, Transnationalisation, and Crisis in Hungary and 
Latvia’, Emecon: Employment and Economy in Central and Eastern Europe, 2010, Vol. 1. No. 1. See also 
Lengyel, Pretoriánusok kora, pp. 45-49. 
865 Népszabadság, ‘Tizenahat éves csúcson a munkanélküliség!’, 29 March 2010. See also Thomas Escritt, 
‘Struggle to restore credibility after the crisis’, Financial Times, 4 December 2009, p. 28. 
866 On the growth of unemployment in Hungary between 1990-2006, see pp. 205-212 above. 
867 Eurostat Statistical Database. 
868 WIIW, Current Analyses and Forecasts; Özlem Onaran, ‘From transition crisis to the global crisis: 
Twenty years of capitalism and labour in the Central and Eastern EU new member states’, Capital & Class, 
2011, Vol. 35, No. 2, Table 1, p. 217. 
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were coming out relatively unscathed from the crisis: the wealth of the 10 richest 
Hungarians grew by HUF 124 billion (approximately US$ 557.5 million) in 2009.869  
 
 
Dominant Narratives of Hungary’s Vulnerability to the 
Crisis 
Having seen the velocity with which Hungary found itself entangled with the global 
economic crisis, we are forced to ask why it became so vulnerable to its negative effects? 
In order to answer this question, journalists, policymakers, businessmen and academics 
have provided a number of competing interpretations. Similar to elsewhere, these 
arguments range from the simplistic and ‘populist’ to the complex and specialised.870 Here, 
we focus on four distinct narratives, which have dominated mainstream discourse in 
Hungary. Below, we present the central aspects of these accounts.  
 
 
Corrupt Politicians and Greedy Bankers are to Blame  
The velocity with which the US sub-prime mortgages crisis unravelled into a global crunch 
left many of the world’s financiers, regulators and politicians dumbfounded. For the 
average citizen it was a mixed feeling of anger and bewilderness. Apart from seeking to 
grapple with how this could happen, the question on most people’s lips was who was to 
blame? Soon enough, the global news media were replete with examples of greedy bankers 
and corrupt politicians, at whom an accusing finger could be pointed.871  
 
In Hungary, this narrative places the culpability for the crisis on ‘corrupt communists and 
liberals’ (e.g. MSZP or SZDSZ politicians) or ‘greedy bankers’, which, in line with the 
endemic anti-Semitism in the region, is covertly or even openly alluded to as being Jews. 
They are the local agents of the dominant ‘globalo-capitalist world order’, which allegedly 
                                                
869 Napi Gazdaság, ‘A 100 leggazdagabb magyar’, 2010. 
870 For an excellent summary of the dominant narratives of the global crisis in the Anglo-Saxon world, see 
Noel Castree, ‘The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis: Narrating and Politicising a Calamity’, Human Geography, 
2010, Vol. 3, No. 1.  
871 The list of figures is undeniably long, but arguably nobody symbolises the greediness and corruption of 
bankers better than Bernard Madoff, the highly respected Wall Street investor, who was sentenced for 150 
years in prison after having run the biggest ‘Ponzi scheme’ in world history. The prosecutors claimed losses 
of US$ 65 billion on behalf of their clients (most of whom were bankrupt by then). 
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seeks to ‘plunder the [Hungarian] nation’.872 This argument has become popularised by 
different political forces on the Right and their intellectual acolytes, but it can also be 
traced in the views of some conservative businessmen.873 According to the division of 
labour between different right wing forces, the ‘moderate’ Right (e.g. FIDESZ) relentlessly 
reminds the electorate about the blame of successive socialist-liberal governments and 
their associated business circles in Hungary and abroad, whilst the far-right (e.g. Jobbik) 
seek to add a dose of anti-Semitism to the narrative.  
 
Seemingly ‘simplistic’ and ‘irrational’, it is not difficult to understand the attractiveness of 
these views when taking into consideration the miserable track record of the ruling 
socialist-liberal coalition and their associated business partners during their years in power. 
Aided by a plethora of media outlets, the national-conservative opposition sought 
relentlessly to remind the Hungarian electorate about the culpability of successive MSZP-
SZDSZ governments. In order to succeed, the Hungarian Right has been engaged in a 
conscious, protracted cultural and ideological battle, what Gramsci defined as a ‘war of 
position’, which has seen a drastic shift to the right of the Hungarian media landscape.874 
Ranging from the conservative Magyar Nemzet, the most popular daily newspaper in 
present-day Hungary and closely allied to FIDESZ, through the programmes of Hír TV, the 
country’s most popular news channel, to the openly far-right propaganda pumped out by 
the small media empire owned by Gábor Széles (one of the richest men in Hungary),875 
right-wing ideas permeate much of the Hungarian media landscape.876 
 
But the popularity of the ‘corrupt politicians and greedy bankers’ narrative in Hungarian 
society is not simply the result of the dominance of the right-wing media. Under 
Gyurcsány’s time in power, MSZP and SZDSZ politicians became increasingly 
synonymous with corruption.877 One of the most infamous corruption scandals exploded in 
the spring of 2008, when the Budapest Police launched an investigation against the 
                                                
872 László Bogár, Magyarország felszámolása, Budapest: Kairosz Kiadó, 2008. 
873 See Bogár, op. cit.; Árpád Kovács, ‘Összekeverték a dodzsemet a tankerhajóval’, in Álomcsőd. Interjúk a 
válságról, edited by József P. Martin and Iván Várkonyi, Budapest: Alinea Kiadó, 2010, pp. 103-116; or the 
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Committee.  
874 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp. 229-239. 
875 Figyelő, ‘A Széles birodalom’.  
876 Gáspár M. Tamás, ‘Az antifasizmus jövője’, Élet és Irodalom, Vol. 54, No. 13, 2 April 2010. 
877 Lengyel, Pretoriánusok kora, pp. 127-132. 
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management of the Budapest Public Transport Company (Budapesti Közlekedési Vállalat, 
BKV), on suspicions of embezzlement with public funds. By the summer of 2009, the 
‘BKV affair’ had expanded to cover the payment of generous redundancy payments to 
high-ranking MSZP and SZDSZ politicians, including the deputy Mayor of Budapest and 
MSZP politician Miklós Hagyó. As for the credibility of the socialist-liberal government 
and Prime Minister Gyurcsány, it had been in tatters ever since the latter’s infamous gaffe 
in September 2006, when he, using particularly foul language, admitted that the 
government had lied about the state of the economy in order to get elected.878 Support for 
the socialist-liberal coalition has been evaporating ever since. By the time of the general 
elections in April 2010, the level of public disillusionment and distrust in the government 
was so low that the national-conservative opposition could enjoy a comfortable ride back 
into power.  
 
As for the greediness of bankers, it is enough to invoke the name of former MNB 
Governor András Simor in order to understand why the ‘greedy bankers’ narrative easily 
strikes a chord with many ordinary Hungarian citizens.879 Simor’s monthly salary of 
roughly US$ 460,000 is not only obscene compared to average Hungarian salaries, but also 
more than twice as much as that of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke.880 The fact 
that Simor was awarded the prize of ‘Central Banker of the Year in 2010 for Emerging 
Europe’ by Euromoney, the global finance journal, only adds insult to injury to those who 
already feel that the burdens of the crisis have not been shared equally in Hungarian 
society.881  
 
Despite its popular appeal, it is not difficult to pinpoint the analytical shortcomings of the 
‘corrupt politicians and greedy bankers’ narrative. While it is true that shady politicians 
and self-aggrandizing financiers must take responsibility for their reckless actions, Castree 
is right to underline that ‘abstract[ing] them as a group from the wider political economy 
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879 Bloomberg Business Week, ‘Simor-Orban Battle Means Hungarian Policy Divisions Until 2013’, 16 July 
2010. 
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[only] serves to obscure a number of important factors [behind the crisis]’882. Quoting 
Castree again, it is also dubitable whether ‘greed’ is of much use as an explanatory value 
either, as it implies ‘some transhistorical human impulse that threatens to manifest itself in 
the absence of proper checks.’883 Nonetheless, the claim that corrupt politicians and greedy 
financiers were at fault for Hungary’s economic malaise has gained a very considerable 
popular appeal.  
 
Lax Regulatory Oversight   
Once economic commentators, politicians and policy experts recovered from their initial 
shock about the severity of the global crisis, the term ‘regulatory failure’ became one of 
their favourite explanations for its cause. The argument here is that lax fiscal or monetary 
oversight, or a combination of both, by regulators worldwide enabled finance to outgrow 
the constraints of the real economy. As a 2010 IMF report put it, ‘bad policies’, ‘overly 
expansionary macroeconomic settings and excessively optimistic views on prudential 
risks’, aggravated the effects of the crisis in CEE.884 
 
Here again, there is a mass of evidence for proponents to draw on. Examples of regulatory 
shortcomings – or in many cases a complete lack of regulation – were evident for many 
years, globally as well as regionally. Governments and various regulatory institutions in 
CEE were well aware of the dangers of rapid credit growth in their economies, but chose to 
turn a blind eye to the problem, in order to remain ‘competitive’ and maintain the illusion 
of ‘economic success’ for their electorate. In Hungary, experts and commentators have 
emphasised the lack of prudence in the banking system (foreign currency denomination of 
mortgage loans as the prevailing practice, excessive credit-to-deposit ratios, etc.) and a 
general unpreparedness for turbulence in financial markets (marked by an insufficient level 
of foreign exchange reserves in the central bank), as evidence of regulatory 
shortcomings.885  
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Whilst the ‘light touch regulation’ narrative has been less attractive than Interpretation 1 in 
the eyes of the Hungarian public, it is, as Castree points out, ‘polyvalent in the political 
sense’886. As such, it enables those who signed up to the fantasy of ‘self-regulating’ 
finance a chance to offer touching mea culpas in its name. Even the IMF – one of the 
strongest advocates of financial deregulation in the last two decades – recently offered its 
own apologies to the region, admitting that ‘with the benefit of hindsight, a more active 
policy response during the boom phase would have helped.’887 However, to the misfortune 
of the CEE economies, by the time the IMF realised its mistakes, it was already too late.  
 
For commentators that have maintained a critical stance towards neoliberal ‘market 
fundamentalism’, such as Joseph Stiglitz or Paul Krugman, the global economic crisis 
seemed to offer a rare opportunity to break with the hegemony of neoliberal ideas and 
provide proposals for how to tackle regulatory shortcomings. Building on the insights of 
Kenneth Galbraith, John Maynard Keynes, and Hyman Minsky, their proposals included 
the implementation of a ‘new system of financial regulation’, which would protect the 
public interest against the private agendas of profit-maximising banks. Other proposals 
included the passing of a new ‘Glass-Steagall Act’888, tougher capital adequacy 
requirements, reform of accounting standards, tighter restrictions on tax havens, greater 
consumer protection from ‘predatory lending’, the break-up of ‘too-large-to-fail’ banks, 
and the imposition of a ‘Tobin tax’ on certain cross-border financial transactions.889 In 
Hungarian debates, László Andor has been one of the most well-known representatives of 
these views. According to Andor, the onset of the global financial crisis revealed the 
weaknesses of the neoliberal economic model. Building on the insights of Keynes, has 
argued for the need of an alternative economic policies, which would increase state 
                                                
886 Castree, ‘The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis’.  
887 IMF, ‘The Credit Boom...’, p. 26. 
888 The name given to the 1933 US Banking Act, which imposed limits on commercial bank securities 
activities and affiliations between commercial banks and securities firms. From the early 1960s, US 
policymakers began to take measures to ‘repeal the Glass-Steagall Act’, as it was perceived to limit the 
ability of US banks to engage in the expanding trade of securities. The act was formally repealed in 1999, 
when the US Congress passed the ‘Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’, which eliminated legal barriers in the market 
between commercial banks, investment banks, securities firms, and insurance companies. As President 
Clinton famously noted after having signed the bill, ‘the Glass-Steagall Act is no longer appropriate to the 
economy in which we live’.  
889 See for example Paul Krugman, End this Depression Now!, New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2012 and 
Joseph Stiglitz, The Stiglitz Report: Reforming the International Monetary and Financial  Systems in the 
Wake of the Global Crisis, New York, NY: The New Press, 2010. 
 233 
economic intervention to promote employment growth, redistribution of income, and the 
achievement of long-term, ‘sustainable development’.890  
 
It should, however, be pointed out that criticism of neoliberal policies is not monopolised 
by progressive forces. Indeed, in what is the contradictory reality of Hungarian post-
transformation capitalism, neoliberal critique has increasingly become the home turf of the 
Right. As we shall see below, it has been Orbán’s new national-conservative government, 
which has taken the most concrete measures towards curbing the power of finance.  
 
 
Western-style (Neoliberal) Capitalism is to Blame   
The third argument has been voiced by those who prefer to trace the roots of the current 
crisis to the shortcomings of the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. The focus lies here on 
how a ‘fundamentalist’ belief in the virtues of free market capitalism enabled ‘speculative 
capital’ to break free from the boundaries of the nation-state, spurring a frantic race for 
profit, which ultimately led to the ruin of all. 
 
Again, representatives of this narrative across the world have come in all sorts of political 
colours. At the onset of the global financial crisis, French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
famously argued that ‘a certain idea of globalization is dying with the end of a financial 
capitalism’, and drew the seemingly straightforward ideological conclusion: ‘Self-
regulation, to fix all problems, is over. Laissez-fair is over’.891 The Nobel Prize-winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz also arrived at a similar conclusion:  
The world has not been kind to neo-liberalism, that grab-bag of ideas based on the 
fundamentalist notion that markets are self-correcting, allocate resources efficiently, and 
serve the public interest well. It was this market fundamentalism that underlay Thatcherism, 
Reaganomics, and the so-called “Washington Consensus” in favor of privatization, 
liberalization, and independent central banks focusing single-mindedly on inflation. … Neo-
liberal market fundamentalism was always a political doctrine serving certain interests. It 
was never supported by economic theory. Nor, should it now be clear, is it supported by 
                                                
890 Andor, Eltévedt éllovas, pp. 208-219. 
891 Sarkozy 2008, here cited in Steven Erlanger, ‘Sarkozy stresses global financial overhaul’. New York 
Times, 26 September 2008, p. C9. 
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historical experience. Learning this lesson may be the silver lining in the cloud now hanging 
over the global economy.892 
 
Narrative 3 thus argues the current crisis did not represent the bursting of yet another credit 
bubble, but indeed symbolised a ‘theological crisis for the neoliberal belief system’.893 
This argument was neatly summarised by the renowned globalisation critic Naomi Klein. 
In a speech at the University of Chicago, she argued that the financial crisis sweeping Wall 
Street,  
should be for Friedmanism what the fall of the Berlin Wall was for authoritarian 
communism: an indictment of ideology. It cannot simply be written off as corruption or 
greed, because what we have been living, since Reagan, is a policy of liberating the forces of 
greed to discard the idea of the government as regulator, of protecting citizens and 
consumers from the detrimental impact of greed, ideas that, of course, gained great currency 
after the market crash of 1929, but that really what we have been living is a liberation 
movement, indeed the most successful liberation movement of our time, which is the 
movement by capital to liberate itself from all constraints on its accumulation.894 
 
Similar sentiments have also been echoed in Hungary. One of the most renowned 
representatives of this view on the Left is the Hungarian-born American sociologist Iván 
Szelényi. In 2008, when the global economic crisis was still in its infancy, he passed a 
harsh judgement on neoliberalism and its apologists in Hungary and elsewhere in CEE:  
Now that the crisis of global finance capitalism shakes the world in its very foundations, 
when we experience an economic collapse of a magnitude not experienced since 1929-1933 
(a collapse that affects Hungary and in fact the entire European post-Communist region 
especially severely), the wisdom of the neoliberal path chosen by the post-Communist 
countries in 1989-90 appears highly dubious. Today, the ball got rolling from the United 
States, but it appears that it may trigger the greatest avalanche in this very region. 
Neoliberalism is in crisis in America as well, but it seems that post-Communist capitalism, 
which was more neoliberal than the neoliberals themselves, will have to pay twice the price 
for its … erroneous economic and social policy.895 
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Szelényi warned against premature claims about the ‘end of capitalism’, but argued for a 
‘qualitative revolution’ that moves beyond the neoliberal model of capitalism based on 
economic growth through mass consumption, towards a model encouraging ‘less 
consumption of goods with better quality’. For this vision to materialise, Szelényi 
acknowledged the need for stronger regulation by the state.896    
 
Yet, proselytising about the demise of laissez-faire capitalism and the return of the state 
has not been restricted to left-wing intellectuals. Indeed, one of the most vocal critics of 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism in Hungary has been none other than the current leader of the 
country’s national-conservative government, Prime Minister Orbán. In a speech delivered 
in July 2010, he spoke of the ‘crisis of Western capitalism’ (read: neoliberalism) caused by 
‘the dominance of speculative capitalism over productive capitalism in recent decades’. 
Equating the current crisis to a ‘crisis of Western civilisation’, the logical conclusion of 
this argument is that there is a need for a rediscovery of (Christian) ‘moral values’, 
accompanied by the return of the state in economic affairs.897 As we shall see in section 4, 
since coming back into power in 2010, the new FIDESZ-led government wasted little time 
in putting Orbán’s words into action. 
 
 
Macro-economic Imbalances are to Blame   
The fourth narrative seeks to move beyond the narrow scope of previous three 
interpretations. On a global level, this means placing the global crisis within a wider 
economic context. As Castree suggests, this involves folding ‘interpretations two and three 
together and show[ing] them to be … elements of a much larger story.’898  
 
Narrative 4 presupposes that the reasons why Hungary and other CEE economies were 
badly hit by the crisis cannot be reduced to single factors alone, but are the result of a 
combination of complex factors. According to Philippe Le Houerou, World Bank Vice 
President for Emerging Europe and Central Asia (ECA), the region’s vulnerability to the 
crisis was due to a combination of factors, including large current account deficits, high 
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levels of external debt, rapid credit growth and a consumption boom financed by foreign 
currency borrowing.899 Irrespective of political convictions, there is a general consensus 
among proponents of Interpretation 4 that these factors were, to a greater or lesser extent, 
all present in Hungary prior to the current crisis. Differences arise, however, regarding the 
causes that enabled these factors to develop. 
 
The proponents of neoliberal orthodoxy trace the reasons for Hungary’s vulnerability the 
global economic crisis to one or more of the following factors:  
• Doubts about the government’s fiscal policy (whether the government would be able 
to stick to its deficit reduction targets after years of though austerity); 
• Lack of ‘competitiveness’ vis à vis similar economies in the region and globally due 
to the failure of successive governments, on both sides of the political spectrum, to 
implement necessary ‘structural reforms’ in the economy; and (as a result) 
• The failure to switch to a new path of (sustainable) economic growth.  
 
In Hungary, former Minister of Finance László Békesi has been one of the most vocal 
representatives of these ‘Market Maoists’900. In a long article published on the eve of the 
2010 general elections in the liberal Hungarian weekly paper Élet és Irodalom, Békesi 
argued that Hungary’s economic problems were due to ‘erroneous’ government policies 
between 2001-2006, combined with the negative structural characteristics of the Hungarian 
economy.901 Instead of following policies of ‘sustainable growth’ (e.g. increasing exports 
and investments, while furthering household savings and fiscal stability), Békesi 
maintained that successive governments in Budapest led the economy onto a path of 
‘artificial growth’ by pursuing ‘voluntarist’ measures, which sought to increase domestic 
consumption through credit-based state spending and wage increases in excess of 
productivity growth. This lead to a ‘dramatic increase in public debt and seriously 
undermined the economy’s competitiveness.’ In addition, structural imbalances, with the 
Hungarian economy being ‘dominated by sectors that are sensitive to conjuctural changes’ 
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(e.g. car production, construction, commerce, electronics, and the tourism and services 
industry), which are usually severely affected by downturns in global demand, placed 
further strains on the country during the global crisis.  
 
Although we might concur with parts of Békesi’s diagnosis, his solutions sound less 
appealing. For Békesi and his neoliberal confrères, the panacea to Hungary’s economic ills 
lies in more, not less, neoliberalisation. As he made it clear, ‘There should only be as much 
planning as is absolutely necessary, whilst as much market as is absolutely possible.’ In 
order to achieve this, labour must, of course, be brought to its knees. Wage increases 
should therefore be tied to increases in productivity and the government should stimulate 
exports whilst maintaining a stringent stance in fiscal policy. Hence, the overall goal of 
economic policy in Hungary, ‘should not be the optimisation of distribution … but 
increasing competitiveness’.902 This programme resonates with the opinions of the more 
transnationally-oriented sections of Hungarian capital and can also be traced to the policy 
proposals of international bureaucratic organisations, such as the IMF, World Bank, and 
the EU.903 However, as the 2010 general elections revealed, it is highly unpopular with the 
Hungarian electorate.  
 
In its progressive version, Interpretation 4 places the Hungarian economy within a wider 
context, emphasising the macro-economic, geopolitical, and historical dimensions of its 
economic problems. Andor, for example, argues that the Hungarian crisis cannot be 
viewed in isolation from the increasing interdependence amongst the EU’s member states. 
Looking at the banking system of CEE, he notes that it is largely foreign owned 
(predominantly by Austrian, Italian, French, German and Swedish banks), which means 
that ‘a financial crisis in this region cannot be isolated from the rest of the EU.’904 Others, 
such as the Oxford-based Hungarian economist Péter Róna, have traced the problems of 
the Hungarian economy to its continuously high levels of underemployment. According to 
Róna, chronic underemployment is due to the lack of competitiveness of Hungarian 
corporations vis à vis the subsidiaries of transnational corporations. The lack of 
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903 See for example Gordon Bajnai, ‘Az ország sokat tanult ebből a válságból’, in Martin and Várkonyi, 
Álomcsőd, pp. 11-26. 
904 Andor, ‘Hungary in the Financial Crisis...’, p. 291. 
 238 
competitiveness of Hungarian firms, Róna argues, is ultimately due to a combination of 
bad monetary policies of the Hungarian central bank and the government’s lack of 
development strategies.905  
 
Ultimately, however, progressive commentators are left in an awkward situation: as they 
(justly) seek to defend the badly wounded welfare state from further neoliberal attacks, 
they become spellbound by the institutions which they protect, seeing in them the key 
agent of progressive change. Hence, it ends up following Narrative 3, calling for a more 
active state in economic affairs. But while shoring up the beleaguered welfare state is a 
noble cause to fight for, the problem with this view is that their solutions to the crisis 
remain within the framework of the existing system.  
 
To its credit, Interpretation 4 provides a much-needed macro-economic, geopolitical and 
historical dimension, which manages to highlight how global imbalances affect the 
Hungarian economy. However, in the end, the technical and abstract language of this 
interpretation means that it lacks the popular resonance of Interpretation 1 and 3. 
Therefore, as Castree points out, it is ‘operative only among those versed in the 
technicalities of the global political economy’906 – the type of people who read the 
Financial Times (or comparable business papers in Hungary, such as Heti Világgazdaság), 
IMF or World Bank reports or in books or academic essays on the global political 
economy.    
 
 
Towards an Alternative Account of the Crisis in 
Hungary …  
The current global economic crisis has highlighted the contradictory dynamics of capitalist 
development. As we have seen above, the effects of the crisis on individual economies and 
different regions have been variegated. The above outlined narratives all highlight 
interesting aspects behind Hungary’s vulnerability to the global crisis, however, none of 
them seem to provide a satisfactory account of how its recent economic malaise is 
                                                
905 Péter Róna, ‘Monetáris maszlag’, Népszava, 29 June 2009.  
906 Castree, ‘The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis’. 
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interlinked with the dynamics of the global economy. What they arguably lack is a sense of 
totality.  
 
There is a body of Marxist literature upon which a much more critical stance towards the 
negative effects of the global economic crisis on CEE economies can be constructed. At 
the heart of these analyses is an assumption that central concepts of Marxist political 
economy, such as ‘class’, ‘law of value’ and ‘competition’ should lie at the heart of an 
analysis of capitalism.907 The essence of such an approach is that the contradictory 
development of post-transformation economies cannot be understood sui generis, but 
needs to be considered in relation to the contradictory dynamics of the global economy 
and the international state system. In this section we seek to complement these insights by 
drawing on the notion of ‘uneven and combined development’, as developed originally by 
Leon Trotsky and in which there has recently been renewed interest.908   
  
This interpretation links Hungarian events to the complexities and contradictions of the 
global economy and the international state system. Conceiving of capitalist development as 
a dynamic process, which results from the interaction between economic change and 
political and social forces, the notion of uneven and combined development offers a 
framework upon which a non-deterministic account of the impact of the global crisis on 
Hungary and other political economies in CEE can be constructed. This narrative 
emphasises the importance of local conditions (historical and institutional dimensions and 
the role of the state) as crucial to the variegated ways these countries have been reinserted 
into the global economy. To paraphrase Brenner et al., the expansion of the logic of capital 
is always embedded within and reworks existing institutional landscapes through processes 
                                                
907 For Marxist interpretations of the transformation in CEE, see for example Hardy, Poland’s New 
Capitalism; Szalai, New Capitalism... and ’A rendszerváltástól a rendszerválságig’; Tamás, ‘Counter-
revolution against a counter-revolution’ and id. ‘A capitalism pure and simple’, 2008, Left Curve, No. 32, pp. 
66-75. 
908 Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution and id. The Permanent Revolution and Results and 
Prospects, London: Socialist Resistance Publishers, [1930 and 1906]/2007. For more recent debates on the 
relevance of combined and uneven development, see Jamie C. Allinson and Alex Anievas, ‘The Uses and 
Misuses of Uneven and Combined Development: an Anatomy of a Concept’, Cambridge Review of Intern-
ational Affairs, 2009, Vol. 22. No. 1, pp. 47-67; Alex Callinicos, ‘Does Capitalism Need the State System?’, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2007, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 533-549; Bill Dunn and Hugo Radice 
(eds.), 100 Years of Permanent Revolution: Results and Prospects, London: Pluto Press, 2006; Marcel van 
der Linden, ‘‘The “Law” of Uneven and Combined Development: Some Underdeveloped Thoughts’, Hist-
orical Materialism, 2007, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 145-165; Justin Rosenberg, ‘Globalization Theory: A Post 
Mortem’, International Politics, 2005, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 2-74; Justin Rosenberg and Alex Callinicos, 
‘Uneven and Combined Development: the Social-relational Substratum of “the International”?: An Exchange 
of Letters’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2008, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 77-112.  
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of capital accumulation.909 Hence, while capital, to quote Marx and Engels, seeks to ‘create 
a world after its own image’910, it does not represent a homogenizing process, but leads to 
variations across time and space. 
 
 
Capitalism as Uneven and Combined Development  
Common to Marx and Trotsky’s understanding of capitalism was the idea that it had to be 
understood as a ‘totality’, which unifies the world into a single interactive productive 
system under the dominance of capital. The modus operandi of this system is the ‘law of 
value’. As Hardy points out, this law has two aspects. On the one hand, competition means 
that ‘all producers have to produce with the minimum input of labour time’, while on the 
other, ‘it forces a tendency towards a normal rate of profit in all industries.’911 As 
capitalism expands across the world, aspects of uneven and combined development 
become visible between different societies. As Harman describes: 
The capitalist exploitation of labour dissolves all pre-existing social forms, transmuting them into 
elements of a single capitalist world. Every tangible object is continually being reduced to a simple 
expression of a single, unitary substance – abstract labour. Every element of unevenness is continually 
being combined with every other element of unevenness to provide the totality which is the world 
market.912 
 
Here we can discern how the theory of uneven and combined development can be 
connected to Marx’s concept of the law of value, a point recently explored in a stimulating 
essay by Colin Barker.913 His argument is based on the notion that under capitalism, 
‘Expanding productivity, creates a rapidly growing flow of commodities whose value must 
urgently be realised’, which forces capital to move beyond its national boundaries.914 The 
competition resulting from this process ‘translates into “international” pressure on the 
nations and industries of the entire world.’915 As Barker points out, once a world market 
built on the logic of capital accumulation has developed, the law of value imposes itself on 
                                                
909 Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, Nick Theodore, ‘Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, Modalities, Path-
ways’, Global Networks, 2010, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 182-222. 
910 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
[1848]/1992, p. 7. 
911 Hardy, Poland’s New Capitalism, pp. 37-38. 
912 Chris Harman, ‘Philosophy and revolution’, International Socialism, 1983, No. 21, p. 75. 
913 Colin Barker, ‘Beyond Trotsky: Extending Combined and Uneven Development’, in Dunn and Radice, 
100 Years of Permanent Revolution, pp. 72-87. 
914 Ibid., p. 80.  
915 Ibid. 
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those subject to its power with brutal ferocity, generating uneven and combined 
development in the process: 
The law of value, this modern expression of [uneven and combined development], is not merely a 
“description of regularities” but a prescriptive command, more … powerful in its real effects on 
behaviour than any edict or fatwa. It subordinates not only workers and employers, but the mightiest 
governments. Yet its forces derive, not from any powerful deliberative agency, but from the 
impersonal workings of the capitalist form of combined development.916 
 
Here we can trace the foundations of a crucial corollary feature of the law of value; what 
Marx described as the ‘tendency of the rate of profit to decline’. Barker argues that this 
concept seems to offer a ‘a neat dialectic’ with the theory of uneven and combined 
development, as it illustrates how ‘one process, accumulation, engenders through its very 
logic its opposite, devaluation.’917 This is the case, according to Barker, since the 
‘interaction of capitals, through the circuit of production and circulation’, is in itself based 
on relations between ‘unevenly advantaged capitals’, which leads to incongruities in the 
investment of new production, and hence tends ‘to cheapen commodities at the point of 
sale.918 Consequently, capitalists that are first to develop new production techniques, and in 
the process manage to bring down the value of associated commodities, deliver ‘a nasty 
shock’ to those who – for one reason or another – have remained with their old production 
methods.919 Left with outdated methods of production, these capitalists find – when they 
bring their products to the market – that the general price has decreased and their output of 
commodities (e.g. their capital) has diminished.920  
 
In many ways, this contradiction epitomises the paradoxical outcomes of the neoliberal 
transformation of Hungary and other ex-Soviet bloc economies, which on the one hand 
saw these economies being incorporated into the circuits of global capital, while on the 
other hand perpetuating uneven development both within these countries, as well as 
between them and the more advanced economies of the capitalist core. It is to the central 
features of this process that we now turn our attention. 
 
 
                                                
916 Barker, ‘Beyond Trotsky’, p. 81.  
917 Ibid. 
918 Ibid. 
919 Ibid. 
920 Ibid. 
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The Current Crisis as a Crisis in Neoliberalism with Hungarian 
Characteristics 
As we argued in the previous chapter, one of the key features of the neoliberal regime of 
accumulation that developed in Hungary after 1989 was the dominance of foreign capital 
of key sectors of the economy (with the notable exception of Slovenia, this was the case in 
other CEE economies as well). In the case of Hungary, we argued that the influx of foreign 
capital contributed to ‘uneven and combined development’. On the upside, it contributed to 
the arrival of multinational enterprises, which introduced new technologies and 
manufacturing activities, such as computing or car production, while the proportion of 
low-technology industries declined significantly.921 Foreign capital also contributed to a 
rapid shift in the direction of Hungary’s trade. Between 1989 and 1991 the share of 
Hungarian exports going to Soviet bloc markets decreased from 41 percent in 1989 to 19 
percent, while the share of total exports going to OECD countries rose to 70 percent.922 
Since then, these tendencies have become entrenched. As a result, the structure of the 
Hungarian economy became similar to those prescribed in neoclassical textbooks. Hence, 
for the adherents of neoliberal orthodoxy, Hungary represented a ‘success story’ of 
neoliberal transformation in the region. However, as Phaedrus, the Roman fabulist 
famously proclaimed, ‘Things are not always what they seem to be, and the first 
appearance deceives many.’ Similarly, Hungary’s reintegration with the global economy 
and growing resemblance in overall macroeconomic structure with advanced economies 
does not reveal some of the structural imbalances that have remained intact twenty years 
after Hungary’s formal transition to the market.  
 
The drawbacks of the Hungarian political economy’s dependence on foreign capital and 
export-led growth are visible in the overall structure of the economy: key sectors of the 
economy are controlled by foreign capital, while the internal market is very weak. This is 
notoriously the case of the banking sector, where the share of foreign banks in total 
banking assets was 82.9 percent in 2006, higher than Poland (74.3 percent) and Latvia 
(62.9 percent) and significantly higher than Slovenia (29.5 percent.923 While foreign 
capital holds a monopoly position in many parts of the Hungarian economy, the problems 
                                                
921 Gács, ‘Structural change and catching up’, p. 143; Szalavetz, Structural change – structural 
competitiveness, p. 6.  
922 Jeffries, Socialist economies and the transition to the market, p. 428.  
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that stem from this are aggravated by, what Szalai describes as, the ‘monocultural 
character’ of foreign capital, in the sense that the activities of multinational corporations 
are primarily geared towards the needs of Western European markets (in particular 
Germany, which is Hungary’s most important trade partner).924 According to estimates by 
Loránt, the profit extracted by MNCs from the Hungarian economy amounts to 6-7 percent 
of total GDP.925 As a further drawback, Pitti draws attention to the fact that MNCs focus, 
to a very large extent, on assembly-like activities that are generally easily replicable, rely 
on low-skilled labour and can (if necessary) be shifted abroad with a penstroke.926 
 
At the same time, Hungary’s reintegration with the global economy has come at a high 
social cost. Throughout the region, economic restructuring led to a ‘post-transition 
recession’, whose magnitude and duration even the World Bank admitted to was 
‘comparable to that of developed countries during the Great Depression, and for most of 
them it was much worse’.927 Economic output in Hungary only returned to its 1989 level in 
1999, but by then ordinary Hungarians had paid a heavy burden for the slump.928 In 1996, 
real wages and pensions were 24 respectively 30 percent below their 1989 levels.929 
Economic recession also resulted in rising income inequalities. The income of the highest 
10 percent of the population towards the final days of the Kádár regime was estimated 
around 4-5 times higher than the lowest one-tenth of the population. By 2003 the figure 
had risen to 8.4.930 In concrete terms, this translates into staggering differences in wealth: 
while the poorest 1 million Hungarians control a mere 3 percent, the richest 1 million own 
25-26 percent of national wealth.931  
 
With hindsight, the outcomes of Hungary’s politico-economic transformation thus appear 
highly uneven. The country has been integrated into the global economy as a semi-
peripheral player, with all the economic, political and social drawbacks that this entails. As 
the current crisis has revealed, this is a dangerous position to be in.  
 
                                                
924 Szalai, ‘A rendszerváltástól a rendszerválságig’. 
925 Loránt, ‘Magyarország eladósódásával...’. 
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Political Responses to the Crisis: Contextualising the Ascendancy of the 
Orbán Regime 
So, how have policymakers sought to respond to the unfolding crisis? When the crisis 
broke, Keynesian deficit spending was ‘rediscovered’ in the United States, China, and (to a 
lesser degree) in Europe. In the United States, the Bush Jr. administration introduced the 
2008 ‘Emergency Economic Stabilization Act’ (also known as the ‘Paulson Plan’) in order 
to bailout the US financial system. This was followed in February 2009, by the ‘American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act’, introduced by the recently installed Democratic 
President Obama, which provided an estimated US$ 787 billion fiscal stimulus package to 
the US economy through a combination of tax breaks and government spending on 
infrastructure, welfare and education programs. Simultaneously, the US Federal Reserve 
has engaged in successive rounds of ‘quantitative easing’932 – effectively meaning the 
printing of money and pumping it into the financial system, in order to stimulate the 
economy. Similarly, Chinese leaders reacted early to the crisis, launching a massive 
stimulus package of RMB¥ 4 trillion (US$ 586 billion) in November 2008, in order to 
maintain the impressive growth rates that have contributed to the spectacular rise of the 
Chinese economy in the last three decades.933 However, rather than alleviating the 
contradictions of ‘neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics’,934 it has in many ways 
intensified the contradictions of its economic model.935 In contrast to the measures adopted 
by the US and China, which were able to lessen the immediate effects of the crisis, the 
measures adopted by the EU have led to a further economic deterioration, resulting in what 
is now commonly referred to as the ‘Eurozone crisis’. The crisis has laid bare the 
contradictions inherent in the EU, which has been exacerbated by uneven and combined 
development and increasing inter-state rivalry.936 Although the European Commission 
announced the introduction of a € 200 billion stimulus package in November 2008, it was 
not only significantly smaller than similar packages introduced by the US and China, but 
also represented a combination of national programmes adopted by single EU states in 
                                                
932 Robin Harding, ‘Quantitative easing explained’, Financial Times, 3 November 2010.  
933 As Hardy and Budd point out, this effectively represented ‘the largest economic stimulus package in 
history, equivalent to 14 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).’ Cited in Jane Hardy and Adrian Budd, 
‘China’s Capitalism and the Crisis’, International Socialism, 2012, No. 133. 
934 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p. 120-151. 
935 Ho-Fung Hung, ‘America’s Head Servant? The PRC’s Dilemma in the Global Crisis’, New Left Review, 
2009, Vol. 2, No. 60. 
936 RMF, The Eurozone Crisis.... 
 245 
competition with each other.937 As Marx famously put it in Volume 3 of Capital, the 
reaction of European states to the crisis has been akin to that of a band of ‘enemy 
brothers’.938 Importantly, while Keynesian fiscal stimuli have been relatively important in 
the US and China, it has been highly contested by powerful states within the EU (in 
particular the conservative governments of Germany and the UK).939 Instead, government 
intervention has primarily focused on bailing out the financial sector. As Becker and Jäger 
point out, ‘This corresponds with the interests of particular capitalist groups within the 
financial sector but also with parts of the upper middle classes. Moreover, this is 
compatible with the export oriented fractions of capital in the neo-mercantilist countries 
[such as Germany] which hope that the measures will revive the economy and their 
exports.’940 These measures, however, have resulted in further drops in economic output, 
employment, consumption and government revenues, while failing to reduce public debt 
and interest rates. As a result, of these measures developments in some countries, in 
particular Greece, are comparable to the Great Depression and leading to political and 
social tensions that might end up not only in the collapse of the Eurozone, but also the 
breakup of the EU. 
 
If ‘mild anti-cyclical policies’ have been limited in the advanced capitalist states of 
Western Europe, they were (with the notable exception of the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia) a rarity in CEE.941 On the one hand, this epitomises the (semi-)peripheral 
position of the region within Europe and the wider global economy. On the other hand, 
however, it reflects the ideological dominance role of neoliberal orthodoxy among ruling 
elites in the region.942 Thus, in Hungary, the semi-technocratic government of Gordon 
Bajnai, introduced harsh neoliberal austerity measures in 2009, in the hope that it would 
help ‘rebalance’ the Hungarian economy and enable the country to regain its ‘credibility’ 
among foreign investors. The new measures included: a two-year pay freeze for workers in 
the public sector, an increase in the value-added tax rate from 20 to 25 percent (except for 
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a number of basic consumer goods, such as bread and dairy products), the introduction of a 
tax on real estate, and the elimination of a number of welfare provisions, such as the 13th 
monthly pension and salary, a decrease in maternity leave from three years to two, and a 
reduction in state compensation for residential heating.943 These measures broadly 
coincided with the recommendations of the neoliberal Reform Union (Reformszövetség)944 
and the US management firm McKinsey, and were, at the time, backed by the centre-left 
parties in parliament, broad sections of the Hungarian capitalist class, the media, as well as 
international commentators and financial institutions.945  
 
Although the austerity measures introduced by the Gyurcsány and Bajnai governments 
managed to improve the budget deficit and the current account balance, they came at a 
high social cost and led to increasing public anger and disillusion with free market 
capitalism and democratic institutions. A comparative survey, carried out in 2009 by the 
Pew Research Center, captured the level of public disillusion and anger amongst ordinary 
Hungarians.946 According to the survey, a stunning 94 percent of those interviewed in 
Hungary regarded the economic situation in the country as ‘bad’, while 72 percent said 
they were ‘worse off now than under Communism’. These figures were significantly 
higher than those of many neighbouring countries, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, 
and Slovakia.947 Moreover, the survey also revealed that Hungarians were not only 
disillusioned with the economy, but with politics too: 77 percent of Hungarians were 
‘dissatisfied’ with the way democracy was working in their country, compared to 49 
percent of the respondents in the Czech Republic, 46 percent in Slovakia, and only 39 
percent in Poland.948 The study also showed an increasing opposition to EU membership in 
Hungary, with only 20 percent agreeing that EU membership was ‘a good thing’, while 43 
percent were neither in favour, nor against, but almost two-third (28 percent) responded 
that it was ‘a bad thing’. Hungarians were significantly more pessimistic towards the EU 
                                                
943 Lengyel, Pretoriánusok kora, p. 78-88; Pogátsa, ‘Hungary: From Star Transition Student’, p. 608. 
944 The Reform Union was founded in November 2008 in order to promote the formation and realisation of 
economic and social reforms in Hungary. Its members included the main interest groups of Hungarian 
business, renowned scientists, and influential neoliberal economists, such as László Békesi, Attila Chikán, 
and Péter Oszkó (as we noted in the previous chapter, the former two had served in high-ranking government 
positions in the 1990s, while the latter became Minister of Finance in the Bajnai government). The 
organisation terminated itself on 1 April 2009, after it considered to have reached its initial objectives. 
945 Lengyel, Pretoriánusok kora, p. 78. See also Heti Világgazdaság, ‘Kész a Reformszövetség programja: 1-
2 ezer milliárdos adócsökkentés’, 11 February 2009. 
946 Pew Research Center, Two Decades After the Wall’s Fall: End of Communism Cheered but Now with 
More Reservations, Washingtond, DC: The Pew Research Center, 2009. 
947 Ibid., pp. 3, 40 
948 Ibid., p. 32.  
 247 
than most of their neighbours in the region, with 63 percent in Poland, 58 percent in 
Slovakia, and 45 percent in the Czech Republic holding a positive view.949 In conjunction 
with this, support for the ruling MSZP and their long-time coalition partner, the 
(neo)liberal SZDSZ was reaching record-low levels.950 
 
Figures like these arguably indicate that Hungary’s impasse was (again) extending beyond 
a ‘conjunctural crisis’ (e.g. the ‘normal’ downturn of a capitalist business cycle), to what 
Gramsci described as a ‘crisis of authority’, or an ‘organic crisis’. Confronted with such a 
situation, the political system seeks to free itself from representative structures and the 
rules of parliamentary democracy. Gramsci spoke of ‘Caesarism’ or ‘Bonapartism’, in 
which ‘a great historical personality is entrusted with the task of “arbitration” over a 
historico-political situation characterised by an equilibrium of forces heading towards 
catastrophe’, as potential solutions to the crisis.951 As Gramsci noted, Ceasarism or 
Bonapartism can take both progressive and reactionary forms: Ceasar and Napoleon I were 
examples of ‘progressive Ceasarism’, while Louis Bonaparte (Napoleon III) and Bismarck 
personified ‘reactionary Ceasarism’.952 However, ‘Ceasarist’ or ‘Bonapartist’ solutions can 
also prevail in a parliamentary democracy, where they usually take the form of ‘grand 
coalitions’, which directly connect the economic and sectoral interests of the ruling classes 
with fractions of the political elite. In comparison with the Bonapartist phenomenon, which 
was personalised and confined to the 19th century, these solutions offer greater flexibility 
in constructing a power bloc that bypasses, or significantly alters, representative arbitration 
and electoral legitimacy, without breaking explicitly with the existing parliamentary 
framework.953 
 
In our view, it is within this context that the return to power of the national-conservative 
FIDESZ party, headed by Viktor Orbán, needs to be situated. As we noted above, support 
for the socialist-liberal coalition had been evaporating ever since 2006, when the 
Gyurcsány government backtracked on its electoral manifesto of ‘reform sans austerity’ 
                                                
949 Pew Research Center, Two Decades After the Wall’s Fall, p. 67.  
950 According to one opinion poll, carried out by Medián in March 2009 (one year prior to the general 
elections), support for the MSZP was at record-low 16 percent (the lowest in ten years), while support for the 
(neo)liberal SZDSZ was below the 5 percent threshold for entering parliament. See Medián, ‘Van még 
lejjebb?’, 18 March 2009; Népszabadság, ‘Rossz az irány – mondja a magyarok 91 százaléka!’, 18 March 
2009.    
951 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 219. 
952 Ibid., p. 219. 
953 Ibid., pp. 210-223, 275-276. 
 248 
and instead went ahead with the introduction of a neoliberal austerity programme. Hugely 
unpopular with the electorate following the revelation of his (in)famous ‘lie speech’ in 
September 2006, Gyurcsány finally stepped aside in March 2009, when it became clear 
that he lacked support with the MSZP for further neoliberal reforms. However, instead of 
calling for early elections – a move that was advocated by the President of Hungary László 
Sólyom –, the MSZP decided to form a caretaker government of non-elected ‘experts’. 
Initially, the MSZP initially asked the former Governor of the MNB, György Surányi, to 
form a technocratic government, but he declined due to a lack of support from FIDESZ, 
the main opposition party.954 In the midst of all the confusion, the MSZP eventually turned 
to the young, but uncharismatic Gordon Bajnai, a former Minister of National 
Development and Economy and ex-business partner to Gyurcsány, who took charge of a 
semi-technocratic government in mid-April 2009. In order to ‘regain the trust’ of 
international financial markets and foreign investors, Bajnai introduced further neoliberal 
reforms. However, while these measures managed to the steer the country away from the 
risk of immediate economic collapse, they did not ‘stop the rot’ of the MSZP and the 
SZDSZ.  
 
The collapse of the socialist-liberal vote was confirmed in the 2010 general elections, 
which saw the share of the MSZP vote falling by more than 23 percent compared to the 
2006 general elections (from 43.2 to 19.3 percent), while the (neo)liberal SZDSZ failed to 
get into parliament altogether (as did the other main party of the transition, the 
conservative MDF, led by Lajos Bokros). Instead, the main winner was the political Right, 
with the national-conservative FIDESZ-KDNP ‘coalition’,955 led by Viktor Orbán, 
obtaining 52.7 percent of the votes and a two-thirds supermajority in parliament, while the 
far-right Jobbik party became the third largest party in parliament with 16.7 percent of the 
vote and 46 MPs.956 The result of the local elections in the autumn of 2010 confirmed that 
FIDESZ had consolidated its power in Hungarian politics and that it had virtually no 
political opposition to speak of.957  
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According to Orbán, the victory of FIDESZ constituted a ‘revolution at the ballot box’ and 
the overthrow of ‘the old system of corrupt oligarchs’ and its replacement with a new 
system: ‘the system of national cooperation’.958 Since coming into power the new 
FIDESZ-led government has thus sought to carry out a root-and-branch transformation of 
Hungarian society through the means of ‘work’, ‘law and order’, and ‘family’, in order to 
overcome the failures of the transformation (in particular the last eight years of socialist-
liberal rule).959 In the sphere of the economy, this has meant an expansion of the agenda of 
‘neoliberal populism’, which was pursued by the first Orbán government between 1998-
2002 (described in detail in the previous chapter). As part of its wider aim of restoring the 
‘competitiveness’ of the Hungarian economy and to entice some of the long-term 
unemployed back into work, the new government seeks to create a new, ‘work-based’ 
economy based on a strong, property-owning middle class. As set out in a number of 
ambitious plans and programmes, such as the Széchényi Plan II960 and the Széll Kálmán 
Plan I and II,961 this is to be achieved through the provision of state subsidies to Hungarian 
firms (especially small- and medium sized enterprises in agriculture, car manufacturing, 
construction, food processing, and the tourism industry), the introduction of a highly 
regressive 16 percent flat tax rate,962 the elimination of corruption and unnecessary red 
tape leading to market distortions, along with strict adherence to a balanced budget. These 
measures have been accompanied by a reformation of the welfare system that includes the 
introduction of a highly regressive, new workfare programme, which obliges the 
unemployed to accept job offers from the local government or, in the case that no work is 
available, try to survive on a replacement allowance that is below the minimal salary. 
                                                
958 Viktor Orbán, ‘Forradalom történt a szavazófülkékben’, speech at Vörösmarty Square, Budapest, 
Hungary, 25 April 2010. 
959 GoH, A Nemzeti Együttműködés Programja, Budapest: Government of Hungary, 22 May 2010. 
960 The new Széchényi Plan was launched by the Orbán government in Januay 2011. It represents essentially 
an updated version of the original Széchényi Plan, introduced by the first Orbán government in 2001. 
961 The plans, which are named after conservative politician and Prime Minister (1899-1903) Kálmán Széll, 
seek to outline a programme of ‘structural reform’ with the aim of reducing the public dept and foster 
economic growth. The first plan was revealed in March 2011, while an updated version was presented in 
April 2012 and later accepted by parliament. 
962 According to a recent study by Tóth and Virovácz (2013), two economists connected to the conservative 
Századvég foundation (the latter is a researcher at the foundation, while the former worked there previously), 
the tax reform introduced by the FIDESZ-KDNP government in 2010 has reduced state revenue with HUF 
444 billion per year. Almost three-fourths of this amount (74 percent) benefited the wealthiest 20 percent in 
society. While the study confirmed what many ordinary Hungarians already believed to be a fact, it has been 
discredited by the right-wing media, as well as, more surprisingly, by the management of Századvég, which 
has distanced itself from the study, arguing it ‘does not reflect the position [of the foundation]’. See Csaba 
Tóth and Péter Virovácz, ‘Winners and Losers: An assessment of the Hungarian flat tax reform with micro-
simulation’, Public Finance Quarterly, 2013, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 369-385 
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Through these measures the government aims to create one million new jobs by 2020.963 
While these measures have come under some (half-hearted) criticism from the socialist-
liberal opposition in Budapest and Western journalists, they have resonated with the 
interests of powerful sections of Hungarian capital.964  
 
Simultaneously, the new Orbán government has sought to ‘renew’ and ‘broaden’ 
Hungary’s economic connections. On the one hand, this is to be achieved by opening the 
Hungarian economy towards the east, in particular the rapidly developing economies of 
China, India, and Russia, while, at the same time, seeking to ‘maintain[…] the benefits of 
EU membership.’965 Orbán recently confirmed the strategic shift in Hungarian trade and 
production during a visit to India, where he announced that his government aims to 
increase the share of Hungary’s exports to non-European countries from 12 to 33 percent 
by 2018.966 On the other hand, the Orbán government has been waging a persistent guerre 
de mots with carefully selected fractions of ‘foreign’ capital. Thus, in July 2010, the 
government, fearful of losing electoral support, refused the IMF’s proposal to implement 
further austerity measures and opted instead to seek funds directly from global financial 
markets. The IMF and its acolytes were flabbergasted by the government’s decision, 
labelling Orbán a ‘maverick’ and ‘populist’.967 Critics of the IMF, on the other hand, were 
enthralled. The American economist Mark Weisbrot even went so far as to argue that 
Hungary was ‘pioneering an alternative to austerity’ in Europe.968 Apologists of 
neoliberalism in Hungary and abroad have since been infuriated even further by the 
government’s decision to bring down the budget deficit and the foreign debt through 
‘unorthodox’ measures, including the imposition of levies (so called ‘crisis taxes’) on 
banks and financial institutions, telecommunications, energy and large retail companies 
(all of which are mostly foreign owned) for a period of three years, and the re-
centralisation of private pension funds. However, while neoliberal economists, foreign 
                                                
963 GoH, A Nemzeti Együttműködés Programja, p. 17. 
964 In fact, the government’s programme includes a joint statement between Viktor Orbán and László 
Parragh, the Head of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Magyar Kereskedelmi és Ipar-
kamara, MKIK), in which the two express their agreement with the broader aims of the government’s 
economic programme. Ibid., pp. 41-42. See also the interview with Sándor Demján in Martin and Várkonyi, 
Álomcsőd, pp. 37-50. 
965 GoH, op. cit., pp. 39-40. 
966 Viktor Orbán, ‘Növelni kell az Európán kivüli magyar exportot’, MTI, 17 October 2013.  
967 Financial Times, ‘Hungary Blunders’ (editorial), 20 July 2010. 
968 Mark Weisbrot, ‘To Viktor go the spoils: how Hungary blazes a trail in Europe’, The Guardian, 9 August 
2010.  
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investors, and the business press have been fuming against these moves,969 they have been 
popular with the Hungarian electorate.  
 
Orbán’s ‘ballot box revolution’ has, however, not only been limited to the economy, but 
extends to wider spheres of Hungarian society too. As Orbán explained at a speech in 
2010, the constitutional revolution of FIDESZ was a ‘bourgeois revolution’ (polgári 
forradalom), which, unlike the blasphemous Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, had managed 
to overthrow the old regime without any bloodshed, while, at the same time, successfully 
‘channelling a revolutionary morale into Hungarian democracy’.970 In order to consolidate 
its rule, the new national-conservative government in Budapest has moved with a swiftness 
and assertiveness akin to Louis Bonaparte himself, in order to create the Hungary that the 
Right has craved for decades. As Walter Mayr explains in Der Spiegel, ‘The package of 
laws, ordinances and guidelines to define labor policies, which Orbán got off the ground in 
only 15 months reads like the minutes of a top-down coup d’état.’971 To begin with, Orbán 
handed loyal party apparatchiks long-term posts in the corridors of power, including the 
President of the Republic, the State Audit Office, and the Constitutional Court, as well as 
top positions in cultural organisations (the state media, the film industry, and 
universities).972 To cement its power further, the FIDESZ-KDNP coalition in parliament 
passed an incredible 363 new laws between May 2010 and December 2011 (about one new 
law for every two working days!), including reforms to the electoral law, the judicial 
system, the functioning of the central bank, and a highly controversial media law.973 The 
media law, passed in August 2010, created a new media authority (the National Media and 
Info-communications Authority, NMHH) and empowered a five-member Media Council 
with the responsibility to maintain ‘the undisturbed operation, in compliance with 
pertaining legislation in force, of the media and the markets for electronic 
communications, postal and information technology services’, as well as ‘establishing and 
maintaining fair competition’, and ‘supervising the compliant behaviour of service 
providers.’ The members of the council are elected for nine years by a two-third 
supermajority of the FIDESZ-dominated parliament and a well-known FIDESZ politician 
                                                
969 For example, the Financial Times described the government’s levy on banks and financial institutions as 
‘the most punitive considered anywhere in the world’. See Chris Bryant, ‘Budapest’s Mixed Messages Sow 
Confusion’, Financial Times, 23 July 2010. 
970 Viktor Orbán, ‘Új kezdet’, speech at the ‘Polgári Piknik’ in Kötcse, Hungary, 30 May 2010. 
971 Walter Mayr, ‘The Goulash Archipelago: EU Remains Silent as Hungary Veers Off Course’, Der Spiegel, 
19 August 2011. 
972 Ibid. 
973 Raymond Zhong, ‘The Descent of Hungary’, Wall Street Journal, 22 March 2012. 
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was appointed Director of the organisation.974 The organisation, which is thus a virtual 
one-party authority, has the right to deny media outlets of their licenses and impose heavy 
fines of up to almost US$ 1 million on journalists and media outlets for publishing articles 
with ‘improper content’ – and it alone has the right to decide what is ‘improper’.975 The 
media law has been widely criticised by the parliamentary opposition in Hungary and the 
EU for jeopardising the freedom of the press. In response to the criticisms, the government 
has modified the law twice, but according to Freedom House, the renowned international 
press freedom organisation, ‘the laws do not adequately protect media independence.’976 
 
The radical changes introduced by the Orbán government were finally hardwired into the 
backbone of the Hungarian state on 1 January 2012, when Hungary’s new constitution 
came into force. The new constitution, known as ‘The Fundamental Law of Hungary’ 
(Magyarország Alaptörvénye), was drawn up in less than a year and with little regard for 
non-conformist opinions.977 According to Orbán, the 2010 elections represented the defeat 
of the old system and the establishment of a new one, and this historical act necessitated 
the establishment of a new constitution to carve in stone the goals of the revolution. 
However, the new constitution has come under widespread criticism by sceptics in 
Hungary and abroad, who have argued that it stands out as a model for a new type of 
reactionary democracy.978 Three points, which appear especially problematic, stand out in 
particular. First, the new constitution claims that Hungary had no ‘self-determination’ in 
the period between 19 March 1944 (the beginning of the Nazi occupation of Hungary) and 
2 May 1990 (the formation of the first democratically elected parliament since 1945). By 
so doing, the new national-conservative government in Budapest explicitly legitimises the 
authoritarian Horthy regime, which ruled Hungary between 1920-1944. Amongst its many 
wrongdoings, the Horthy regime fought on the side of Nazi Germany in World War II and 
was responsible for serious war crimes in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as 
sending hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews to certain death in Nazi concentration 
                                                
974 Korkut, Liberalization Challenges in Hungary, p. 181. 
975 Eric Follath and Christoph Schult, ‘Media Law Outrage: Hungary’s “Orbanization” is Worrying Europe’, 
Der Spiegel, 28 December 2010; Freedom House, ‘Hungary’, in Freedom in the World 2013, Washington, 
DC: Freedom House, 2013; Kim L. Scheppele, ‘Hungary’s Free Media’, New York Times, 14 March 2012. 
976 Freedom House, op. cit.. 
977 Korkut, op. cit., p. 182. 
978 László Bruszt, ‘Az 1989-es átmenet alkotmánya és az újjászületés dokumentuma’, Népszabadság, 11 May 
2011; Zoltán Fleck et al., ‘Vélemény Magyarország Alaptörvényéről’, Élet és Irodalom, Vol. 55, No. 26, 11 
June 2011; Korkut, op. cit.; Gáspár M. Tamás, ‘Az utolsó tengelyhatalom’, Magyar Narancs, No. 23, 6 June 
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camps. As G.M. Tamás has noted in a recent critique, all forms of legal complications arise 
from this, including the negation of one of the basic principles of the UN Charter and the 
UN Declaration of Human Rights: the commitment against fascism.979 Second, the new 
constitution makes explicit references to Christianity and St. Stephen’s Holy Crown as 
symbols of the continuity of the Hungarian state, codifies an ethnicised idea of citizenship, 
defines marriage as ‘a union between man and woman’, and promotes the family as ‘the 
basis of the nation’s survival.’980 Third, and finally, Hungary’s new constitution codifies 
some of the central tenets of neoliberalism, including the enforcement of a balanced budget 
and a ‘debt brake’ (limiting the maximum level of public debt to 50 percent of GDP), 
while, at the same time, linking the provision of social rights to the fulfilment of 
obligations, which contribute to the performance of the Hungarian state.981 On the basis of 
what I argued above, the new Hungarian constitution appears to be the final step in the 
Orbán government’s attempt to hardwire a new, authoritarian neoliberal regime in 
Hungary.  
 
At the time of writing (mid-2014), this attempt seems to have been relatively successful. 
After 1.7 percent of negative economic growth in 2012, the Hungarian economy finally 
turned the corner and grew by 1.1 percent in 2013. This trend seems to have sustained 
itself in the first half of 2014, with the economy growing by 1.1 and 0.8 percent 
respectively in the first two quarters of the year.982 At the same time, unemployment is 
officially down to 8 percent (from a high of 11.8 percent in the first quarter of 2010), while 
inflation stood at a record-low 0.1 percent in July 2014.983 In addition to this, in August 
2013, the Orbán government repaid Hungary’s 2008 loan to the IMF (ahead of schedule). 
Thus, as the government relentlessly reminded the electorate in the run-up to the 2014 
general elections: ‘Hungary is performing better [read: under the Orbán government].’984 
The message seems to have been convincing: in the 2014 general elections, the ruling 
                                                
979 Tamás, ‘Az utolsó tengelyhatalom’.  
980 See article L of The Fundamental Law. 
981 See articles N and O of The Fundamental Law.  
982 Source: Eurostat Statistical Database (last accessed on: 12 September 2014).  
983 Source: KSH Statistical Database (last accessed on: 12 September 2014).  
984 GoH, ‘Magyarország jobban teljesít’, Budapest: Government of Hungary, 2013. Available on: 
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FIDESZ-KDNP coalition won 44.5 percent of the votes, enabling it to regain its two-third 
supermajority in parliament.   
 
Having said this, there are nevertheless important limitations to the accumulation regime 
introduced by the Orbán regime. To begin with, forecasts for the global economy continue 
to portray sluggish economic growth for the coming decade – the lowest since the 1930s. 
Making matters worse, even if the global economy would pick up, any recovery in 
Hungary is ‘likely to be modest’, as the potential for economic growth ‘is held back by 
weak investment, low employment among low-skilled workers and shortcomings in labour 
and product markets’, according to the OECD.985 Finally, the neoconservative economic 
policies pursued by the Orbán regime have widened income inequalities between the rich 
and the poor.986 With this in mind, from the viewpoint of the Hungarian working class, the 
outlook in Budapest does not look so bright after all. 
 
 
Conclusion  
In 1989 ‘actually existing socialism’ came to an abrupt end in CEE. In the two decades that 
have passed since, the countries of the region (indeed the whole world) have lived in a 
neoliberal fantasyland. The zeitgeist of this period was summed up by the utopian ‘end of 
history’ thesis of the neoconservative American philosopher and political economist, 
Francis Fukuyama. According to Fukuyama, the downfall of Stalinism represented an, 
‘unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism’, marking not only the ‘triumph of 
West’, but also ‘the end of history as such’.987 
 
The global economic crisis that began in 2007-2008 has questioned the triumphalism of 
neoliberal capitalism. As we demonstrated in section 2, the crisis revealed the weak 
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foundations of the specific neoliberal regime of accumulation that has been constructed in 
Hungary since 1989. At first sight, Hungary’s vulnerability to the current crisis appears to 
be contingent on the fluctuations of the world market. Thus, fanatic Market Maoists or 
born-again Keynesians are calling for ‘market reforms’ or more ‘state-led development’ in 
the belief that these measures will put the economy ‘back on track’.  
 
In section 4 we provided our own assessment of Hungary’s vulnerability to the global 
economic crisis, and argued that it reflected the shortcomings inherent in the neoliberal 
regime accumulation that had been consolidated since 1989. Under pressures from the 
world market, successive governments in Budapest, irrespective of their position on the 
political spectrum, pursued policies of liberalisation, privatisation, and marketisation in the 
desperate hope that these would help to turn around the economy and bring higher living 
standards to ordinary Hungarians. However, these reforms have failed to live up to their 
promises. Not surprisingly, this has led to widespread public anger and disillusion with 
free market capitalism and parliamentary democracy, as demonstrated by public opinion 
polls. Capitalist triumphalism thus seems to be giving way to the dystopia of ‘capitalist 
realism’.988 As we argued, it is against this background the we need to understand the 
policies pursued by the national-conservative FIDESZ-KDNP coalition, under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Orbán, since 2010. In our view, the Orbán regime represented 
an attempt to overcome the ‘organic crisis’ of Hungarian capitalism, through a 
combination of authoritarianism and neoliberalism. While this thesis does not attempt to 
assess the balance sheet of the Orbán regime, we claimed that, until mid-2014, it had been 
relatively successful in its attempt to construct hegemony for a new, authoritarian 
neoliberal regime.  
                                                
988 See Mark Fischer, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?, Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2009, for 
an excellent diagnosis of the term. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to develop a deeper understanding of the origins of 
Hungary’s neoliberal transformation and to analyse the contradictory and variegated 
development of the Hungarian political economy since the ‘transition’ in the 1980s to the 
current crisis. Thus, the main research questions asked in this thesis were: How can we 
better understand the neoliberal transformation of the Hungarian political economy? Who 
were the central agents of neoliberal doxa, what methods did they use in order consolidate 
neoliberalism in Hungary, and what were the main outcomes? What explains Hungary’s 
vulnerability to the global economic crisis and in what way is it relevant to the current 
conjuncture? This Conclusion will seek to answer the above questions in summarised 
form, while also pointing to some of the broader lessons that can be learned from the 
Hungarian case study.  
 
 
Rethinking the Political Economy of Neoliberal Transformation in 
Hungary  
This thesis has offered a theoretically informed and empirically innovative analysis of 
what has arguably constituted some of the most important events in the history of the late 
20th and early 21st century. The ‘double transformation’, from bureaucratic central 
planning and authoritarian regimes to a market economy and liberal democracy, in 
Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe was not simply the predictable outcome of a 
failed economic model, or the victory of liberalism over ‘totalitarian’ regimes, as argued 
by neoliberal economists. Nor was it a straightforward outcome of the ideological attack of 
‘free-market fundamentalism’ on the welfare state in its various forms (Keynesianism, 
‘socialism’, or import-substitution in the ‘Third World’), as argued by many institutionalist 
scholars. When conceptualised in isolation from wider developments in the capitalist 
 257 
world economy and international state system, orthodox approaches within the 
transformatology literature offer theoretically limited and empirically questionable 
conceptions of the ‘double transformation’ in Hungary and elsewhere in CEE.  
 
Drawing on central concepts within Marxist political economy, in particular the theory of 
state capitalism, as well as novel empirical insights from primary sources in Hungary, we 
argued instead that the neoliberal transformation in Hungary (and elsewhere in the region) 
needs to be understood in relation to wider changes in the capitalist world economy since 
the end of World War II and, in particular, the reconfiguration of the world economy 
following the crisis of global capital accumulation in the mid-1970s. When viewed in this 
light the nominally ‘socialist’ economies in Eastern Europe showed marked similarities 
with the ‘capitalist’ economies in the West: the separation of the means of production from 
the producers, wage labour and its ‘subsumption’ to capital, brutal exploitation, hierarchic 
division of labour, money, rent, and the feverish drive to accumulate capital – an 
imperative derived from the systemic pressures of economic and geopolitical competition 
with the West. However, as we argued in Chapter 2, this regime of accumulation was 
neither ‘irrational’, nor ‘unique’ to ‘Soviet-style economies’. Rather, the tendency towards 
state intervention in the economy was something that was noticeable to varying degrees 
throughout the capitalist world economy, in particular in more ‘backward’ economies, in 
the period of ‘state capitalism/financial capitalism’ (1873-1929/45) and ‘“pure” state 
capitalism’ (1945-1973). In the case of Hungary, state intervention in the economy became 
increasingly important during the interwar years, and this trend was intensified in the 
aftermath of the World War II, as policymakers in Budapest turned to the state in order to 
reconstruct the war-ravaged Hungarian economy. Following the gradual ‘Sovietisation’ of 
Hungary in the late 1940s, this trend was intensified. 
 
Although notoriously oppressive and exploitative, the Soviet model of late-capitalist 
development proved relatively successful in Eastern Europe. Similar to elsewhere, 
Hungarian policymakers in the 1950s and 1960s could boast of impressive economic 
growth rates, as state-led development ‘from above’ – emphasising rapid capital 
accumulation through investment in heavy industry, allocation by central planning, relative 
autarchy, and an extensive use of political and ideological incentives in order to increase 
production – achieved rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, accompanied by a 
concomitant rise in living standards. However, by the early 1960s, the limitations of the 
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model were becoming visible, as the sources of ‘primitive accumulation’ (vast reserves of 
labour) were coming to an end. Throughout the Soviet bloc there were now increasing 
debates about the need for economic ‘reform’. In Hungary, the quest for how to ‘perfect 
the economic mechanism’ was officially launched in 1966 when the Kádár regime 
announced plans to introduce a ‘comprehensive reform’ of the economy, known as the 
‘New Economic Mechanism’ (NEM). As we described in detail in Chapter 3, the NEM 
was prepared by a working group, including renowned reform economists (Tibor Liska, 
János Kornai, and Márton Tardos) and advocates of ‘market reformism’ within the ruling 
MSZMP (Rezső Nyers, Jenő Fock, and István Hetényi). Officially introduced on 1 January 
1968, the NEM came to be known as ‘the most ambitious economic reform programme 
ever undertaken in a Warsaw Pact country’989.  The reforms brought radical changes to the 
Hungarian economy, including greater autonomy to managers of state-owned enterprises in 
production and investment decisions, a more active role of world market prices in the 
economy, a differentiated wage system in the workplaces, and a gradual opening of the 
Hungarian economy to foreign trade with advanced ‘capitalist’ states in the West. The 
hope of Hungarian policymakers was that these reforms would lead to improvements in 
efficiency, spur productivity growth, and raise living standards, thereby enabling the Kádár 
regime to maintain its delicate ‘social contract’ with Hungarian society. Although 
relatively successful (in economic terms), the NEM was gradually scaled back after 1972, 
following increasing political pressure from ‘conservative’ sections of the ruling MSZMP 
and wider layers of Hungarian society (including managers of state-owned enterprise, the 
official trade union bureaucracy, and sections of the working class), as well as from 
Moscow and other Soviet bloc regimes.   
 
But market reformist ideas did not remain in the ideological freeze box for long. The onset 
of the global economic crisis in 1973 and the subsequent decline in economic growth 
brought increasing pressures on policymakers on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The 
leaders of the Soviet bloc responded to these pressures by seeking greater integration with 
the capitalist world economy through the mechanisms of foreign trade and export-led 
growth. This was to be achieved through a policy of importing technologically advanced 
goods from the West, in return for industrial and agricultural products going in the other 
direction. The rapid rise in imports would be paid by loans from Western governments, 
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private banks, and international financial institutions. The Kádár regime supported this 
policy, as foreign borrowing seemed feasible, while export-led growth provided a 
politically prudent alternative to the introduction of unpopular (and potentially 
destabilising) austerity measures. However, greater integration with the world economy 
left the state capitalist economies exposed to their own internal contradictions and the 
vicissitudes of the world market. As a result, the debt burden of the state capitalist 
economies rose significantly from the mid-1970s and onwards. Hungary became a 
forerunner within the Soviet bloc (albeit in a negative sense): by the late-1980s, the 
country’s external debt exceeded US$ 18 billion – the highest in the bloc and one of the 
highest in the world in per capita terms.  
 
As the economic crisis of the state capitalist economies deepened in the 1980s there were 
increasing calls within the Soviet bloc for economic and political reforms. Thus, in Chapter 
4 we demonstrated how the crisis of the Hungarian economy opened up a space, in which, 
what we defined as ‘proto-neoliberal’ social forces and ideas could emerge ‘organically’ in 
Hungarian society before the formal ‘transition’ from central planning to a free market 
economy in 1989. Drawing on semi-structured interviews and critical text analysis of 
proposed reform programmes, we identified a group of young and renowned radical reform 
associated with the influential Institute of Financial Research, the official research institute 
of the Ministry of Finance, as the ‘organic intellectuals’ of ‘proto-neoliberalism’ in late-
Kádárist Hungary. Also known as the ‘Dimitrov Square Boys’, in reference to the Karl 
Marx University of Economics in Budapest (where most its members received their 
education), the group included such famous economists as Lajos Bokros, György 
Matolcsy, and György Surányi, who would all go on to play key roles in the 
neoliberalisation of post-transition Hungary and other countries in the region. The 
’Dimitrov Square Boys’ were well-versed in neoclassical economics (the lingua franca of 
neoliberalism), worked in tight, secluded bureaucratic teams, were united by their personal 
ties and common sociological background, and were driven by a strong sense of ‘making 
history’. Moreover, they had close connections with ‘reform communists’ within the ruling 
MSZMP and leading members of the nascent opposition movement in Hungary, as well as 
international financial circles, which provided them with authority in reform debates at the 
time. In 1987, these economists published a programme for radical economic reform, 
known as ‘Fordulat és Reform’ (Turnabout and Reform). Commonly acknowledged by 
historians and political economists as the Absichtserklärung of neoliberalism in Hungary, 
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the document contained many ideas of the ‘transition’, such as the deregulation of markets, 
openness to foreign investment and international trade as the main engine of economic 
growth, the pursuit macroeconomic stability at all costs necessary, and the privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises (although only implicitly stated), which would soon become 
‘common sense’ among policymakers in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. As we 
concluded in Chapter 4, the essential aim of ‘Fordulat és Reform’ was to save the ailing 
Hungarian economy from the organic crisis of state capitalism, while retaining the class 
power on which it rested, in order to save the ailing Hungarian economy from the organic 
crisis of state capitalism. 
 
 
The Consolidation of Neoliberalism in Hungary After 1989: 
Contradictions and Limitations 
Shifting our focus to post-1989 developments, Chapter 5 analysed the consolidation of 
neoliberalism in Hungary in the period between 1990-2006. In most of the 
transformatology literature, Hungary was portrayed during this period as a ‘success story’ 
of (neoliberal) transformation and a model to be emulated by other economies in the 
region, by virtue of its rapid and peaceful transformation, which arguably resulted in the 
creation of a dynamic market economy, geared towards international trade and capital 
inflows, accompanied by the establishment of a stable democratic regime with relatively 
generous social welfare policies.  As an acknowledgement of Hungary’s ‘achievements’, 
the country obtained membership in a number of prestigious international and regional 
bureaucratic organisations, including the OECD (in 1995), the WTO (1996), and NATO 
(1999). Finally, on 1 May 2004, Hungary joined the EU (together with seven other ‘post-
communist’ states) to the tunes of Ludwig van Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’ – an event 
described by Alex Callinicos as the ‘pinnacle of neoliberalism’990 in Europe.  
 
While we agreed with the commonly held view that Hungary was in a certain sense a 
‘success story’ of neoliberal transformation in the region, our analysis differed from 
mainstream accounts on two important points. Firstly, while the consolidation of 
neoliberalism in Hungary and elsewhere in CEE was admittedly encouraged by external 
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17 October 2009. 
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forces and dynamics – as exemplified by the insistence of hegemonic Western 
governments and international financial institutions on ‘structural adjustment’ as 
conditions for further loans, or the extensive investment in the ideological underpinnings 
of neoliberalism, in particular by USAID, EU, and multinational corporations – we argued 
that domestic social forces (including sections of the Hungarian capitalist class, political 
elites, and technocratic economists with close links to domestic and international 
policymakers, financial institutions, and multinational corporations) played a key role in 
lubricating different economic actors towards the pursuit of a neoliberal regime of 
accumulation. Thus, we pointed out that, irrespective of their political colour, the 
neoliberal restructuring of the Hungarian political economy was pursued by all post-
transition governments in Budapest (albeit with differences in emphasis), in the hope that 
this would improve the ‘competitiveness’ of the ailing Hungarian economy and enable it to 
‘catch-up’ with more advanced capitalist states in Western Europe. The introduction of a 
radical austerity programme in 1995, popularly known as the ‘Bokros Package’ and 
recognised as the largest austerity package in the history of post-1989 Hungary, by the 
socialist-liberal government headed by Gyula Horn, revealed the unbending determination 
of Hungarian policymakers to pursue neoliberal reform, even if it came at a cost of the 
curtailment of democratic and social rights, rising social polarisation, public discontent, 
and almost certain electoral defeat. 
 
Second, in contrast to the prevailing view in the transformatology literature, we 
emphasised the inherent contradictions and limitations of what we described as 
‘neoliberalism with Hungarian characteristics’. Thus, although rapid deregulation and 
privatisation contributed to the inflow of much-needed foreign direct investment, which 
enabled the Hungarian economy to grow by an impressive annual rate of more than 4 
percent between 1997-2006, there was little evidence of this growth ‘trickling down’ to the 
popular masses. Instead, neoliberal restructuring led to chronic underemployment (creating 
what Marx termed the ‘industrial reserve army of labour’), growing polarisation of 
incomes both nationally and between different regions, and the entrenchment of poverty in 
Hungarian society (a particularly striking phenomenon among Hungary’s Roma minority). 
However, by the early 2000s, the sources of economic growth were diminishing, as 
inflows of foreign direct investment were decelerating in relative terms due to increasing 
inter-state competition both among the CEE economies and globally, following the rapid 
rise of China as a manufacturing powerhouse in the world economy. This was 
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accompanied by increasingly bitter electoral rivalry between social-liberal and national-
conservative political forces. In the autumn of 2006, public discontent with unpopular 
austerity measures, dishonest politicians, and the wider failures of the ‘double 
transformation’ exploded into the largest anti-government demonstrations in the brief 
history of Hungarian democracy. Yet, despite lacking popular support for further 
‘structural reforms’ and increasing signs of economic turbulence ahead, the socialist-liberal 
government in Budapest, led by Ferenc Gyurcsány, decided to push ahead with further 
‘structural reforms’.  
 
 
From ‘Poster Boy’ of Neoliberal Transformation to ‘Basket Case’: 
Hungary and the Global Economic Crisis 
Turning our attention to contemporary events, Chapter 6 analysed the impact of the current 
global economic crisis on the Hungarian political economy. Following a critical review of 
dominant narratives of Hungary’s crisis in the literature, we dismissed the view, 
popularised by the political Right, neo-conservative intellectuals, and sections of the 
Hungarian capitalist class, that the country’s vulnerability to the crisis was the fault of 
‘corrupt politicians’ and/or ‘greedy bankers’ associated with the ruling MSZP-SZDSZ 
coalition. Nor was it, we argued, due to a ‘lack of regulatory oversight’ or ‘bad 
government policies’, as argued by international and regional financial institutions or a 
plethora of renowned neoliberal and institutionalist economists in both Hungary and 
abroad. Drawing on central concepts of Marxist political economy, we argued instead that 
the current crisis constituted a ‘crisis in neoliberal capitalism’ on a global level, although 
not a ‘crisis of Western-style [neoliberal] capitalism’, as claimed by some influential 
thinkers on the Left, such as Iván Szelényi, as well as the political Right, including, most 
famously, the current Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orbán.  
 
With an economy highly reliant on foreign capital and dependent on exports, we argued 
that the Hungarian economy was in a precarious position already before the onset of the 
crisis. As the global economic crisis expanded outwards from the United States, the 
‘heartland’ of neoliberal capitalism, following the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage 
market in 2007, the Hungarian economy was hit in two waves: first, following the 
‘financial tsunami’ that hit the global economy after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
 263 
September 2008. This triggered a global credit-crunch, which by October 2008 had 
evolved into a sovereign debt crisis, after international investors speculatively sold 
Hungarian government bonds and the value of the forint depreciated sharply against the 
Euro and other major currencies. The government eventually averted bankruptcy after 
receiving a bailout of US$ 25.1 billion from international lenders (including the IMF, 
World Bank, and the EU). Second, as the financial crisis spread to the ‘real economy’, 
leading to a destructive downward spiral of declining levels of trade, which impacted 
negatively on production and employment. Although not as bad as the Baltic States, which 
suffered the worst recessions in the EU, the Hungarian economy was nonetheless badly 
afflicted by the global recession, with GDP contracting by 6.8 percent in 2009. This was 
worse than the performance of other ‘Visegrád states’ (the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Slovakia), and also poorer than such advanced capitalist economies as the United States, 
Germany, and Japan.  
 
The negative impact of the crisis was exacerbated by another round of austerity measures, 
introduced in 2009 by the semi-technocratic Bajnai government, in the hope that this 
would ‘rebalance’ the Hungarian economy and enable the country to regain its ‘credibility’ 
among foreign investors. By 2010, public anger and disillusionment with the existing state 
of affairs was near total, with surveys indicating a low level of support for ‘the triple 
shibboleth’991 of free-market capitalism, parliamentary democracy, and the ‘West’. At the 
same time, support for the parties of the socialist-liberal coalition, which had been in 
power since 2002, was at an all-time low, while paramilitary groups connected to the 
fascist Jobbik party were marching up and down the country, calling for ‘radical change’ 
(radikális változást), while terrorising ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, ‘liberals’ and 
‘communists’. The economic crisis in Hungary was thus turning into from what Gramsci 
described as a ‘crisis of authority’, or an ‘organic crisis’.  
 
It is within this context that the ascendancy of the Orbán regime needs to be situated. Since 
being catapulted back into power in 2010, the national-conservative government led by 
Viktor Orbán has implemented a number of policies that have raised eyebrows among 
foreign investors, policymakers, and pundits in both Hungary and abroad, including the 
refusal to implement further austerity measures as dictated by the IMF, the imposition of 
                                                
991 Tamás, ‘Counter-revolution against a counter-revolution’.  
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‘crisis taxes’ on banks, energy, telecommunications, and large retail firms (most of whom 
are foreign owned), the placement of loyal party apparatchiks in the upper echelons of 
power, the passing of a new media law curtailing the freedom of the press, and, finally, the 
introduction of a new, legally problematic and socially regressive constitution. However, 
in contrast with those commentators, on both sides of the political spectrum, that have 
perceived the Orbán regime as a ‘deviation’ from the neoliberal consensus, we argued that 
it represented an emblematic case of a wider shift towards ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’992 
globally. Thus, the chief aim of the Orbán regime was not only the reordering of the 
Hungarian economy under the auspices of ‘populist’ policies or the curtailment of 
democracy, but to fundamentally transform Hungarian society through the means of 
‘work’, ‘law and order’, and ‘family’, in order to overcome the structural problems of 
Hungarian capitalism and promote the development of a strong, entrepreneurial middle 
class supportive of national-conservative values. Although our analysis was limited (due to 
the still ongoing nature of the current crisis), our general assessment was that, until now, 
the Orbán regime had been relatively successful in achieving its objective. 
 
 
The Relevance and Limitations of the Thesis and Suggestions for Further 
Research 
By drawing on central concepts within Marxist political economy, in particular the theory 
of state capitalism, as well as a number of semi-structured interviews with Hungarian 
sources and critical text analysis of primary and secondary material on the transformation, 
this thesis has sought to offer a way to overcome the deeper theoretical, methodological, 
and empirical shortcomings shared by much of the transformatology literature. The 
account provided above thus necessitates a fundamental rethinking of dominant 
conceptualisations and periodisations of the transformation in CEE. While acknowledging 
that important economic, political, and social changes did take place in 1989, the origins of 
the ‘transition’ needs to be pushed back to the immediate years following the global 
economic crisis of 1973. The ‘double transformation’ in Hungary and elsewhere in the 
region in 1989 was not the victory of one system over another (‘East’ vs. ‘West’, 
‘communism’ vs. ‘capitalism’, etc.), but rather the outcome of a wider shift in capitalist 
world economy, from state-led capitalism towards neoliberal capitalism. While external 
                                                
992 Bruff, ‘The Rise of Authoritarian Neoliberalism’. For similar assessments with regard to CEE, see Dale 
and Hardy, ‘Conclusion: The “Crash” in Central Eastern Europe’, pp. 258-261; Zizek, ‘The Deadlock’. 
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forces and pressures were a major driving force in this process, domestic actors played a 
key role in ensuring that the ‘right medicine’ was prescribed to the ailing Hungarian 
economy. 
 
However, as we acknowledged in the Introduction, given the large historical scope of this 
thesis, there are certainly limitations to the thesis, while a number of issues call for further 
exploration. To begin with, in explaining the ascendancy of ‘proto-neoliberalism’ in late-
Kádárist Hungary, we focused primarily on the pressures stemming from economic and 
geopolitical competition between East and West, and domestic calls for economic and 
political reform, while paying little or no attention to how wider processes of class struggle 
globally and between different ‘fractions’ of capital in dominant states of the world system 
influenced the behaviour of Hungarian policymakers. An analysis of these processes would 
arguably be helpful in explaining how, under which conditions, and with what methods 
neoliberal transformation was effectively realised. Moreover, although we have made 
some reference in passim to neoliberal transformations elsewhere in the world, this thesis 
has focused on Hungary as a paradigmatic case of neoliberal transformation in CEE. 
Exploring the similarities and difference with other ‘paths to neoliberalism’993 (to borrow 
the title of Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas and Sarah L. Babb’s oft-cited article), deserves 
much further scholarly attention. For example, what does the example of Hungary tell us 
about the role of the labour movement and the political Left (from ‘New Labour’ and 
social democracy, through ‘reform communist’ parties, to the radical Left) in the 
development of neoliberalism? Or what does the current crisis (and the political responses 
to it) in Hungary tell us about the future direction of neoliberal capitalism and the 
possibility for progressive movements of resistance to develop? Having said this, it is our 
hope that this thesis might stimulate further research into these areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
993 Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, ‘Rebirth of the Liberal Creed’, pp. 533-579. 
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